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Abstract 
Many Public-Private Partnership Projects (PPPs) have failed because of risks occurring 
during operation and earlier studies have demonstrated a need for risk assessment and 
allocation methods for PPPs. Although researchers have been working in this area for years, 
the amount of empirical work is limited, especially when applied to developing countries, 
particularly to Vietnamese PPPs. This research attempts to design a framework using 
quantitative methods. Besides, qualitative methods are also used as supportive methods. The 
framework is proposed to identify risks, allocate risks, evaluate the project’s riskiness and 
return, and optimize concession parameters. The proposed framework is based on two 
fundamental theories which are Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Risk Adjusted 
Decoupled Net Present Value (Risk Adjusted DNPV).  
In AHP, the subjective evaluations are converted into numerical values and analysed to rank 
each alternative on a numerical scale. A pairwise comparison is then applied to the 
alternatives regarding specific criteria. Mathematical analysis is then used to create a 
comprehensive comparison of alternatives. Therefore, in this framework, first, critical risks 
are identified and evaluated based on their probability of occurrence and the degree of 
impact. After that, AHP is used to evaluate alternatives’ (projects) riskiness. In addition, AHP 
is used to allocate critical identified risks with regards to the ability criteria of each party.  
Risk adjusted DNPV in this framework is used to evaluate returns of the projects and to 
optimize the concession parameters. Currently, Net Present Value method (NPV) is being 
widely used to evaluate projects’ returns because of its simplicity to investors. In the NPV 
method, risks are accounted for by adjusting a “risk-free rate” to form a risk-adjusted 
discount rate (RADR), and then the RADR is used to devalue cash flow with time. However, 
it has been argued that time and risk are different variables, and they should be separated in 
evaluating projects, otherwise evaluation errors can be generated, especially for projects 
which require long-term investment. PPPs typically demand long-term investments. 
Consequently, PPPs should be an environment in which the limitations of NPV are exposed. 
To minimize the limitations of NPV, Risk Adjusted Decoupled Net Present Value method 
(Risk Adjusted DNVP) has been developed as a new tool to assess projects. In Risk Adjusted 
DNVP, risks are decoupled from the time value, and they are quantified and treated as a cost 
to the project. Nevertheless, Risk Adjusted DNVP has not been applied to the area of PPPs. 
Therefore, this research attempts to use DNPV to evaluate projects’ returns, and to optimize 
concession parameters.  
This research also clarifies how the public and private sector can use the proposed 
framework. Case studies from five Vietnamese PPPs will be shown in the thesis to 
demonstrate the proposed framework.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
Risks can be found everywhere.  In normal events in daily life we have to manage risks to 
survive. Indeed, mankind has attempted to manage risks in a number of fields of life. In the 
field of the construction industry, risk management has been an interesting area of research 
for years because of its influence on the time and cost of projects (Akintoye et al. 1997).  
The construction industry often faces a number of unexpected situations. Hence, in 
comparison with other industries, the construction industry has been plagued by risk more 
than others (Carr & Tah, 2001).  As Lam et al. (2007) said, there is no construction project 
which is risk-free. 
In respect of public-private partnership (PPP) projects, there are a number of definitions of 
PPP. For example, Boussabaine (2007, p.4) defined PPP as: “A generic term for the 
relationships formed between the private sector and public bodies often with the aim of 
introducing private sector resources and/or expertise in order to help provide and deliver 
public sector assets and services. The term PPP is used to describe a wide variety of 
working arrangements from loose, informal and strategic partnerships to design, build, 
finance and operate (DBFO) type service contracts and formal joint venture companies”. 
The World Bank (2012, p.11) defined this type of project as: “A long-term contract 
between a private party and a government agency, for providing a public asset or service, 
in which the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility”. Although 
the definition of PPP varies, they are all centred on the concept of risk (Boussabaine, 
2013).  
In fact, risk management in PPP construction projects has been attracting researchers 
because of their distinguishing characteristics.  In practice, the PPP form is used to 
combine competitive advantages and flexible negotiations, and to apportion risk 
appropriately with an agreement between the public and private sectors (Li et al. 2005).  
However, many PPP projects have failed because of risks (Kwak et al. 2009). 
Vietnam, like other countries in Asia, has experienced rapid economic development in 
recent years which has increased the demand for investment in infrastructure systems 
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(Thomas et al. 2003).  However, the massive need to deliver transport infrastructure has put 
a strain on budgets of the Vietnamese government. Consequently, PPPs are becoming 
inevitable in Vietnam.  PPP construction projects in Vietnam may also have to face many 
risks associated with PPPs in other nations. Thus, similarly to PPPs in other countries, 
effective management of risks can be seen as the core centre to achieve success of PPPs in 
Vietnam.  
For that reason, the current research attempts to propose a framework which can assist 
practitioners in Vietnam to effectively evaluate risks in PPPs in the transport sector. The 
framework is a combination of previous models which have been applied in international 
contexts. One of these models (AHP) was adopted and specialized for the new purpose in a 
new market, while the other model (DNPV) was developed in this research to be a more 
effective model (Risk Adjusted DNPV) in order to be applicable to the PPPs in the 
transport sector in Vietnam. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
At present, researchers have been exploring risk management in PPP projects through 
various avenues.  This includes research on using different technical methods and studying 
different types of risks such as, different attitudes, occupational risk assessment, or 
relational risk management (Boussabaine, 2007; Demirag et al. 2010; Ebrahimnejad et al. 
2010). Other studies also have focused on risk acceptance criteria and early warning 
systems research, etc. (Zhaoa et al. 2011).  Although there have been a number of studies 
attempting to assist practitioners to manage risks in international contexts, there is very 
limited research into the risk area in Vietnamese PPPs (Toan, 2008; Dong, 2009). In 
fact, although some researchers carried out studies on Vietnamese PPPs, their research 
just focused on identifying critical risks rather than actually proposing methods to 
evaluate them (Toan, 2008; Huyen, 2013; Parliament of Vietnam, 2013). 
Besides, the previous research in Vietnam in PPPs has not focused on the transport 
sector (Toan, 2008), while the number of Vietnamese transport projects which have 
been conducted under PPP forms has been increasing (MOT, 2015). More details about 
the increasing number and the need of PPPs in the transport sector in Vietnam will be 
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shown in chapter 2. Therefore, PPPs have not only delivered outstanding outputs in 
terms of transportation infrastructure, but also have demonstrated a need of further 
research in this area.  
Importantly, previous research mainly focuses on a single aspect of the risk management 
process rather than on the framework (Leidel et al. 2010). Besides, from the literature 
review (see chapters 3, 4, and 5), it can be seen that current methods to evaluate projects’ 
riskiness, to allocate risks, to evaluate projects’ return, and to determine the concession 
period have limitations. From this point of view, the research is expected to develop a 
useful and practical framework for risk evaluation in PPP construction projects in 
Vietnam.  Basically, the framework is based on risk identification, risk allocation based on 
AHP, project’s riskiness evaluation based on AHP, return evaluation and concession period 
determination by Risk Adjusted DNPV. The details of these concepts will be provided in 
the following chapters.  
1.3.  Research Rationale and Significance  
As mentioned, by doing this research, a practical framework to evaluate risks in PPPs in 
Vietnamese PPPs was proposed and tested. The research will add to the knowledge in the 
area of risk management both in terms of theory and practice. More specifically, this 
research will add theoretical knowledge to the area as previous models are adopted, 
specialized, and developed to overcome their limitations. For example, AHP is expected to 
be able to assist practitioners in evaluating project riskiness, and to be able to help 
practitioners allocate risks with regards to selected criteria. It should be noted that, AHP 
was not developed, but it was adopted and specialized for the new purposes which are 
riskiness evaluation and risk allocation, and for a new market which is the transport sector 
in Vietnam.  Importantly, models to evaluate project returns and determine the concession 
period were also developed. In terms of practice, the results of this research project can 
bring advantages to the Vietnamese public and private sectors and improve the operation of 
PPP construction projects as it is focused on the Vietnamese market. Moreover, although 
this research project focuses on the Vietnamese construction industry, the results should 
be useful not only in this country, but also in other countries, particularly developing 
countries in South East Asia. 
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1.4. The Aim and Objectives of the Research  
1.4.1. Aim of the Research 
The aim of the research is to propose a framework to effectively evaluate risks in PPPs 
in the transport sector in Vietnam. The proposed framework is expected to be able to assist 
practitioners in identifying and assessing critical risks. It also is expected to be able to 
evaluate projects in regards to critical risks. The proposed framework also aims at being 
able to allocate risks based on selected criteria. Furthermore, it is also aims to be able to 
effectively evaluate project returns and optimize the concession parameters. 
1.4.2. Objectives of the Research 
In order to fulfil the aim of the research, the following objectives are proposed:  
 Review research in risk in PPPs in international contexts. 
 Review research in risk in construction areas and in PPPs in Vietnam. 
 Identify possible risks which can happen in Vietnamese PPPs in the transport 
sector. 
 Identify reasonable methods to assess risks. 
 Understand clearly the seriousness of critical risks. 
 Review possible methods to evaluate projects to critique and develop reasonable 
methods to evaluate PPPs in the transport sector in Vietnam. 
 Review current methods of allocating risks in PPPs to propose a more effective 
method to allocate risks in PPPs in the transport sector in Vietnam. 
 Review current methods in evaluating project returns to propose a more effective 
method to evaluate returns of PPPs in the transport sector in Vietnam. 
 Review current methods in optimizing concession parameters of PPP, to propose 
a more effective method to evaluate returns of PPPs in the transport sector in 
Vietnam. 
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1.5. Research Questions 
In order to fill the gaps mentioned in the problem statement section, several research 
questions need to be answered. These questions are: 
 What are the most critical risks in PPPs in the transport sector in Vietnam? 
 What is the suitable method to identify and assess critical risks in PPPs in the 
transport sector in Vietnam? 
 Are there significant differences between perceptions of the private sector and the 
public sector about critical risks in PPPs in the transport sector in Vietnam?  
 What is the method which can evaluate project’s riskiness? 
 What is the method which can effectively allocate risks in PPPs in the transport 
sector in Vietnam with respect to the provided criteria? 
 What is the effective method to evaluate returns in PPPs in the transport sector in 
Vietnam? 
 What is the effective method to determine the concession period for PPPs in the 
transport sector in Vietnam? 
 How can we combine different effective methods in a framework to evaluate risks 
in PPPs in the transport sector in Vietnam? 
1.6. Research Hypotheses 
Before conducting the research, the following hypotheses are made:  
H1. There are significant differences between perceptions of the public sector and the 
private sector about the criticality of risks. (Hypothesis was tested based on the findings 
provided in chapter 8). 
H2. The proposed framework can evaluate projects with regards to critical risks by 
applying a model based on AHP (Hypothesis was tested based on the findings provided 
in chapter 9). 
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H3. Risk allocation strategies with regards to selected criteria can be found by using the 
proposed framework applied to allocation model based on AHP. (Hypothesis was tested 
based on the findings provided in chapter 9). 
H4. Projects are more beneficial in the proposed framework’s evaluation than in 
traditional NPV evaluation. (Hypothesis was tested based on the findings provided in 
chapter 10). 
H5. The proposed framework using Risk Adjusted DNPV is more effective than NPV in 
evaluating project returns and therefore in optimizing the concession parameters. 
(Hypothesis was tested based on the findings provided in chapter 10). 
1.7. Scope of the Research 
Since risk in PPPs is an enormous area for researchers to study and there are a number of 
risk evaluation frameworks which contain a number of elements, the scope of this research 
is centred on the following aspects: 
 Research only focuses on PPPs in the transport sector in Vietnam. More specifically, 
highway, national road and bridge PPP projects. 
 The framework only focuses on main components, namely, Risk Identification and 
Assessment, Project’ riskiness Evaluation, Risk Allocation, Return Evaluation, and 
Concession Determination. 
1.8. Overview of Methodology 
This section provides an overview of the methodology applied in this research. The details 
of the methodology are demonstrated in chapter 7.  
Fundamentally, quantitative approaches were applied with necessary supports of 
qualitative methods. Literature about risk in PPPs was reviewed (see chapters 3, 4, 5). By 
reviewing these previous studies, first, possible risks in Vietnamese PPPs were identified, 
and an assessment method was also proposed. Secondly, the literature review was also 
applied to identify current methods to evaluate projects’ riskiness and to allocate risks, 
hence the literature was critiqued regarding their strengths and weakness. From here, 
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models to evaluate projects’ riskiness and to allocate risks were formed. Similarly, the 
literature review also provides a critique of current methods used to evaluate project 
returns and to determine the concession period. By critiquing these models, new models 
were developed, and combined to propose a risk evaluation framework (see chapter 6).  
Data collection was done by questionnaires, interviews and a case study. More specifically, 
data for identifying risks, evaluating riskiness of the project, and allocating risks was 
collected from questionnaires and interviews. Data for models of evaluating project returns 
and the concession period was collected from the case study. Data then was analysed by 
selected methods (see chapter 7) together with software namely, SPSS, Easyfit, and 
Microsoft Excel. Findings were then discussed in relation to the hypotheses in order to 
provide conclusions. 
1.9. Thesis Outline 
Figure 1.1 shows the outline of the research. In the figure, each chapter is illustrated with 
their order and relation to other chapters.  
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Figure 1. 1 Structure of Thesis 
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Chapter 1: This chapter provides basic information about the research. Information such 
as the research area focused, research aim, objectives, research questions and research 
hypotheses are highlighted.  
Chapter 2: An overview of the Vietnamese PPPs market is illustrated. The development of 
this market is provided with a specific focus on the transport sector.  
Chapter 3: This chapter reviews the risk management in PPPs and related research about 
this area. By the end of this chapter, the researcher has come up with a list of possible risks 
in Vietnamese PPPs, a method of assessing these risks, and components of the proposed 
risk evaluation framework. 
Chapter 4: A review of the application of AHP in PPPs area is provided. By the end of 
this review, a conclusion is made that AHP will be used to evaluate the riskiness of the 
project and to allocate risk.  
Chapter 5: Current methods which have been used to evaluate project returns and to 
determine the concession period are reviewed. By the end of this chapter, an idea of using 
a new method in the proposed framework to evaluate returns and the concession period is 
made.  
Chapter 6: The proposed risk evaluation framework is illustrated in detail. Information of 
how to apply the framework in practice is demonstrated.  
Chapter 7: The research methodology is shown. Research methods and techniques which 
were used to carry out the research are demonstrated.  
Chapter 8: Information about uncovering the critical risks in Vietnamese PPP is provided. 
Risk scores, risk ranking and the significant differences between perceptions of the public 
sector and the private sector are also highlighted.  
Chapter 9: The findings about the application of AHP models in evaluating project 
riskiness and in allocating risks are provided.  
Chapter 10: The findings about the application of risk adjusted DNPV models in 
evaluating project returns and in determining the concession period are illustrated.  
Chapter 11: The findings provided in chapters 8, 9, 10 are discussed with research 
hypotheses, and with findings from previous studies. Compatibility and incompatibility of 
related research are also highlighted.  
Chapter 12: This chapter shows the conclusion of the research. In addition, limitations of 
the current research are also revealed. Additionally, directions for future research are also 
recommended. 
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC – PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS 
IN VIETNAM 
2.1. Introduction 
The focus of this research is on Vietnamese PPPs in the transport sector. Therefore, this 
chapter aims to provide basic information about the market in Vietnam. Firstly, the 
overview of the macro-economic environment is provided in order to assist the reader 
understanding the economic situation of Vietnam in recent years. Secondly, the progress of 
investment in the infrastructure system in Vietnam is demonstrated to show the need of 
participation of the private sector in this area. Thirdly, more information about Vietnamese 
PPPs’ investment and PPPs in the transport sector will be illustrated.  
2.2. Outline of Macro-economic Environment  
Vietnam still remains a poor country with a population of over 90 million. However, this 
country has made impressive progress in recent years.  According to BTI (2014), the 
percentage of the population living under the poverty line was 28.9 percent in 2002, and 
this number decreased by more than half to 14.2 percent in 2010, and further declined to 
12.6 percent in 2012. However, BTI (2014) noted that the number may be underestimated. 
Table 2.1 reveals the main economic indicators in recent years.  
Table 2. 1 Main economic indicators (World Bank, 2013) 
Economic Indicator 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GDP (£M) 63828.59 69901.74 81233.28 93049.09 
GDP growth (%) 5.3 6.8 6.0 5.0 
Inflation (CPI) (%) 7.1 8.9 21.3 9.1 
Export growth (%) 11.1 14.7 12.2 11 
Import 141669.1growth (%) 6.7 14.1 3.5 9.7 
Public debt (% of GDP) 51.2 54.0 50.8 52.1 
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 6.3 6.5 6.5 5.4 
It can be recognized that, in recent years, the GDP growth rate of Vietnam has been around 
6.0 percent. It increased from 5.3 percent in 2009 to 6.8 percent in 2010, and then 
gradually decreased to 6.0 percent in 2011 and to 5.0 percent in 2012. Another remarkable 
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point from table 2.1 is the fluctuation of the inflation rate. The inflation rate went up from 
7.1 percent in 2009 to 8.9 percent in 2010. This number then reaches the peak of 18.7 
percent in 2011 before being brought under control to go down to 9.1 percent in 2012. The 
public debt was around 51 percent over the observed period.  
In Vietnam, 43 percent of employment in the informal sector is in the manufacturing and 
construction area, 31 percent in trade and 26 percent in services. It should be noted that 
state-owned enterprises account for approximately 40 percent of the economic output of 
the country. The number of private companies in the top 500 largest companies in Vietnam 
increased from 103 in 2007 to 225 in 2012. However, BTI (2014) stated that barriers to the 
development of the private sector still remain significant. IMF (2012) observed that since 
2012 the economy has begun to stabilize after the negative economic situation in 2010 and 
2011. Nevertheless, significant vulnerabilities still continue. Therefore, the first priority of 
the Vietnamese government in the next few years will still be to stabilise the economy. The 
IMF (2012) also forecasted that due to the tight macroeconomic policies to stabilize the 
economy, the growth rate might slow down. 
Table 2. 2 Number of registered contractors and breakdown by capital size (IMF, 2012) 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of registered contractors 23403 31584 39777 48753 
Breakdown of registered contractor by size classification 
Largest (14.66 £ mil. and over) 103 133 305 514 
2nd Largest (from 5.87 to 14.66 £ mil.) 224 255 681 875 
3rd Largest (from 1.47 to 5.87 £ mil.) 768 878 2576 3392 
4th Largest (from 0.29 to 1.47 £ mil.) 3163 5371 9195 14426 
5th Largest (from 0.145 - 0.29 £ mil.) 3677 5855 9268 10182 
Under 0.14 £ mil. 15468 19092 17752 19346 
Regarding the construction industry, figures indicate that this industry has been steadily 
developing. Table 2.2 presents the development of registered contractors from 2008 to 
2011 by capital size. From this table, it can be seen that the number of registered 
contractors more than doubled from over 23,000 units in 2008 to over 48,000 units in 
2011. The increase is also represented in all sizes of the organization (Mai and Van, 2012). 
In fact, the statistics do not only increase in terms of the number of firms, but also increase 
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with regards to the productivity in the construction area. The cost of construction also 
widely fluctuated during the period from 2008 to 2011. This was the effect of the 
fluctuation of the general product prices and the construction material prices. According to 
Mai and Van (2012), the construction materials’ CPI went up from 12.58 percent in 2009 
to 15.74 percent and 17.29 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively.  
2.3. Infrastructure Investment in Vietnam 
2.3.1. General 
As a result of the development of the economy, the level of investment into the 
infrastructure system has also been increasing. Figure 2.1 displays the investment in the 
infrastructure in Vietnam by sector as the percentage of GDP and it also illustrates the 
value of the investment by sector. 
Figure 2. 1 Infrastructure Investment in Vietnam as the percentage of GDP (Thanh and Dapice, 2009) 
 
 
 
Since 2001, the investment/GDP ratio increased gradually. It stood at around 6 percent in 
2001 and increased to over 12 percent in 2007. The figure also highlights that the transport 
and communication system demonstrates the highest development. More specifically, in 
1995 only more than 0.5 billion pounds was spent to improve the transport and 
communication system. However, this number went up steadily to more than 2 billion 
pounds in 2007 (Thanh and Dapice, 2009). 
According to ADB (2013), the level of local and paved roads in Vietnam increased from 
47.6 percent of the road network in 2007 to 85 percent of the network in 2013.  Nhi (2014) 
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observed more specifically to illustrate that around 43 percent of the road network is in 
good quality while 37 percent of them are considered to be in standard condition, and the 
rest are in a poor condition. It is also noted that provincial and local roads are worse than 
national roads as many of them are vulnerable to harmful weather conditions.  
Other than road network, Vietnam has also made significant investment in other 
infrastructure networks. For example, significant efforts have been made to upgrade, repair 
and maintain the railways that have been built in the last decade. Another remarkable effort 
in developing the railway system is to build the high-speed train network that was planned 
in 2012. However, this master plan is still struggling with the issue of how to attract 
external financial resources. Currently, there is no deep-water port in Vietnam, and the 
effort of planning to build a deep-water port is also a notable factor to improve the 
infrastructure system. The Vietnamese government has also attempted to upgrade the 
airport system. Recent developments of Noi Bai, Da Nang, Tan Son Nhat, and Dong Nai 
airports have highlighted this effort. Furthermore, the energy system is also the area that 
investors both from the public sector and the private sector have been investing in. For 
example, the investment has been made to fulfil the dramatic increase of energy 
consumption from 98 KWh in 1990 to 1,035 KWh per capita in 2010. It is forecasted that 
the demand for energy increase is around 15 percent annually, and it is not any easy task 
for the country’s government to service this increasing demand (Nhi, 2014). 
2.3.2. Need of Infrastructure Investment 
Although Vietnam has achieved a number of impressive developments regarding the 
infrastructure, experts still criticize that the infrastructure system in Vietnam remains in a 
poor condition, failing to support the high demand of the economy and social development 
(IMF, 2014). In fact, the insufficient infrastructure system is considered as one of the most 
serious reasons holding back the development of the economy and society (Giang and 
Pheng, 2015). Figure 2.2 discloses the ranking of the general quality of the infrastructure in 
Asian countries, while figure 2.3 demonstrates the quality of transport sectors in 
comparison with other Asian countries. As can be seen from figure 2.2 that the general 
quality of the Vietnamese infrastructure system is in the second last position, and its 
ranking is just higher than the rate for Indonesia. Similar situations are given when it 
 14 
 
comes to the transport sector, and this is illustrated in figure 2.3. In road, railway, port and 
airport areas, the rates for Vietnam are always near the bottom of the table (Toan, 2008). It 
should be noted that the red vertical line is to demonstrate the average score of 125 
countries observed. Thus, the quality of the Vietnamese infrastructure system is under the 
average point. 
Figure 2. 2 General Infrastructure Quality Comparison (World Competitiveness Report 2006-2007) 
 
Figure 2. 3 Transport Infrastructure Quality Comparison (World Competitiveness Report, 2006-2007; 
Toan, 2008) 
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Together with the insufficient quality of the system, the dramatic increasing of demand is 
also the fundamental motivation for investing in the infrastructure system. For example, 
the economic growth has resulted in a significant increase in demand for electricity in 
Vietnam. It is measured that the average electricity demand growth is around 16 percent 
annually. In fact, the insufficiency of the electricity capacity has led to power cuts and 
electricity imports from China. It is estimated that in order to afford this increasing 
demand, the government of Vietnam should spend approximately £2.6 billion a year. In 
terms of the water sector, it is reported that safe drinking water has not yet been delivered 
to most of Vietnam’s population. In terms of the water sector, it is reported that safe 
drinking water has not yet been delivered to most of Vietnam’s population. Although it is 
estimated that around 60 percent –70 percent of citizens in major cities and 50 percent in 
medium-size provinces and around 30 percent in small provinces have access to water 
services. It is also estimated that in order to satisfy the water consumption in the two 
biggest cities, namely Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh, $2 billion needs to be invested (ADB, 
2012).  
In terms of the transport sector, it is highly likely that this is the sector requiring the biggest 
budget for improvement. Vietnam has shown rapid growth of transportation demand in 
recent years. It has been observed that the share of investment for the transport sector alone 
in the total budget for the infrastructure system has been rising in comparison with other 
sectors. The investment for upgrading the national highways for 2002–2010 was estimated 
to take around £5.7 billion from the country’s budget. In fact, from 2005-2015, it has been 
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estimated that £11.8 billion has been mobilized to invest in the transport systems in Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City. For others transport routes, around £34 billion has been spent from 
2010 to 2015 (Mekong Research Infrastructure Development, 2010). The port subsector 
also requires investment as the consequence of having no deep-water ports has led to 
higher ship transportation costs in comparison with other countries in the area. For 
example, ship transport in Vietnam is estimated to increase £1.1 billion per year because 
goods have to be transported through Singapore and Hong Kong (ibid.). Similarly, nearly 
£3.3 billion is needed to improve the railway system from 2011 to 2020, whereas the 
airport subsector requires nearly £1 billion to upgrade at the current time (ADB, 2012). 
Figure 2.4 presents the general picture of the forecasted demand for the transport sector 
beginning in 2030. In general, the growth rate of the rate of good transport demand is 
approximately 7.3 percent annually over the observed period, while the demand for 
passenger transport is round 12 percent annually (Dien, 2011). Figure displays that for 
good transport, the maritime is the transport mode in which the demand for good transport 
has been increasing at the highest levels, followed by the railway and road subsectors. In 
contrast, the road subsector is the area that has been showing the rapidest speed of growth, 
followed by the railway subsector, while figures show that the demand for the maritime 
subsector is in fact not significant. This is consistent with the observation that the number 
of vehicles has been increasing by 19-21 percent annually (Mekong Research 
Infrastructure Development, 2010). 
Figure 2. 4 Transport Demand Forecasts (Dien, 2011) 
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The breakdown of investment requirements necessary to develop the transport 
infrastructure system up until 2020 is presented in Table 2.3. In this table, roads and 
railway subsectors require the highest budget and the budget for Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City are much higher in comparison to requirements for other places. In contrast, sea 
transport, internal marine transport and airport subsectors require much lower investment. 
This plan is, in fact, consistent with the growth of each subsector as disclosed in figure 2.4.  
Table 2. 3 Transport Infrastructure Investment Requirements (Toan, 2008) 
                   £ Billion 
Type of Transport Infrastructure  
2002-
2010 
2011-
2020 
Annual Average 
1. Road 7.22 9.64 0.94 
Highway 1.66 4.65 0.35 
National Roads 4.09 3.67 0.43 
regional Roads 1.47 1.32 0.15 
2. Railway 6.42 11.55 1.00 
High Railway 5.99 10.61 0.92 
Normal Railway 0.43 0.94 0.08 
3. Sea transport infrastructure 0.60 1.91 0.14 
4. Internal Water transport infrastructure  0.14 0.13 0.01 
5. Air transport 0.52 1.07 0.09 
6. Transport in Hanoi and HCM city 5.75 12.69 1.01 
Roads 3.80 6.50 0.57 
Railway 1.66 5.68 0.41 
Supporting transport 0.29 0.26 0.03 
7. Rural road 2.54 2.28 0.27 
Total 23.18 39.01 3.46 
This rapid increase of transport demand has led to good opportunities for development of 
the transport sector, but also resulted in significant challenges for the budget of the 
Vietnamese government. As a result, a variety of financial resources have been sought out 
in order to meet the investment demand. The following section will clarify the main 
financial resources that Vietnam has been mobilizing to invest in the infrastructure system.   
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2.3.3. Sources of Infrastructure Investment  
According to Nhi (2014), infrastructure capital comes from three main sources, namely, the 
public sector, private sector’s investment and user charges, and loans and grants from 
international organizations. More specifically, the government budget accounts for 28 
percent of the investment, while the private sector and user charges are responsible for 35 
percent of capital, and the remaining 37 percent comes from loans and grants from 
overseas organizations. It is also noted that the capital from the government and overseas 
organizations is declining and the capital from the private sector is rising. The break down 
structure of financial sources for the Vietnamese infrastructure system is revealed in figure 
2.5. This figure shows that the government budget accounts for only 11 percent, while the 
remaining 17 percent comes from mobilization. The one percent from the community 
reflects that local people finance the infrastructure system using their own money. For 
example, they can mobilize finances to build water supply systems in some rural areas.  
Figure 2. 5 Infrastructure financing mechanism (World Bank, 2010) 
 
More specifically, the infrastructure financing mechanism by sectors is shown in table 2.4. 
It can be recognized that the transport sector achieves the highest numbers. It also should 
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Table 2. 4 Infrastructure Financing Mechanism by Sector by percentage of GDP (Nhi, 2014) 
Financial Source Transport Electricity Telecom Water Total 
Users 
 
0.9 0.3 0.1 1.3 
ODA 1.7 1.2 0.3 0.3 3.5 
Budget 0.8 0.1 
 
0.1 1 
Government Bonds 1.2 
   
1.2 
SOCBs 0.1 
 
0.2 
 
0.3 
Private 0.2 1.2 0.6 
 
2 
Community 
   
0.1 0.1 
Total 4 3.4 1.4 0.6 9.4 
 
Comparing the movement of the financing sources, it can be realized that the budget from 
the government for infrastructure investment has been decreasing. Table 2.5 compares the 
general statistics about the financing mechanism in 2000 and 2008. Statistics illustrate that 
the state’s budget decreased by around 50 percent over 8 years, while the finance from 
non-state sources increased by nearly 7 times. Similarly, it can be also seen that FDI 
financing increased by about 8 times over this period.  
Table 2. 5 Infrastructure Financing Mechanism by Sector (%) (Nhi, 2014) 
Type of Infrastructure 
2000 2008 
State None-State FDI State None-State FDI 
Transport 92.17 4.84 2.98 49.7 31.66 18.63 
Electricity, gas 16.67 50.9 32.43 48.85 9.69 41.46 
Water 96.6 0.56 2.84 15.51 25.18 59.32 
Communication 
Services 
95.67 0.09 4.25 35.08 44.65 20.27 
From the above-summarized statistics, it can be recognized that private finance has become 
an essential financial source to develop the Vietnamese infrastructure system. However, 
Vietnam has been facing difficulties in attracting this type of finance. According to the 
World Bank (2007), private fund managers are still more interested in investing in other 
sectors such as consumer products, financial markets, and real estate etc. rather than the 
infrastructure sector.  
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2.4. PPP Investment in Vietnam 
2.4.1. Infrastructure PPP Investment 
Recognizing the important role of the private investors in developing the infrastructure 
system, the government of Vietnam has been building the legal framework to encourage 
the participation of this sector since 1987. In 1987, with Foreign Investment Law, the 
government clarified the participation of foreign investors in Vietnam, and this led the 
foundation to issue Decree 87/ND-CP in 23
rd
 of November, 1993 to legalize the investment 
mechanism for BOT projects. In the following years, they issued other important 
documents namely, 77/ND-CP, 62/1998/ND-CP, 78/2007/ND-CP, 108/2009/ND-CP, and 
71/2010/QD-CP. However, these documents have been criticized in that they do not make 
the distinction between different types of PPP investments, and this creates confusion for 
investors. In order to overcome this problem, the Vietnamese government has recently 
issued Decree 15/2015/ND-CP and Decree 30/2015/ND-CP. In the one hand, Decree 
15/2015/ND-CP clarifies the areas of PPP investment, conditions, procedures, the 
mechanism of management of government budget in implementing PPPs, the promotion 
mechanism for PPPs, and the responsibility distribution mechanism.  On the other hand, 
Decree 30/2015/ND-CP clarifies the mechanism to select investors in PPPs. These new 
documents are expected to improve the PPPs’ environment in Vietnam.  
Currently, Vietnamese PPPs are mainly BOT, BTO, and BT. The first PPP project was the 
Co May Project in the 51 highway in 1996. According to the original contract, investors 
have the right to collect tolls from June 1999 to July 2011 (Huyen, 2013). By the end of 
2010, there were 384 PPPs with various sizes implemented.  Amongst these projects, local 
governments are responsible for managing 342 projects while the Ministry of Transport 
manages 29 projects, and 13 projects are managed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(Parliament of Vietnam, 2013).  
Figure 2.6 displays the PPP investment forms in Vietnam up until the end of 2010. 
Amongst current types of PPP in Vietnam, BT is the most common form with 211 projects, 
followed by BOT with 129 projects, and just 2 BTO projects. In contrast, the combination 
of BOT and BT was used in 42 projects. 
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Figure 2. 6 PPP investment forms in Vietnam (Parliament of Vietnam, 2013) 
 
In terms of investment by sectors, the transport sector received the highest number, 254 
projects, followed by the industry complex investment with 59 projects. There have been 
50 waste projects, 13 power plants and 8 water supply projects implemented under PPP 
forms. 
Figure 2. 7 PPPs in Vietnam by sector (Parliament of Vietnam, 2013) 
 
Reports from the local governments demonstrate that they have been preparing to select 
investors for 185 projects with a total investment of 14,216 billion pounds and propose 40 
projects with 2.43 billion pounds. It can be noticed that after nearly 20 years, the PPP 
market in Vietnam has been remarkably developing both in terms of quantity and scales of 
projects. The transport sector has attracted the most number of private investors. The 
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following section will give more detail about the participants of private investors in the 
transport sector.  
2.4.2. Statistic about PPP Investment in the Transport Sector 
As mentioned previously, this sector has attracted the biggest investment in comparison 
with other sectors. The number of PPPs in the transport sector accounts for 66.12 percent 
of the total number of PPPs with the investment accounted for around 50.52 percent of the 
total capital invested in PPPs (Nhi, 2014). Figure 2.8 below explains the process of a 
transportation PPP project.  
Figure 2. 8 Process of Implementing PPPs in Vietnam (Huyen, 2013; Toan, 2008, Vietnamese PPP 
Regulations) 
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As shown in figure 2.8, there are three stages, and the first two stages are mainly for 
preparation and negotiation while the last stage is for implementing the project. The risk 
analysis first needs to be carried out in the development stage, more specifically in pre-
feasibility step and feasibility step in the second stage. In these steps risks are evaluated in 
order to evaluate their applicability and profitability. 
Except for small and medium-scale projects managed by local governments, all other 
transports are currently managed by the Ministry of Transport. The investment in transport 
projects are only implemented under BOT and BT forms. The number PPPs currently 
managed by the Ministry of Transport in different stages is compared in figure 2.8. 
Amongst projects which have been implemented, only Deo Ca Project and No 20 highway 
Bao Loc-Dalat are a combination of BT and BOT while the other projects are BOT form. 
Details of current and proposed PPP projects in the transport sector are provided in 
Appendix K.  
Figure 2. 9 Current and Future Transport Project managed by Ministry of Transport 
 
It should be noted that projects currently in the operational and construction stages are all 
road traffic projects. However, in 42 future projects, PPPs will be used for other subsectors 
of transport. Figure 2.10 shows the number of developing PPPs by subsector. 
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Figure 2. 10 Projects in Development Stage by sector (MOT, 2015) 
 
In terms of the type of investors in this sector, they are mainly domestic investors, and 
there have been only a small number of foreign investors who participated in PPPs in 
transport sector. Many of the investors are well-known contractors in Vietnam. However, 
investors from banking sectors are also interested in this investment. It should be noted that 
Vietnamese bankers usually need to join contractors to set up SPV as they need to take 
advantage of the experience of contractors in this field.  
In short, officials have pointed out that the implementation of PPP in the transport sector 
has been delivering significant achievement to this sector. The problems of project delays 
have been decreasing in PPPs in comparison with traditional forms. Critical national 
transport links have been upgraded mainly by PPP forms in recent years.  
2.5. Summary 
This chapter provided basic information about the market in Vietnam which is the market 
that the current research attempts to explore. In this chapter, the overview of the macro-
economic environment was demonstrated. In addition, the attempt to develop the 
infrastructure system of Vietnam in recent years was also clarified. Furthermore, the 
development of the PPP market, and PPPs in the transport sector was also demonstrated. 
From the statistics provided in this chapter, it can be recognized that the massive need for 
transport system development is creating a huge financial burden on the limited budget of 
the public sector. Therefore, the PPP mechanism is playing an essential role in developing 
the transport system in Vietnam. Hence, this chapter also demonstrated the value of this 
research.  
32 
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CHAPTER 3: RISK MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
PROJECTS 
3.1. Introduction 
This research looks at the risk management area in PPPs. Therefore, it is essential to 
provide insights about risk management and research in this area. This chapter will firstly 
provide basic concepts about risks and uncertainty to demonstrate the concept that the 
research focuses on. Secondly, the risk management process in PPPs will be reviewed. In 
the review of the risk management process, the different point of views from the public and 
private sectors are also demonstrated. After that, previous studies about risk assessment, 
allocation and other important issues in risk management will be revised. At the end of this 
chapter, the elements of the proposed risk evaluation framework will be justified. In 
addition, the list of risks and allocation criteria will be also clarified at the end of this 
chapter. 
3.2. Uncertainty and Risk Definitions review 
Understanding the meanings of risk and uncertainty is essential in PPPs. Therefore, in this 
section, the concepts of risks and uncertainty will be reviewed. The definitions of these 
notions in previous literature are sometimes not clearly distinguished. Hence, the purpose 
of this section is to provide the clear meanings of these two notions. This, in turn, will 
clarify the area that the current research is focusing on. 
3.2.1. Concept of Uncertainty  
One of the first attempts to make the distinction between uncertainty and risk is the 
research by Knight (1921). In his opinion, risks can be seen as knowable probability 
distributions, while uncertainty cannot be quantified statistically. More specifically, 
Stephen and Larry (1987) analysed the definitions of risk and uncertainty of Knight (1921) 
where the definitions are based on three categories of unknown outcomes, namely, priori 
probabilities, statistical probabilities, and estimates. Stephen and Larry (1987) analysed 
that Knight’s (1921) risk definition includes priori probabilities and statistically 
probabilities, whereas Knight’s (1921) uncertainty definition includes the estimation 
category. Stephen and Larry (1987) disagreed with distinction between risk and uncertainty 
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as they criticized that individuals are seen as being able to select consistency between 
outcomes as was stated in the definition of Knight (1921). However, individuals always 
have subjective probability (Stephen and Larry, 1987). Other authors, such as Walker et al. 
(2003, p.5) defined uncertainty as: “any deviation from the unachievable ideal of 
completely deterministic knowledge of the relevant system”. They further described 
uncertainty in three dimensions, namely, location of uncertainty, level of uncertainty, and 
nature of uncertainty. More specifically, the nature of the uncertainty can be classified into 
epistemic uncertainty and ontological uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty appears from the 
imperfection of the risk model, processes, etc., while ontological uncertainty occurs 
because of natural imperfection of the initial condition of the system. The location of the 
uncertainty illustrates its position in any context. Uncertainty can be divided into three 
levels, namely statistical uncertainty, scenario uncertainty, and recognized ignorance. 
McManus and Hastings (2004, p.2) believe that things that are not known or are known 
unclearly can be seen as uncertainty. They explained that many of them are measurable and 
not always negative. In fact, they can be worse or better than is forecasted. Other 
researchers, such as Aven (2011), say that uncertainty can be seen as a way of classifying 
the consequence. Uncertainties simply mean events that individuals do not know exactly 
when they happen and what their consequences are (Aven, 2011). It has been recognized 
that in order to understand the concept of uncertainty, extensive literature debate has 
emerged. It has been also recognized that the calculable form of uncertainty can lead to the 
concept of risk (Boussabaine, 2014). 
3.2.2. Concept of Risk 
Similarly to the concept of uncertainty, there are a number of definitions that define risks. 
For example, the most popular points of view looking at risk can be Chance of Loss, 
Exposure, Hazard, and Probability of an Event’s occurrence. 
More specifically, from the view of Chance of Loss, according to Boussabaine (2014), risk 
can be defined as:  
Risk = Chance + Loss                                                (3.1) 
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As shown in equation 3.1, risk is seen as a function of chance and loss. It should be noted 
that chance can be quantified. Oliver et al. (1999) said that Chance can be defined as the 
probability of occurrence of an event. However, according to Boussabaine (2014, p.38), in 
terms of this definition of risk, “chance is state of mind about what will happen rather than 
a quantifiable measurement of how likely a loss will happen”. 
From the point of view of Hazard, the most popular definition, as Boussabaine (2014) 
stated, of risk can be expressed as: 
Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability x Exposure                               (3.2) 
Equation 3.2 shows that in contrast to other points of view, risk, here, is a function of 
hazard, vulnerability and exposure. Thus, any change in these items can lead to change in 
the risk level. Boussabaine (2014) criticized that hazard in this point of view depends on 
the magnitude, duration, spatial dispersion, and temporal spacing. Therefore, it is 
complicated to quantify the effect of hazard in this definition. Vulnerability is usually 
measured by the level of loss made by the consequence. In terms of exposure, the 
frequency distribution needs to be formed from quantitative data. 
It has been observed that the most popular point of view of looking at risk, especially in the 
engineering market, is to see risk as a probability or likelihood of an event’s occurrence 
(Woodruff, 2005). More specifically, risk is measured as:  
Risk = Probability x Consequence                                 (3.3) 
The advantage of this point of view is that risk can be statistically measured and predicted. 
The probability of occurrence can be estimated by heuristic data. Furthermore, analysts 
observed that this definition can create advantages in converting uncertainty to risk 
(Boussabaine, 2014). Due its advantages, this research will look as risk as the function of 
probability or likelihood of an event’s occurrence and consequence as is shown above in 
equation 3.3.  
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3.3. Risk Management in PPPs from the Cross-sector Perspective  
3.3.1. Risk Management Process 
Due to inconsistency in defining risk, the definition of risk management also varies. 
According to Dawson (1997, p.15), risk management can be determined as a “continuous 
process by which the sources of uncertainties which could affect the objectives are 
systematically identified, their impact scientifically assessed, and their effect and 
likelihood managed to produce an acceptable balance between the risks and opportunities”. 
However, he also noted that the definition can depend on the specific project. 
In the construction area, formal and scientific approaches to manage risks have been 
developed over the last few decades. In these approaches, many models and techniques are 
combined to create the framework for risk control. One of the first processes proposed can 
be seen from the work by Perry and Hayes (1985). In their process, risks, firstly, need to be 
identified, then they need to be analysed, and finally, a response strategy can be formed. 
Arguing that the risks and mitigation strategies need to be monitored, Al-Bahar and 
Crandall (1991) added the monitor stage into the process. Aiming to create a detailed risk 
management process for construction projects, Chapman and Ward (2003) proposed a 
nine-phase risk-management process, and argued that this structure is more detailed than 
most specific methods.  This nine-phase risk process includes the define phase, focus 
phase, identify phase, structure phase, ownership phase, estimate phase, evaluate phase, 
plan phase, and manage phase. In fact, more recent studies show preference towards the 
shorter processes which are similar to processes proposed by Perry and Hayes (1985), and 
by Al-Bahar and Crandall (1991). For example, ISO (2009) stated that effective process for 
risk management in construction projects should have risk planning, risk identification, risk 
assessment, risk analysis, risk response, risk monitor, and managing the process record. A 
shorter process, which is widely recognized, was more developed further by Nieto-Morote 
et al. (2011). They argued that an effective risk management process has four basic stages. 
The first stage is to identify and classify risks. Risks are then analysed by quantitative or 
qualitative techniques in the second stage. In the third stage, managers need to respond to 
these risks. Finally, risks need to be monitored through the project’s life-cycle. 
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Similarly to risk management in general, construction projects, in relation to risk 
management in PPPs, have vital stages such as identification, evaluation, and the control 
stage which are required to be applied and these stages cannot be discrete (Akintoye et al. 
2003). However, in contrast to the process of general construction, an important stage, 
namely, the risk allocation stage, needs to be added because it is one of the core advantages 
of the PPP form. For this purpose, Boussabaine (2007) proposed a risk management 
framework for PPPs. As displayed in the figure 3.1, risks are priced after being analysed, 
and after that risks need to be allocated to the right party.  
Figure 3. 1 The life cycle of risk management in PFI/PPP project (Boussabaine, 2007, p.256) 
 
Likewise, Zou et al. (2008) proposed the life cycle-oriented risk management framework 
for PPPs, and in this framework, risk allocation is also added and focused on. More 
specifically, they converted the risk allocation stage into preliminary risk allocation, 
detailed risk allocation and reallocation phases. A more recent study by Leidel et al. 
(2010) also mentioned that for PPPs, risks need to be allocated before any mitigation 
strategies can be made. In fact, there are a number of research studies that looked into the 
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risk aspect of PPPs. However, previous research mainly focused on a single aspect of the 
risk management process rather than on the framework (Leidel et al. 2010). 
3.3.2. Risk management in PPPs from the Public Sector’s Point of View 
From the public sector perspective, PPP is expected to be an effective form to deliver 
modern and high-quality public services. The criteria of PPPs from the public sector point 
of view are Value for Money, and Affordability. The concept of Value for Money refers to 
the comprehensive quality of service provided by a PPP, not just a single aspect of the 
service. According to OGC (2004b), Value for Money is “the optimum combination of 
whole-life costs and quality, to meet the user requirements”. Others simplify that the 
concept of Value for Money is to illustrate the attempt to acquire the maximum benefit 
from minimum sources (ODPM, 2005; OGC 2004c). It should be noted here that, the 
investment from the public sector is service-driven more than market factor-driven 
(Boussabaine, 2007). In addition, in contrast to the commercial point of view, which is the 
private sector point of view that projects with highest NPV should be chosen, from the 
public sector point of view, projects with the least NPV are preferred because the 
potentially highest financial benefit can be gained (Boussabaine, 2007). Affordability 
refers to the tangible and intangible benefits from the project over its life cycle.   
In this form of a construction project, the public sector takes the advantages of the 
managing and financing ability of the private sector. Their purpose is to transfer as many 
risks as possible to the private sector. Therefore, PPPs are expected to be flexible in order 
to allocate risks between the two sectors (Declercq, 1999).  Hence, in PPPs, the public 
sector is not responsible for the main financial investment to build the asset. In fact, the 
contribution of the public sector and private sector in this investment is on a case-by-case 
basis. This helps the public sector to reduce the risks of financing the project. Moreover, to 
prevent the risks from occurring in the operational stage, the public sector can fix the 
payment schedules. Payment can be made from the government or directly from the end 
users. This, theoretically, prevents the public sector from the operational risk factors 
(Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014). In fact, in this form, the public sector is considered to 
carry fewer risks than the private sector in terms of investment (Sarmento, 2010).  
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Likewise, from the public sector’s perspective, PPPs can bring certain risks that may not 
appear in a traditional construction project. For example, due to the small amount of 
contribution in the investment, the public sector may have less power in managing a 
project through its life cycle (Quiggin, 2005). This lower level of power creates difficulty 
in re-negotiation in case changes are needed. In fact, for this reason the British 
Government has established a new form of PFI called PF2, which requires a certain 
contribution from the public sector to retain a certain level of power in the project (HM 
Treasury, 2012). In addition, a high level of transaction cost associated with the complex 
system of PPP is also a risk that the public sector may face (Froud, 2002). In fact, from the 
point of view of the public sector of looking at risks, academics suggest that for the public 
sector the proactive strategy should be required in risk management in PPPs rather than a 
reactive method (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014). 
3.3.3. Risk Management in PPPs from the Private Sector’s Point of View 
It can be recognized that in the private sector perspective, risks in PPPs are mainly 
evaluated from the commercial aspect. This is a reasonable perspective as in a PPP project, 
the private sector is responsible for investing, constructing, and operating the project. It is 
assumed in PPP forms that the private sector is better at managing financial and 
operational risks because they are not biased in evaluating risks, and they have experience 
in risk management (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014). Indeed, most significant risks in 
PPPs which are transferred to the private sector are associated with financial aspects 
(Akintoye et al. 2003). The private sector is also responsible for constructing the project. 
Therefore, most of the significant risks during the construction stage are transferred to the 
private sector. In this stage, many things can go wrong as it is a complex period. For 
example, planning permission can be refused, design features may not be consistent with 
others, or change in regulation can be applied. All these risks require time and money in 
order to be resolved (Akintoye et al. 2003).  
The private sector in most cases set up the SPV and this SPV is a method of acquiring 
finances from different resources. The main part of the capital can come from the bank or 
other credit organizations, and this part is recovered since the project now comes into the 
operational stage, and starts to make revenue (Akintoye et al. 2003). This, in deed, is a way 
 32 
 
to spread risks to other partners. When the project comes to the operational stage, in 
theory, the private sector can recoup their investment. However, in this stage, they have to 
face other risks such as operational cost overrun risk, or low demand risk which is one of 
the most critical risks for PPPs (Akintoye et al. 2003). For the transportation project, toll 
schemes are fixed in the contract, and the private sector cannot change it even if the 
demand is lower than expected. In fact, they can only change the toll scheme or submit for 
compensation if there is evidence that the low demand is due to the action or inaction from 
the host government. 
Inside the private sector, lenders are also the partners who are very risk averse. It is 
observed that risks are a greater concern of lenders rather than sponsors as the main capital 
comes from debt rather than equity. Lenders are concerned about the risk allocation 
between parties as if the project is considered as low risk, lower interest rates may be 
applied or vice versa (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014). It can be recognized that the 
sponsors directly bear the risk of demand during the operational stage. However, lenders 
are the party which is also indirectly influenced by the demand risk as if the demand is 
insufficient, the sponsors can be bankrupt and therefore lenders are not repaid. In reality, 
some lenders may apply a certain requirement of debt-equity ratio to the sponsor to 
safeguard the obtainability of the debt service (Akintoye et al. 2003). In fact, certain PPP 
laws also require a maximum level of debt in the capital. The sponsors may have to satisfy 
the requirement from both the host government and lenders. It should be noted that from 
the point of view of sponsors, the project with lower equity is not always considered to be 
the riskier project (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014). 
It is essentially important to remark that in contrast to the public sector, from the private 
sector’s point of view, the project with highest NPV is preferred as it shows that investors 
can acquire more returns from that project. They key of a PPP is that a long-term asset is 
being financed by a long-term investment (Carrick, 2000). However, from the private 
sector point of view, higher investment and a longer payback period may go with riskier 
situations (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014). Therefore, an appropriate concession period 
needs to be determined by the investors. This concession period needs to be able to help 
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investors to achieve the expected returns, and it also needs to have a reasonable length of 
time to minimize the movement of risk factors. 
3.4. Risk Identification and Assessment 
As criticized previously in the problem statement section in the chapter 1, previous studies 
mainly focused on some aspect of risks rather than the overall risk management framework 
(Leidel et al. 2010). In previous research, risk identification, risk assessment and risk 
classification are usually combined so these risks become clear to the practitioners (Bing et 
al. 2005).  
Regarding risk identification, this is the first step of risk management in PPP projects. The 
purpose of this step is not only to discover events that may go wrong but also to identify 
the importance and potential opportunities from these events (Redmill, 2002). In this stage, 
uncertain events are classified based on the objectives of practitioners. Techniques such as 
check lists, brainstorming, interviews and questionnaires, cause - event-effects, Delphi, 
Brainstorming, Pin card, Gallery, Collective Note Book (CNB) and Nominal Group 
Technique (NGT) have also been used in the area of PPP construction projects for many 
years (Demirag et al. 2010). Amongst these techniques, academics have suggested to use 
approaches which require the directed-thinking approach such as interviews, brainstorming 
and checklists as these approaches are easy to use, and hence it is leads to sufficient results 
(Ebrahimnejad et al. 2010). After risks are identified, risks need to be assessed in order to 
optimize the value for money, to calculate risk adjustment, and to create and monitor 
mitigation strategies (Innovative Program Delivery, 2012).  
In terms of risk assessment, in general, there are three methods to analyze risks, which are 
qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, and hybrid analysis. Qualitative risk analysis is 
used to discover and rank risks for further strategies. They may assess its probability of 
occurrence and its impact on project outcomes. Other factors such as time to mitigate these 
risks and the relationship between these risks can also be measured. In this type of analysis, 
experts and professionals are required to use their professional judgment and experience to 
evaluate events. Past data from similar projects can be applied while conducting this 
technique (Innovative Program Delivery, 2012).  On the other hand, quantitative methods 
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can be employed after the risks are identified and assessed in the qualitative method. The 
examination in this method can compare the time and cost the projects need to spend to 
overcome the situation if a risk occurs and the time and cost if this risk does not occur. 
Value for money can be more deeply analyzed to create key contract conditions 
(Innovative Program Delivery, 2012). 
A number of researchers have attempted to identify, assess and categorize risks in PPPs in 
the transport area. For example, in order to identify critical risks in BOT road projects in 
India, and determine the perception of stakeholders have about these key risks, Thomas et 
al. (2003) used a literature review to construct a list of potential risks which are likely to 
occur, which they then required participants to rate. They also conducted interviews with 
some of the participants to further discuss the answers that were collected. An all-India 
survey was ran, and the researchers considered this method to be a well-established 
technique for collecting data. Participants were then required to rank the criticality of these 
risks on a Likert Scale of 1 to 5. The criticality index was then calculated by the following 
formula:   
                  
                       
              
                       (3.4) 
Where n1, n2, n3, n4 and n5 represent the number of participants who consider a risk as 
‘most critical’, ‘very critical’, ‘critical’, ‘somewhat critical’ and ‘not critical’, respectively. 
Finally, the result illustrates traffic revenue, delay in land acquisition, insufficient demand, 
delay in financial closure, cost overrun, and poor debt servicing as the most critical issues 
in BOT road projects in India. Amongst these risks, traffic revenue risk is the most serious 
issue.  
Similarly to Thomas et al. (2003), Ghosh et al. (2004) also focused on PPP projects in the 
transportation area. In this research Ghosh et al. aimed to find risks in rail projects in 
Thailand. Questionnaires were used to obtain research objectives, and they were designed 
based on a total of eight key risks located through a comprehensive literature review. These 
risks are classified into Financial and economic risk, Contractual and legal risk, 
Subcontractors related risk, Operational risk, Safety and social risk, Design risk, Force 
majeure risk, Physical risk, and Delay risk. The assessment technique used in this research 
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is the same one used by Thomas et al. (2003). Finally nine key risks including financial 
and economic risk, contractual and legal risk, and sub-contractors related risk, operational 
risk, safety and social risk, design risk, force majeure risk, physical risk, and delay risk, 
were identified in this research. Table 3.1 shows a list of risks in the research of Ghosh et 
al. (2004). 
Table 3. 1 Risks in PPPs used by Ghosh et al. (2004) 
Financial  
and Economic Risk 
Unavailability of funds 
Economic disaster 
Tendered Price 
Exchange rate fluctuation 
Inflation 
Financial failure of contractor 
Contractual and Legal Risk 
Delay in solving contractual issues 
Delay in solving disputes 
Change order negotiation 
Delay payment on contract and extras 
Sub-contractors Related Risk 
Sub-contractor failure 
Co-ordination of subcontractor 
Sub-contractor lack of adequate number of staff 
Financial failure of sub-contractor 
Operational Risk 
Equipment productivity 
Labour productivity 
System outage 
Treatment of material removed from site 
Safety and Social Risk 
Pollution and safety rules 
Accidents 
Damage to person or property 
Ecological constrains 
Public consultancy 
Design Risk 
Inadequate specification 
Conflict of document 
Scope of work definition 
Design change 
Force Majeure Risk 
Act of God 
War 
Fire and theft 
Physical Risk Subsurface condition of geology 
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Subsurface condition of ground water 
Unforeseen site condition 
Delay Risk 
Construction delay 
Third Party delays 
Although Ghosh et al. (2004) state that the design of the research is reliable and that the 
questionnaires were well-conducted, the focus of this research was on only one project 
which is the Chaloem Ratchamongkhon line, thus the results might not be generalizable. 
However, the advantage of this research is that the Chaloem Ratchamongkhon line is a 
large and complex project which may be rarely accessed by other researchers; therefore, 
this study can bring unique outcomes. Similarly, Ng et al. (2012) also employed this 
simple method to assess factors influencing the success of PPP projects at the feasibility 
stage in Hong Kong. The 7-point scale was applied. The level of scale can be different, but 
the principle behind it is similar. The mean score of these rankings was used to determine 
risk ranking in descending order of importance. Table 3.2 shows the success factor used in 
the research by Ng et al. (2012). 
Table 3. 2 Success factor in PPPs used by Ng et al. (2012) 
Technical 
Project size is technically manageable by a single consortium 
Possibility of innovative solutions (e.g. leading to time/cost savings) 
Availability of government experience in packaging similar PPP projects 
Availability of experienced, strong and reliable private consortium 
Service quality can be easily defined and objectively measured 
Contract is flexible enough for frequent change in output specification 
Project is not susceptible to fast-paced change (e.g. technological change) 
Financial and Economic 
Project is more cost effective than traditional forms of project delivery 
Project can be substantially self-funded or on a non-recourse basis 
Project value is sufficiently large to avoid disproportionate procurement costs 
Project is of financial interest to private sector 
Project can attract foreign capital 
Project is bankable and profitability of the project is sufficient to attract 
investors and lenders 
Economic environment is stable and favourable 
Existence of a sound governmental economic policy 
Competition from other projects is limited 
Social There is a long-term demand for the products/service in the community 
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The community is understanding and supportive 
Delivery of services is stable and reliable 
Level of toll/tariff is acceptable 
Project can create more job opportunities 
Project is environmentally sustainable 
Political and Legal 
Project is not politically sensitive 
Political environment is stable 
There is political support for the project 
The project is compatible with current statutory and institutional arrangements 
There is a favourable legal framework (mature, reasonable and predictable) 
Others 
Fairness of new conditions to employees 
Possibility of significant redundancy 
Existence of a resolution for any civil service staff redundancy 
Supportiveness and commitment of staff to the project 
Flexibility to decide appropriate risk allocation 
Support from the government (e.g. guarantee or loans) is available 
Authority can be shared between the public and private sectors 
Possibility of an effective control mechanism over the private consortium 
Matching government’s strategic and long-term objectives 
They observed that the acceptance level of tolls is the most critical factor in PPP projects in 
Hong Kong. This research also compares the different preference between the private and 
public sectors, and demonstrates useful conclusions. However, the research method used 
by Thomas et al. (2003) and Ng et al. (2012) may be easy to carry out, but it does not 
clearly show the level of probability of the occurrence of a risk, and its impact on project 
outcomes. 
Another simple and popular method which can resolve the problem mentioned above can 
be seen in papers published by Akintoye et al. (1998) and Chan et al. (2011). These papers 
assess risks based on their probability of occurrence and impact on project outcomes. More 
specifically, the research by Akintoye et al. (1998) was run to investigate risk analysis and 
management in PFI projects in the UK, and to discover practitioners’ perceptions on risks 
associated with these projects.  In this program, the researcher also delivered participants 
with a list of risks designed by comprehensively reviewing the literature. They then asked 
that the participants to rank both the probability and impact of these risks on a scale of one 
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to five. In this scale, five represents most likely and the biggest impact, and one denotes the 
least impact. Risk score is then computed as the multiplied value of Probability and Impact. 
Finally, high design and construction cost, poor performance, delay in construction, cost 
overrun, high operation and maintenance cost, high payment and tendering cost are the 
most critical risks, respectively (Akintoye, et al. 1998). In the same way, Chan et al. (2011) 
aimed to uncover and assess risks in PPP projects in China, and discovered a proper risk 
allocation strategy. A list of 34 risks was created and participants then rated the occurrence 
probability and impact of risks on a 5-point scale. The risk significance index was calculated as 
the multiplied value of Risk Probability and Risk Impact. One advanced point in the research 
of Chan et al. (2011) is that they also tested the difference between the perceptions of the 
public and private sectors. 
Another research area on PPP risks identification and assessment, which has been discovered by 
a number of academics, is the area of fuzzy theory. Methods using this theory also assess the 
probability of occurrence and the impact of a risk on project outcomes with a more sophisticated 
process, and they are expected to provide more accurate outcomes. Academics in this field state 
that assessing risks in PPP projects is usually based on an expression of linguistic terms, and this 
requires the judgment of experts who may be biased, subjective and partial. Therefore, there is a 
need of a method to interpret these linguistic terms accurately, and fuzzy method is expected to 
perform this. Additionally, they argue that risks in PPP projects are usually fuzzy in nature, and 
thus evaluating these risks by using fuzzy methods may be an appropriate option. Taking the 
paper by Xu et al. (2010a) as an example, in this paper, a fuzzy synthetic evaluation model 
was introduced to assess risks in PPP highway projects in China through the judgement of 
four stakeholder groups. In this model, the literature review, Delphi techniques, factor 
analysis, mean scoring ranking technique, and fuzzy synthetic evaluation were employed. 
Amongst these techniques, the literature review, Delphi, and factor analysis were used in 
the first stage of the research to identify possible risks, then the mean scoring ranking 
technique and fuzzy synthetic evaluation were employed in the second stage. More 
specifically, risks were identified through the literature review and two rounds of Delphi 
techniques. They also needed to be categorised into different levels, and each of these level 
contains a specific number of risks. Table 3.3 shows the risks in PPPs used in the research 
of Xu et al. (2010a).  
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Table 3. 3 Risks in PPPs used by Xu et al. (2010a) 
Government corruption 
Government intervention 
Public credit 
Nationalization/ Expropriation 
Third party delay/ Violation 
Political/Public opposition 
Inadequate law and supervision system 
Legislation change 
Interest rate fluctuation 
Foreign exchange fluctuation 
Inflation 
Poor public decision-making process 
Land acquisition 
Delay in project approvals and permits 
Conflicting or imperfect contract 
Financing risk 
Project/Operation changes 
Completion risk 
Material/labour non-availability 
Unproven Engineering techniques 
Unforeseen weather/ Geotechnical conditions 
Operation cost overrun 
Market competition 
(Uniqueness) 
Change in market demand 
Price change 
Expense payment risk 
Lack of supporting infrastructure 
Residual risk 
Inadequate competition for tender 
Inability of concessionaire 
Force majeure 
Organization and co-ordination risk 
Change in tax regulation 
Environment risk 
These risks then are ranked based on the mean score technique, fuzzy set, and fuzzy 
synthetic evaluation. Xu et al. (2010a) concluded that government intervention and 
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government maturity risk are the most critical risk groups. It is expected that this method 
can support practitioners to assess risks based on objective evidence rather than subjective 
judgment (Xu et al. 2010a). In a similar way, Ebrahimnejad et al. (2010) published a 
ranking model for BOT infrastructure projects. However, in contrast to the research by Xu 
et al. (2010a), more risk criteria are included in the research by Ebrahimnejad et al. (2010). 
Five risk criteria used in this research are Probability criteria, Impact criteria, Quickness 
of Reaction toward risk criteria, Event measure quantity criteria, and Event capability 
criteria. The reason to use these criteria is that the probability and impact criteria are 
not sufficient for ranking risks (Ebrahimnejad et al. 2010). In addition, the Fuzzy 
Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (FTOPSIS) and Fuzzy 
Linear Programming Technique for Multidimensional Analysis of Preference 
(FLINMAP) are both used for ranking risks before establishing the final ranking. Li et al. 
(2012) also carried out fuzzy methods to identify and assess risks. In this research, the 
literature review, Delphi technique, factor analysis, mean score ranking and fuzzy synthetic 
evaluation were used. For the risk identification stage, a comprehensive literature review, 
Delphi technique, and factor analysis were used, then they used the mean score ranking 
and fuzzy synthetic evaluation in the risk assessment stage. The Delphi questionnaire 
survey was designed based on a total of 34 risk factors identified from the literature 
review. The keys to using the Delphi technique are the definition of experts, the number of 
rounds conducted, and the structure of the questionnaire. They state that this technique is 
best for research that needs consensus results and for when the historical data is 
insufficient. Risks then were classified in order to structure and evaluate the relationship 
between them.  Similar to most of the studies, risks are classified based on the sources of 
risks, however, this research classified risks based on the life cycle perspective since Li et 
al. (2012) argue that the risk management process is a continuous progression which runs 
through the whole life of the project, not only at a specific moment. More detailed than 
most studies which only separate a project into 3 stages which are development, 
construction and operation, Li et al. (2012) divide the project more specifically into a 
feasibility study that has financing, design, construction, operation and transfer phases.  
In short, it can be observed that the most popular methods to assess risk are using the 
Likert scale, the risk score which is the multiplied number of the probability and impact, 
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and fuzzy techniques. Each of these methods has their own advantages and disadvantages. 
For example, the Likert scale cannot show the probability of occurrence and degree of 
impact, while the Fuzzy method may make it sophisticated and impractical to use in 
practice. Using the risk score seems to be the most popular method. However, this method 
might not show the relationship between risks. 
3.5. Risk Allocation 
Before taking any action to mitigate risks, risks need to be allocated to the right place. In 
fact, risk allocation can be seen as a way to respond to risks. Risk allocation is the core of 
PPP projects. This allocation is made between the public and private sectors. Although in 
conventional construction projects, risk allocation also needs to be implemented, risk 
allocation in PPP is different. For example, table 3.4 illustrates the typical risk allocation in 
different types of construction projects. 
Table 3. 4 Risk allocation according to PPPs form (Boussabaine, 2013, p.20) 
  
  
Build Own Operate Contract 
(BOO) 
DBFO Contract 
Build Own Transfer Contract 
(BOT) 
Design & Build 
Public 
sector 
SPV Contractor 
Public 
sector 
SPV Contractor 
Public 
sector 
SPV Contractor 
Public 
sector 
SPV Contractor 
Financial 
Risk 
  ☒   ☒ ☒   ☒ ☒   ☒     
Construction 
Risk 
    ☒     ☒     ☒     ☒ 
Technologica
l Risk 
    ☒     ☒     ☒     ☒ 
Sponsor Risk   ☒           ☒ ☒ ☒     
Environment 
Risk 
  ☒     ☒     ☒   ☒     
Commercial 
Risk 
  ☒     ☒     ☒   ☒     
Operating 
risk 
    ☒   ☒ ☒     ☒ ☒     
Legal Risk ☒ ☒   ☒     ☒     ☒     
Regulatory 
Risk 
  ☒     ☒     ☒   ☒     
Political Risk ☒     ☒     ☒     ☒     
Force 
Majeure 
☒     ☒     ☒     ☒     
According to Innovative Program Delivery (2012), risk transfer valuation in PPP can be 
counted for 60 percent of the total cost which can be saved under PPP, because risks are 
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managed effectively by a certain party. The main idea of risk allocation is to allocate risk 
to the party which best manages it. However, with an optimal risk allocation, it is not only 
important which party is chosen to transfer the risk to, but it is also to identify how to 
transfer the risk, and what the best time to transfer the risk is (Abednego et al. 2006). 
Risk allocation is not an easy task as it depends on many factors, for example on the 
attitude of managers or the capability to manage risks (Zhang et al. 2002). In addition, the 
public sector and the private sector may have different points of view about PPP. For the 
public sector, PPPs are considered as a system to transfer risks to private sectors, thus they 
may prefer to transfer many risks to partner parties. According to Chung (2008), the 
market competition is changing the process of risk transfer or risk guarantee from the 
government to risk dumping by the government. This may mean that the government may 
attempt to take full advantage of the competitive environment to transfer as much risk as 
possible to a private partner (Chung et al. 2010).  On the other hand, for the private sector, 
they need to obtain a balance between risks and opportunities. This means that they need to 
acquire gains more than losses created by risks. The public sector may seek the lowest 
expenses for taxpayers while the private sector wants to maximize their profits (Innovative 
Program Delivery, 2012). Therefore, if too few risks are allocated to the private sector the 
value for money, which is the heart of PPPs, can be negatively affected. In contrast, if too 
many risks are transferred to the private sector, including risks that the private sector may 
not be able to manage, the value for money is also badly influenced. Moreover, this also 
can reduce the willingness of a private party to go further into projects, and if the private 
sector stops bidding, the final aims of the project can be seriously influenced (Innovative 
Program Delivery, 2012). In addition, risks should be theoretically transferred to the party 
having the strongest ability to manage it. However, in practice, the capability of risk 
management of each party is very complex to evaluate. Hence, this evaluation may be 
subjective (Lam et al. 2007). In practice, risk allocation in PPP projects is a flexible 
process and it depends on many factors and may vary following the circumstances of each 
project or each country. 
Academics who look at risk allocation in PPPs usually investigate the risk perception of 
stakeholders in practice to form guidelines for practitioners in the negotiation process. For 
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instance, a study by Chou et al. (2012) compares the PPPs between rail projects and 
general infrastructure projects to detect the difference in the risk allocation perception of 
stakeholders between these projects. The study found no difference amongst these types of 
construction regarding the risk allocation perception of stakeholders. More specifically, in 
both types of construction, land acquisition, change in law, and government reliability are 
critical risks that should be allocated to the public sectors, and delay in supply, operation 
cost overrun and technology risks should be managed by the public sector. 
Similarly, Singh et al. (2006) identified a risk allocation strategy in eight BOT road 
projects in India to create a risk allocation framework. In this framework, most of the risks 
are allocated to public clients. They are, for example, pre-investment, resettlement and 
rehabilitation, permit/approval, delay in land acquisition, delay in payment of annuity and 
change of scope. On the other hand, the private partner is responsible for delays in 
financial close, time and cost overrun during the construction and operation period.  With a 
similar aim to create a guideline for managers in PPPs in practice in the UK, Bing et al. 
(2005) ran a study to understand the risk allocation preference of stakeholders in these 
projects. Risks were gathered from the literature review and were then sent to stakeholders. 
In the analyzing process, if more than 50 percent of participants consider locating the risk 
to a party, then that risk is categorized as allocated to that party. If no majority is found of 
participants assigning a risk to a specific party, Bing et al. (2005) then categorized that risk 
needing more detailed information. In this research, Bing et al. (2005) found that 
stakeholders prefer the public sector to manage the political risks and site availability risks. 
This preference may reflect the fact that the government in the UK has been demonstrating 
a stable political situation, and thus they can manage these risks better with lower costs. In 
addition, the government in the UK has experience and a special legal framework for risks 
of site availability. Therefore, there is no surprise that these risks are chosen to be managed 
by the public sector.  On the other hand, a majority of risks are allocated to the private 
sector. More specifically, 32 out of 46 risk factors are assigned to the private sectors. 
Comparing this finding to the research conducted in Hong Kong by other authors where 
only 20 percent of risk variables were allocated to the private sector (Zayed et al. 2008), it 
may be that the objectives of transferring risks to the private sector are considered to have 
been achieved in the UK. Some risks that need to be managed by both sectors such as tax 
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regulation and inflation rate are shared between the two sectors. Surprisingly, Bing et al. 
(2005) found that the risk of low levels of public support, project approval and permit, 
contract variation, and lack of experience are risks that no party in this research has 
experienced managing. The conclusion about the objectives of transferring risks to the 
private sector in research by Bing et al. (2005) contradicts the findings by Ke et al. (2010) 
in China. In the research by Ke et al. (2010), no risk is chosen to be solely managed by the 
private sector. This may indicate that the objectives of transferring risks to the private sector 
have not been achieved. 
Apart from discovering the risk allocation perception of stakeholders in practice, other 
researchers have also attempted to discover allocation strategies by applying other 
techniques. For example, the risk matrix is a simple and effective tool to develop risk 
response strategies when risk events have been identified and assessed. This tool was 
developed by Alexander et al. (2006), and Panthi et al. (2001) applied this tool in the area 
of PPP construction projects. Based on the probability and impact, a risk event is mapped 
in the risk matrix which forms the basis for formulation of the risk response strategies. This 
tool is considered as easy to use, to explain to participants, and to get participants involved 
in (Panthi et al. 2001). For applying this tool, a risk needs to be ranked based on its 
probability and impact. For instance, risk can be ranked by a 10-point scale, and then with 
their scale each risk will fit a position in the matrix and this position can guide practitioners 
on how to deal with that risk (Panthi et al. 2001). 
In order to develop risk allocation strategies, Chan et al. (2011) required participants 
illustrate their perception by using a 3-point scale in which 1 denotes the public sector, 2 
denotes that it is equally shared between the public and private sectors, and 3 denotes the 
private sector. However, they then use the following formula to assess allocation 
perception: 
                              X10% = U+/- Z*δ                               (3.5) 
Where, X10% is the upper and lower value in which a risk will be allocated to a specific 
party. U represents the mean value of a population, and the corresponding Z and σ = 
population standard deviation.  
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In this paper, they use the value of Z as 0.125 and σ as 1. Thus, X ranges between 2.875 
scores and 3.125 scores. This means if a risk has a score under 2.857, it will be allocated to 
the public sector, and if the score is over 3.125, it will be transferred to the private sector.  
One of the limitations of above allocation methods is that criteria for risk allocation are not 
taken into account. In order to overcome this limitation, Xu et al. (2010) developed a 
model based on fuzzy theory to allocate risks in PPPs. Xu et al. (2010) expressed that this 
model can effectively interpret linguistic expressions into systematic quantitative analysis. 
In this model, first risks are identified through a comprehensive literature review and then 
critical risk allocation criteria are classified to evaluate the capability of managing risks of 
a party. Then the weighting for each risk allocation criteria is determined by the mean 
score, and the membership function for each risk allocation is also determined by fuzzy set 
theory. Finally, fuzzy evaluation is employed to create quantitative results of equitable risk 
allocation strategies. This model is expected to provide a comprehensive and systematic 
framework for risk allocation strategy and reduce bias from an individual’s judgment. In 
this paper, Xu et al. (2010) also illustrated a case study as an example of this model to 
conclude that this model can effectively and objectively determine a risk allocation 
strategy for PPP projects in China. One of the advantages of this allocation method is that 
criteria for risk allocation are created. However, these criteria are not compared directly to 
one another. Instead, they are weighted using a Likert scale. It would be better if the 
pairwise comparison method was employed. Furthermore, the fuzzy technique is criticized 
as being sophisticated and hence, it may be difficult to use in practice.  
3.6. Risk costing in PPP projects 
Risk costing is the stage in which risks are considered to have an impact on the project’s 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX), and Operational Expenses (OPEX), and project revenue. 
Therefore, the first principle of risk costing is to identify these risks. The analyst then 
needs to evaluate these risks in terms of the probability of occurrence and degree of 
impact. It is suggested that the risks with the highest cost impact should be the top priority. 
However, analysts need to make the distinction between risks with a low probability of 
occurrence, but a high degree of impact, and vice versa. Researchers suggested that both 
project-specific risks and non-project specific risks need to be priced (Boussabaine, 2014).  
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One of the basic methods of risk costing is the Variance and Standard Deviation Method. 
In this method, a mean-variance utility function of a risk factor is proposed. After that the 
risk cost can be estimated in two cases, namely, Lower band state, and Upper band state. In 
the Lower band state, the lower boundary of the risk cost is presented with a probability. In 
other words, the risk cost cannot be below this level with a provided probability (P). In 
contrast, the Upper band state provides a higher boundary of the risk cost with the 
probability (1-P). After that, the expected volatility of the cost of risk also needs to be 
assumed. From these values, the risk cost can be estimated. The second basic method is the 
Expected Value Method. Basically, the risk cost is determined by the sum of all possible 
values for the cost and each value is multiplied by the probability of occurrence for that 
value. In other words, the cost of risks can be calculated as the sum of the cost of risk 
impact, the cost of the uncertainty of estimation, and any hypothetical cost as a 
consequence of risk (Boussabaine, 2014). Details of these strategies can be found from 
other literature such as that of Boussabaine and Kirkham (2004) and Boussabaine (2006).  
3.7. Risk Bias 
It is recognized that the risk assessment is influenced by the attitude of observers in a 
specific situation. In the area of PPPs, observers who carry out risk assessment are usually 
groups of experts, and their opinions may vary substantially (Boussabaine, 2014), and 
these variation can lead to bias. Bias can be defined as: “any systematic deviation from a 
normative criterion that affects thinking, often leading to errors in judgement” (Litvak and 
Lerner, 2009, p.89). They also clarified that judgement that lacks correlation with a 
criterion, or lacks correlation with other opinions, or is based on unreliable information can 
be seen as bias. As stated, risk assessment in PPPs is usually carried out by experts, and 
emotions of these experts can have an influence on assessment of the results (Han and 
Lerner, 2009). More specifically, authors clarified these emotions into expected emotion 
and immediate emotion. Expected emotion refers to the outcome of a past event that the 
observer experienced, while immediate emotion indicates the observer’s emotion at the 
time of assessing risks.  
Regarding the sources of bias, a number of sources have been classified by academics. For 
example, Cho et al. (2010) said that Manageability is a source of bias. This source refers to 
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the ability of the observer to achieve reliable outcomes and ignores the negative influence 
of their assessment (Boussabaine, 2014). Yudknowsky (2006) used the term Availability to 
refer to the source made from past experience which has influence on future results. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) stated that bias can occur when the observer starts from an 
anchor and modifies it until they meet the desired outcome. Authors classified this source 
as Anchoring. Confirmation is also a source of bias. This term refers to the situation that 
estimators only seek evidence that supports their belief, but ignore evidence that does not 
support their belief. Lloyd (2010) reported that Representativeness is an important source 
which needs to be considered when assessing risks. This source refers to the situation that 
sample size cannot reflect the status of a population. In addition, Optimism is also a source 
of bias. This refers to the case where an observer may have overconfidence in assumptions 
in the decision making process (Anderson and Galinsky, 2006). Moreover, Boussabaine 
(2013) also reported that the judgment about the level of risk associated with an event can 
also be a source of bias, namely, Scale. More specifically, observers may tend to refer to a 
large-scale event with a large risk. However, the level of risk is not always related to the 
scale of event.  
In order to manage bias in assessing risks, some methods suggested from previous 
academics such as Boussabaine (2013) and Akintoye et al. (2003) can be applied. For 
example, the risk estimation team should consist of people from different parties and 
different backgrounds. Experts in the field should also be invited to reduce bias. In 
addition, appropriate risk analysis techniques should be used. Furthermore, all assumptions 
and limitations must be clarified and cautiously checked. In addition, historical data should 
be used to check any errors and inconsistencies. 
3.8. Risk Governance  
Risk governance is the system to ensure that all parties involved in the projects fulfil their 
duties in managing risks that are identified. This system should be able to address which 
department is responsible for implementing, controlling and monitoring the mitigation 
strategies for risks. It can be seen from figure 3.1 that the governance needs to be carried 
out through the project’s life cycle. In this system, clear roles and responsibilities of each 
duty in managing risks are provided. For example, the governance system can provide the 
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guidance in allocating and pricing risks for partners. Guidelines can be provided in written 
format with clear examples or case studies to ensure that they are practical for involved 
partners. 
3.9. Selection of Elements in the Proposed Framework 
3.9.1. Elements of the Proposed Risk Evaluation Framework 
Based on the literature review about risk management in the construction area as well as in 
PPPs, it is decided that the proposed risk evaluation framework should contain an 
identification function which can assess a risk from its probability of occurrence and 
degree of impact, and this function will be described in detail in section 6.2.1.1 in chapter 
6. The proposed framework should also contain the function of evaluating the riskiness of a 
project, and allocating risks based on multiple criteria. The literature review about a 
specific theory (AHP) which can present these functions will be provided in chapter 4, and 
the application of this theory in the framework will be showed in sections 6.2.1.2 and 
6.2.1.3 in chapter 6. In addition, the proposed evaluation framework should also have the 
function to evaluate the return and determine the concession period. The literature review 
about models which can play this role will be shown in chapter 5, and the application of 
the selected model (Risk Adjusted DNPV) will be shown in sections 6.2.2.2 and 6.2.2.3 in 
chapter 6.  
3.9.2. Selection of Risks 
From reviewing the literature, a list of risks was created. These risks are drawn from 
previous studies and from discussions with practitioners in the field. These risks will be 
assessed and priced with regard to the Vietnamese PPPs. After discussions with academic 
experts and practitioners, some of the risks used in other research were removed because 
they may not be suitable for transportation projects, and for a developing market in 
Vietnam. Table 3.5 shows the risks used in this research with their sources, and Table 3.6 
shows the interpretation of these risks.  
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Table 3. 5 Risks Selected in Current Research 
Risk 
Group 
Risk 
Source 
Political 
Risks 
P1. Concession termination by Government  Xenidis et al. (2005) 
P2. Political opposition 
Ameyaw et al. (2015);  Li et 
al. (2005) 
P3. Unstable government  
Yuan et al. 2008; Li et al. 
(2005) 
P4. Corruption  
Ling and Hoang (2010) 
Wang et al. (2000);  Ke et al. 
(2010) 
P5. Public sector default Toan and Ozawa (2008) 
P6. Public scepticism about the real benefits of 
PPP 
Song et al. (2013); Yuan et 
al. 2008 
P7. Forced buy-out Risks Toan and Ozawa (2008) 
Legal 
Risks 
L1. Disapproval of guarantees by the government 
Discussion with Vietnamese 
practitioners 
L2. Revision of the contract clauses Song et al. (2013) 
L3. Poor project approval and permit process 
Ling and Hoang (2010); 
 Ameyaw et al. (2015); Li et 
al. (2005) 
L4. Regulation Change 
Singh et al. (2006); Thuyet et 
al. (2007); Li et al. (2005) 
L5. Restriction on tolls Xenidis et al. 2005 
L6. Taxation risks Ke et al. (2010) 
Market  
Risks 
M1. Lack of transparency 
Ling and Hoang (2010) 
 
M2. Weak financial capacity of investor Ke et al. (2010) 
M3. Difficulty in accessing finance from the banks 
Discussion with Vietnamese 
practitioners 
M4. Inflation risk 
Singh et al. (2006); Thuyet et 
al. (2007); Ameyaw et al. 
(2015); Xu et al. (2011); Li et 
al. (2005) 
M5. Fluctuation of Interest rate 
Ling and Hoang (2010); 
Ameyaw et al. (2015); Li et 
al. (2005) 
M6. Foreign currency exchange fluctuation Ameyaw et al. (2015) 
M7. Influence of negative economic events 
Thuyet et al. (2007); Li et al. 
(2005) 
M8. Poor financial market Chan et al. (2011) 
M9. Income streams are usually in local currency Paolo Urio (2010) 
M10. Asset value less than predicted at the time of 
transferring 
Yuan et al. 2008 
Construc
tion 
Risks 
C1. Changes in industrial code of practices Li et al. (2005) 
C2. Poor design  Thuyet et al. (2007) 
C3. Low quality products Thuyet et al. (2007) Li et al. 
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(2005) 
C4. Low site safety Ke et al. (2010) 
C5. Unavailability of materials 
Discussion with Vietnamese 
practitioners 
C6. Design changes Ameyaw et al. (2015) 
C7. Difficulty in land acquisition and resettlement 
Singh et al. (2006); Ameyaw 
et al. (2015) Li et al. (2005) 
C8. Impractical feasibility study Thuyet et al. (2007) 
C9. Impractical requirements of progress of 
project 
Discussion with Vietnamese 
practitioners 
C10. Delay in other infrastructures relating to the 
project 
Li et al. (2005) 
Operatio
nal 
Risks 
O1. Operation cost overrun 
Ameyaw et al. (2015); Yuan 
et al. (2008); Li et al. (2005) 
O2. Default of operator Toan and Ozawa (2008) 
O3. Low quality of operation Yuan et al. 2008 
O4. High maintenance cost  
Yuan et al. 2008; Li et al. 
(2005) 
O5. Fluctuation of demand 
Song et al. (2013); Ameyaw 
et al. (2015); Yuan et al. 
2008 90 
Relations
hip 
 Risks 
Re1. Inadequate experience in PPP of Private 
sector 
Roumboutsos et al. (2008) 
 
Re2. Inadequate experience in PPP of Public 
sector 
Roumboutsos et al. (2008) 
 
Re3. Inappropriate distribution of responsibilities 
and risks 
Li et al. (2005) 
Re4. Low quality  of cooperation between 
different partners 
Thuyet et al. (2007) Li et al. 
(2005) 
Other 
Risks 
Ot1. Bad natural events 
Thuyet et al. (2007); 
Ameyaw et al. (2015);  
Ot2. Force majeure events 
Li et al. (2005); Ameyaw et 
al. (2015)  
 
Table 3. 6 Risk Interpretation 
P1. Concession termination by 
Government  
The concession period is unpredictably terminated by the host 
government.  
P2. Political opposition 
Opposition of politicians about the need of constructing 
project under PPP form 
P3. Unstable Government  Macro political changes in the government system or regime   
P4. Corruption  Involved officials from any party demand unjust rewards 
P5. Public Sector default 
The host government cannot afford its financial ability. For 
example, annual payment to investors 
P6. Public scepticism about the The scepticism of citizens about benefits of project under PPP 
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real benefits of PPP form 
P7. Forced buy-out Risks 
The SPV is forced to sell the franchise operation period to the 
host government 
L1. Disapproval of guarantees by 
the government 
The host government refuses to offer guarantee investors in 
terms to support investors accessing financial resources  
L2. Revision of the contract 
clauses 
High frequency of changes in contract clauses both because of 
public and private sector requirements  
L3. Poor project approval and 
permit process 
Time consuming, unclear and too many unnecessary 
documents are required in approval process 
L4. Regulation change 
The host government applies  inconsistent regulations and 
laws, leading to unpredictable changes in new regulations and 
laws 
L5. Restriction on tolls 
The level of toll which is paid by end-user,  is restricted by the 
host government  
L6. Taxation risks 
The tax levels are too high, or inconsistent changes in tax 
regime  
M1. Lack of transparency 
Lack of public information about the project during the project 
life cycle 
M2. Weak financial capacity of 
investor 
Private investors do not have sufficient financial capacity 
during construction time  
M3. Difficulty in accessing 
finance from the banks 
 Banks demand too many procedures which make difficulties 
for investors to access credit sources 
M4. Inflation risk Wide and unpredictable fluctuation of inflation rate 
M5. Fluctuation of interest rate Wide and unpredictable fluctuation of Interest rate 
M6. Foreign currency exchange 
risk 
Wide and unpredictable fluctuation of foreign currency 
exchange fluctuation 
M7. Influence of negative 
economic events 
Occurrence of macro negative economic events such as global 
or national financial crisis, or specific sector crisis  
M8. Poor financial market Insufficiency of credit resources available for investors 
M9. Income streams are usually in 
local currency 
Revenue collected from end-user or from the host government 
is paid in Vietnam Dong 
M10. Asset value less than 
predicted at the time of 
transferring 
Assets transferred to the government at the end of the 
concession period have less value than forecasted 
C1. Changes in industrial code of The host government applies changes in technical 
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practices requirements, and technical standards during the project life 
cycle 
C2. Poor design  
The quality of design is unsuitable both in terms of technical 
standards and citizens’ use of benefits  
C3. Low quality products The technical quality of products is below par 
C4. Low site safety 
A lack of application of safety requirements, and lack of 
restrict  monitoring about safety on site 
C5. Unavailability of materials 
Lack of material resources around construction site. The 
supplement of material is inefficient  
C6. Design changes 
High frequency of design adjusting required from the host 
government  
C7. Difficulty in land acquisition 
and resettlement 
The project land is unavailable, or delays in occupying land. 
Resettlement process is not accepted by citizens 
C8. Impractical feasibility study Over or under estimation about the benefits of the project 
C9. Impractical requirements of 
progress of project 
The host government requires impractical project’s completion 
time  
C10. Delay in other infrastructures 
relating to the project 
Different work sections in relating projects are not constructed 
on time leading to the delays in current project.  
Delays of other construction projects around the construction 
areas 
O1. Operation cost overrun 
Management costs are higher than expected, excluding 
maintenance cost. 
O2. Default of operator 
Operator cannot afford the losses during the operation period 
and quit the project 
O3. Low quality of operation 
The quality of operation is below  par for example, low quality 
of facility management, inadequate cooperation with other 
parties in identifying maintenance needs, and reducing 
overload vehicles  
O4. High maintenance cost  
Maintenance costs are higher than expected.  
Some reasons of unexpected maintenance are external to 
investors 
O5. Fluctuation of demand Traffic level widely fluctuates and is below forecasted levels 
Re1. Inadequate experience in 
PPP of the private sector 
Investors have not participated in many PPPs in the transport 
sector in Vietnam 
Re2. Inadequate experience in 
PPP of the public sector 
The host government does not have sufficient experience in 
PPPs in transport sector 
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Re3. Inappropriate distribution of 
responsibilities and risks 
Both parties are too risk averse and risks are not transferred to 
the party which is the best to manage them  
Re4. Low quality of cooperation 
between different partners 
Parties in project do not show effective co-cooperation due to 
different working methods or bureaucratic system  
Ot1. Bad natural events 
Occurrence of nature events such as heavy rain, high 
temperature, floods, earthquakes, etc.  
Ot2. Force majeure events Occurrence of events such as war, terrorism, etc.  
3.10. Summary  
In this chapter, fundamental concepts about risks and uncertainty were explained to 
illustrate the concept that the research centres on. This chapter also reviewed literature 
about the risk management process in PPPs. Different perspectives of the public and 
private sectors were also displayed. Different essential issues in managing risks were also 
expressed in this chapter. At the end of this chapter the elements of the proposed risk 
evaluation framework were justified. More specifically, it is concluded that the proposed 
framework should contain functions of identifying risks, of evaluating the riskiness of 
projects, allocating risks based on multiple criteria, effectively evaluating project returns 
and determining the concession period. In addition, this chapter also illustrated a list of 
risks that will be used in this research. More specifically, 44 risks are chosen and these 
risks are categorized in seven groups. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS IN EVALUATING PPP 
PROJECTS’ RISKINESS 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter clarifies the reasons for promoting Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to be 
used in the proposed risk evaluation framework. For this purpose, firstly, fundamental 
principles of AHP are presented. Secondly, the application of AHP in a wide range of area 
is shown to demonstrate the variety of the application of this technique. Thirdly, a more 
detailed review is provided for application of AHP in the area of construction projects in 
international markets. Fourthly, the review is focused on the application of AHP in the PPP 
construction projects. The research about this application is reviewed and their advantages 
and disadvantages are criticized. After this, the justification for using the application of 
AHP in the proposed framework is presented. Finally, the main points of the chapter are 
summarized in the conclusion section.  
4.2. Analytic Hierarchy Process in Decision Making 
4.2.1. Principles of Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a multiple criteria decision making method. This 
process was first introduced by Satty (1980). In this method, subjective evaluations are 
transferred to numerical values. Pairwise comparisons are made between criteria and 
alternatives. From these pairwise comparisons, mathematical analysis is used to create a 
comprehensive comparison of options (Bhushan and Rai, 2004). In Satty’s process, small 
inconsistency was allowed because humans are not consistent at all times. It should be 
noted that the word inconsistency refers to the situation that the decisions of pairwise 
comparisons made by decision making are inconsistent. For example, decision maker may 
evaluate item i is more important than item j and item j is more important than item k, but 
item k is more important than item i. As stated Satty (1980) is aware that human are not 
consistent at all times by nature. Therefore, he provides an acceptable level of 
inconsistency. Basically, he illustrates how much inconsistency is accepted in AHP model. 
More detail about this test can be found in section 7.5.4.6 in chapter 7.  
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In order to make a decision based on AHP, first, decision makers need to identify the 
problem and the knowledge area that they need. After that, the hierarchy including the 
alternatives (options) and criteria (or sub-criteria) needs to be structured. The pairwise 
comparison needs to be built between alternatives, and between criteria (sub-criteria). Each 
element in a higher level in the hierarchy is used to compare elements in the lower level 
with regard to that higher level’s element (Satty, 1980). Figure 4.1 shows an example of the 
hierarchy structure. 
Figure 4. 1 Hierarchy structure and pairwise comparison (Bhushan and Rai, 2004) 
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To create a pairwise comparison, linguistic judgements need to be transferred to the 
numeric value. Table 4.1 below clarifies how linguistic comparison can be converted to the 
numeric value. In table 4.1, each linguistic judgment can be converted to a number from 1 
to 9. The values of 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 are first considered, and the values of 2, 4, 6, 8 can be used 
if needed.  
Table 4. 1 Linguistic Measures of Importance in AHP (Saaty, 1980) 
Scale Definition Explanation 
1 Equal  Two items contribute equally to the objective 
3 Weak  One item is slightly more important than another 
5 Strong  One is strongly more important than another 
7 Very Strong  One is very strongly more important than another  
9 Extremely Strong One is extremely more important than another 
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By creating a pairwise comparison, the weight of criteria and matrix of option scores can 
be made. From here, the comprehensive comparison between alternatives can be made to 
create a decision.  
4.2.2. Application of AHP in a Wide Range of Area 
Since AHP was first introduced, there have been a number of applications of this theory to 
improve the quality of the decision making process. Indeed, the applications of this theory 
have spread over a wide range of areas.  
For example, AHP was first applied in the social area in the research by Hegde and 
Tadikamalla (1990), Ahire and Rana (1995), Yurimoto and Masui (1995), Korpela and 
Tuominen (1996), Korpela et al. (1998), and Korpela and Lehmusvara (1999). More 
specifically, a paper by Hegde and Tadikamalla (1990) reported the application of AHP in 
selecting the location for a service terminal. In this selection, the location alternatives were 
compared based on multiple aspects (criteria) such as operating cost, availability of staff, 
capacity of dedication, and so on.  The decision made in this report was concluded to be of 
reasonable quality with respect to all mentioned aspects. Similarly to Hegde and 
Tadikamalla (1990), a process for choosing the location for a warehouse was also modelled 
based on AHP in research by Korpela and Tuominen (1996). The finding of the research 
shows that the AHP-based selection process is flexible and systematic. They also 
concluded that this selection process is a significant improvement in comparison to other 
selection methods. In addition, the process is also said to be able to enable decision makers 
to select alternatives in an iterative manner as the hierarchy of elements can be adjusted. 
Also focusing on a warehouse network, Korpela and Lehmusvara (1999) designed a 
process to evaluate a warehouse network based on AHP with regards to customer 
requirements. They expected that the proposed framework was flexible in comparison with 
traditional selection methods based on cost and profit analysis alone. Research by Ahire 
and Rana (1995) proposed a model to assist managers in choosing the most effective 
business units for pilot testing of total quality management (TQM). The research was 
carried in the USA market, with focus on the hospital environment. The conclusion of the 
research was that the model can create a rational foundation to choosing business units. 
Research by Korpela et al. (1998) also presented a framework based on AHP to manage a 
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logistics service. This framework has 7 steps which are systematically proposed based on 
AHP.   
More recent research applying AHP to the social area can be attributed to Chiang (2013), 
Mishra et al. (2015), Uyan (2013), Bunruamkaew and Murayam (2011), Şeker and 
Özgürler (2012), Unjan et al. (2013), and Mani et al. (2014). AHP and GIS were combined 
to identify potential ecotourism sites in Thailand. The identification process was designed 
to assess multi-criteria of sites such as landscape, wildlife, topography, and accessibility 
features (Bunruamkaew and Murayam, 2011). Also in selection of the location, research by 
Uyan (2013) identified a suitable location for a solar firm in Turkey. The selection process 
was also designed based on AHP and GIS. They concluded that this selection process 
allows decision makers to consider the location both in terms of the economic aspect and 
environmental aspect. Similarly, research by Mishra et al. (2015) also used AHP combined 
with Geographic Information System to identify suitable land for an organic farm. They 
stated that this combination is very useful to identify suitable land for farms. 
In research by Şeker and Özgürler (2012), AHP was combined with SWOT analysis to 
assess a Turkish consumer electronics company in terms of its strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats. In this study, a SWOT matrix was transferred to a hierarchy 
structure and this structure was analysed using the AHP method. An AHP tool was also 
used to analyse the positive and negative aspects of the area’s expansion policy of oil palm 
in Thailand in a paper by Unjan et al. (2013). In this analysis income impacts and social 
impacts to the area were both considered by AHP. Similarly, AHP was also used to select a 
supplier in the research by Mani et al. (2014). In this research, social parameters such as 
equity, health, safety, wages, education, philanthropy, child labour and bonded labour were 
compared. Research was applied to three case studies to demonstrate the process and the 
respondents in this research were experts in the field.  
Researchers have also attempted to apply AHP to the area of education. Research by 
Tadisna et al. (1991), Bryson and Mololurin (1997), Ereeş et al. (2013), can Chen et al. 
(2015) can be examples. More specifically, research by Tadisna et al. (1991) used AHP to 
set up a process to select a doctoral program. A case study was carried out with MBA 
students to illustrate the process. It was expected to improve the quality of selection by 
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looking at the location of schools, infrastructure, quality of entering students, and 
reputation of schools. In Bryson and Mololurin’s (1997) research, AHP was used to create 
a systematic action learning evaluation procedure (ALEP). A more recent study by Ereeş et 
al. (2013) evaluated simulation applications used in the education area by analysing 
opinions of experts and academicians using AHP. Ereeş et al. (2013) concluded that AHP 
makes it faster and more convenient to fill out the evaluations. Likewise, teaching 
performance is also evaluated using fuzzy AHP in the research by Chen et al. (2015). A 
case study was used to test the application. Chen et al. (2015) commented that this 
evaluation method can enable a consensus of decision makers and diminish uncertainty. 
Additionally, the evaluation was considered as scientific, accurate, and objective by using 
fuzzy AHP. 
The manufacturing sector is also an area attracting the implementation of AHP. For 
example, in research by Shang et al. (1995), researchers combined AHP and Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to choose the most appropriate Flexible Manufacturing 
System (FMS). Shang et al. (1995) clarified that Flexible Manufacturing System has both 
tangible and intangible benefits. Intangible benefits include long-term goals, and AHP was 
used to examine the nonmonetary criteria influencing corporate goals and long-term aims. 
Research by Mohonty and Deshmukh (1998) also used AHP to propose a strategic model 
for learning and evaluating advanced manufacturing technology with a case study on an 
Indian electronics manufacturing enterprise. Mohonty and Deshmukh (1998) also stated 
that AHP was applied in this strategic model because of its ability to quantify intangible 
aspects. In a more recent study by Yang et al. (2009), an integrated performance 
measurement model was created based on AHP and an analytical network process (ANP) 
evaluation to manage strategy. Performance criteria from the literature review were used to 
create the hierarchy structure. The first level of criteria has 6 elements, namely quality, 
utilization, flexibility, employee, delivery dependence, and cost. In addition, 44 sub-criteria 
were also created. The results of this evaluation model were compared to results from 
financial reports, and the comparison showed that the combined AHP and ANP illustrate 
the real performance of a manufacturing system. A later research by Jovanović et al. 
(2015) attempted to analyse manufacturing sectors in Serbia. To prioritize these sectors 
AHP was applied to take the opinion of experts from the Serbian Chamber of Commerce 
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and Industry. The application was evaluated as convenient in the research. Similarly, 
research by Gupta et al. (2015) presented an AHP-based model to evaluate sustainable 
manufacturing practices in the electrical industry. In this model, key practices of 
sustainable manufacturing were used to build the hierarchy structure. The model was 
deemed logical and as able to take into account both mathematical aspects and human 
psychology (ibid). 
Researchers in the area of software engineering have also been attracted to this decision 
making technique. For example, Choi (1999) developed two optimization models based on 
AHP to evaluate Commercial Off The Shelf (COST) software products. Different COST 
software products were compared based on their functions and on financial criteria such as 
limited budget. Similarly, the selection of a multi-media authorizing system was also 
supported by AHP in the research by Lai et al. (2002). AHP was employed to analyse the 
opinions of six experts to compare different software with regards to quality, indirect 
benefits, practicality, satisfaction and financial aspects. Interestingly, the selection of AHP 
software was also tested in AHP in the research by Ossadnik and Lange (1999). In this 
evaluation, hierarchy was built by criteria from the international norm ISO/IEC 9126. 
Additionally, scientists also made an effort using AHP to support political decision. For 
example, Carlsson and Walden (1995) used AHP to create a model to support Political 
Group Decisions. Carlsson and Walden (1995) explained that AHP was used to avoid 
inconsistency in decision making. A hierarchy of political criteria was built. This hierarchy 
contains 6 criteria and 21 sub-criteria. The government analysis was also supported by 
AHP in research by Li and Sherali (2003). In this paper, a model for analysing foreign 
direct investment opportunities was presented. To reach their goals, expert opinions were 
analysed by AHP. Furthermore, AHP was also applied to other areas such as industry, and 
banking, etc. (Vaidya and Kumar, 2006). 
4.3. AHP in the Construction Area 
4.3.1. AHP as a Single Approach in the Construction Area 
One of the first studies of AHP that looked into the construction area was the study by 
Skibniewski and Chao (1992). By observing that intangible features of advanced 
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construction technologies and of associated risks are difficult to quantify in traditional 
evaluation approaches, Skibniewski and Chao (1992) proposed a model based on AHP to 
assess intangible benefits of advanced construction technologies. They used this model to 
compare different alternatives of advanced construction technologies with regards to the 
final goals of decision makers. This was different from the traditional comparison methods 
which compared the financial aspects of the alternatives only. They also used a case study 
of a tower crane to illustrate the model. Later research by Kalamaras et al. (2000) used 
AHP as a single approach to select the best highway alignment, and five alignments were 
used to demonstrate the model. In this model, multiple aspects of the best alignment were 
chosen to compare alternatives. For example, they considered the impact of the highway on 
the environment, the functionality of the highway, construction time, construction cost, and 
the economic value of investment.  In addition, for each of these criteria, sub-criteria were 
also given. Contractor selection was also supported by AHP in the research by Topcu 
(2004). The research was applied to the Turkish construction market. Researchers observed 
that in the bidding process in this market, the lowest bidder was the winner. However, they 
criticized that this type of selection is not appropriate. Consequently, their contractor 
selection model looked at three main concepts, namely, cost, time and quality of the project 
to select the most eligible contractor. They also advised that additional criteria such as 
health and safety, and environmental impact can be added in the making decision. Also 
looking at selecting contractors in a construction project, Mishra et al. (2015) applied AHP 
to prequalify contractors. The proposed model was expected to select contractors for 
design-build, cost plus time and warranty delivery methods. It was also expected that with 
support from AHP, only competent contractors with low-cost bidding can pass the 
prequalification process. However, in contrast to the model by Topcu (2004), the model by 
Mishra et al. (2015) has two stages and some aspects such as financial stability, manpower, 
and equipment were considered in the first stage only. As stated by the authors, this is to 
prevent large contractors from controlling the market. Looking at a different aspect of 
construction projects, Shapira and Goldenberg (2005) applied AHP to select equipment for 
a construction project. They argued that current models failed in evaluating soft factors 
together with cost aspects of the selection. Therefore an AHP-based model was proposed 
to resolve that issue. Four criteria and eighteen sub-criteria with regards to the final goals 
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were hierarchized. Zhang et al. (2006) also applied AHP to evaluate expressway 
construction projects in China. They applied his model to seven expressway construction 
projects and concluded that his model using AHP is valuable both in terms of theory and 
practice. Lin et al. (2008) criticized the nine scale provided in AHP and proposed an 
improved AHP call A
3
 to increase the consistency level of this method in applying into 
construction project. To demonstrate the improvement, they used a data from a bidding 
process of a construction project. The model was considered as cost effective, timeless and 
be able to improve the quality of selection.  
More recently, AHP was used by Kim et al. (2010) to propose a technique to assess safety 
risks in construction projects. In their study, literature review and expert survey were first 
conducted. Then, AHP was employed to identify weight of each risk. Similarly in terms of 
assessing safety risks, Badri et al. (2012) also employed AHP combined with Expert 
Choice software to identify potential sources of safety risks.  After testing this method by 
case studies, their method was evaluated as it can quickly prioritize risks and their causes. 
Moreover, they also suggested that this method is simple to practice without large 
investment. 
With attempts to reduce the negative impact of construction activities to the environmental 
aspect and socio-economic features, Reza et al. (2011) used AHP to create a three level 
hierarchy to evaluate projects. Three main criteria, namely, environmental concerns, socio-
political issues and economic concerns, and thirteen sub-criteria were included in this 
hierarchy. A flooring system in Tehran was used to demonstrate the model. However, they 
noted that the model is flexible and can be used in other building components in different 
geographical regions. Also considering the environment impact, Zhou et al. (2015) 
proposed a model to assess the environment impact of civil structures. The model 
supported decision makers to make an eco-friendly decision, and a steel box girder bridge 
and a pre-stressed concrete (PSC) box girder bridge were used to present the model. 
Zavadskas et al. (2011) proposed a method to determine the management strategies for 
construction projects. In this model, strength, weakness, opportunities and threats of a 
project were structured and analysed by AHP. A number of criteria were also created for 
SWOT based on the objectives and interests of stakeholders. They also used a case study to 
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show the applicability of the proposed model. Kayastha et al. (2013) applied AHP to the 
Tinau watershed in Nepal to create a landside susceptibility map. Eleven factors were 
investigated based on availability of data for the region. They noted that although the 
model can be used in other areas however, the criteria factors need to be adjusted based on 
the specific region. Wankhade and Landage (2013) used AHP as one of the components in 
the non-destructive testing system which is used to detect internal defects and cracks in 
concrete structures, pavements, and metal testing. AHP was used to select the most 
appropriate repair method. 
Attempting to improve the consistency of AHP, Li et al. (2013) attempted to keep the 
simplicity by modifying the conditions that experts indicated on questionnaires. In their 
improvement, similarly to the standard AHP, pairwise comparison was applied to the 
criteria, but instead of comparing two criteria by nine scales as in standard AHP, 
judgement between two criteria was instead sorted by the researchers (Li et al. 2013). This 
feature was expected to reduce the number of pairwise comparisons, thus increasing the 
consistency. However, the finding shows that IAHP is not applicable when the number of 
criteria is three or four. In addition, the consistency level is also not satisfied when the 
number of criteria is eight or nine. 
4.3.2. AHP in Hybrid Approaches in the Construction Area 
4.3.2.1. AHP and Fuzzy Set Theory 
The combination of AHP and fuzzy set theory is the subject which has attracted a number 
of researchers. For example, Filippo et al. (2007) presented a procedure to evaluate 
highway restoration. In this model, AHP was combined with fuzzy theory to form a model 
called the Fuzzy Multi-Criteria Model to support the decision. The model was used to 
determine the work sections which need to be restored. The research was carried out with 
data from the Brazilian construction industry. A hierarchy structure was created for criteria 
namely, risk of accidents, economic meaning, environmental influence, and risk of erosion. 
Two highway segments were used to test the proposed model. Pan (2008) also used the 
combination of AHP and fuzzy set theory to select the best method to construct a bridge 
project. Pan (2008) stated that this combination can resolve the problem associated in 
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mapping people’s opinions with an exact number. The triangular, trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers and α-cut concept were employed in the model. Similarly to conventional AHP, 
the input data is the hierarchy of criteria and pairwise comparisons. They stated that the 
model is faster and more efficient. Another notable study which tried to combine AHP and 
fuzzy theory was the study by Zayed et al. (2008). They combined fuzzy theory and AHP 
to compare the risk level in four Chinese highway projects. There is a difference in 
applying AHP in this research. For instance, they introduced the definition of the effect 
score, and instead of building the matrix of option scores, they find the effect score and 
then use this value as the matrix of option scores in AHP. This can make the computation 
much easier because in order to find the effect scores they just need to rank projects or 
companies regarding each risk in nine scales, then use the average score. Thus, a number 
of pairwise comparisons do not need to be made. However, they then ignored the benefit of 
pairwise comparison; that it can create a clear and direct comparison between each 
element. 
Examining the contractor selection process, Jaskowski et al. (2010) used Fuzzy AHP to 
support the decision of selecting an appropriate contractor. Through the Fuzzy AHP model, 
the technical and economic ability of the contractors can be assessed (Jaskowski et al., 
2010). It was expected that this model can enable the user to find a solution even if the 
pairwise comparisons are not totally completed by decision makers. However, they also 
admit that the proposed model is not complete because additional difficulties diminish the 
mean of deviations between values given by experts and the group’s weight then appears. 
Observing the human resource aspect of construction projects, Shahhosseini and Sebt 
(2011) presented a fuzzy adaptive decision making model based on AHP. The purpose of 
researchers was to create a computing model which can take into account various candidate 
competencies. In this model, human resource was classified into 4 categories, namely, 
project manager, engineer, technician and labourer. Shahhosseini and Sebt (2011) uttered 
that the proposed model is a precise and useful tool. It was also suggested that the model 
can be used for firms with low experience in managing human resources. They also noted 
that the model is flexible in order to add more additional factors to the criteria in the 
hierarchy structure. It is also expected to reduce the hidden cost and time during the 
selection stage.  
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Li and Zou (2011) employed fuzzy AHP to construction projects in China to prove that 
fuzzy AHP is also practical in assessing and ranking risks in this type of construction 
project with improved accuracy and reduced subjectivity. They concluded that by 
combining fuzzy theory and AHP, researchers can reduce problems associated with 
uncertain judgements of experts. The model can bring more accurate risk assessment, and 
reduce the level of responding experts’ subjectivity. The risk ranking order was not 
significant different compared to results made by AHP. However, it is considered that 
clearer orders were made. Nevertheless, the problems of a low inconsistency level was not 
resolved in this research and they suggested that to minimize the consistency, experts need 
to be selected based on experts in the field, high relevant experience, and management 
experience. In addition, the authors admitted that fuzzy AHP increases the number of 
computations. Ka (2011) combined Fuzzy AHP and ELECTRE II methods (Elimination 
ET Choice Translating Reality) to select the optimal dry ports construction projects. Ka 
(2011) say that this combination makes the process much more suitable in real situations of 
selecting dry ports. The weights of six influencing factors were determined by AHP. After 
that, these weights are analysed by ELECTRE II methodology to evaluate alternatives. 
With the purpose of improving the safety of the construction site, more specifically, 
preventing fire accidents, Hui et al. (2012) used AHP to determine the safety assessment 
indexes by collecting experts’ opinions. Five single factors of the index system were 
structured and evaluated by fuzzy methods. The bidding process was also examined in the 
research by Chou et al. (2013). By observing that the bidding process is a complex 
decision making process containing numerous influential factors, and that previous bidding 
models have not been successfully developed in terms of determining the bid amount with 
a specific confidence level, in the research by Chou et al. (2013), fuzzy AHP was 
combined with regression based simulation to create a model supporting decision makers 
in the bidding process. Chou et al. (2013) go further into the combination of AHP and 
fuzzy theory. They used the Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) with the Monte 
Carlo simulation (MCS) to propose a new bidding strategy. In this model, FAHP was used 
to weigh the factors influencing the cost of a project. After that, the cumulative distribution 
functions were created by a regression model in different confidence levels. The model 
was expected to assist bidders in deciding whether they should go to the bidding 
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competition. It also was expected to help bidders in estimating the success of the bid level 
with a certain level of confidence. The model was tested in a bridge project in Taiwan. 
Fuzzy AHP in this model was used to weigh the criteria relating to the cost of the project. 
Moreover this model was used with the Monte Carlo simulation to create a cumulative 
distribution function of the winning bid level to assist bidders in the bidding process. 
However, in this model Chou et al. (2013) just looked at the cost aspect of the project. 
A more recent study by Akadiri et al. (2013) criticized that the current models to select 
construction materials fail to take into account the sustainability principles, and the process 
of assessing relevant criteria. Therefore, they combine AHP and fuzzy theory to form the 
fuzzy extended analytical hierarchy process (FEAHP) model to select sustainable material 
for construction projects. Six relevant criteria, namely, environmental effect, competence 
of resource, reduction of waste, cost, quality and social profit were collected by using the 
triple bottom line (TBL) technique. They then are structured to be used in the FEAHP. 
However, they also have to admit that their model is complicated to use as it increases the 
number of calculations.  
Additionally, the use of fuzzy AHP is also combined with TOPSIS which is also a multiple 
attribute decision making technique. Research by Golestanifar et al. (2011) and Chamzini 
and Yakhchali (2012) can be taken as examples. In research by Golestanifar et al. (2011), 
fuzzy AHP and TOPSIS methods were used to propose an approach to select the best 
tunnel excavation method. In this approach, preference order of attributes was determined 
by fuzzy AHP, and final rankings of the excavation methods were made by TOPSIS. A 
case study of the Ghomroud water conveyance tunnel in Iran was presented to illustrate the 
effectiveness of the model in assisting contractors. Also looking at tunnel projects, 
Chamzini and Yakhchali (2012) used fuzzy AHP and TOPSIS to select the Tunnel Boring 
Machine (TBM).  Similarly in the research by Golestanifar et al. (2011), fuzzy AHP 
determined the weights of the evaluation criteria, and TOPSIS was used to make the final 
rankings of options.  
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4.3.2.2. AHP in other Hybrid Approaches in the Construction Area 
Another hybrid method that should be mentioned is the combination of AHP and the 
VIKOR method. A paper by Liu and Yan (2007) presents a model based on the VIKOR 
method, which is also a multiple criteria decision making approach, and AHP to support 
decision makers in selecting the most preferred bidder in the construction bidding process. 
Authors revealed that VIKOR is used to resolve the problems of conflicting criteria. 
Similar to other AHP models, the weights of criteria, namely, quotation, construction 
design, company's capability, quality, and time, were determined by AHP. They also used 
a numerical example to show that the model is the correct method to use and is effective. 
In addition, the Integrated Value Model for Sustainability Assessment (MIVES) was also 
combined with AHP in the construction project. For example, Lombera and Aprea (2010) 
used MIVES to define the sustainability criteria of industrial buildings. These criteria are 
environment, cost, functionality, society, safety and visual aspect. Industrial buildings are 
then evaluated by AHP with regards to these criteria. The final outcome of this 
combination is the Environmental Sustainability Index of the industrial buildings. 
Similarly, MIVES was also combined with AHP in the research by Pons and Aguado 
(2012) to determine the technology to build schools in Catalonia, Spain. MIVES, in this 
model, was also used to determine the most significant and discriminatory indicators to 
structure a hierarchy for the AHP process. Going further with the combination of AHP and 
MIVES, Caño et al. (2012) added the Monte Carlo simulation technique to the 
combination. The purpose of the proposed model is not only to provide the potential 
sustainability index, but also to take into account the uncertainty in achieving the 
sustainability goals. MCS was also applied to AHP in the paper by Gervásio and Silva 
(2012). However, this paper provided an additional technique, Preference Ranking 
Organization Method of Enrichment Evaluation (PROMETHEE), to their model. The use 
of MCS and PROMETHEE was expected to resolve the uncertainty of evaluating life-
cycle based criteria, namely, environmental, economic and social aspects. This design was 
expected to enhance the quality of the decision making process.  
Another outstanding mixed technique is the combination of AHP and Utility Theory (UT). 
Hsueh et al. (2007) combined AHP and UT to create an online evaluation system for Joint 
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Ventures (JVs) in evaluating international contractors. The purpose of this model was to 
determine the Expected Utility Value (EUV) of each scenario. For this purpose, AHP was 
used to analyse the information of international contractors while UT was employed to deal 
with risks of each scenario. Criticizing that using AHP alone cannot provide appropriate 
results if the number of criteria is more than fifteen, Wang et al. (2008) used the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) method, and the simple additive weighting (SAW) method, 
together with AHP to propose a model to overcome this limitation. The values of the 
linguistic judgement were obtained thought the DEA while the SAW method was 
employed to deal with risks in each criterion. A numerical example was also provided to 
illustrate the combination. 
A further interesting combination is that of AHP and Complex Proportional Assessment of 
alternatives with Gray relations (COPRAS-G). This combination was provided in the paper 
of Bitarafan et al. (2012) to determine sustainable development and safety regulations. In 
this combination, criteria with the grey relational grade were analysed by (COPRAS-G). 
The values of these criteria were then described in intervals.   
A more recent paper by Aminbakhsh et al. (2013) introduced a system using the AHP and 
cost of safety (COS) model to prioritize safety risks to determine reasonable investment. In 
their system, AHP was used to reduce the inconsistent judgements made by participants. 
Three levels of risks were presented. There were three groups of risks in level 2 and in 
each risk group (level 3), there were 3 safety risks. It was concluded that they model was 
able to identify and rank safety risks in construction projects. However, there is confusion 
about the way in which pairwise comparisons are made. More specifically, risks in risk 
groups (level 3) are pairwise compared, and this is consistent to AHP theory. Therefore, 
according to AHP theory, risk groups in level 2, then, need to be pairwise compared 
regarding the risks in level 3. However, in the research by Aminbakhsh et al. (2013), these 
risk groups in level 2 are not compared with regards to risks in each group. Consequently, 
the final results of the comparison in level 2 cannot reflect the importance of risks in level 
3. Moreover, as it is time-consuming, this is one weakness of this system as it requires a 
huge amount of pairwise comparisons (ibid.). 
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4.4. AHP in Risk Management in PPPs  
Apart from application of AHP to the general construction area, some researchers have 
also utilized this decision making theory in managing risks in PPP construction projects. 
For example, research by Ababutain (2002) also used AHP as a tool to select the best 
proposal for a BOT project. Success factors for a BOT project were identified and 
structured as a hierarchy. Five criteria, namely, promoter qualifications, project 
qualifications, financial feasibility, implementation requirements, and socio-economic 
effects, were selected.  A total of 25 successful factors were selected as sub-criteria. 
Focused on Joint Venture construction projects, Zhang and Zou (2007) used Fuzzy 
Analytical Hierarchy Process to create a quantitative assessment approach to assess the risk 
level of joint venture construction projects in China. In the risk hierarchy, the second level 
contains internal risks, project specified risks, and external risks. In the third level, fifteen 
risks are structured. Similar to the standard AHP, the weights of risk factors are 
determined. Then researchers used fuzzy set theory to build fuzzy evaluation matrixes. By 
discovering that the selections of the PPP financing model and risks influencing these 
models have fuzzy characters, research by Chang and Liu (2008) also used fuzzy AHP to 
select the financing method for PPP. Three criteria, namely, Good attributes of 
infrastructure, Object of private co-operator, and Consciousness and concept of the 
government, were decided. In addition, 8 sub-criteria were identified to create the 
hierarchy. 
Another remarkable application in PPP is the research by Lie and Zou (2008). They 
observed that PPPs require large and long investments. Thus, they have associated this 
with unique and dynamic risks. They developed the risk identification and assessment 
framework based on fuzzy AHP from the project life cycle perspectives. In their model, 
risks are identified from the literature review; they then are classified into six categories 
which are the stages in the life cycle of the project, namely, Feasibility study, Financing, 
Design, Construction, Operation, and Transfer. Each risk group has a number of risks. A 
total of 23 risks were used to structure the risk hierarchy. AHP was used to make a 
pairwise comparison between risk groups. Then the fuzzy weighting of the pairwise 
comparison can be computed. Finally, the ranking of risk factors can be found by 
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defuzzification of fuzzy weighting.  One of the good points of this research is that using 
fuzzy AHP may resolve the problems which traditional AHP may face which is that the 
information of risk might be imprecise and uncertain in order to make crisp judgment 
(Wang et al. 2007). However, this model makes a pairwise comparison of 6 risk groups. 
This may increase the level of inconsistency as Li et al. (2013) observed that the number of 
elements should not be over five. In addition, one of the very important points to note is 
that the advantage of AHP is to be able compare alternatives (in this case, risk factors) 
regarding the multi criteria; however, in the research by Lie and Zou (2008), with the fuzzy 
AHP model, risk weightings are just determined from defuzzification of fuzzy weighting. 
In other words, risk factors are not being pairwise compared with respect to the decision 
makers’ multi-criteria. It can be seen that risks are compared with respect to the 
consequence of the project, but no details of the consequence are provided. Hence, the 
advantage of this model in ranking risks, in comparison with other risk ranking techniques, 
is limited. 
Research by Li and Zou (2011) also presented a fuzzy AHP model as a risk assessment 
technique for PPPs. Similar to the research by Lie and Zou (2008) mentioned previously, 
the purpose of Li and Zou’s (2011) research is to rank risk factors associated in PPP. A 
hierarchy structure with three levels was created. The criteria were divided into 7 groups, 
namely, risks in the feasibility stage, risks in the tendering stage, risks in the financing 
stage, risks in the design stage, risks in the construction stage, risks in the operation stage, 
and risks in the transfer stage. The model was then demonstrated by a PPP expressway 
project from China. They also compared the ranking results made by traditional AHP and 
fuzzy AHP, and concluded that fuzzy AHP can make it easier to rank risks because 
weighting values created by traditional AHP are similar to each other. In addition, by 
introducing an index α, they expected that this model can reduce the responding experts’ 
subjectivity which may appear in traditional AHP. However, they also admit that the 
rankings of risks are similar in both methods, and fuzzy AHP creates more computation 
than does traditional AHP.   
Alternative remarkable application into PPPs that should be revised is the use of AHP by 
Raisbeck and Tang (2013). Different from the research by Lie and Zou (2008) and by Li 
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and Zou (2011) mentioned in above paragraphs, by observing that the design stage is one 
of the keys of a PPP, Raisbeck and Tang (2013) looked further into a single stage of a PPP, 
namely, the stage of development of a design. The hierarchy structure has three levels. The 
second level shows that four criteria were formed, namely, Design (D) and Design 
Management (DM), which are exploratory distinctions, and Design Support (DS) and 
Design Infrastructure (DI), which are exploitative distinctions. In the third level, for each 
element in the second level, sub-criteria were created. A total of 36 sub-criteria were 
structured in the hierarchy. The comparisons were made by experts in the field. It should 
be noted that in contrast to the purpose of the research by Lie and Zou (2008), the purpose 
of the research by Raisbeck and Tang (2013) is to find the ranking of criteria in level 2. 
Thus, sub-criteria in level 3 can be seen as multi-criteria for comparing criteria in level 2, 
and this can use the advantages of the AHP method. However, similar to the limitation 
found by Lie and Zou (2008), there are too many sub-criteria in each criteria group. For 
instance, there are 10 factors in the Design (D) category, and 10 factors in the Design 
Infrastructure (DI) category. Thus, pairwise comparison between these sub-criteria can be 
inconsistent, or it can be too time-consuming to achieve an acceptable consistency level. 
4.5. The Selection of AHP in The Proposed Risk Evaluation Framework 
From the above review, it can be seen that there has been a number of studies which have 
applied AHP to the construction industry, and some of them have been applied in 
managing risks in PPP projects. However, it can be recognised that a majority of previous 
studies have just focused on identifying and ranking risks in projects. There is no 
application of AHP in evaluation of PPP projects with regards to critical risks. In addition, 
there is no research that applies AHP in allocating these critical risks in PPPs. Therefore, 
this research will apply AHP to evaluate riskiness in PPPs. This is beneficial in practice as 
in reality the host government has to select the most important projects to be implemented 
in PPP form.  Moreover, AHP will be used to allocate critical risks to the party which is the 
best way to manage them because the allocating process is also a decision making process 
in which parties need to consider multiple important factors. The details of how to apply 
AHP in evaluating risk level of PPPs, and how to allocate critical risks by using the 
proposed framework will be provided in sections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.1.3 in chapter 6. 
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Importantly, it should be remarked that a number of developments and combinations have 
been provided in using AHP. However, each developed model also comes with its own 
limitations as described. In fact, as Li et al. (2013) concluded although there have been 
many developments and combinations used for AHP to improve it ability, such as 
increasing the consistency in the comparison matrix, or improving the ability of dealing 
with subjective judgements, these improvements make AHP more and more complicated to 
use in practice. For that reason, the current research is going to use the standard AHP 
because of its simplicity and its satisfactory outcomes as stated by Lie and Zou (2008), 
Bitarafan et al. (2012), and Raisbeck and Tang (2013). The application of AHP in the risk 
evaluation framework is for the purpose of comparing different projects with regards to 
risks associated to a specific PPP market. Importantly, the standard AHP was used with the 
suggestions from previous studies in mind, such as that of Li and Zou (2011), by choosing 
participants who are experts in the field with high relevant experience, and who are in the 
management team, so the limitation of AHP can be minimized. 
4.6. Summary 
This chapter clarified the reason for using the AHP model and assessed the proposed risk 
evaluation framework by reviewing and critically analysing the application of AHP in a 
wide range of contexts. In this chapter, firstly, fundamental principles of AHP were 
provided. After that, the application of AHP in the construction area and PPP projects was 
provided. The literature review in this chapter showed that the advantage of AHP is the 
ability to compare different alternative with regards to multiple criteria. This chapter also 
demonstrated that there is no application of AHP in the evaluation of PPP projects’ 
riskiness, and no research applying AHP in allocating critical risks in PPPs. AHP is 
combined in the proposed risk evaluation framework to firstly evaluate PPP’s riskiness, 
and secondly to evaluate critical risks. In addition, this chapter also clarified the use of 
standard AHP because of its simplicity and suitability for the aim of this research.  
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CHAPTER 5: REVIEW OF INVESTMENT EVALUATION METHODS AND 
CONCESSION DETERMINATION METHODS FOR PPPs 
5.1.  Introduction 
In this chapter, return evaluation methods, which have been used in assessment of PPPs, 
will be reviewed. First, the evaluation methods used to evaluate projects in all sectors in 
the international market will be examined. The popularity of these methods is also 
compared. After that, the most popular methods which have been used to evaluate PPPs 
will be considered. More specifically, the Payback method, IRR, and NPV-based methods 
will be reviewed in detail. The review will also provide the advantages and disadvantages 
of these evaluation methods. By critiquing the limitations of these methods, the chapter 
will clarify the reason why these methods do not accurately evaluate PPPs in the transport 
sector. Moreover, the developments which have been used to resolve the limitations of 
these methods are also represented. Finally, the basic ideas of Risk Adjusted DNPV will be 
presented with its advantages. 
5.2. Investment Evaluation Methods 
When planning to invest in a long-term project, it is important to evaluate the financial 
aspect of the project. In other words, investors need to ensure that the project is profitable. 
Because of this vital need, there have been many methods used by analysts to evaluate 
investments, for example, Payback period methods, Internal Rate of Return (IRR), Net 
Present Value-Based methods, PI-Index method, etc.  Investors can either use one of these 
methods or combine them to make a sound decision. The popularity of these methods has 
been also recorded by a number of researchers. For example, John and Harvey (2001) 
carried out a survey amongst 392 CFOs in the USA about the evaluation methods that 
these CFOs frequently used at the end of 1990s. In their study, IRR, NPV, Hurdle Rate and 
Payback are the most popular methods used in the USA. In fact, IRR and NPV are by far 
the most popular methods according to their survey. Moreover, in their study, large firms 
are more likely to use NPV than small firms, and highly levered firms are more likely to 
use NPV and IRR than firms with small debt. They also stressed that there is no difference 
between growth and non-growth organizations.   
 73 
 
More recent studies have also attempted to rediscover the popularity of evaluation methods 
amongst investors. Recent studies have shown different popularity of these techniques in 
different parts of the world. For instance, research by Ryan and Ryan (2002), Alkaraan and 
Northcott (2006), Truong et al. (2008), Bennouna et al. (2010), and Baker et al. (2011a) 
found that NPV is the most popular technique in the US, the UK, Australia, and Canada, 
respectively. More specifically, Ryan and Ryan (2002) conducted a survey of the Fortune 
1000 Chief Financial Officers and discovered that analysts are more likely to use NPV in 
the US market. Similar to the research by John and Harvey (2001) mentioned previously, 
Ryan and Ryan (2002) also observed that firms with larger capital budgets use NPV and 
IRR more frequently. In terms of the UK market, Alkaraan and Northcott (2006) examined 
the use of analysis tools in large UK manufacturing companies. In this research, Alkaraan 
and Northcott attempted to find the most common methods amongst NPV, Payback, IRR, 
and ARR. The survey showed that large UK manufacturing companies used NPV as their 
first choice of evaluation. They also emphasized that the result is consistent for non-
strategic and strategic projects. Similarly, Truong et al. (2008) also confirmed that projects 
were mostly evaluated by NPV in Australia, but the companies also use other methods 
combined with NPV. More precisely, respondents in their research indicated that they 
usually used NPV to evaluate projects with three to ten years’ investment. In the Canadian 
market, Bennouna et al. (2010) conducted a survey of 88 large firms in Canada, and 
amongst these firms, NPV is used the most. However, one limitation of this research is that 
the research only focused on large firms. In order to resolve this limitation of the Canadian 
market, Bennouna et al. (2010) and Baker et al. (2011a) conducted a survey with a large 
sample size of Canadian firms and the result also confirmed that NPV was the most 
frequent approach used. 
However, in the European market, IRR and Payback method have been more popular. For 
example, Brounen et al. 2004 carried out an international survey and confirmed that 
German organizations tend to use IRR and the Payback Method to evaluate their projects. 
In their study, small firms tend to use the Payback method to analyse projects. A later 
study by Sridharanand and Schuele (2008) of the German market also found that Payback 
and IRR were dominant methods used to analyse investment. Similarly, research by 
Sandahl and Sjögren (2003) about Swedish markets also discovered that Payback is the 
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most common method that financiers used as the first choice of evaluation. It can be seen 
from their findings that the Payback method is by far the most frequently used technique 
with 39.1 percent of investors choosing it as the primary evaluation technique. Another 
study by Holmen and Pramborg (2009) into Swedish firms using foreign direct investments 
made a point that the use of the Payback method increases with the political risk and host 
country’s growth. They clarify that with high political risk investors are reluctant to use 
traditional NPV. Similarly, the dominance of the Payback and IRR methods was also found 
in research by Iturralde and Maseda (2004) that looked into Spanish firms.   
Similar to European market, Asian investors also tend to use Payback and IRR methods 
rather than NPV. Indeed, research by Shinoda (2010) into 250 investors at listed firms on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange also found that the Payback method was the primary choice of 
investors followed by NPV. He made a point that investors in these firms usually used the 
payback method for short-term investment such as equipment investment or information 
system investment, while NPV was used for long-term investment analysis. In short, they 
used the combination of these methods to make their decision. Another research into the 
popularity of evaluation methods in Asia is the research by Hermes et al. (2007) into 
China’s market. In their paper, 45 Chinese companies and 42 Dutch firms were 
investigated. The finding also shows the preference for ARR, Payback and IRR methods in 
Chinese firms. Moreover, investors from Hong Kong and Indonesian also prefer Payback 
and IRR methods (Leon et al. 2008). More recently, the popularity of evaluation 
techniques is reviewed by Andrés et al. (2015). Table 5.1 show the popularity of evaluation 
methods in each country based on the finding of Andrés et al. (2015). 
Table 5. 1 The most popular investment evaluation methods by country 
Country Most popular methods 
USA NPV, IRR, Payback 
Canada NPV, IRR 
UK NPV, IRR, Payback 
Netherlands NPV 
Germany NPV, Payback 
France RO, NPV 
Spain Payback, IRR 
Sweden Payback 
Australia NPV 
Hong Kong Payback 
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Indonesia, Malaysia NPV, Payback 
Philippines, Singapore Payback 
South Africa ROI 
Argentina NPV 
Japan Payback, IRR 
China IRR 
Latin- America NPV 
It can be seen from table 5.1 that, although there is a difference in the first choice of 
investor for evaluation methods, NPV, Payback, and IRR methods are still the most 
popular approaches used. In fact, the table shows that these methods have been used in 
both developed and developing markets.  
5.3. Payback Method 
In this evaluation method, the project can be considered as acceptable if the project’s 
payback is smaller than the time to recouple the maximum cost forecasted by investors. In 
addition, when comparing projects, investors should choose the project with the shortest 
payback period. Moreover, the investment should be continued if the payback period is 
longer than the specified period (Boussabaine and Kirkham, 2006). Boussabaine and 
Kirkham (2006) noted that when applying the payback method, there are high hurdle rates 
and long payback periods for large projects while small projects can be selected by low 
hurdle rates and short payback periods. 
In explaining the popularity of the Payback method, researchers have shown a number of 
advantages of this approach. For instance, Weston and Brigham (1981) say that investors 
use the payback method to not be forced to use external financing. However, a later study 
by Holmen and Pramborg, (2009) says that they cannot find evidence to support Weston 
and Brigham’s (1981) statement. Moreover, Mills and Herbert (1987) mentioned that this 
method is popular because it is easy to understand and easy to calculate. Thus, it is also 
useable for small firms. In addition, some have stated that the Payback method is popular 
because manager use it to benefit their self-interests. Additionally, the Payback method can 
act as communication role (Lefley, 1996).  More specifically, Awomewe and Oundele 
(2008) clarified that the payback method allows investors to quickly examine how long it 
will take to obtain initial investments. In addition, it can be seen as a supplementary tool 
for investment analysis.  
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However, the Payback method has been also criticized for its disadvantages. For example, 
Lefley (1996) criticized that in this method, the returns after the payback period are not 
taken into account. In addition, they also criticized that the timing of returns is ignored in 
this method.  Some people such as Hoskins and Mumey (1979) support the claim about the 
returns after the payback period, in that the pre-payback period can be the predictor for the 
post-payback period. However, Lumby (1994) says that the argument by Hoskins and 
Mumey (1979) is not valid because it seems to ignore the post-payback returns because 
they are difficult to forecast. Lumby also stressed that there are very limited situations 
when ignoring post-payback returns has a small effect on investment decision. Regarding 
the timing of returns in the payback method, a Discounted Paypack (DPB) method was 
improved to overcome this limitation. However, the DPB still ignores the returns after the 
payback period (Yard, 2000). Besides, the DPB method leads to another criticism about the 
rate that should be used to discount the cash flows.  Awomewe and Oundele (2008) also 
criticized that using this method is difficult to distinguish projects with different sizes. 
Furthermore, it can overestimate the short-term profitability (Awomewe and Oundele, 
2008).  More importantly, this method does not take into account risks in systematic way. 
It can also contain bias against long-term projects, and it can also show the rejection of 
projects which have a positive NPV (Boussabaine and Kirkham, 2006).  
Although the Payback method is also one of the most popular methods in evaluating 
projects, IRR and NPV are more frequently used in evaluating PPPs. The sections below 
criticise the use of IRR and NPV in PPPs. 
5.4. Internal Rate of Return 
Fundamentally, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) measures the return on the equity of the 
capital invested. The IRR is the discount rate which changes the NPV of the cash flows to 
zero. The value of IRR can be from 10 to 30 percent depending on the risk of the country 
and risk of the project (Boussabaine and Kirkham, 2006). The equation below describes the 
idea of IRR. More details of how to calculate IRR can be found from other references such 
as Boussabaine and Kirkham (2004). Assuming that the project has cash flows CF0, 
CF1,…,CFn. IRR is the rate that: 
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 = 0                                  (5.1) 
 
In the rule of IRR, the project will be accepted if the appropriate discount rate for a project 
(r) is smaller than IRR, and the project will be rejected if IRR< r.  In ranking projects, the 
project with higher IRR will be selected. However, it should be noted that if the projects 
are mutually exclusive, ranking by IRR cannot be used because the size of the project has 
influence on IRR in terms of time (Boussabaine and Kirkham, 2006).  
According to previous research, IRR is commonly used because of its advantages. For 
example, in this method, future cash flows of the investment are taken into account. In 
addition, the timing of the money is also considered in this method. Furthermore, the 
opportunity rate of return, and riskiness of the projects are also considered (Osborne, 2010; 
Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2012; Nábrádi and Szôllôsi, 2007).  
However, IRR has also been criticized due to its drawback. For example, in order to 
calculate IRR the same rate of lending and borrowing needs to be assumed. In addition, the 
opportunity cost of the project is not considered.  Changes in cash flows’ timing can create 
many IRR because the cash flow direction is changed. Moreover, in the situations where 
refinance is needed, the new debt may not be considered. Also, any change in parameters 
during the operation stage will be difficult to rectify (Boussabaine and Kirkham, 2006; 
Nábrádi and Szôllôsi, 2007). As previously mentioned, it may make inaccurate 
comparisons between small projects and large projects. 
In fact, Cuthbert and Cuthbert (2012), by reviewing PFI in the UK, concluded that using 
IRR alone in PFI projects is significantly misleading, and it is likely to understate the cost 
of PFI to the public sector and to grossly understate the profit of the private sector. They 
suggested that if IRR is quoted in PFI, parties need to use it in conjunction with statistics of 
outstanding debt (Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2012).  
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5.5. Net Present Value-Based Methods  
5.5.1. Standard Net Present Value 
In the NPV method, all future cash flows are discounted with a given discount rate and 
then they are summed, subtracting the initial investment cost. It is considered that NPV 
which is above zero can guarantee that the project will generate a profit that is at least 
equal to the investment cost. The equation below shows how NPV is measured: 
NPV = CF0 + 
   
     
 + 
   
      
 +…+ 
   
      
                                   (5.2) 
Where, 
CF0: Initial Investment 
NPV: Net Present Value 
CFi: Cash Flow generated in year t 
 : Risk discounted rate  
The risk discounted rate can be the sum of the risk free rate, (which is often considered as 
the government bonds), and a risk premium rate (to cover risks such as technical, 
commercial) (Doctor et al., 2001).  
One of the key ideas of the NPV is that cash flow tomorrow is less valuable than cash flow 
today. Therefore, cash flows in the future need to be discounted by each time period “t”. 
Thus, the discount rate is a core element in this approach. This rate considers the 
opportunities’ cost of the project and hence varies following the variation of riskiness of 
the project. Therefore, NPV can be considered as a risk- adjusted approach (Gaily, 2011). 
The discount rate can be calculated as the weighted average cost of equity and debt used in 
the project or it can be assumed as the cost of capital of the whole company in small 
projects (Chiesa and Frattini, 2009). Another key point of NPV is that this approach takes 
into account all cash flows during the project lifecycle. All incomes and expenditure 
streams need to be discounted by the discount rate, and the final value of the project is the 
remaining value after subtracting the income stream from the expenditure stream. If the 
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NPV is positive, the project is considered as profitable and the rate of return will be higher 
than the minimum required rate of return, and vice versa. Consequently, projects with 
higher NPV can be considered to bring higher return (Žižlavský, 2014).  
In general, the rules of the NPV method are that the NPV of the project needs to not be less 
than zero. If the NPV is negative the project is rejected. If the present value of the project 
shows the highest cost that investors would invest, the NPV shows the additional value of 
the project. In comparing projects, the project with the highest positive NPV should be 
chosen (Boussabaine and Kirkham, 2006).  
In reality NPV is one of the most popular methods (Hanafizadeh et al. 2011) as this 
approach contains several attractive features for investors. For example, future cash flows 
are considered in this method, and timing of these cash flows is also taken into account. 
Moreover, it allows investors to compare different projects with different risk profiles, and 
usually higher discount rates are selected for riskier projects (Budnick, 1988). In addition, 
in this approach, projects are evaluated with regards to potential opportunities rather than 
the time period (Gaily, 2011). Likewise, some explicit arbitrary threshold for instance, 
payback time is not required in calculating NPV (Gaily, 2011). Additionally, it is also well-
known for its simplicity (Espinoza and Morris, 2013). 
On the other hand, the NPV approach has been also criticized in a number of aspects. For 
example, regarding the discounted rate, McSweeney (2006), observed that using a single 
discounted rate is fraught with drawbacks which can generate an incorrect estimation of a 
project. Moreover, the discount rate is criticized to be more concerned with the source of 
finance than the project itself, and it is difficult to account for specific risks in this discount 
rate (Pergler et al. 2008). Similarly, Doctor et al. (2001) also criticize that the use of 
WACC to calculate the risk discount rate only takes into account the financial risks and it 
seems to be not specific for each project. This can lead to unreasonable results which seem 
to be difficult to explain. In addition, NPV requires future cash flows to be discounted 
precisely in the long-term future by a discount rate, and this seems to be very difficult to 
do. Thus, NPV can appear to be unreasonable for long-term projects (Doctor et al. 2001). 
Consequently, this can lead to underestimation or overestimation. Furthermore, this 
method seems to make an unreasonable distinction between the risky project and the long-
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term project (Žižlavský, 2014).  Also, equal risks are assumed for both cash inflows and 
cash outflows. Also, if the project requires refinance, the new debt is not considered. In 
addition, for mutually exclusive projects, NPV assumes that investment opportunities are 
independent. However, in real world situations this may not apply. Furthermore Warren 
(1982) criticized that the value of NPV is influenced by the size of the investment. Similar 
criticisms were also made by Helfert (2001). 
5.5.1. Risk-adjusted NPV 
In order to resolve the weakness of NPV, a number of developed methods have been 
modelled, for instance, risk-adjusted NPV by Stewart et al. (2001). In risk-adjusted NPV, 
costs, risks and time are taken into account to determine a real value of the project. In their 
model, revenues are multiplied with the current risk while associated costs are multiplied 
with the likelihood of having to pay each cost. The risk-adjusted value is calculated by 
subtracting the risk-adjusted payoff to associated costs. Therefore, the risk adjust NPV is 
the NPV of the risk adjusted revenue minus the sum of NPV of the risk-adjusted costs 
(Stewart et al., 2001). The risk-adjusted value is presented by Stewart et al. (2001) as:  
rV = PR0 - ∑    
 
                                     (5.3) 
Where,  
rV: Risk-adjusted value 
P: Payoff 
R0: Current risk 
Ci: Associated cost for risk i 
Ri: The risk that needs to be considered 
From this equation, the risk-adjusted NPV can be calculated as: 
rNPV = NPVPR0 - ∑       
 
                       (5.4) 
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Where,  
rNPV: Risk adjusted NPV 
NPVPR0: NPV of the risk adjusted payoff   
NPVCiR0/Ri = sum of the risk-adjusted costs of risk i 
R0: Current risk 
Although these methods have been developed to resolve the weakness of NPV, one of the 
common features of these methods is the conjunction of the discounted rate for risk and 
time value (Halliwell, 2011). A number of researchers have stated that adding risk and time 
together cannot be a valid approach because they can be entangled (Zeckhauser and 
Viscusi, 2008). 
5.5.2. Stochastic NPV 
In terms of scholastic NPV, each component of the cash flow is considered as the 
distribution probability. Hence, NPV in this model can be displayed as a stochastic variable 
described by a probability distribution. 
According to Chiesa and Frattini (2009), expected NPV can be modelled as: 
E(NPV) = ∑
       
      
 
                                       (5.5) 
Where, 
E(NPV): Expected NPV 
E(NCFt): Expected value of the net cash flow in year t 
r: risk free rate 
It can be seen from the equation 5.5 that the risk free rate is used instead of the risk 
discount rate.  
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In fact, the idea of calculating NPV with a separated risk and time was proposed by 
Robichek and Myers (1965, 1966) in Certainty Equivalent NPV. 
5.5.3. Certainty Equivalent NPV 
Basically, in this model, investors need to exchange a certain cash flow for a risk cash 
flow. This model uses the risk free rate instead of the risk discount rate, and the cash flows 
are added by a coefficient “αt” varying from 0 to 1 (Chiesa and Frattini, 2009).  
NPVCEQ = ∑
         
      
 
                                             (5.6) 
Where, 
NPVCEQ: Certainty equivalent NPV 
E(NCFt): Expected Cash flows in year t 
αt: Coefficent in year t 
r: risk free rate 
According to Žižlavský (2014), the value of αt can be received from some reference. For 
example, a table for αt specially created for an R&D project was provided by Chiesa and 
Frattini (2009). By using the risk-free rate, this model can resolve some problems 
associated with the conjunction of a discounted rate for the risk and time value as Halliwell 
(2011) stated. In addition, this method is considered as more flexible and reliable than 
traditional NPV. However, this approach has been seldom applied, as there is no practical 
method to determine the value of the coefficient “αt” (Espinoza and Morris, 2013). 
Moreover, determining input criteria for this model is also impractical (Espinoza and 
Morris, 2013).   
5.5.4. Fuzzy Net Present Value 
By criticizing that it is impossible to precisely assume some values in NPV methods, such 
as cash flows and discount rates, researchers have proposed Fuzzy NPV. They argue that 
cash flows and discount rates can be seen as fuzzy numbers. Basically, instead of 
predicting specific values in different periods of time, possible intervals can be considered. 
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For example, [Ct + ԑt, Ct + βt] and [rt + θt, rt + ϖt] can be used, where Ct and rt are predicted 
cash flow and risk discount rate, whereas, ԑ, β, θ, ϖ are variable determined by decision 
makers (Wen and Lu, 2007). However, it is criticized by some researchers such as Cao et 
al. (2009), Ucal and Kuchta (2011), Kumar and Bajaj (2014), that, this method makes 
computation much more complicated.  
5.6. Decoupled Net Present Value Method 
In contrast to NPV methods, DNPV treats risk and time separately. Espinoza and Morris 
(2013) criticized that the limitations of NPV-based methods can be resolved if the time 
value of the uncertainty associated with future cash flows is separated.  In this method, an 
investor is viewed as an insurance provider, and the investor forecasts synthetic insurance 
premiums as compensation for risks predicted. It should be recognized that the independent 
synthetic insurance product is assumed to exist. The value of compensation is seen as a 
synthetic insurance premium, and risks are treated as the cost of the project. According to 
Espinoza et al. (2013), DNPV can be measured as: 
      
     ̃         ̃   
      
 = 
           ̃     ̃   
      
                 (5.7) 
Or 
 
     
       ̃ 
      
                                                (5.8)  
Or              
               ̃                 
 ̃ 
      
                 
(5.9) 
 
Where DNPVt: Decouple Net Present value of a project at year t; 
  t:Revenue of the project at year t; 
 Ĩt: Expenditure of the project at year t; 
 r: risk-free rate, 
 ̃Vt:  Loss due to the decrease of revenue  
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 ̃    Loss due to the increase of expenditure 
  ̃t:  ̃Vt +  ̃   which presents the expected total cost of risk at time t. This can be 
forecasted as the sum of all sources of risks.  
From the above equation, it can be seen that the value of DNPV is equal to NPV at the 
risk-free rate minus the present value of the cost of risks discounted by the risk-free rate.  
From the equation, it can be recognised that it is crucial to estimate the value of  ̃  ;  ̃   
which can be measured as: 
 
 ̃                                           (5.10)                                         
 ̃        Ĩt                                     (5.11)                                             
where ƞv and ƞI are risk parameters presenting the riskiness of the project. More 
specifically, ƞv is the parameter identifying the loss due to the decrease of revenue, and ƞI is 
the parameter identifying the loss due to the increase of expenditure. Further details on 
how to determine these parameters will be provided in chapter 6. Espinoza et al. (2013) 
proposed three methods to estimate risk parameters. They are heuristic methods, 
probability-based methods, and stochastic methods (option pricing). In the simplest level, 
the heuristic method, the cost of risk is assumed by investors, and in reality it can be seen 
as the cost contingency assumed by investors. This cost contingency depends on investors’ 
experience. For example, in the construction industry, it may not be uncommon that on the 
expenditure side, the cost overrun is usually assumed by investors. In addition, this 
parameter can also be taken from suggestions from literature, or previous studies about the 
targeting construction industry. For example, cost contingency can be found in some 
research such as those by Baccarini, (2004), Hanafizadeh et al. (2011), Paul el al. (2014), 
and Anastasopoulos, et al. (2014).  The next method, the probability-based method, is 
more sophisticated. The value of ƞ is estimated by using probability distribution. Basically 
from the data of revenue and expenditure, companies can create a distribution of these 
data. Some types of distribution such as triangular normal, log-normal, and beta 
distribution can be used.  In the third method, real option pricing method bonds are used 
(Black and Scholes, 1973). These methods take into account the variation of revenues or 
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expenditure. On the revenue side, the risk parameter can be seen as a put option, and on the 
expenditure side, it can be seen as a call option. Details of these methods will be described 
in chapter 6 about the proposed risk evaluation framework. 
5.7. Selection of an Evaluation Model 
Due to the previously mentioned criticism of current methods in evaluating PPPs, and 
advantages of DNPV, in this research, DNPV will be used as a model to evaluate 
Vietnamese PPPs in the transport sector. However, DNPV also contains limitations, and in 
this research, this limitation will be resolved by proposing Risk-Adjusted DNPV. 
More specifically, although according to Espinoza and Morris (2013), DNPV is expected 
to resolve limitations of NPV, regarding the PPPs in the transport sector, DNPV has not 
taken into account the influence of other risk factors on the loss of the revenue side, and 
the loss on the expenditure side. In other words, other risks such as “Delay in other 
infrastructures relating to projects” and “Difficulty in Land acquisition and Resettlement” 
can have an influence on loss on the revenue side. Therefore, in this proposed framework, 
Risk-Adjusted DNPV is proposed. Based on the idea of DNPV, Risk-Adjusted DNPV also 
separates risk and time. In addition, risk factors which can have an influence on the loss on 
the revenue side and loss on the expenditure side can be taken into account. Basically, in 
Risk-Adjusted DNPV the risk-adjusted parameter ( ̅  is used instead of the risk parameter 
(  .The details of how to use Risk-Adjusted DNPV will be provided in section 6.2.2.2 in 
chapter 6 which is about the proposed risk evaluation framework. 
5.8. Concession Parameters Based on Risk Adjusted DNPV 
This section will clarify the use of Risk-Adjusted DNPV in optimizing concession 
parameters. In PPPs, the concession period refers to the period of construction and 
operation (Zhang, 2009). Determining the concession period in a BOT project is one of the 
most important tasks, since the concession period clarifies the time that the project will be 
transferred to the public agency. Therefore, it defines the responsibility and benefit of each 
sector in the project. The unreasonable concession period can lead to losses for the 
government or private investors. If the concession period is too short, the private sector can 
suffer from losses. In contrast, concession period that is too long can reduce the benefits of 
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public agency. Hence, determining a reasonable concession period to protect the interests 
of both sectors has been an attractive feature to practitioners and academics.  
A model, BOTCcM, was developed by Shen et al. (2002) to determine an alternative 
concession period for BOT contracts. BOTCcM can provide an interval for the concession 
period. On one hand, the starting point of the interval is to protect the interests of the 
private sector. On the other hand, the second point is to protect the interests of the public 
sector. The starting point of the interval can be determined by the idea that the Net Present 
Value during the concession period should not be less than the investor’s expected return. 
       ∑     
  
    ∑
     
   ɍ  
  
      ≥ IcR                        (5.12) 
The end point of the interval is determined based on the principle that the NPV from the 
transfer time to the end of the period should not be less than zero. 
       ∑     
 
      
 ∑
     
   ɍ  
 
      
                       (5.13) 
Where, 
NPV 
(1)
: Net Present Value during the concession period.  
NPV 
(2)
: Net present value after the concession period.   
NPVt: Net present value at year t. 
Tc: concession period which need to be determined. 
It: Income in year t. 
Ct: cost in year t. 
ɍ: discounted rate.  
Many models have been developed to improve BOTCcM. For example, BOTCcM is 
criticized by Shen et al. (2005) that the model does not consider the impact of risks. Shen 
et al. (2005) present an additional risk model. The Monte Carlo simulation was used to 
simulate variables such as Annual Capital Investment (Ic), Construction Time (t0), Toll 
price (p), Annual Traffic Volume (q), Annual discount rate (r), and Annual Maintenance 
Cost (Cm). The result of this developed model is also an interval of the concession period. 
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Moreover, it is criticized that one of the weakness of BOTCcM is that it cannot show a 
specific time span for the concession period. In order to determine a specific concession 
period, a BOT bargaining concession model (BOTBaC) was developed by Shen et al. 
(2007), and this new model is also an extension of BOTCcM. The BOTBaC takes into 
account the bargaining behaviour of both the private and public sectors. The bargaining 
theory is based on the principle that in negotiations, an individual’s action depends on what 
others do (Shen et al. 2007). Based on the interval created by BOTCcM, investors and the 
government will bargain until they meet a specific concession period which balances the 
interests of both sectors. 
Another model developed from BOTCcM is the model developed by Wu et al. (2012). Wu 
et al. (2012) criticized that BOTCcM does not take into account the net asset value (NAV) 
at the transfer time. They say that at the transfer time, the construction is transferred to the 
government, and the NAV at this time is greater than zero, and it can be seen as revenue 
for the government. Therefore, the NAV needs to be added in BOTCcM. From this ideal, 
the 2
nd
 equation in BOTCcM is modified as:  
       ∑     
 
      
 ∑
     
   ɍ  
 
      
                      (5.14) 
Wu et al. (2012) also suggests that the risk concession model (Shen et al. 2005), and 
BOTBaC (Shen et al. 2007) have no consideration of the project’s net asset value at the 
transfer time, and these models should add this item in order to determine a more 
reasonable concession period. 
These models have been developed to reduce the limitations of each model. However, 
these models are based on the Net Present Value technique which has a number of 
limitations which have been mentioned previously. 
In addition, one of the limitations of the model of Wu et al. (2012) is that the depreciation 
cost in the paper by Wu et al. (2012) is determined by straight-line depreciation. It is said 
that this method is simple. However, its limitation is that the asset is assumed to be used 
with the same frequency every year (Warrant et al. 2009). In fact, the demand for a 
transport construction changes every year. Therefore, to determine the depreciation cost, in 
 88 
 
this framework, the Unit of Production method is used. The idea of this method is that the 
asset is depreciated based on the unit of production used, and therefore it is suitable for 
assets relating to traffic levels (Queensland Competition Authority, 1999). The detail of 
how to calculate the depreciation cost will be mentioned in section 6.2.2.3 in chapter 6.  
5.9. Summary  
This chapter reviewed return evaluation methods that have been used in PPPs in 
international contexts, and reviewed the current methods in determining the concession 
period. The purpose of reviewing these methods is to, firstly, justify the reason for using 
Risk-Adjusted Risk DNPV in this research. The literature review demonstrated that a 
number of evaluation methods have been used to evaluate returns in PPPs. However, these 
methods have their limitations. For example, one of the most critical limitations is the 
conjunction of risk and time in one parameter. For this reason, DNPV will be applied in 
this research. However, this chapter also criticized that DNPV does not take into account 
the influence of other risk factors in losses on the expenditure and revenue side. Therefore, 
in this research, Risk-Adjusted DNPV is proposed. In addition, this chapter also criticized 
other previous models in determining concession periods. Hence, in this research a model 
to optimize the concession period will be also proposed based on the theory of Risk-
Adjusted DNPV.  
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CHAPTER 6: PROPOSED RISK EVALUATION FRAMEWORK FOR 
VIETNAMESE PPPs IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 
6.1. Introduction 
As previously stated, the aim of the research is to propose a framework to evaluate risks in 
Public-Private Partnership projects (PPPs) in the transport sector in Vietnam. In this 
chapter, the details of the proposed framework will be introduced. Basically, the 
framework is a combination of Risk Identification Technique, Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) and Risk-Adjusted Decoupled Net Present Value (DNPV) theory. The framework is 
expected to be able to identify risks associated with Vietnamese PPPs in the transport 
sector. From this point, the framework is expected to be able to evaluate projects’ riskiness, 
and to evaluate projects financially with regards to associated risks. As a result, the 
proposed framework is also expected to determine a reasonable franchise concession 
period for PPP projects. Furthermore, the framework is expected to allocate risks in 
Vietnamese PPPs to the party which is best able to manage them. In the following sections, 
firstly, the conceptual model of the framework will be explained, after that each component 
of the proposed framework with the principles and theory behind them will be 
demonstrated.  
6.2. Conceptual Framework 
Figure 6.1 shows the conceptual framework. As can be seen from the figure, there are 8 
boxes in the conceptual framework which show different steps in evaluating risk in PPP. 
The arrows show the relationship amongst the steps. Each party can use this framework in 
different ways. For example, they can skip some boxes based on risks they are managing. 
Details on how each party can use this framework are presented in following sections.   
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Figure 6. 1 Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.1. Public Sector 
Figure 6.2 below demonstrates the process of applying the proposed framework for the 
public sector. From the figure, it can be seen that the first step for the public client is “Risk 
identification”. After that, the public sector can move to the next box, “Project Evaluation 
by AHP”. It should be noted that in this framework it is essential to use the risks identified 
in the first step to set up the AHP model. The details on how to set up this AHP model will 
be presented below. At the same time, the public sector receives the DNPV Return 
evaluation from the private sector, and after that they can optimize the concession 
parameters. It should be noted here that in this step they optimize concession parameters to 
protect the public sector’s benefits. Details of how to carry out this stage will be presented 
later. From the results of the optimizing concession parameters and the Project’s Riskiness 
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Evaluation, the public sector can make the decision for a value for money comparison. 
From that, they can make the final decision to implement the project under PPP or refuse 
it.  
Figure 6. 2 Process of using the framework for the public sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.1.1. Risk Identification Use for the Public Sector 
The first step of the model from the public point of view is to identify critical risks in PPPs 
in the transport sector in Vietnam. In this step risks are accessed by “Frequency of 
occurrence” and “Degree of impact”. More details of this assessment can be found in 
chapter 7. The finding of this stage is the risk score for each risk, and risk ranking table. 
These risk scores and risk ranking table will be used as input data for other steps which 
will be clarified in the following sections.   
From Figure 6.1, it can be seen that there are links between the “Risk identification” and 
“Project’s Riskiness Evaluation”, and “Return Evaluation by Risk-adjusted DNPV”, and 
“Optimizing Concession Period Parameters”. These links express the relationship between 
these items. However, in this model, from the public sector point of view, the result from 
the risk identification stage is only used to set up the AHP model. For example, from the 
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result of the risk identification stage, the most critical risk that with the highest risk scores, 
may be chosen to set up AHP, risks with just the most frequent occurrence can be chosen 
or risks with just the highest degree of impact can be selected. The decision of choosing 
risks is based on the public sector for each specific project.  
6.2.1.2. Project’s Riskiness Evaluation 
The purpose of “Project’s Riskiness Evaluation” box in figure 6.2 is to evaluate different 
projects or one project with different forms of construction with regards to critical risks. 
Input data for this box comes from the “Risk Identification” box and from the range of 
project options that need to be considered. More specifically, critical risks from the 
outcome result of “Risk Identification” and the range of project options will be used to set 
up the AHP project evaluation. Outcome results of this box can be put into the “Risk 
allocation” box. 
As stated previously in chapter 4, each criterion will have a weight based on the pairwise 
comparison made by decision makers. The more important criteria should have the higher 
weights. The options are scored with respect to each criterion. Finally, a global score for 
each option with respect to all criteria can be calculated by combining the weight of criteria 
and score of options.  Figure 6.3 shows the AHP structure in project evaluation and Figure 
6.4 shows the process of carrying out AHP when evaluating projects in this research.  
Figure 6. 3 AHP structure in project’s riskiness evaluation 
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m 
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Figure 6. 4 Process of Carrying out AHP in Project’s Riskiness Evaluation 
  
 
a. Determining the Vector of Risk Groups Weights. 
Assume that we have a set of risk groups which contains m risk group. A pairwise 
comparison matrix A needs to be built. A is an m x m real matrix.  
A= [
        
        
    
        
] 
Each member aij of the matrix A represents the importance of i risk group in comparison to 
j risk group. If aij >1, the risk group i is more important than j, and if aij < 1, the risk group 
i is less important than the risk group j. Importantly, each entry of the matrix A needs to 
satisfy the rule: aij x aji = 1.  The importance comparison is measured by following a scale 
ranked from 1- 9. The table below expresses the linguistic judgement in AHP. 
Table 6. 1 Linguistic Measures of Importance in this research based on measurements made by Saaty (1980) 
Scale Definition Explanation 
1 Equal Two risk groups contribute equally to the objective 
3 Weak One risk group is slightly more important than another 
5 Strong One risk group is more strongly more important than another 
7 Very Strong One risk group is very strongly more important than another 
9 Absolute Strong One risk group is extremely more important than another 
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Table 6. 2 Pairwise comparison made between risk groups 
 Risk group 1 Risk group 2 … Risk group m 
Risk group 1 1    
Risk group 2  1   
…   1  
Risk group m    1 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show the comparison made in applying AHP in project evaluation. 
From these tables, it can be seen that the number of comparisons made between risk groups 
is m(m-1)/2, and the number of pairwise comparisons made between project options is 
n(n-1)/2. 
Table 6. 3 Pairwise comparison among project options 
 Project 1 Project 2 … Project n 
Project 1 1    
Project 2  1   
…   1  
Project n    1 
 
After building matrix A, a normalized pairwise comparison matrix Anorm can be built and 
each entry     of the matrix A norm is computed as: 
    
   
∑    
 
   
                                                             (6.1) 
 
Then the criteria weight vector can be calculated as:  
 W1  
 W2  
W= W3                                                                   (6.2) 
 …  
 W5  
Where:  
   
∑    
 
   
 
                                                         (6.3) 
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In other words, the criteria weight vector can be built by first creating a new matrix in 
which each member in the new matrix is determined by dividing the corresponding 
member in matrix A to the sum of the column that the member is in. Secondly, wj is 
calculated by averaging the members in each row of the new matrix.  
b. Determining the Matrix of Option Scores 
After the criteria weight vector is known, the matrix of option scores will be determined. 
The matrix of option score S is an n x m real matrix. Each member     represents the score 
of ith option with respect to the jth criteria. 
To determine S, first, it is necessary to build a pairwise comparison matrix B
j
 for each 
criteria. Where: j=1-m. 
 B
j
 is an n x n real matrix, where n is the number of options, and each member    
 
 
represents the evaluation of option h in comparison to option i with respect to the criteria   
with (h =1 – n). 
B 
(j) 
= 
[
 
 
 
    
    
     
 
   
    
     
 
    
   
    
   ]
 
 
 
 
                                   (6.4) 
According to Satty (1980): 
   
     
                                                          (6.5) 
Similarly, the value of    
 
 can be measured by the scores showed in table 6.1. 
After finding the matrix B, the method used to determine the criteria weight vector W will 
be used to calculate member s
i
, ( i = 1-m). Then S is determined as:  
S = [s
1
, s
2,…,sm]                                                    (6.6) 
         It should be noted that in this equation, s
i 
is the vector; therefore, S is a matrix. 
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c. Ranking the Options 
Finally, the global vector v is determined as: 
V = S .W                                                           (6.7)                                         
Each member of V represents the score of i
th
 project with respect to all risk groups. We 
have the project ranking by placing members in V in a descending or ascending order.  
In order to make an aggregation of matrixes, the Weighted Arithmetic Mean Method was 
used with the equation: 
      ∑           
 
 
 ∑                                   (6.8) 
Where, 
    : Group priority of option Aj 
      : The value made by member Ei in making pairwise comparison between risk 
groups, or options 
Wi: Weight of member Ei 
N: Number of member 
In case all members of the group have an equal weight, which is the case in this research, 
we then have: 
     ∑         
 
 
                                                (6.9) 
6.2.1.3.  Risk Allocation 
The “Risk allocation” box has links with “Project’s project riskiness evaluation”, “risk 
identification”, and “concession period parameters”. More specifically, critical risks from 
the risk identification stage can be used to set up the risk allocation AHP model. On the 
other hand, the risk allocation model can be set up after the Project’s Riskiness Evaluation 
is conducted. Outcomes of this allocation stage will define the risk allocated to each party, 
and one of these risks is the financial risk, which can be examined in the Return in 
Evaluation and Optimization of Concession period parameters. 
In terms of application of AHP to allocate risks to the party which is best able to manage 
them, a set of criteria and a set of options also need to be established. In this risk allocation 
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model, the set of criteria contains criteria by which decision makers want to evaluate each 
option. For example, criteria will be: “The capability to foresee the risk”, “The capability 
to control the probability of occurring”, and “The ability to bear the consequence”. The 
set of options contains alternatives that the risk can be allocated to. For example, they can 
be: “Public sector”, “share”, or “Private sector”. Figure 6.5 shows the AHP allocation 
structure for risk i, and figure 6.6 shows the process of carrying out AHP in allocating risk 
i. 
Figure 6. 5 AHP allocation structure for risk i 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 6 Process of carrying out AHP in allocating risk i 
  
 
A very important point to note here is that this allocation model is based on an assumption 
that the importance of criteria is the same for all risks. For example, “the capability to 
foresee the risk i” is equally important to “the ability to foresee the risk j”. This is also one 
of the limitations of the research as in reality, they might not be equally important. For 
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Check Matrix Consistency 
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between allocation options 
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Allocation 
option k 
… Allocation 
option 2 
Criteria 1 Criteria 2 … Criteria l 
Ranking Allocation 
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instance, for private investors, regarding the inflation risk, the ability to foresee the risk 
might be more important than the ability to control the probability of occurrence. However, 
for insufficient traffic volume risk, these abilities might be equal. 
Similarly to the project riskiness evaluation process, the set of criteria weight and the 
matrix of option scores need to be formed. Also, a pairwise comparison matrix E needs to 
be built. E is an l x l real matrix described below. 
E= [
        
        
    
        
]                                     (6.10) 
Each member eij of the matrix E represents the importance of i criteria in comparison to j 
criteria. If eij >1, the criteria i is more important than j, and if eij < 1, the criteria i is less 
important than criteria j. Similarly, each entry of the matrix E needs to satisfy the rule: eij x 
eji = 1, where i, j = 1- l. The value of eij can also be determined from table 6.1.  
Table 6. 4 Pairwise comparison made between ability criteria 
 Ability criteria 1 Ability criteria 2 … Ability criteria l 
Ability criteria 1 1    
Ability criteria 2  1   
…   1  
Ability criteria l    1 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the comparison made in applying AHP in project evaluation. 
From these tables, it can be seen that the number of comparisons made between the ability 
criteria is l (l-1)/2, and the number of pairwise comparisons made between the allocation 
option is k(k-1)/2. 
Table 6. 5 Pairwise comparison made between allocation options (parties) 
 
Allocation 
option 1 
Allocation option 
2 
… 
Allocation 
option k 
Allocation option 1 1    
Allocation option 2  1   
…   1  
Allocation option k    1 
After building matrix E, normalized pairwise comparison matrix Enorm can be built where 
each entry  ̅     ̅  of the matrix E norm is computed as: 
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 ̅   
   
∑    
 
   
                                                    (6.11) 
Then the criteria weight vector can be calculated as:  
 U1  
 U2  
U= U3                                                                    
 …  
 U5  
 
Where:  
   
∑  ̅  
 
   
 
                                                     (6.12) 
 
Likewise, the matrix of allocation option scores Z needs to be determined. The matrix of 
option scores Z here is a p x l real matrix. Each member     represents the score of ith 
allocation option with respect to the jth criteria. 
Similarly, a pairwise comparison matrix for each ability criteria D
j 
can be formed, where 
j=1-l. 
 D
j
 is a k x k real matrix, where k is the number of allocation options, as mentioned and 
each member    
 
 represents an evaluation of option h in comparison to option i with 
respect to the criteria   with (h =1 – k). 
D
j 
= 
[
 
 
 
    
    
     
 
   
    
     
 
    
   
    
   ]
 
 
 
 
                                     (6.13) 
Members of this matrix also need to satisfy the rule:    
      
     and the value of    
 
 can 
be measured by the scores showed in table 6.1. 
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After finding the matrix D, the method used to determine the criteria weight vector U will 
be used to calculate member Z
i
, ( i = 1-k). Then Z is determined as:  
Z = [z
1
, z
2,…,zl]                                           (6.14)                                  
Finally, the global vector G is also determined as: 
G = Z .U                                               (6.15) 
Each member of G represents the score of the jth allocation option for risk i with respect to 
the ability criteria.  
6.2.1.4. Value for money evaluation 
It can be seen from figure 6.2 that the “Value for money evaluation” box is the final box in 
the application process for the public sector, and it is also the goal of the public sector. In 
this framework, the value for money evaluation can be made by analysing the project’s 
riskiness evaluation by AHP, risk allocation by using AHP, return analysis, and concession 
parameter optimized. From the findings of the previous steps, the public sector can 
determine whether public clients can have maximum benefit from the potential projects. 
For example, a project may be considered when it can bring the value for money if its 
riskiness is the lowest amongst the options, when few risks are retained by the public 
sector, when there is a less Risk Adjusted DNPV, and when there is a reasonable 
concession period to project the public sector’s interest.  
6.2.2. Private Sector 
Figure 6.7 shows that there are 4 steps of applying this proposed framework. The first step 
is also to identify the risks that can occur in the project. After that, the finding of the first 
step will be used to determine the losses because of low revenue and high expenditure. In 
the next step, return evaluation by risk-adjusted DNPV can be applied. From the analysis, 
in the return evaluation by the risk-adjusted DNPV, the private sector can optimize the 
concession parameters. It should be noted here that the private sector optimizes the 
concession parameters in order to protect their benefits. Finally, from this return evaluation 
and concession parameters optimization, the final project evaluation can be made. 
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Figure 6. 7 Process of applying proposed framework for the private sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2.1. Risk Identification Use for the Private Sector 
In terms of methods that can be used to identify risks for the private sector, they are similar 
to the methods described in chapter 3 and section 6.2.1.1 of this chapter. Risks are also 
evaluated by “Frequency of Occurrence” and “Degree of Impact”. 
However, it is very important to note that for the private sector, the outcome of this step, 
which will be used in other steps, must be the risk score. It is different from the application 
for the public sector in that the public sector can choose risks based on risk scores, or 
“Frequency of Occurrence” and “Degree of Impact” to be input data for other steps, but for 
the private sector, input data for other steps and received from “Risk Identification” must 
be the risk scores. 
6.2.2.2. Return Evaluation by Risk Adjusted DNPV 
Figure 6.8 shows that in order to apply the risk-adjusted DNPV, the private investors need 
to use the heuristic data about the revenue and expenditure to estimate the revenue and 
expenditure for the future. The heuristic data is also used to determine the construction cost 
distribution and the volatility of heuristic revenue. From this distribution and the volatility, 
the risk parameter ƞ can be determined. After that, risk parameter ƞ will be adjusted by 
using risk scores from the risk identification stage to form the risk-adjusted parameter  ̅. In 
Risk Identification 
Determine losses due to low revenue and high expenditure 
Risk adjusted DNPV 
 
Return Evaluation by Risk adjusted DNPV 
 
Project Evaluation 
 
Optimize Concession Parameters 
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the next step, the Risk-adjusted DNPV return evaluation can be analysed. After that, with 
the Risk-adjusted DNPV return evaluation, investors can optimize those concession 
parameters.  
Figure 6. 8 Process of calculation of Risk adjusted DNPV to PPP in this research 
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 More specifically, regarding the application of the risk-adjusted DNPV in this framework, 
data from Vietnamese PPPs will be used to determine the value of risk parameters by using 
three methods described in chapter 6 about DNPV evaluation which are the heuristic 
methods, probability based methods, and stochastic methods (option pricing). The sections 
below describe these three methods to determine the cost of risks.  
a. Heuristic method  
In the simplest level, the heuristic method, the risk parameters,    and    can be assumed 
by investors, and in reality it can be seen as the cost contingency assumed by investors. 
This cost contingency depends on investors’ experience. For example, in the construction 
industry, it may not be uncommon that on the expenditure side, the cost overrun is usually 
assumed by investors. In addition, this risk parameter can also be taken from suggestions in 
the literature, or previous studies about the construction industry. For example, cost 
contingency can be found in some research such as those by Baccarini, (2004), 
Hanafizadeh et al. (2011), Paul el al. (2014), and Anastasopoulos et al. (2014). 
b. Probability-based method 
The second method, the probability-based method, is more sophisticated. The cost of risk 
is estimated by using probability distribution. Basically from the data of revenue and 
expenditure, companies can create distribution of these data. Some types of distribution 
such as triangular normal, log-normal, and beta distribution can be used. Figures 6.9 and 
6.10 bellow show the visual explanation of the idea of this method. 
Figure 6. 9 Probability density distribution for revenues and shortfall (Espinoza and Morris, 2013, p.480) 
 
 
 
 
(a) Revenue Distribution 
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Vmax 
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(b) Potential loss distribution due to revenue shortfall 
 
Figure 6. 10 Probability density distribution for expenditure and shortfall (Espinoza and Morris, 2013, 
p.481) 
 
 
 
 
(a) Investment cost distribution 
 
 
 
(b) Potential loss distribution for expenditures 
From these distributions, the cost of risk can be calculated by integrating these 
distributions, using the following equations by Espinoza and Morris (2013): 
 ̃   ∫     
  
  
                                          (6.16) 
 ̃   ∫     
  
  
                                                 (6.17) 
Where, 
 ̃  : Loss due to revenue is lower than estimated  
 t - Vmin 
0 
Mean Shortfall 
 t - Vmode 
Imode Imin Imax 
Expected Investment Cost 
It <  Ĩt It >  Ĩt 
Mean excess expenditure 
Imax - Ĩt 
0 
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 ̃  : Loss due to expenditure is higher than expected 
  : Expected revenue 
  : Actual revenue  
  : Expected expenditure 
  : Actual expenditure  
         : The probability that the actual revenue is lower than the expected 
revenue  
         : The probability that the actual expenditure is higher than the expected 
expenditure.  
In other words, risk parameters can be determined as: 
  =           * (  ̃excess -   )/ It                              (6.18) 
  =                ̃excess)/                          (6.19) 
Where,  
  : Expected revenue 
  : Expected expenditure 
 ̃excess: Expected value of the expenditure in the truncated area 
 ̃excess: Expected value of the revenue in the truncated area 
c. Real option pricing method 
In the third method, the real option pricing method (Black and Scholes, 1973) is used. 
These methods take into account the variation of revenues or expenditure. Figure 6.11 
shows the graphical presentation of options of the real option theory. It can be seen that 
each movement of the instrument can lead to different option, and real option theory takes 
into account this variation.  
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Figure 6. 11 Representation options by Real Option Theory (Espinoza, D., and Morris, 2013, p.482) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the revenue side, the risk parameter can be seen as a put option, and on the expenditure 
side, it can be seen as a call option. 
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 √ 
                                              (6.22)                                  
          √                                                         (6.23)                             
 
Where, 
S: Expected cash flows from the project. 
X: The investment cost 
T: Time to maturity  
r: Risk free rate which can be determined as the government treasure bond rate 
𝝈: Volatility of the revenue based on the heuristic data  
T ( time to expiration of the option) 
Pr(S>X) 
Call = Max(S-X,0) 
Pr(S<X) 
Put = Max(X-S,0) 
Exercise Price X 
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δ: Dividend paid by the stock, bond, or other instrument. It can also be seen as the 
cost that investors have to pay to hold the option or to remove the competitors (Leslie 
and Michaels, 1997). 
   : Operator of the cumulative standard normal distribution function 
d. Adjustment of risk parameters by influence factors 
However, as criticized previously in chapter 5, it can be seen that the DNPV does not take 
into account other risks which can have an influence on the risk of lower revenue than 
expected, and to the risk of higher expenditure than expected. In other words, DNPV 
presented as by Espinoza and Morris (2013) and Espinoza and Rojo (2015), is not risk 
adjusted. 
Therefore, in this research DNPV is improved by adding a method to take into account the 
risks which can have influence on the risk of lower revenue, and on the risk of higher 
expenditure. More specifically, the risk scores found from section 6.2.1.1. will be used to 
adjust the risk parameter    and   , based on methods suggested by Cooper et al. (2005).  
Risk adjusted risk parameter  ̅v and  ̅  will be determined by the following equations: 
 ̅                                                       (6.24) 
 ̅                                                         (6.25) 
Where,  
 ̅  : Risk-adjusted parameter for loss due to lower revenue  
 ̅ : Risk-adjusted parameter for loss due to higher expenditure  
      ,   : Risk Score of risk i, j, k which can have influence on the lower revenue 
       ,   : Risk Score of risk h, l, t which can have influence on the higher 
expenditure 
From this risk-adjusted parameter, Risk Adjusted DNPV can be calculated as:  
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       ̃̅ 
      
                           (6.26) 
Where,  
 ̃̅    ̃̅     ̃̅   
 ̃̅    ̅                                                       (6.27) 
 ̃̅     ̅                                                         (6.28) 
Where, 
 ̃̅  : Loss due to revenue is lower than estimated adjusted by influence factors  
 ̃̅  : Loss due to expenditure is higher than expected adjusted by influence factors 
  : Expected revenue 
  : Expected expenditure 
6.2.2.3. Optimizing Concession Parameters 
As demonstrated in the conceptual framework, outcomes from the return evaluation stage 
are the input data for the optimization of concession period parameters. The outcome of 
this optimization stage can be combined with outcomes from the Project Riskiness 
Evaluation by AHP to form the final project evaluation.   
Figure 6.10 shows the process of optimizing concession parameters. After finding the 
return analysis from the previous step, the Depreciation cost  ̃  in year t needs to be 
determined. After that, the Net Asset Value can be determined. From these analyses, 
concession parameters can be optimized. The details of how to optimize these parameters 
will be shown in the following sections.  
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Figure 6. 12 Process of optimizing concession parameters 
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In order to optimize the concession period parameters, the Risk-Adjusted DNPV is applied 
to the model developed by Wu et al. (2012) which is described in detail in chapter 5.  
a. Optimization of concession parameters to protect the private sector’s benefits 
In this proposed framework, in order to protect investors’ interests, the following equation 
must be satisfied:  
                                                         (6.29) 
Where, 
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Ic: Investor Capital investment 
R: Expected return rate from investment  
The equation (6.28) can be written as: 
                     ∑
        ( ̃̅      ̃̅  )
      
  
    
 ∑
        ̃̅   
      
    
     ∑
        ( ̃̅      ̃̅   )
      
  
                                                                                                 
(6.30) 
or it can be simplified as: 
   
∑
        ̃̅   
      
    
     ∑
        ( ̃̅     ̅̃   )
      
  
                                            (6.31)                           
     
Where,  
 ̃̅   : Loss on the expenditure side in construction period 
 ̃̅   : Loss on the expenditure side in operational period 
b. Optimization of concession parameters to protect the public sector’s benefits 
In this proposed framework, in order to protect investors’ interests, the following 
equation must be satisfied: 
                                                          (6.32) 
The equation (6.29) can be modified as:  
                     ∑
        ( ̃̅      ̃̅   )
      
 
                             (6.33)                      
Where, 
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Tc: Transfer time 
Tcon: Construction time 
NAVTc: Net asset value of the project at its transfer time 
 ̃̅   : Loss on the expenditure side in construction period 
 ̃̅   : Loss on the expenditure side in operational period 
As criticized in chapter 5, the NAV calculation method used in the paper by Wu et al. 
(2012) has weaknesses. Therefore, NAVTc in this model is determined as: 
                    ∑
 ̃ 
      
 
      
                         (6.34) 
Where, 
  ̃ : Depreciation cost in year t added risk parameter on the revenue side; r: risk-free 
rate.  
According to the Unit of Production Method (Queensland Competition Authority, 1999), 
and (Wu et al. (2012), the depreciation cost can be measured as:  
                   
  
 
                                            (6.35) 
Where, 
Nt: Number of units produced in year t 
N: Total number of units predicted though the economic life of the project 
It should be note that in this framework the unit can be traffic demand. In addition, the tolls 
are fixed through the project’s lifecycle.  
Therefore,  
  
 
  = 
                                          
                                      
                        (6.36) 
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Equation 6.36 can be used for situations where data about traffic demands is missing, but 
the data about tolls and changes in tolls is available. 
It also should be noted that due to the application of DNPV, the construction cost is added 
by the risk-adjusted parameter on the expenditure side. Therefore, the calculated 
depreciation costs need to take into account the risk of changes construction cost. 
Therefore:   
 ̃   
   
 
 ∑
     ̃̅    
      
 
    
                              (6.37) 
Using equations 6.34 and 6.37, one can easily determine the NAV of the project at the 
specific year. From that, equations 6.29 and 6.32 can be solved to determine an interval of 
the concession period which can protect the interests of both sectors.  
6.2.2.4. Comprehensive Project Evaluation for the Private Sector 
It can be seen from figure 6.7 that the final step for the private sector is to make a 
Comprehensive Project Evaluation. This project evaluation can be made by analysing the 
findings from the Return Evaluation by Risk-Adjusted DNPV and optimization of the 
concession parameter. On one hand, the Return Evaluation by Risk-Adjusted DNPV allows 
investors to recognize the profit level of the project in each year. On the other hand, 
findings from the stage of optimization of concession parameters can allow investors to 
determine the transfer time which can protect the private sector’s interests. More 
specifically, the stage of optimization of concession parameters allows investors to 
recognize whether they can obtain the expected rate of return. In reality, this analysis can 
be used in the negotiation stage to balance the interests of both sectors. 
6.3. Summary 
In summary, the purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the proposed framework to 
manage risks in PPPs in the Vietnamese transport sector. The framework is designed for 
both public sector and private sector use. The process of applying this framework for each 
sector was also presented. 
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For the interests of the public sector, this framework allows the public sector to consider 
different projects under one PPP form, and it can also allow public sectors to compare one 
project in different forms of PPP. This is very important in situations where the public 
sector needs to select one project amongst many. The evaluation made by the public sector 
by using this framework is the comparison of the quantitative, and qualitative evaluations. 
On the one hand, projects are compared with regards to critical risk by using the AHP 
model. This comparison is mainly based on quantitative analysis with supportively 
qualitative analysis. On the other hand, the concession period submitted by the public 
sector can be also be quantitatively evaluated by the Risk-Adjusted DNPV. Furthermore, 
the framework also enables the public sector to allocate the critical risks to the right party 
with regards to the selected ability criteria.   
For the interest of the private sector, this framework is expected to enable investors to 
evaluate projects more accurately. More specifically, in this framework, returns are 
analysed by the new method, the risk-adjusted DNPV. The framework allows investors to 
estimate the loss of low revenue and high expenditure. In addition, concession parameters 
are also optimized to protect investors’ interests. In short, this framework is expected to 
enable both sectors to evaluate risks in Vietnamese PPPs in the transport sector, and to 
balance the interests of both sectors. 
The next chapter will illustrate the research methods which have been used to demonstrate 
the applicability and the robustness of the proposed framework.  
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CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
7.1. Introduction 
The purpose of research methods and techniques is to support researchers to carry out 
research and answer research questions. A good research design is essential to ensure the 
quality and validity of any research (Saunders et al. 2012). The purpose of this chapter is to 
show how research was carried out. This chapter, firstly, will discuss the basic concepts 
about research methodology. Secondly, research methods applied in this research will be 
described. Important information such as type of data, data collection, sampling size, and 
data analysis will be illustrated. In addition, difficulties faced while carrying out the 
research will also be forecasted, and strategies to overcome these difficulties will be 
proposed. The methods showed in this chapter are for the purpose of carrying out the 
research and proving the robustness of the proposed risk evaluation framework.  
7.2. Concepts of Research Methodology and Research Methods 
Before discussing the research methodology and research methods, the definition of 
research should first be addressed. According to Leedy (1989, p.5), research can be defined 
as: “A procedure by which we attempt to find systematically, and with the support of 
demonstrable fact, the answer to a question of the resolution of a problem”. More 
specifically, Rajasekar et al. (2006, p.2) demonstrated that research is:  “a logical and 
systematic search for new and useful information on a particular topic”. Research can also 
be simply defined as a search for knowledge (Kothari, 2004).  
Regarding the research method definition, this can be seen as the procedures, schemes, 
techniques that researchers used in their research study (Kothari, 2004). These methods 
assist researchers to collect, analyse, and find the solution for the problem (Rajasekar et al. 
2006). Differently, research methodology refers to the philosophy of how research should 
be carried out (Saunders et al. 2012). It is a systematic way of resolving a problem. 
Research methodology shows the various steps that researchers use to study a research 
problem (Kothari, 2004).    
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7.3. Research Design 
The research design is the preparation of conditions in which the data collection and 
analysis are carried out. This design needs to be in collation with the purpose of the 
research (Kothari, 2004). It is the structure of implementing the research. The research 
design should be able to demonstrate the area that the research will focus on. It also needs 
to provide the reason why the research is carried out. For example, it can address which 
sector the research is about. Other essential information such as, what type of data is 
needed, sampling size, where to collect the data, how to collect data, analysis techniques, 
etc., also need to be clarified in the design (Saunders et al. 2012). Some researchers may 
split the research design into four main aspects, namely, sampling design, observational 
design, statistical design, and operational design (Kothari, 2004). The Research design 
builds an essential foundation for carrying out the research, and it assists the research to be 
able to perform research work easily, systematically and scientifically. This step should be 
done before any actual work can be employed (Rajasekar et al. 2006). 
7.4. Research Approach 
Selecting the suitable research approach is essential for any research as the process of 
collecting and analysing data for specific research needs to be carried out in a suitable, 
scientific and systematic mode. One way of distinguishing the research approach is to 
clarify the research into qualitative research, quantitative research, or hybrid research. The 
following sections will summarize the fundamental points of these approaches.   
7.4.1. Qualitative Approach 
The qualitative approach is used to deal with qualitative phenomenon. It is expected to 
assist research to reach the aims of underlying motivations and causes by employing in-
depth interviews. It is also carried out to discover people’s perceptions about specific 
objects (Kothari, 2004). Fundamental characteristics of this approach can be non-numerical 
and descriptive using words. It aims to observe the feeling and to explain situations. Using 
this type of approach, data collected is non-numerical. These data can be obtained from the 
interviews, focus groups, observation, and collection of material such as letter, pictures, 
videos, and narratives. The data can be analysed in two levels with increasing levels of 
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sophistication. In the first level, the analysis is mainly descriptive without any assumption, 
or forestation. In the second level, analysis is more interpretative, and it is used to 
understand the meaning of responses (Hancock, 2007).  
One of the remarkable advantages of this approach is that it can take into account the 
complexity of the real world, including the complicated relationships between objects. In 
addition, it can be adopted to be suitable for local areas for specific situations (Hancock, 
2007). However, it has also been criticized for its limitations such as it may be difficult to 
test the hypothesis and theories, and the data collection can be time-consuming. Also, the 
findings might not be generalized to other environments, and the findings can also be 
biased due to the personal behaviour of researchers or observers (Saunders et al. 2012). 
7.4.2. Quantitative Approach 
In contrast to the qualitative approach, the quantitative approach takes into account the 
measurement of quantity or amount, and this approach is applicable for research which 
requires expression in terms of quality (Kothari, 2004). It puts emphasis on the 
measurement, hypotheses, and course-effect relations between objects (Creswell, 2003). 
The fundamental characteristics of this method can be numerical and conclusive. In 
addition, it is a process which provides interactive evidence, and it can show findings 
which can be presented in table graphs. In the qualitative approach, analysis of data can 
contain measurement of the frequency of variables, differences between variables, and 
statistical significance of the findings (Hancock, 2007). 
Some main advantages of this method are that it can be used for large populations and it 
can provide the results in terms of statistics. Also, this method allows researchers to 
compare the differences between groups, and to measure the trends of these differences. 
Additionally, the findings acquired from this method can be generalized to other 
populations in other environments (Sukamolson, 2007). However, it has been observed that 
one of the limitations of this method is that a large population is required in order to 
acquire accurate findings. Moreover, this approach might contain gaps in the information 
where provided in the data collection technique designed by the researcher (Saunders et al. 
2012). 
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7.4.3. Mixed Approach 
During recent years, the increasing trend of mix paradigms has been debated. Researchers 
have argued that it is more fruitful to look at the research from both qualitative and 
quantitative aspects rather than adhering to a single approach (Creswell, 2003). From this 
point of view, mixed methods have occurred as the third approach yielding to both the two 
traditional approaches (Bergmann, 2011; Molina-Azorı´n & Cameron, 2010; Walsh, 2012). 
Johnson et al. (2004, p.17) defined mixed methods research as “the class of research where 
the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, 
methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study”.  
Saunders et al. (2012) suggested that researcher should think of the philosophy that is 
being applied as a continuum rather than as contrasting methods. Brannen (2005) further 
clarified that during implementation of the research, the researcher may be faced with 
different types of data in different stages of the study. Hence, they should bring different 
research methods to their work. Bryman (2001) noted that when combining the two 
methods, the domination of each method in each stage of the research should be taken into 
account to generate the best combination.  
7.5. Implemented Research Methods 
The previous sections demonstrated that the combination of approaches can bring 
advantages in conducting research. Therefore, in this research, a hybrid method was 
applied. In applying this method, a number of tasks were identified. These tasks include the 
literature review, survey and interview design, data collection, and data analysis. Figure 7.1 
shows the outline of the tasks in their order. The following sections illustrate the details of 
each task and the relationship between tasks. 
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Figure 7. 1 Research Methodology Process 
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7.5.1. Literature Review 
The two main reasons for reviewing the literature are, first, to help the researcher to 
generate and form research ideas, and secondly, to provide a critical review about related 
studies. These critical reviews are to demonstrate the knowledge of research in the field. It 
also clarifies the area that the research focuses on. Importantly, this part illustrates the 
limitations of previous research and proves the development made by researchers to 
resolve limitations (Sharp et al. 2002). Gall et al. (2006) highlighted that the first purpose 
of the literature review is to assist researchers in refining the research questions and 
objectives. 
In this research, the literature review was used to identify possible risks that can occur in 
Vietnamese PPPs. For this purpose, previous studies about PPPs in international contexts 
were reviewed. Moreover, the literature review was conducted for the purpose of 
identifying assessment methods of risks in PPPs. Previous methods were examined with 
their limitations in order to find the appropriate method to assess risks in the risk 
evaluation framework. The literature review was also used to examine the previous studies 
which have applied AHP in managing risks in PPPs. From that point, a development of 
methods using AHP to evaluate projects, and using AHP to allocate risks was proposed as 
a part of the risk evaluation framework. Importantly, the literature review was used to 
examine the previous methods of evaluating project returns and determining concession 
periods. By critically analysing previous research, new approaches of evaluating project 
returns and optimizing concession periods was proposed.  
All of these reviews demonstrate the area of the research, and the gaps that the research is 
attempting to fill, and how these gaps can be filled. 
7.5.2. Case Study  
The case study method was applied in this research to demonstrate the AHP model in 
evaluating the project’s riskiness, and to demonstrate the Risk-Adjusted DNPV model in 
analysing returns and optimizing concession periods. In terms of the AHP model, case 
studies were selected, and questionnaires were designed in regards to these case study. For 
the Risk-Adjusted DNPV model, secondary data was collected for the selected case study. 
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One of the beneficial advantages of the case study method is that it allows researchers to 
collect more data for each case and enables researchers to make a more critical and deeper 
analysis (Gomm et al. 2000). Selection of case studies was deeply discussed with academic 
experts and practitioners by looking at criteria for case studies. The description of these 
case studies is provided together with the findings in chapter 9. The purpose of this is to 
make it easier for the reader to follow. 
7.5.3. Questionnaire Survey and Interview 
The questionnaire survey and interview are popular methods in collecting data in 
management research as they are able to answer questions about who, what, where, how 
much and how many (Saunders et al. 2012). These methods can assist researchers in 
collecting data from a large population with a minimal economic budget. The data 
collected from these methods can be qualitative. However, researchers can quantitatively 
analyse the data using descriptive statistics. Moreover, by using these methods, the 
possible relationship between variables can also be predicted. Importantly, these methods 
assist the researcher in monitoring the research and data collection process. Figure 7.2 
below shows the process of creating questionnaires in this research. 
Figure 7. 2 Process of Questionnaire Design in the current research 
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In terms of interviews, interviewers were selected from participants participated in the 
questionnaire survey. Besides, participants who made unclear answers or outstandingly 
different in comparison with other respondents were also asked to have interviews.  
7.5.3.1. Questionnaire and Interview Structure 
a. Structure of questionnaire survey and interview for risk identification 
As mentioned in the literature review, the risks will be assessed based on their probability 
of occurrence and degree of impact. Therefore, the questionnaire for this part was designed 
following this purpose. More specifically, for each risk, participants were asked to give 
their opinion about the probability of occurrence and the degree of impact. Five scales 
were provided namely, very low, low, medium, high, and very high. In terms of interviews, 
interviewers were selected from participants who participated in the questionnaire survey. 
In addition, participants who gave unclear answers or outstandingly different answers in 
comparison with other respondents were also asked to have interviews. 
Table 7. 1 Sample of questionnaire to identify critical risks 
Question: Please give your opinion about the probability of occurrence and the degree of impact of the 
Corruption Risk 
Risks 
Frequency of Occurrence Degree of Impact 
Very 
Low Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Very 
Low Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Corruption 
risk 
          
b. Structure of questionnaire for project’ riskiness evaluation  
As mentioned in the literature review, there is a proposed risk evaluation framework.  
Projects will be evaluated by AHP, and data for this model was also collected from the 
questionnaires. Therefore, the questionnaire was designed based on this purpose. More 
specifically, the questionnaire was designed to enable participants to make a pairwise 
comparison between projects, and between groups of risks. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show 
samples of the questionnaire for this part. 
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Table 7. 2 Sample of questionnaire for comparison between risk groups 
Question Equal 
Slightly  
More 
Critical 
Strongly  
more 
Critical 
Very 
strongly 
more 
Critical 
Extremely  
more 
critical  
How critical is Construction Risk in comparison with Political and 
Legal Risks? 
     
How critical is Construction Risk in comparison with Market Risks?           
How critical is Construction Risk in comparison with Operation Risks?           
 
Table 7. 3 Sample of questionnaire for comparison between project options 
With regards to Construction Risk please answer  
 
Equal 
Slightly  
Riskier 
Strongly  
Riskier 
Very 
strongly 
Riskier 
Extremely  
Riskier 
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Phu My 
Bridge Project? 
     
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien 
Bridge Project? 
          
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong 
Nai Bridge Project? 
          
For the purpose of making it easier to follow, more details about values that respondents 
put into the answers will be provided with explanation in section 6.2.1.1, chapter 6.  
After the results of comparison were established, a smaller scale of questionnaires was 
created in order to observe the opinion of practitioners about the findings. The 
questionnaire contained only one question, which was to ask how the practitioners agreed 
with the findings made. Table 7.4 shows the sample of this questionnaire.  
Table 7. 4 sample of questionnaire for collecting the practitioners’ opinion about finding of AHP 
Please provide your opinion about provided results about comparison of project with 
regards to provided critical risks. 
Strongly  
disagree 
Disagree Neutral  Agree 
Strongly  
Agree 
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c. Structure of questionnaire for risk allocation 
Similarly, the literature review mentioned that risks are allocated by AHP. Therefore, the 
questionnaire was also designed based on this purpose. More specifically, the questionnaire 
was designed to enable participants to make a pairwise comparison between allocation 
abilities, and between parties for each risk. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show the samples of the 
questionnaire for risk allocation. 
Table 7. 5 Sample of questionnaire for comparison between allocation ability criteria 
Question Equal 
Slightly  
More 
Important 
Strongly  
more  
Important 
Very 
strongly 
more 
Important 
Extremely  
more 
Important  
How important is The ability to foresee the risk in comparison 
with The ability to control the risk's probability of occurring? 
          
How important is The ability to control the risk's probability 
of occurring in comparison with The ability to bear the 
consequence of the risk? 
          
How important is The ability to foresee the risk in comparison 
with The ability to bear the consequence of the risk? 
          
Table 7. 6 Sample of questionnaire for comparison between party options 
With Regards to the ability to foresee the risk of Low Quality Products 
 Equal 
Slightly  
better 
Strongly  
better 
Very 
strongly 
better 
Extremely  
better 
How better is the public sector in comparison with 
the Share option? 
    
      
How better is the public sector in comparison with 
the private sector? 
    
      
How better is the public sector in comparison with 
the private sector? 
    
      
7.5.3.2. Sample size and data collection 
In this research, a mixed method of delivering questionnaires and interviews was applied. 
More specifically, the questionnaire was delivered by online via internet, post mail and 
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hand in. The reason for using this mixed method is that each method has its own 
advantages and disadvantages, and the combination of these methods can bring further 
strength. 
There were 4 rounds of sending questionnaires in the current research. The first round was 
to collect expert opinions about critical risks in Vietnamese PPPs. The second round was to 
collect the experts’ opinions about evaluating the project’s riskiness. The third round was a 
small survey to collect the opinion of experts about the results of evaluating projects’ 
riskiness by AHP. The fourth round was carried out to collect experts’ opinions about risk 
allocation. 
The number of risks and practitioners who have been working in PPPs in the transport 
sector in Vietnam is unknown. By conservative estimation, risks in transportation PPPs in 
Vietnam will be known by five percent of the practitioners. In addition, with the goal of 
obtaining a sampling error of within 5 percent with a 95 percent of confidence level, the 
minimum number of sample size was calculated as was suggested by Saunders et al. 
(2012) shown in equation 7.1. Besides, it should be noted that in this research, method by 
Saunders et al. (2012) was used to calculate the sample size. However, future research can 
use other techniques, for example, using Gpower suggested by other academics such as 
Faul et al. (2007), (Dattalo 2008), and Gardner (2010). The application of this technique 
will be recommended in the conclusion for future research. 
          [
 
  
]
 
      (7.1) 
Where,  
n: Minimum sample sized required 
p: Percentage of respondents belonging to the field 
q: Percentage of respondents not belonging to the field 
z: Value corresponding to the confidence level (obtained from table 7.7) 
e%: Margin of error required 
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Table 7. 7 Z values (Saunders et al. 2012) 
Level of confidence Z 
90% certain 1.65 
95% certain 1.96 
99% certain 2.57 
Thus, the minimum sample size was measured as: 
n= 5 x 95 x (1.96/5)
2
 = 73 
However, in order to increase the rate of response, the questionnaire was sent to 320 
practitioners. For the first round, 151 questionnaires were returned. This shows that the rate 
of response was 47.18 percent. For the second round, only 57 valid questionnaires were 
received. In contrast, in round 3, questionnaires were sent to only 57 practitioners who 
participated in round 2. Because the questionnaire for this round contained only one 
question, 48 of practitioners, which is equivalent to having 84.21 percent answered. In 
round 4, 57 practitioners from round 2 were excluded. Therefore the questionnaires were 
sent to 263 practitioners, and 32 of them were returned. This brings the rate of response to 
12.16 percent. It can be seen that the lowest response rate was 12.16 percent.  
Regards to the response rate of 12.16 percent, as mentioned in section 7.5.3.2 for 
delivering questionnaires internet, post mail and hand in section were applied. However, it 
should be noted here is that the method “Internet” in this research means sending by email, 
rather than using “Internet website survey”. Therefore, the response rate may be lower than 
the response rate of the method in which researchers use the “Internet website survey”, and 
lower than the response rate for the method in which post mail and hand mail are not 
combined. Besides, according to Saunders et al. (2012), the response rate also depends on 
the specific field and population size. In the situation of this research, questionnaires were 
sent to the 320 practitioners who are experts in the field. Therefore, obtaining response 
from these experts might be more difficult. Other researcher, such as Nulty (2008) 
emphasised that with the number of questionnaire sent over 300, the answers from the 
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response rate of more than 10 per cent can be used, but it can reduce the quality of the 
results analysed.  
In fact, this is one of the limitations of this research, and this limitation will be reported in 
the final chapter and improving the response rate will be one recommended direction for 
the future research.  
7.5.4. Data Analysis Methods 
7.5.4.1.  Reliability Test 
In this research, reliability of data was tested using Cronbach’s alpha test. This method is 
one of the most popular methods to measure reliability. In general, this method enables 
researchers to check the acceptable level of internal consistency. Theoretically, if α is equal 
to zero, there is no correlation amongst values, and if α is equal to 1, then there is a 
complete correlation amongst values. According to previous research, if α is from 0.6 to 
0.7, there is an acceptable consistency. If α is from 0.7 to 0.9, there is good consistency and 
if α is greater than 0.9, there is an excellent consistency (Christmann and Van Aelst 2006; 
Kottner et al. 2010; Pinto et al. 2014).   
7.5.4.2. Computation of Risk Score 
As mentioned in literature review, risks will be seen as a function of probability of 
occurrence and the degree of impact. Therefore, linguistic judgements were converted to 
numeric values. More specifically, 5 levels of probability and impact were used which are 
0.9 for “very high” and “very large”; 0.7 for “high” and “large”, 0.5 for “medium”, and 0.3 
for “low”, and 0.1 for “very low”. 
Risk score of risk I assessed by respondent j: 
i i
j jR Fr x Im
i
j                                                           (7.1) 
 
i
jFr : Frequency of occurrence of risk I assessed by respondent j 
 Im
i
j : Degree  of impact if risk i assessed by respondent j 
Risk score of risk i: 
R
i
 = 
1
n
i
j
j
R
n


                                                     (7.2) 
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7.5.4.3.Mean Ranking 
Mean ranking method was used to order risk scores. From that the most critical risks can 
be found. More specifically, risk with higher mean risk scores are considered as more 
critical. In order to use the mean ranking it was assumed in this research that all 
participants have the equal weight. In fact, research such as Thuyet et al. (2007), Li and 
Zou (2011) have proved that there is no significant difference between risk assessment 
results made by weighted participants and by non-weighted participants. 
7.5.4.4. Standard Deviation (S.D) 
Standard Deviation is used to quantify the level of variation of a set of values. In other 
words, it indicates how the value is distant to the mean. If a standard deviation close to 0, it 
demonstrates that the value point is close to the mean, while a high number of indicates 
that values are spread out.  
7.5.4.5.One Way ANOVA  
One Way ANOVA was used to test the significant difference between result from the 
private sector and from the public sector. This, in fact, is the way of testing one of the 
hypotheses that the perceptions of two parties are different with regards to risks. According 
to Saunders et al. (2012), One-way ANOVA can bring reliable result regarding to 
significant difference test. It is important to emphasise that in applying One-way ANOVA 
test, the assumption about homogeneity of variance needs to meet. Basically, this 
assumption refers to the requirement that the population variances or spread of scores in 
each group are equal (Fitzgerald and Flinn, 2000). This assumption is to ensure that the 
estimates of the population variance are good to analysis the mean (Hoffman, 2015). In 
carrying out this test, the ANOVA result will automatically show the results of testing 
homogeneity. Satisfied variables for this assumption will be selected from this result. 
Besides, in the case that the assumption was not meet, the Welch test was applied. Welch 
test was recommend by a number of research such as Reed and Stank (1988), Moder 
 128 
 
(2010), and Jan and Shieh (2014). It should be noted that, the result of Welch was also 
automatically created together with ANOVA test by using SPSS. 
7.5.4.6.AHP Data Consistency Test 
As mentioned in chapter 4 and chapter 6, the AHP method was used to evaluate projects 
with regards to risks. The details of how to analyse these data were proved clearly in 
section 6.2.1 in chapter 6. 
According to AHP, the consistency of input data can be checked. The data is consistent if 
the following equation is satisfied: 
  
  
                                                                    (7.3)                                                              
Where, 
   
   
   
                                                             (7.4) 
λ can be calculated by first a building normalized pairwise comparison matrix. Second is 
averaging each row of the normalized pairwise comparison matrix. Third, we multiply 
each member of this vector to the sum of each column. Finally, λ is equal to the sum of 
these multiplied results. 
The random index RI can be used from table 7.8: 
Table 7. 8 Random Index RI (Saaty, 1980) 
M 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.51 
In order to make an aggregation of matrixes, the Weighted Arithmetic Mean Method was 
used with the equation: 
      ∑           
 
 
 ∑                                     (7.5)                  
Where, 
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    : Group priority of option Aj 
      : Value provided by member Ei in making comparison between risk groups or 
options 
Wi: Weight of member Ei 
N: Number of member 
In case all members of the group have equal weight, which is the case in this research: 
     ∑         
 
 
                                               (7.6)                           
7.5.4.7. Financial Analysis by Risk Adjusted DNPV 
The returns and concession parameters were analysed based on Risk Adjusted DNPV. The 
details of how to analyse and how to optimize the concession parameters were provided in 
sections 6.2.2.2 and 6.2.2.3 in chapter 6. 
7.5.4.8. Root Mean Squared Error 
The Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) is a frequently used test to compute the difference 
between the values forecasted by a model and actual values obtained from reality. This test 
was used in this research to test the return analysis using the Risk-Adjusted DNPV and 
actual returns. According to Boussabaine and Elhag (1999), RMSE can be calculated as:  
     √
∑   ̂      
  
 
 
                                          (7.7) 
Where, 
RMSE: Root Mean Squared Error 
  : Actual value  
 ̂ : Predicted value  
   Total number of values (5 values) 
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7.5.4.9. Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
The Mean Absolute Percentage Error is the test to measure the accuracy of a forecast 
model. In this research, this test was used to measure the accuracy of the Risk-Adjusted 
DNPV model in comparison with the NPV model. According to Boussabaine and Elhag 
(1999), MAPE can be calculated as: 
MAPE = (∑
|    ̂  |
  
 
  * 100 %)/n                           (7.8) 
Where, 
MAPE: Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
  : Actual value  
 ̂ : Predicted value  
   Total number of values (5 values) 
From MAPE, Average Accuracy can be determined as:  
Average Accuracy % = 100% - MAPE                                      (7.9) 
 
7.5.4.10. Analysis of Missing Data 
Missing data in this research refers to the questionnaires which were not completely 
answered by participants, and to the data lacked in order to analyse returns by using Risk 
Adjusted DNPV. For the missing data collected from questionnaires, missing values were 
coded in the analysis software and the missing data was ignored, and only available data 
was analysed. For the missing data in return analysis, practitioners were re-contacted to 
acquire the missing data. If this strategy did not work, the assumptions about missing data 
were made and these assumptions were mentioned in the analysed results. These methods 
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were expected to overcome the problems of missing data as is suggested by Higgins 
(2011), and Saunders et al. (2012).  
7.6. Access and Research Ethics 
From the previous sections, it can be easily recognized that the current research requires 
both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected for input data of 
questionnaires and interviews, while secondary data relates to return analysis. Before 
carrying out this research, the researcher was totally aware of the difficulty in accessing 
data resources. In terms of primary data, the most common reason for not participating in 
the research can be the time required, concerns about confidentiality, and lack of 
understanding about the value of the research (Saunders et al. 2012). Regarding the 
secondary data, the concerns about confidentiality can be the main reason. In addition, in 
Vietnam’s conditions, access the data can also be a problem because much of the data in 
the Vietnamese market is still reserved only in hard copy. This, in turn, can create 
difficulty in organizing and accessing data.   
 
In order to overcome these difficulties, a number of strategies suggested by researchers 
such as Higgins (2011) and Creswell (2014) was applied. For example, a clear description 
about the research was provided for each practitioner. This description shows the reasons 
for and value of the research. In addition, the right of the participants was also illustrated 
clearly. Participants were shown that they have the right to withdraw from the research at 
any time, and they have the right to not answer any questions that they do wish not to. 
Moreover, the confidentiality of participants was also clearly described. Also, sufficient 
time was prepared to collect required data. Importantly, as suggested by Higgins (2011) 
and Creswell (2014), familiarity and understanding about organizations was developed, 
and advantages of existing contacts were fully used. Lastly, new contacts were also 
developed.  
 
7.7. Summary 
The purpose of research methods and techniques is to support researchers to carry out 
research and answer research questions. This chapter explained the research methods used 
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in the research. More specifically, quantitative methods were implemented with supportive 
qualitative methods in order to answer the research questions and prove the research 
hypotheses. In this chapter, the process of collecting data was described in detail. 
Questionnaires and case studies were chosen to collect data. The selection of the sampling 
size and case studies were also justified in this chapter. Moreover, data analysis techniques 
for each function of the proposed framework were described. Lastly, this chapter also 
justified the methods applied to deal with ethical issues which may occur when carrying 
out research. 
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CHAPTER 8: CRITICAL RISKS IN VIETNAMESE PPPs 
8.1. Introduction 
As described in chapter 6, identifying critical risks is an important function of the proposed 
risk evaluation framework. The list of risks, justified in section 3.9 in chapter 3, was 
evaluated. This chapter, firstly, shows the ranking of critical risks in Vietnamese PPPs by 
applying the proposed framework. In addition, the difference between the perceptions of 
the private sector and public sector about these critical risks will also be demonstrated. 
Furthermore, the criticality of risks and the difference of perceptions between the two 
sectors will be analysed in-depth to bring a clear understanding to the findings. Finally, the 
selection of risks that will be used to test the applicability of AHP models in evaluating the 
project’s riskiness and in allocating risks will be shown.  
8.2. Survey Results  
8.2. 1. Participants 
From June 2014, 320 questionnaires were sent to practitioners who have worked in road 
and bridge PPP projects in Vietnam. Participants were sponsors, public clients, contractors, 
lenders, and inspectors. Participants from other sectors such as academics and researchers 
were also invited to take part in the survey. As mentioned previously in chapter 7, at the 
end of the survey, 151 questionnaires were answered, and this illustrates the rate of 
response of 47.18 percent. Table 8.1 and table 8.2 below demonstrate the profile of 
participants in the survey. After the analysis was made, the results were also discussed with 
some of the participants during interviews. 
Table 8. 1 Participants’ Area of Work 
Sector Participants Number Working Area 
Public Public Client 27 Transportation 
Private Domestic Investor, Contractor and 
Inspector 
97 Transportation 
Private Foreign Investor, contractor and 
Inspector 
9 Transportation 
Others 
Academic 11 
Research and 
Education 
Private Lender 7 Banking 
 Total 151 
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Table 8. 2 Participants Information 
8.2. 2. Risk Ranking for Vietnamese PPP transportation projects  
Table 8. 3 shows the reliability statistic. It can be seen that the Cronbach's Alpha is ranging 
from over 0.6 to 0.9. According to Christmann and Van Aelst (2006), and Kottner et al. 
(2010), and Pinto et al. (2014) these numbers show that the reliability of the input data is 
ranging from questionable level to very good level. Table 8.4 shows the risk ranking for 
Vietnamese PPPs in the transport sector. In general from table 8.4, it can be seen that the 
private sector is more risk averse in comparison to the public clients. In addition, the 
ranking made by the private sector is very close to the general ranking. One of the possible 
reasons is that the number of participants from the public sector is only 27 which is the 
minority in comparison to 119 participants from the private sectors who are the majority in 
this research. Also, it can be seen that there are 32 risks that are scored from the private 
and public sectors which shows a statistically significant difference. To deepen the analysis 
about critical risks displayed in table 8.4, the following sections draw insights about these 
risks and fundamental reasons are also speculated.  
Table 8. 3 Reliability Statistic 
Risks 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Public  Private 
Construction Risks 0.917 0.830 
Political Risks 0.773 0.782 
Legal Risks 0.833 0.847 
Market Risks 0.912 0.886 
Operational Risks 0.901 0.653 
Relationship Risks 0.653 0.679 
 
Level of 
experience 
More than 10 years  From 5 to 10 years  Less than 5 years  
101 35 15 
Working 
position 
Top Managers Head of a department  Staff 
7 37 107 
Education in 
risk 
management 
Educated risk management in PPP  
Educated risk 
management  
in construction projects 
Not educated in  
risk management  
102 40 9 
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Table 8. 4 Risk ranking for Vietnamese PPP transport projects 
Code Risks 
General 
Ranking by Sector 
Public Private Others 
Score Ranking St. d p-value Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking 
C7 
Difficulty in land acquisition 
and resettlement 
0.502 1 0.121 
0.551 
0.489 1 0.5 1 0.563 1 
L3 
Poor project approval and 
permit process 
0.463 2 0.106 
0.293 
0.485 3 0.465 2 0.395 4 
M4 Inflation risk * 0.403 3 0.122 0.000 0.462 6 0.392 3 0.37 7 
M7 
Influence of negative 
economic events 
0.378 4 0.070 
0.897 
0.38 12 0.377 5 0.386 5 
O4 High maintenance cost 0.374 5 0.098 0.962 0.377 13 0.377 4 0.334 10 
P4 Corruption 0.373 6 0.132 0.881 0.385 10 0.375 6 0.325 12 
O5 Fluctuation of demand * 0.342 7 0.111 0.00 0.3 18 0.369 7 0.168 26 
Re2 
 Inadequate experience in 
PPP of public sector 
0.341 8 0.094 
0.181 
0.369 14 0.337 8 0.312 13 
M2 
Weak financial capacity of 
investor* 
0.337 9 0.105 
0.018 
0.415 7 0.323 9 0.334 9 
M1 Lack of transparency 0.336 10 0.101 0.149 0.363 15 0.315 10 0.454 2 
C4 Low site safety * 0.324 11 0.112 0.000 0.469 5 0.289 20 0.414 3 
L5 Restriction on toll * 0.318 12 0.107 0.032 0.395 9 0.309 12 0.228 19 
M5 Fluctuation of interest rate * 0.314 13 0.107 0.000 0.41 8 0.295 16 0.306 14 
M3 
Difficulty in accessing 
finance from the banks * 
0.311 14 0.104 
0.000 
0.486 2 0.267 26 0.33 11 
C3 Low quality products * 0.31 15 0.100 0.002 0.383 11 0.293 17 0.339 8 
C10 
Delay in other infrastructures 
relating to the project 
0.308 16 0.098 
0.186 
0.351 16 0.301 14 0.294 15 
C8 Impractical feasibility study * 0.291 17 0.086 0.015 0.247 19 0.293 18 0.385 6 
M8 Poor financial market * 0.286 18 0.098 0.000 0.178 23 0.314 11 0.221 20 
L2 
Revision of the contract 
clauses * 
0.279 19 0.101 
0.000 
0.203 21 0.307 13 0.177 24 
P1 
Concession termination by 
government  * 
0.268 20 0.084 
0.000 
0.167 27 0.298 15 0.241 18 
L1 
Disapproval of guarantees by 
the government * 
0.264 21 0.096 
0.000 
0.169 26 0.287 21 0.257 16 
Re4 
Low-cooperation between 
different partners * 
0.258 22 0.089 
0.000 
0.211 20 0.277 24 0.183 23 
M6 
Foreign currency exchange 
fluctuation * 
0.25 23 0.099 
0.000 
0.149 29 0.291 19 0.081 43 
L4 Regulation change * 0.244 24 0.126 0.000 0.137 31 0.284 23 0.137 33 
P3 Unstable government  * 0.238 25 0.085 0.000 0.127 33 0.264 27 0.25 17 
M9 Income streams are usually in 0.235 26 0.108 0.000 0.063 42 0.285 22 0.154 30 
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local currency * 
P7 Forced buy-out risks * 0.23 27 0.097 0.897 0.082 39 0.274 25 0.148 31 
Re3 
 Inappropriate distribution of 
responsibilities and risks * 
0.229 28 0.143 
0.000 
0.473 4 0.169 40 0.219 21 
C6 Design changes * 0.208 29 0.075 0.001 0.17 25 0.221 28 0.165 28 
C5 Unavailability of materials 0.2 30 0.069 0.322 0.189 22 0.212 32 0.105 37 
P6 
Public scepticism about the 
real benefits of PPP * 
0.193 31 0.065 
0.000 
0.128 32 0.219 30 0.088 42 
C9 
Impractical requirements of 
progress of project * 
0.191 32 0.084 
0.000 
0.099 35 0.219 29 0.143 32 
M10 
Asset value less than 
forecasted at the time of 
transferring * 
0.19 33 0.101 
0.000 
0.336 17 0.167 41 0.163 29 
Re1 
Inadequate experience in PPP 
of private sector 
0.184 34 0.058 
0.214 
0.174 24 0.197 34 0.075 44 
L6 Taxation risks * 0.184 35 0.082 0.000 0.083 38 0.213 31 0.111 35 
C2 Poor design * 0.176 36 0.078 0.003 0.106 34 0.195 35 0.119 34 
O1 Operation cost overrun * 0.174 37 0.103 0.000 0.046 43 0.206 33 0.097 38 
Ot1 Bad nature events 0.172 38 0.064 0.055 0.14 30 0.176 38 0.208 22 
P2 Political opposition * 0.159 39 0.085 0.000 0.037 44 0.191 36 0.097 39 
O2 Default of operator * 0.158 40 0.064 0.000 0.084 37 0.18 37 0.11 36 
C1 
Changes in industrial code of 
practices 
0.152 41 0.098 
0.825 
0.152 28 0.15 43 0.167 27 
O3 Low quality of operation * 0.151 42 0.006 0.002 0.097 36 0.17 39 0.09 40 
Ot2 Force majeure events * 0.136 43 0.077 0.002 0.077 41 0.151 42 0.172 25 
P5 Public sector default * 0.032 44 0.002 0.000 0.078 40 0.012 44 0.088 41 
  Average 0.261      0.245   0.268   0.227   
*: Significant difference between public and private sector at 95 percent confidence 
8.3. Finding Analysis 
Following sections will analysis findings of risk scores and risk ranking presented in 
table 8.4. Firstly, 10 risks with highest risk scores will be analysed. The reason for 
choosing this group of top 10 is recommended by academic experts and practitioners as it 
may show possible number of risks that investors need to focus as the first priority. In 
fact, the idea of in depth analysis top ten risks has been also used in a number of previous 
research such as Thuyet and Ogunlana (2007), Ling and Hoang (2010), and Xu et al. 
(2011).  Secondly, a group of 6 six with lower scores in comparison with to 10 risks will 
be discussed. The reason for grouping these six risks is that although they are not in the 
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top ten risks, but they still receive scores over 3.0 which are considered as a medium 
level compared to other scores in table 8.4. Thirdly, a group of 14 risks will be 
demonstrated. The reason for grouping these 14 risks is that they all have the risk scores 
ranging between 2.0 and 3.0 which is the second lowest level in the table 8.4. Lastly all 
risks with lowest scores which are under 2.0 will be analysed.  
The method of grouping risks with similar scores is expected to bring readers and 
practitioners in the field better links amongst risks which obtain similar perception from 
participants. In fact, the idea of analysing risks by groups categorized based on purpose 
of researchers has been applied in previous research such as, Thomas et al. (2010), Zhao 
et al. (2013), and Song et al. (2013). 
8.3.1. Top ten ranked risks 
Table 8. 5 Top ten ranked risks 
Code 
 
Risks 
General 
Ranking by Sector 
Public Private Others 
Score Ranking 
St. 
D 
Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking 
C7 Difficulty in land acquisition and resettlement 0.502 1 0.121 0.489 1 0.500 1 0.563 1 
L3 Poor project approval and permit process 0.463 2 0.106 0.485 3 0.465 2 0.395 4 
M4 Inflation risk * 0.403 3 0.122 0.462 6 0.392 3 0.370 7 
M7 Influence of negative economic events 0.378 4 0.070 0.380 12 0.377 5 0.386 5 
O4 High maintenance cost 0.374 5 0.098 0.377 13 0.377 4 0.334 10 
P4 Corruption 0.373 6 0.132 0.385 10 0.375 6 0.325 12 
O5 Fluctuation of demand * 0.342 7 0.111 0.300 18 0.369 7 0.168 26 
Re2 Inadequate experience in PPP of public sector 0.341 8 0.094 0.369 14 0.337 8 0.312 13 
M2 Weak financial capacity of investor* 0.337 9 0.105 0.415 7 0.323 9 0.334 9 
M1 Lack of transparency 0.336 10 0.101 0.363 15 0.315 10 0.454 2 
8.3.1.1. Land acquisition 
In table 8.5, “Difficulty in land acquisition and resettlement” (C7) stands at the first 
position with the mean risk score of 0.502. In the opinion of participants from all sectors, 
C7 is always the most serious risk. This finding is consistent with some of the previous 
studies about the Vietnamese construction market. For example, Toan and Ozawa (2008) 
and Thu and Perera (2011) also found in this study that Vietnam’s construction market is 
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facing a serious challenge about how to effectively resolve land disputes in construction 
projects, and their study evaluated this risk as the fourth most serious issue in Vietnamese 
BOT projects. 
Table 8. 6 Complaints about land related issues (Thu and Perera, 2011) 
Complaints 
Number of complaints Increase (%) 
1993-1995 1996-2005 
Old land claims 800 
1224 53.00 
Land acquisition 800 
12,708 1488.50 
Land dispute 200 
1548 674.00 
Accusation of violations of land laws 100 
1800 1700.00 
other 100 
720 620.00 
Total 2000 
18,000 800.00 
The conflicts in land acquisition usually contain three parties, namely the land user, the 
developer, and the host government. Table 8.6 compares the complaints in land in Vietnam 
from 1993 to 2005. The figures present that the conflicts in land acquisition increased from 
800 from the period of 1993-1995 to 12,708 in the period of 1996-2005 (Thu and Perera, 
2011).  In fact, the regulations in Vietnam emphasized that it is the citizens’ obligation to 
support the government in acquisition of land for a predetermined development plan. 
However, through negotiations, it was decided that the interests of involved parties would 
be protected.  The expenditure for land acquisition in Vietnam consumes a large part of the 
total capital cost. For instance, in some projects the cost for this process can be a third of 
the total expenditure (The Asia Foundation, 2014). According to the law, land is owned by 
the state and the holders only have a land-use-certificate to use the land. In the case of land 
acquisition, the host government and developer need to negotiate with occupants on the 
price of acquiring land use rights. The decree 78/2007/ND-CP and the circular 
03/2011/TT-BKHDT clarify that although the local government is responsibe for 
delivering land to the developer, the investors are in charge of the costs of acquisition. 
Therefore, investors need to negotiate with the land users about compensation rates unless 
the investors have a suffiecient budget to fulfill all requirements from land users, but 
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investors’ financial budgets are, in fact, limited. In some special projects, the cost for land 
acquisition is compensated by the government and this expenditure is not counted in the 
total capital expenditure (Circular 03/2011/TT-BKHDT). The reason for this action is to 
motivate investment from the private sector. Partiticants from both sectors reveal that 
issued regulation documents do not clearly delineate how to apply the market price and 
state price, and the price structure is also not clarified. This causes difficulties for the 
officals who are responsible for  land acquisition. 
One of the dominant reasons underlying dissatisfaction and disputes in land acquisition in 
Vietnam is that there is a two-land-price system which consists of the market land price 
and the land price decided by the government. More specifically, the compensation given 
to the land-use-certificate holder is decided by the government and investors, and this price 
is criticized to be lower than the market price, and hence, does not reflect the land right. 
This law is expected to support investors in theory; however, in reality it has created 
conflicts in land acquisition since the citizens demand a fair compensation rate which is 
equivalent to the market rate (Thu and Perera, 2011). These conflicts can ignite if the 
negotiation is not able to protect the interests of citizens, the government and investors. 
Table 8.6 shows that the number of conflicts increased dramatically after the year 1996. In 
fact, from the year 1996, the difference in the two prices became significant.  
In fact, as participants replied, in many cases, local citizens desire to provide investors with 
the land use right. The motive may be the urgent need of development and investment in 
the area, and that the compensation rate offered by the investors is sound. However, the 
disputes happen in the resettlement stage. More specifically, after being resetteled to a new 
accomodation, resetteled citizens perceive that the living condition in the resettled place is 
below par, and unlike what was promised by the developers. For example, the transport 
links in the new areas are poor, the basis of life security conditions is not satisfied, or the 
practice of traditional and cultural lifestyles is interrupted (Transparency International, 
2011). According to the land law of 2013, investors must prepare two plans, namely: 
Compensation Assistance and Resettlement Plan and a Livelihood Restoration Plan. 
However, government officials from this study admitted that the local government and 
investors just tend to mainly focus on monetary compensation, without assisting land users 
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to acquire new livelihoods. This, indeed, can make the life of citizens uncertain (Hansen, 
2013). 
Likewise, the need for having a conversation to express a citizen’s opinion on the 
development of the area is not satisfied. During the land acquisition and resettlement 
process, land users are not provided with sufficient transparent information about projects, 
especially, after the land-use-right is transferred and the process goes into the resettlement 
stage. Additionally, academics made an important point that corruption can also be a 
motive causing obstacles in land acquisition since behind this process, the interests of 
involved groups can be dependent on some planners and politicians. In fact, if delays in 
land acquisition occur, the local government and investors lay the blame on others. 
Moreover, another fundamental reason which raises the level of land disputes is that there 
is inconsistency between the centre and local government’s development plan. For 
example, the development plan of a province may not fit with the overall development plan 
of the region, and this demands adjustments in many layers of the government, and make 
the process time-consuming. Consequently, these undesirable images are gradually shaping 
negative attitudes about land acquisition and resettlement. This, in turn, generates more 
struggles in resolving this risk in other projects.  
8.3.1.2. Poor project approval and permit process (L3) 
The risk “poor project approval and permit process” (L3) expresses the situation in which 
involved parties suffer from delays acquiring project approvals and permits though the 
project life cycle. L3 stands in the second position in table 8.5 with the mean score of 
0.463. The scores given by the public sector and private sector are 0.485 and 0.465, 
respectively. 
The majority of interviewees in this study reported that L3 is not only a critical feature of 
PPPs, but is also a critical feature of the construction industry in Vietnam. This lengthy 
activity has caused higher investment costs and delays in all stages in general through the 
project’s life cycle such as initial planning, design and implementation of construction, and 
completion. Even though in Vietnamese PPP laws, timing for the approval and permit 
process is revealed, in reality, longer time needs to be spent on this issue. Moreover, 
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current issued documents come only from the time schedule for submissions from early 
stages such as selecting investors, contractors, and inspectors, etc. However, there is vague 
timing for the approval and permit practice during the project’s life cycle which contains a 
number of procedures requiring collaboration with authorities or agencies. In addition, 
respondents’ complaint that there is no inspection timing for the approval and permit 
process, especially for technical issues, resulting in long-lasting delays from technical 
departments. 
One of the primary causes that was discovered is the complicated and unclear 
administrative system in Vietnam. For instance, it is criticized that there are various layers 
of government authorities and technical departments, and the project approval process 
must go through relevant authorities from the commencement to the completion phase of 
their projects. Even in many cases, the regulations in each authority layer are not 
consistent. For example, the regulation of the central government might conflict with the 
regulation of the province or district. Sponsors reported that sometimes in the planning 
stage, obtaining the government’s approval can take several years.  More seriously, the 
government authorities even cancel approvals that had been granted previously. Take the 
approval for the design as an example, where in case a 1/500 scale design needs to be 
approved, any small conflict with the local government plan can force the design process to 
be restarted from the beginning. Some interviewees commented that a project in which the 
design process took three months to finish drawing documents, can take one year to get 
approved from the government departments. 
In addition, executives interviewed replied that the unclear distribution of the responsibility 
of staff and government agencies is also a fundamental reason underlying the seriousness 
of this issue. The power of decision makers is separated, and they are not authorized to 
have enough power to make a quick and productive decision in some cases, and 
consequently, there are multitudes of licenses or decisions from higher levels that are 
required, and the responsibility can be unclear. Furthermore, the approval process in initial 
submissions is sometimes not carefully assessed for some projects which had not been 
cautiously evaluated in the feasibility stage. Hence, during implementation of construction, 
conditions which need to be adjusted occur. For example, the capital plan, bidding plan, 
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and process of choosing involved partners had not been wisely analyzed in the feasibility 
stage, and this, in turn, delays the approval process in the future implementation of the 
work. 
Contractors also stated that the inconsistency between requirements from sponsors and 
public clients is also an underlying reason for delays in the approval and permit process. 
For example, requirements for the bidding process can be different between government 
agencies and private investors’ perceptions.  More specifically, for large international 
projects, there are a limited number of domestic contractors who can go into the bidding 
process because some robust domestic contractors are state-owned organizations and this is 
not accepted by sponsors, and this conflict, in fact, may also produce an unfair bidding 
process. Practitioners criticized that even sometimes, higher government agencies 
reprimand project managers if they follow requirements from sponsors which conflict with 
the government’s benchmark.  
The appearance and seriousness of L3 seem to have worsened over time.  Indeed, because 
the approval process requires longer time, when it has been achieved, many critical aspects 
in the agreement such as capital expenditure are not appropriate for current time. 
Consequently, these proposals need to be corrected again, and the adjusted plans must also 
go through the approval and permit process. Perhaps this risk is considered as serious 
because it seems to be external to many private organizations, and it is portraying an 
undesirable picture about the Vietnamese PPP market, turning away many potential 
investors (Thuyet et al., 2007). Indeed, Qui Hao, (2002) said that in his study, 20 percent 
of foreign investors refused to invest in Vietnam again because of the long approval 
process. However, the findings of the interviews also confirm the statement by Ling and 
Hoang (2010) that it appears to be faster for bigger international investors to obtain 
approvals and permits. The reason of this difference is that in order to prevent reselling 
project approvals, the host government demands proof of financial status and a deposit 
which can be kept for 1-2 years (Ling and Hoang, 2010), and this can be more affordable 
for strong financial investors than for small and medium sponsors. 
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8.3.1.3. Inflation rate fluctuation (M4) 
“Inflation Rate Fluctuation” (M4) is categorised in the market risk group. The mean score 
for M4 is 0.403 and this risk stands in the 3
rd
 position in table 8.5. There is a statistically 
significant difference between opinions of public clients and private practitioners as 
participants from public sectors give this risk the score of 0.462 with the 6
th
 position, 
whereas private sectors put this risk into the 3
rd
 rank with a mean score of 0.392. 
The finding from interviewees reveals that investors are more concerned about inflationary 
conditions in PPPs than in conventional construction projects since a PPP form usually 
lasts for a long period. Consequently, considered over a long period, the inflation rate is 
more challenging to use to predict the future changes and it also has a heavier effect.  It is 
worth noting that although the inflation rate in Vietnam has been declining in the current 
years, the fluctuation of this parameter is still threatening investors. From table 8.7 below, 
it is worth noting that the annual inflation rate fluctuates dramatically from 6.2 percent in 
2009 to peak at the rate of 21.3 percent in 2011, then collapsing to 4.8 percent in 2013. 
Participants declared that the wide fluctuation of the inflation rate in previous years has 
given a very negative impression about the Vietnamese market to investors. 
Table 8. 7 Annual Inflation Rate Comparison (World Bank, 2014) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
China 3.8 7.6 7.8 -0.6 6.6 7.8 2 1.7 
Japan -1.1 -0.9 -1.3 -0.5 -2.2 -1.9 -0.9 -0.6 
Thailand 5.2 3.5 3.9 1.9 3.7 4.2 0.2 2.8 
United Kingdom 2.9 2.3 3.2 2.2 3.1 2.3 1.1 1.7 
United States 3.1 2.7 2 0.8 1.2 2 1.7 1.5 
Vietnam 8.6 9.6 22.7 6.2 12.1 21.3 10.9 4.8 
The fluctuation of this parameter is highly correlated with a number of other negative 
consequences. For instance, material cost, interest rate, currency exchange rate, and wages 
can possibly change following the fluctuation of inflation. Indeed, the fluctuation of 
inflation generally flows into the real price behaviour of materials, especially materials for 
transport construction such as asphalt, steel, and concrete (Lindsey et al. 2011). For 
example, during the period from 2006 to 2013, the construction material prices in Vietnam 
showed a wide fluctuation, particularly, in the years of 2010 and 2011, which are the 
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periods with the highest fluctuation of inflation rate ever recorded (VP Bank Securities, 
2014). Regarding the impact on the interest rate, figure 8.1 below presents the interest rate 
in Vietnam from 2005 to 2014. Obviously, the pattern of fluctuation in the interest rate 
shows a marked movement, on the same basis with the pattern of inflation fluctuation. An 
infrastructure project usually requires an enormous capital expenditure, and in the case of 
Vietnamese PPPs, the investors usually mobilise less than 30 percent of the total 
expenditure from equity, and the rest is debt from credit organizations. Consequently, a 
wide interest rate leads dramatically to additional costs to the project, and vice versa. For 
example, according to interviewees’ answers, after the steep decline of the inflation rate in 
2012, the lending interest rates gradually came down, and this has been helping all 
involved parties to save annual expenses. Furthermore, the inflation rate can devaluate the 
currency value of the host country, and this can bring out financial losses for foreign 
investors who have debts from international banks. 
Figure 8. 1 Lending Interest Rate by percentage in Vietnam (Source: World Bank, 2014) 
 
In fact, by reviewing Vietnamese PPP contracts, it can be recognized that parties have cited 
the contingency budget for reasons for inflation. For example, in No 18 highway Uong Bi 
– Halong BOT contract, the contingency budget for operational costs was 13 percent for 
2012 and 10 percent from 2013 forward, and contract clauses also clarify that if the 
inflation rate fluctuates by over 2 percent from the assumed level, these budgets can be 
renegotiated. However, the adjustments in renegotiation are usually the extension of the 
concession period, and this also means involved parties have to face this factor for a longer 
period. Additionally, the wide fluctuation of this factor can also cause pressure on the 
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social effects, negatively influencing any business performance. For example, a high 
inflation rate in 2007 in Vietnam stood behind the aggressive behaviour of employers 
leading to 541 strikes, with many of them aimed at foreign construction organizations, 
even though this issue had very rarely happened in Vietnam previously (Long, 2008). 
8.3.1.4. Influence of negative economic events (M7) 
“Influence of negative economic events” (M7) is categorized in market risks. M7 refers to 
very negative circumstances of the economy such as a financial crisis, or crisis of a specific 
industry. In general, M7 is ranked into the 4
th
 position with the mean score of 0.378. There 
is no statistically significant difference at the level of 95 percent accuracy between 
rankings by private and public sectors.  
The finding appears differently from previous research. For example, in the research by 
Toan and Ozawa (2008) about BOT power plant and transport projects, this risk was 
ranked in the 46
th
 position out of 52 risks. Hence, it seems to not be a serious risk in this 
study by. Similarly, in research by Thuyet et al. (2007) about oil and gas construction 
projects, this risk was only ranked in the 26
th
 position. The inconsistency between these 
findings can be because these research projects were conducted before the financial crisis 
in 2008. However, in the current research, the negative consequence of this crisis has still 
been creating a psychological effect on investors. In fact, investment and capital mobility 
and the financial market were seriously influenced by that crisis (Thanh, 2008). It can be 
clearly recognized in table 8.7 that inflation rates were very high during the crisis, and the 
rate of Foreign Trade Investment to Vietnam also decreased after the year 2008.  In fact, 
from 2008 to 2012, the rate of return for investors in the construction industry in Vietnam 
dramatically decreased. From 2012, the rate has been increasing, but market conditions 
however seem to be unfavourable for investors and the private sector still is cautious about 
any movement of the market (VP Bank Securities, 2014). Academics from in-depth 
interviews of this study reported that the real estate segment is the most important and has 
a large influence on the infrastructure construction segment. However, from 2008 to 2012, 
the Vietnamese real estate sector decreased dramatically. Therefore, the infrastructure 
segment was also affected. 
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Vietnam has also been more cautious by tightening credit sources of the infrastructure 
industry (VP Bank Securities, 2014). In infrastructure investment, debts build a major 
portion of capital expenditure. Hence, the tightened policies from the government also 
generate obstacles for private sponsors. According to academics from this study, the credit 
resource will be still tightened in the future because of the high rate of bad debt in the 
banking system. In some large projects, investors may seek credit resources from the 
international market. However, they need to consider the value of the currency. as the 
value of Vietnamese currency is low in comparison with other countries’ currency, and the 
revenue is received in local currency. 
8.3.1.5. High maintenance cost (O4) 
“High Maintenance Cost” (O4) is in the operational risk group. It expresses the negative 
situations in which investors have to maintain the construction with a higher cost than was 
forecasted during the franchise operation period. O4 is ranked in the 5
th
 position with the 
mean score of 0.374 in general, and public and private sectors do not show significantly 
different opinions about this risk.  
Investors responded that they usually employ a maintenance contract from another partner, 
and this partner also needs to be approved by the public agency. Because maintenance 
expenditures contribute a large part of the annual expenses on road and bridge 
infrastructures, operational authorities are continuously trying to enhance the maintenance 
efficiency and diminish related costs. According to interviewees, there is no fixed financial 
plan for maintenance, but the financial plan for maintenance must not conflict with the 
decree10/2010/TT-BGTVT (MOT, 2014). For example, table 8.7 below indicates the 
annual maintenance budget for No 18 Highway during the franchise operational stage. It 
can be seen from table 8.8 that the maintenance budget for the road and drain system is 
0.55 percent of the total expenditure which is needed for road construction work, and the 
maintenance budget for bridge construction is 0.1 percent of the total construction cost of 
the bridge. However, sponsors admitted that the maintenance budgets are set up based on 
their experience because the frequency and costs of maintenance may depend on certain 
locations of construction.  
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Table 8. 8 Annual Maintenance Budget for No 18 Highway 
Construction Budget 
Road and Drain System 0.55% of expenditure for road surface construction 
Bridge 0.1% of expenditure for bridge construction 
There is a difference between the two sectors about the core reasons for this issue. The 
public clients were concerned about the quality of the roads and bridges, whereas the 
private sector complained about the damage from overloaded vehicles.  In the former case, 
they criticized that the real quality of construction cannot sustain the actual traffic demand. 
Also, they criticized that due to limited investment budgets, investors can possibly select 
road and bridge material and equipment with low initial costs, and they ignore the fact that 
these can lead to a raise in maintenance costs in the future. For the opinion about 
overloaded vehicles, which is still a controversial debate in the Vietnam transport sector, 
participants from private sectors replied that the damage generated by overloaded vehicles 
is becoming more serious in recent times. Many vehicles transport loads are over-designed 
for the capacity for each type of construction. In some cases, drivers transport loads which 
are more than 2 times higher than the designed capacity, and the designed material 
structures are dramatically damaged. In their opinion, resolution of this issue appears to be 
beyond their ability. In addition, they commented that it is problematic to resolve this 
obstacle since there is a lack of CCTV systems in Vietnam, and it is challenging for police 
officers to identify and fine overloaded vehicles. Moreover, participants reported that 
corruption can occur around this issue, which makes O4 more complicated to resolve. 
Some participants revealed the fact that, as a consequence of the high price of transporting 
and other factors such as petrol price, drivers accept being fined, and then add the fines to 
the cost of transportation. Interestingly, another possible complaint is that there is the 
conflict between the capacity of the construction in Vietnamese roads and bridges with the 
international standard design of vehicles. Consequently, if drivers use 100 percent of the 
designed capacity of vehicles, the construction can be overloaded. 
In addition, it should be worth noting that due to the long time it takes to run the projects 
and the irresistibly decreasing quality of the construction over its service life, if O4 occurs, 
investors might need to spend more costs on this risk in the future. 
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8.3.1.6. Corruption (P4) 
Corruption (P4) expresses the circumstance that any involved officials from any party 
demand bribes and unjust rewards. It stands in the 6
th
 position in table 8.5 with the mean 
score of 0.373.  
Table 8.9 below compares the level of corruption in different countries.  It can be seen that 
Vietnam is in the 116
th
 position out of 177 countries. According to interviewees, P4 
remains problematic in any stage in a PPP from development and implementation of 
construction to completion and the franchise operation period. However, in Vietnam, the 
stage in which this risk is the most serious, both in terms frequency of occurrence and 
degree of impact is the development stage. The development stage is a favourable 
environment for P4 since at this time a number of approval permits need to be obtained, 
and the process of selecting investors, contractors, inspectors and other partners is carried 
out. Indeed, private investors replied that unfair selection of investors, contractors and 
other partners can be one of the most frequent issues. In fact, results from a survey by the 
World Bank (2012) found that in the Vietnamese construction industry, the public client is 
the most corrupted sector amongst involved parties. Interviewees also reported the recent 
case of the Hanoi city rail project which is under investigation. In this case, the Japan 
Transportation Consultants Company is being accused of providing bribes of more than 
£500,000 to get the consulting contract (MOT, 2014). 
Table 8. 9 Corruption Ranking (Transparency World, 2014) 
Rank Country 
Score in 
2013 
Score in 
2012 
14 United Kingdom 76 74 
18 Japan 74 74 
19 United States 73 73 
22 France 71 71 
26 Austria 69 69 
46 South Korea 55 56 
80 China 40 39 
102 Thailand 35 37 
114 Indonesia 32 32 
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116 Vietnam 31 31 
140 Laos 26 21 
160 Cambodia 20 22 
Many reasons for this issue were revealed by respondents, for example legal framework, 
poor transparency, weak enforcement of the laws, cash using cultures, and low income of 
practitioners. In fact, according to Global Integrity (2009), the anti-corruption legal 
framework in Vietnam in 2009 was considered amongst the best anti-corruption legal 
frameworks in Asia. However, the results of the current study did not show consistent 
findings. The majority of participants from all parties responded that they did not consider 
the anti-corruption legal framework in Vietnam as an effective framework, and that it is 
still a vast challenge to improve this framework.  More specifically, the legal and 
supervision system is criticized as having many loopholes which can be exploited. As 
stated, there are too many unnecessary and overlapping documents and procedures, and 
from the private sector’s perspective, more unnecessary and overlapping are documents 
required, in which a serious environment for corruption can be generated. In addition, there 
is also a lack of sufficient mechanisms for making involved officials accountable for their 
activities. This finding seems to support the findings of the World Bank (2012) that the 
laws are too general, formalistic, and out of date, and there are no serious sanctions that 
have been implemented. Similarly, other experts also observed that the result of the anti-
corruption fight in Vietnam is still limited, and the reason is the lack of implementation, 
weak enforcement of the laws, and the actual work of anti-corruption departments still is 
not transparent (Freedom House, 2011; US Department of State Investment Climate 
Statement, 2011; Martini, 2012). 
As a consequence of corruption, the low financial ability of investors and contractors can 
be selected. P4 can also negatively influence the effectiveness of inspectors and 
consultants. In comparison with conventional projects in which P4 falls within the 
relationship between the public and private sectors, in PPP, corruption trends can also take 
place but inside the private sector, such as amongst private sponsors, contractors and 
consultants.  Some participants from the private sector confess that now many practitioners 
have accepted a certain level of corruption in order to smooth their work. The cost for this 
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is accepted as an invisible portion in total expenditure. A small number of participants 
disclosed that in some cases, the budget, which needs to be sent to corrupted officials can 
be assumed as an unacknowledged percentage of the total capital expenditure. 
However, interviewees also admitted that in recent years, corruption trends have been 
changing, and P4 has been minimized. For example, with the recognition of the fact that 
the process of selection of investors and contractors is the most favourable environment for 
corruption, in 2014 the government issued the decree 63/2014/NĐ-CP in order to escalate 
transparency and competitiveness. Also, the development of the social media is also one 
factor mitigating this risk since this system can disclose more information to the public and 
make the public pay attention to the projects. This, in turn, can require parties to publish 
more details about projects. Indeed, social media can raise the public’s understanding and 
awareness of the anti-corruption fight. Moreover it can also give pressure and chase cases 
that might otherwise have died out (World Bank, 2012). Nevertheless, some respondents 
from the current surveys also expressed concern about the social media freedom in 
Vietnam, and that social media can be devaluated by the over-control from the host 
government. Respondents disclosed that in big projects, it is less serious than in small and 
medium projects as these projects achieve more attention from the public, but it is still a 
massive challenge in investigating corruption in small and medium projects.  
8.3.1.7. Fluctuation of Demand (O5) 
“Fluctuation of Demand” (O5) is in the operational risk category. It refers to the 
circumstance in which the number of vehicles using toll roads or bridges is higher or under 
the forecasted level. If the demand is higher than predicted, the interests of the public 
clients are not protected, whereas if the demand is lower than an estimated level of 
investors may face losses. Participants ranked this risk in 7
th
 position with the mean score 
of 0.342. There is a statistically significant difference between scores given by the public 
and private sectors. The private sector graded this risk at 0.369 with the 7
th
 position while 
public clients marked this risk 0.300 in the 18
th
 position. 
Variation of demand is one of the most critical risks which directly decrease the revenue 
stream of a PPP project, possibly leading to project failure. According to Chou et al. 
(2012) and EAIC Advisory (2013), in social infrastructure projects, prices of services are 
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often set up based on pre-agreed tariff mechanisms. Therefore, the price variation is not 
considered as critical, but fluctuation of demand is the core element. According to projects’ 
agreements collected during the fieldwork, in Vietnamese PPPs, the fluctuation of demand 
is always embedded in the contract. Basically, if the demand varies widely, the contract 
could be renegotiated. For example, in No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Halong project, if the 
demand alters by more than 5 percent of the predicted demand, the contract will be revised. 
Although this risk and its mitigation strategies are embedded in the contract, parties can 
still be seriously harmed. For instance, because of the pre-agreed level on tolls, investors 
cannot raise the toll level significantly, and then they need to stay in a longer franchise 
operation period, and all financial return plans might be changed. In addition, a longer 
contract may result in more unpredicted uncertainties for all parties. Also, an unpredicted 
demand can also lead to unpredicted maintenance costs which account for a high 
proportion of the total expenditure. 
It is criticized that the inaccurate demand forecast in Vietnamese PPPs is because the 
method of forecasting is unsystematic, unreliable, and not comprehensive. The first 
fundamental reason investigated is the unreliability of historical data about traffic demand. 
It is pointed out that forecasting future traffic flows can be a huge challenging exercise 
with the absence of reliable historical data. Without these data, revenue shortfalls can be 
generated because of overestimation of the traffic level. Another essential reason 
underlying this issue is that the infrastructure development plan of the country is not 
scheduled for a long-term period. For this reason, participants referenced the case of Yen 
Lenh bridges. In this project, the demand varied widely because of the appearance of new 
transport routes which had not been forecasted in the original feasibility study. As a result 
of the failure, the SPV had to transfer the project to the government. Some academics also 
declared their concern about the current 1A highway project which is the main 
transportation link though the country. This highway is now being constructed under BOT 
and BT arrangements. However, there is a Ho Chi Minh free highway which is parallel to 
the current No 1 highway project. Consequently, they are worrying that when the 1A 
highway starts to collect tolls, drivers would go to the Ho Chi Minh free highway and this 
can undesirably cut the demand for the 1A highway. Investors also talked about the Phu 
My bridge project. This bridge was first constructed in 2007 and in was in the operation 
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stage in 2010. However, in 2011 Phu My Construction Company which is the SPV also 
had to return the project to the Ho Chi Minh City government. They complained that the 
local government did not organize traffic flows and delayed in constructing other support 
infrastructures. This, in turn, dramatically decreased the vehicle level for the bridge. In 
fact, the failures of these projects have made heavy financial burdens for the Vietnamese 
government. The first financial burden comes from the financial gap made by the loss of 
demand. The second financial burden comes from the fact that investors did not provide 
the required equity, but they borrowed from the bank and the government had to pay back 
this amount including its interest.  
From the feedback of investors, it is also recognized that credit organizations are likewise 
concerned about the reliability of traffic demand forecasting. Thus, lenders who are usually 
risk averse, are correspondingly concerned about the creditworthiness of the project, since 
they are worried that with an actual revenue stream, investors will be unable to repay their 
financial obligations. Thus, they may require further backup from the host government. 
This, in turn, can make it difficult for investors in mobilising capital. Nevertheless, it is 
recommended that in this case, if an off-take agreement is used, it may be easier for 
investors to access financial resources (EAIC Advisory, 2013). Additionally, academics in 
the in-depth interviews in this study criticized that demand forecasting is also the 
responsibility of investors, and the public sector should be only responsible for losses made 
by action or inaction of the governments, and apart from these governmental faults, 
investors should be in charge for the losses created by reduction of demand. It is, however, 
criticized that with the current regulation in Vietnamese PPPs, investors can escape and 
shift risks to the government, and this is a loophole in the PPP legal system in Vietnam.  
8.3.1.8. Inadequate experience in PPP of public sector (Re2) 
“Inadequate experience in PPP of public sector” (Re2) is placed at the 8th position with the 
mean score of 0.341. The private sector grades Re2 the score of 0.337 with the 8
th
 position 
while the public sector gives this risk the score of 0.369 with the 14
th
 position.  
A majority of participants including people from governmental agencies admitted that the 
host government is lacking sufficient experience in managing PPP arrangements. More 
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specifically, they criticized the experience of building the environment for bankable PPP 
projects, such as the ability in carrying out about competitive bids for PPPs, evaluating the 
feasibility study, and the trouble with resolving cases of dispute during the project life 
cycle. For example, academics also made a strong argument that the host government 
should clearly recognise that some domestic investors are state-owned organizations, and 
debts that they have are from the National Bank of Vietnam. Therefore, it is mainly the 
government’s budget, and in any case of default, the public party may face losses. This 
argument seems to support the consideration in ADB (2012) that the widespread 
dominance of state-owned organizations as investors can create confusion about risk 
allocation and the transparency issues. More seriously, it is criticized that some existing 
PPPs in which investors are state-owned organizations usually have negotiated a direct 
appointment contract rather than a competitively bid agreement (Ibid). 
Furthermore, interviewees cited that the government is lacking adequate experience to deal 
with cases in which investors are domestic bankers. In these cases, bankers do not have 
standard abilities and experience in the construction industry. Therefore, they demand to 
invite other contractors into SPV, and they then present a number of additional costs which 
dramatically raise the total expenses. According to participants’ experiences, in these cases 
investors attempt to be successful in the tendering process in order to achieve the PPP 
contract, then during the contract time they will seek explanations to increase the total 
expenditure which had been embedded in the agreement. Academics made a point that 
investors usually claim causes for increasing the total expenditure at the time the 
construction has been constructed by around 50 percent, and in this condition the 
government is usually reluctant to agree to take the requirement from the sponsors. One of 
the potential causes here is that there is no clear responsibility and accountability 
commitment for each party and for managers in each project. Therefore, the requirement 
for adjustment of total expenditure is likely accepted.  
Additionally, there are limited opportunities to create mechanisms in which the public 
sector can have certain power in dealing with investors in SPV. According to Vietnam PPP 
regulations, there is no limitation about the maximum proportion of equity provided by 
investors. The Vietnamese government believes that this can take full advantage of the 
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financial ability and management skills of the private sectors. However, from the 
experience of PFI in the UK and P3 in the USA, this may also reduce the control power of 
the public sector in monitoring and supervising projects (HM, 2012). For this reason, in 
new PF2 regulations, the UK government requires a certain level of public contribution in 
mobilizing capital (ibid). 
8.3.1.9. Weak Financial Capacity of Investor (M2)  
“Weak Financial Capacity of Investor” (M2) is in the market risk category. Participants 
placed M2 in the 9
th
 position with the score of 0.337. The private sector gave this risk the 
score of 0.323 with the 9
th
 position, whereas the public sector put this risk in the 7
th
 rank 
with the grade of 0.415. The test showed that there is a statistically significant difference 
between perceptions of the two parties.  
Financial ability of the investor is one of the most critical considerations in application of a 
PPP arrangement as investors will be responsible for the project for a long-term period 
which is usually more than 20 years in the case of a Vietnamese PPP. A transportation 
project usually requires massive expenditure. Hence, if the investor defaults at any time, 
other parties’ interests can be seriously damaged. According to Vietnam PPP laws, in order 
to go into the bidding process, investors must submit a clear report about their financial 
ability. This report also demonstrates projects which investors have been investing in. The 
Vietnamese government has also issued regulations about criteria for accessing the 
financial ability of investors in PPP. In case investors are investing in different projects, 
investors' financial ability must be examined regarding all projects.  In addition, the 
financial plan in which investors will mobilize capital also needs to be clearly verified. For 
instance, details about resources that provide debts for investors need to be disclosed. 
However, practitioners criticized that the instrument to examine the financial ability and 
the financial plan of investors is not efficient, and consists of many loopholes.   Also, the 
instructions on how to apply these regulations are not detailed. It was stated that investors 
can use financial tricks to better their financial report. For instance, low financial ability 
investors can join with well-known investors. However, the actual contribution of the well-
known investors is usually very rare, and the work is mostly done by the low ability 
companies. For example, Chinese companies sometimes join with Japanese companies. 
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Nevertheless, after the PPP agreement is achieved, almost all of the work is done by the 
Chinese companies, and Japanese companies seem to disappear during the construction 
time.  Furthermore, it also appears that in some circumstances, investors do not contribute 
the required equity, and they then acquire debts from the other financial sources instead. 
Vietnamese PPP laws usually require investors to have no less than 30 percent of total 
expenditure made by investors’ equity, except in some very special cases. However, in 
some cases, investors just contributed 10 percent to 20 percent of total expenditure and the 
rest is borrowed from other sources which are not revealed in the agreement. This, 
obviously, increases the total expenditure for the project as the interest payments are added 
in. 
Theoretically, if investors have an investment license, this means that their financial ability 
is approved by the public sector. However, there are many cases in which the government 
has to stop some running projects because of the low financial ability of investors. This 
indicates that the ability of investors had not been carefully examined in the bidding stage. 
Investors sometimes pass responsibility to other parties to cover their low financial ability. 
For instance, in the land acquisition stage which costs a big share of the total expenditure, 
some BOT projects are delayed because investors do not have adequate funds to 
compensate land users. Consequently, citizens are not willing to provide the land use right. 
However, investors justify themselves due to the local government not providing 
documents which mention the agreed price of land. However, these documents cannot be 
issued until the investors accept the compensation price. From these explanations, it can be 
recognized that the confusion is due to the unaccountability of project investors.  
8.3.1.10. Lack of transparency (M1) 
“Lack of transparency” (M1) is in the legal risk category and it is the last risk in the top ten 
risk group. M1 has the general score of 0.336. It might be true that the lack of transparency 
is one of the main reasons leading to other obstacles such as corruption. In fact, previous 
research such as that of Greve and Hodge (2011) proved that PPPs usually bring greater 
transparency in comparison with conventional projects. However, participants in this study 
stated that it very difficult to determine the level of the lack of transparency in any project.  
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In this study, from the private sector’s point of view, participants stated that the process 
that they desire to increase the level of transparency the most is the project approval 
process. They expressed their need for a system in which investors can track their approval 
process. This system must be able to show investors which stage their projects are in and 
the exact time schedule for when decisions are made. From the government agency’s 
opinion, they stated that there is a need to have an annual report with detailed information 
of all PPP projects. These reports need to contain information about current financial 
details of the project and the forecast for future returns also needs to be published. In 
addition, the condition of the asset and how the assets are being managed need to be 
provided. In fact, regulations from other countries such as regulation for PF2 in the UK 
reveal that one of the approaches to increase transparency is that the government should 
contribute a certain part to the financial expenditure of the special purpose vehicle. This 
can bring more control power to the government and may make sure that the public and 
private sectors have the same access to the source of information.  
However, the statements above are just about increasing the transparency in the 
relationship amongst stakeholders. Academics interviewed in this research made a point 
that the public clients and investors should cooperate to publish basic relevant information 
to the taxpayer. For example, the condition of the asset and basic financial status of the 
project company should be provided to the public. This can possibly make the taxpayer 
confident about the PPP mechanism and the value for money of projects. 
8.3.2. Medium Ranked Risks 
Table 8. 10 Medium Ranked Risks 
Code Risks 
General 
Ranking by Sector 
Public Private Others 
Score Ranking St.d Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking 
C4 Low site safety * 0.324 11 0.112 0.469 5 0.289 20 0.414 3 
L5 Restriction on toll * 0.318 12 0.107 0.395 9 0.309 12 0.228 19 
M5 Fluctuation of interest rate * 0.314 13 0.107 0.41 8 0.295 16 0.306 14 
M3 Difficulty in accessing finance from the banks * 0.311 14 0.104 0.486 2 0.267 26 0.33 11 
C3 Low quality products* 0.310 15 0.100 0.383 11 0.293 17 0.339 8 
C10 Delay in other infrastructures relating to the project 0.308 16 0.098 0.351 16 0.301 14 0.294 15 
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Table 8.9 presents the second group of 6 risks. “Low site safety” (C4) and “Restriction on 
tolls” (L5) stand at the top of the table with the mean scores of 0.324 and 0.318 
respectively. On the other hand, “Low Quality products” (C3), and “Delay in other 
infrastructure relating to the project” (C10) are in the bottom of the group with the mean 
scores of 0.322, and 0.309, respectively. Other risks such as “Fluctuation of Interest rate” 
(M5), and “Difficulty in accessing finance from the bank” (M3) are placed in the middle. 
In general, all of these risks received scores which are above 0.300. There are 5 risks, 
namely “Restriction on toll”, “Low site safety”, “Fluctuation of Interest rate”, “Difficulty 
in accessing finance from the bank”, and “Low quality products”  having statistically 
significant differences in rankings between the public and private sectors. 
Regarding “Low site safety”, the public sector graded this risk 0.469 in the 5th position 
which is much higher than that given by the private sector, 0.289 in the 20
th
 position. 
Public agency complained that this is a common problem in the construction area in 
Vietnam including road and bridge PPP projects. According to the Ministry of Labour of 
Vietnam (2014), around 30 percent of the total number of accidents at work cases in 2014 
comes from construction projects. It should be noted that the risks are not restricted to 
those working on sites, but also to citizens, since the construction activities in living areas 
are not sufficiently controlled. In fact, the government of Vietnam has issued regulations 
about site safety such as the 48/2010/NĐ-CP. However, it is criticized that investors and 
contractors are breaking the law by providing insufficiently safe protections on site. The 
public agencies expressed that there are cases in which investors collude with contractors 
to minimize the financial expenditure, and then during the franchise operation period, they 
will defend them by providing reasons such as natural disasters or overloaded vehicles. In 
fact, HSE (2006) recommends that investors and contractors should not ignore the fact that 
accidents at work also have financial costs, and they can result in poor business 
performance. In fact, from contract agreements collected, it can be documented that 
contract clauses about site safety are too generally stated, without referencing any site 
safety laws.  
Also, private investors claimed that tolls and any changes in toll mechanisms need to be 
approved by the government. “Restriction on tolls” sometimes forces them to stay longer 
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in the franchise operation period. However, members from the public department replied 
that the level of tolls should be kept in order to be appropriate with the living standards of 
the citizens. This is also a strategy to minimize the risk of opposition from politicians and 
citizens. They made a point that previous experience in Vietnam has shown that 
transportation costs can strongly increase following the rise of the tolls. This, in turn, raises 
the price of other products in the market affecting citizens’ lives.   
Interestingly, the public sector considered “Fluctuation of Interest rate”, and “Difficulty in 
accessing finance from the bank” riskier than the private sector did. More specifically, 
these risks stand at the 2
nd
 and 8
th
 positions in the public sector’s point of view, whereas 
they are in 26
th
 and 16
th
 position in the private sector’s opinion. From these scores, it might 
be seen that the public sector considers that the banking systems are creating serious 
troubles for investors. Public agencies from interviews in this research said that they have 
received a number of complaints from their partners that there are too many requirements 
and procedures from credit organizations, and that the government is not willing to provide 
guarantees in a number of cases. Also, in the past, investors could not mortgage the future 
revenue from the project to the credit organizations, and this built more barriers in 
accessing credit resources. However, general results from this study do not show that the 
private sector considers this risk as critical. In fact, private investors clarified that 
“Fluctuation of Interest rate” can seriously affect their project; however, they consider this 
risk as external to the organization. Actually, in PPP mechanisms, the private sector is 
indeed the party which mainly bears these risks. Therefore, it might not be serious if the 
public sector ranks this risk in a high position.  
8.3.3. Low Ranked Risks 
Table 8. 11 Low Ranked Risks 
Code Risks 
General 
Ranking by Sector 
Public Private Others 
Score Ranking St.d Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking 
C8 Impractical feasibility study * 0.291 17 
0.08
6 
0.247 19 0.293 18 0.385 6 
M8 Poor financial market * 0.286 18 
0.09
8 
0.178 23 0.314 11 0.221 20 
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L2 Revision of the contract clauses * 0.279 19 
0.10
1 
0.203 21 0.307 13 0.177 24 
P1 
Concession termination by 
government  * 
0.268 20 
0.08
4 
0.167 27 0.298 15 0.241 18 
L1 
Disapproval of guarantees by the 
government * 
0.264 21 
0.09
6 
0.169 26 0.287 21 0.257 16 
Re4 
Low-cooperation between different 
partners * 
0.258 22 
0.08
9 
0.211 20 0.277 24 0.183 23 
M6 
Foreign currency exchange 
fluctuation * 
0.25 23 
0.09
9 
0.149 29 0.291 19 0.081 43 
L4 Regulation change * 0.244 24 
0.12
6 
0.137 31 0.284 23 0.137 33 
P3 Unstable government  * 0.238 25 
0.08
5 
0.127 33 0.264 27 0.25 17 
M9 
Income streams are usually in local 
currency * 
0.235 26 
0.10
8 
0.063 42 0.285 22 0.154 30 
P7 Forced buy-out risks * 0.23 27 
0.09
7 
0.082 39 0.274 25 0.148 31 
Re3 
Inappropriate distribution of 
responsibilities and risks * 
0.229 28 
0.14
3 
0.473 4 0.169 40 0.219 21 
C6 Design changes * 0.208 29 
0.07
5 
0.17 25 0.221 28 0.165 28 
C5 Unavailability of materials 0.2 30 
0.06
9 
0.189 22 0.212 32 0.105 37 
This group of 14 risks contain risks which have scores ranging from 2.00 to under 3.00, 
and from the 17
th
 position to the 30
th
 position. In this group, “Impractical feasibility study” 
(C8), “Poor financial market” (M8), and “Revision of the contract clauses” (L2) are at the 
top. In contrast, “Inappropriate distribution of responsibilities and risks” (Re3), “Design 
changes” (C6), and “Unavailability of materials” (C6) are placed at the bottom.  
In fact, there are 13 risks amongst 14 risks in this risk group that have statistically 
significant difference in scores made by the public clients and the private sector. One of the 
remarkable differences can be seen in the risk “Inappropriate distribution of responsibilities 
and risks” (Re3). While the public sector put this risk at the 4th position with the score of 
0.473, the private sector placed it at the 40
th
 position with the score of 0.169. Interviewees 
from government agencies stated that the risk allocation is not clearly stated in the contract 
agreement, especially regarding the future traffic demand. This can create a number of 
disputes when implementing projects which reduces the core effectiveness of the PPP 
arrangement. 
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Another significant difference comes from the risk “Project Termination by Government” 
(P1).  “Project Termination by Government” refers to circumstances in which projects are 
internally stopped by the host government. While private sectors believe that this 
circumstance likely occurs by giving it the 15
th
 position, the public sector only ranks this 
risk into the 27
th
 position. Participants from the public sector explained that termination is 
only employed if during the project life the investors do not show sufficient proficiency in 
running projects. They said that many projects have been delayed by low financial and 
management inabilities of sponsors, and in these cases, replacing investors is the 
compulsory strategy used to rescue the project.  
“Disapproval of guarantees by the government” is also the risk stressed by the participants. 
It also received significantly different scores between the two sectors. More specifically, 
participants from public departments put this “Disapproval of guarantees by the 
government” into the 26th position, whilst in the private sector’s view, it is in the 21st 
position. Public agencies defended that guarantees can be provided in special cases. 
Indeed, the decree 108/2009/ND-CP demonstrates that investors can request for loan 
guarantee for projects in “A Project” category which have a total expenditure of no less 
than around $77 million. However, sponsors complained that the level of expenditure 
required is high. The 8
th
 position is given for the risk “Regulation Change”. Interviews 
showed that one of the main reasons for the changes of regulation is that some regulations 
and legal documents are issued due to the urgent needs in the industry without long-term 
plan consideration. In addition, the feasibility of these regulations is also questioned as 
some of them are made without a feasibility study (Huong, 2014). 
“Forced Buyout Risks” (P8) also had a notable difference in scores. This risk refers to the 
condition in which the project is in the operation stage but the concession period is forced 
to be bought out by the government. It was ranked in a very low position by public clients; 
39
th
. However, the private sector put this risk into the 25
th
 position. One of the possible 
reasons that was revealed is the change in the development plan of the country or the area. 
For example, due to the development plan, the government may need to manage selected 
projects in selected areas in a consistent mechanism. However, the majority of participants 
including those from the private sector also revealed that some buyout cases had been 
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employed with warm acceptance from sponsors as the projects were in circumstances of 
financial burden.   
8.3.4. Very Low Ranked Risks 
 
This group contains 14 risks which have scores of less than 0.20 and stand at the bottom of 
table 8.4. Table 8.12 expresses that 10 risks among these 14 risks have scores with 
statistically significant differences.  
Table 8. 12 Very Low Ranked Risks 
Code Risks 
General 
Ranking by Sector 
Public Private Others 
Score Ranking St. d Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking 
P6 
Public scepticism about the real benefits 
of PPP * 
0.193 31 0.065 0.128 32 0.219 30 0.088 42 
C9 
Impractical requirements of progress of 
project * 
0.191 32 0.084 0.099 35 0.219 29 0.143 32 
M10 
Asset value less than forecasted at the 
time of transferring * 
0.19 33 0.101 0.336 17 0.167 41 0.163 29 
Re1 
Inadequate experience in PPP of private 
sector 
0.184 34 0.058 0.174 24 0.197 34 0.075 44 
L6 Taxation risks * 0.184 35 0.082 0.083 38 0.213 31 0.111 35 
C2 Poor design * 0.176 36 0.078 0.106 34 0.195 35 0.119 34 
O1 Operation cost overrun * 0.174 37 0.103 0.046 43 0.206 33 0.097 38 
Ot1 Bad nature events 0.172 38 0.064 0.14 30 0.176 38 0.208 22 
P2 Political opposition * 0.159 39 0.085 0.037 44 0.191 36 0.097 39 
O2 Default of operator * 0.158 40 0.064 0.084 37 0.18 37 0.11 36 
C1 Changes in industrial code of practices 0.152 41 0.098 0.152 28 0.15 43 0.167 27 
O3 Low quality of operation * 0.151 42 0.005 0.097 36 0.17 39 0.09 40 
Ot2 Force majeure events * 0.136 43 0.077 0.077 41 0.151 42 0.172 25 
P5 Public sector default * 0.032 44 0.001 0.078 40 0.012 44 0.088 41 
These scores reflect that these risks are not critical in Vietnamese PPPs both in terms of 
frequency of occurrence and the degree of impact. Table 8.11 shows that “Public 
scepticism about the real benefits of PPP” (P6), “Impractical requirements of progress of 
project” (C9), and “Asset value less than forecasted at the time of transferring” (M10), 
stand at the top of the table, and opinions of the public and private sectors are significantly 
different regarding these risks.   
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One of the noticeable differences can be seen from the risk Asset value less than forecasted 
at the time of transferring (M10). In fact, public clients rated this risk with a high score, 
0.336, with the 17
th
 position while participants from the private sector gave this risk only 
0.167 with the 41
st
 position. M10 does not only imply the transfer which happens at the 
end of the operation stage, but it also includes any reluctant transfers at any time during the 
project’s life. More specifically, the price that the government has to pay is higher than the 
actual value of the project at the transferring time in case of buying out, or the asset has 
less economic value at the end of the operation period than was estimated. One reason 
might be that the project is overestimated in the feasibility study in the planning stage. 
Consequently, at the beginning, the value of the project is already low in comparison with 
its actual asset value. 
8.4. Selection of Risks for AHP models 
Based on the risks analysis, ten risks from table 8.4 were selected to demonstrate the use 
and applicability of AHP models in the proposed framework in evaluating a project’s 
riskiness and in allocating risks. Table 8.13 shows the selected risks.  
It should be noted that, there are several main reasons for selecting these result. Firstly, in 
order to reduce the number of questionnaires, and with a limited timeframe and financial 
resources, only ten risks were used to test the applicability of the framework, and these 
risks are re-categorised as shown in table 8.13. However, in reality, the number of risks can 
be selected based on the specific situation of the projects.  
Secondly, the risks are not selected only based on scores provided in the table 8.4, but the 
selection is also discussed with academics experts and especially practitioners in these 
projects. This is because the list of risk provided in table 8.4 is for the whole market, while 
the situation of each project can be different. Therefore, the selection needs to be 
recommended by practitioners from these projects. According to practitioners, this 
selection was recommended because it also can evaluate projects from different aspects. In 
other words, different risk groups are considered.  In fact this is also a point which can 
show the flexibility of the proposed model. Figure 8.2 shows basic process of selecting 
risks for AHP from risk scores provided in table 8.4. 
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Figure 8. 2 Process of selecting risks for AHP from Risk Scores and Ranking Result 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. 13 Risks used in AHP models in this research 
Construction 
 Risks 
C3. Low quality products 
C7. Difficulty in land acquisition and resettlement 
Political and 
 legal risks 
L3. Poor project approval and permit process 
P5. Corruption 
Market  
risks 
M2. Weak financial rapacity of investors 
M4. Inflation risk 
Operational  
risks 
O4. High maintenance cost 
O6. Fluctuation of demand 
Relationship  
risks 
Re3. Inappropriate distribution of responsibilities and risks 
Re4. Non-cooperation between different partners 
It can be recognized that risks are re-categorized. The reason for doing this is to reduce the 
number of pairwise comparisons. Risks are re-categorized in 5 groups, namely, 
Construction, Political and Legal, Market, Operation, and Relationship.  
8.5. Summary  
 
Risk identification plays an important role in the proposed risk evaluation framework 
because critical risks need to be identified before any further actions can be made. This 
chapter shows the critical risk ranking in Vietnamese PPPs in the transport sector. In 
general, the private sector is more concerned about these risks than is the private sector. 
Risks such as, Difficulty in Land acquisition and Resettlement (C7) and Poor project 
Risk Scores 
and Ranking 
Academic 
Experts 
Practitioners List of Risk 
for AHP 
Reduce number of 
Computation  
Time and 
Financial 
Resource  
Accessibility of 
Data  
Specific Situation for 
Projects  
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approval and permit process (L3) are the most critical risks in Vietnamese PPP. The in-
depth analysis about the findings was also provided to offer a clear insight into these risks. 
In addition, the findings show that the perceptions of the private sector and the public 
sector are statistically significantly different among 32 of the 44 mentioned risks. The 
reasons for this difference were also speculated and analysed. Moreover, this chapter also 
clarifies risks that will be used to demonstrate the applicability of the AHP models in the 
proposed framework. 
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CHAPTER 9: CASE STUDIES AND FINDINGS FOR THE AHP MODEL 
9.1.  Introduction  
Evaluation of the project’s riskiness and allocation of critical risks are important functions 
of the proposed risk evaluation framework in this research. In this framework these 
functions are carried out by developed AHP models. In order to illustrate the applicability 
of AHP for these tasks, AHP models were carried out in Vietnamese PPPs. This chapter 
shows the findings of application of AHP to evaluate riskiness of the projects, and it also 
illustrates the allocation strategies found by the developed AHP model. Firstly, findings of 
riskiness evaluation are shown with in-depth analysis of real situations in the case studies. 
After that, risk allocation strategies found by AHP are also revealed with the analysis. 
Finally, a summary of the chapter will be provided. 
9.2. Project’s Riskiness Evaluation  
As mentioned in chapter 4 and chapter 6, the advantage of AHP is the ability to evaluate 
different options with regards to multiple criteria. Therefore, in order to test the 
applicability of this model in Vietnamese PPPs, a set of options and a set of criteria need to 
be built. With the purpose of evaluating the riskiness of different projects, Vietnamese 
PPPs were used as options and critical risks were used as criteria. Options are the Yen 
Lenh Bridge project, Phu My Bridge project, Co Chien Bridge project, New Dong Nai 
Bridge project, and No 18 Highway Uong Bi – Ha long project. Table 9.1 illustrates basic 
information about 5 case studies. In terms of criteria, 10 critical risks, identified in chapter 
8, were chosen to set up the criteria. 
Table 9. 1 Summary of Case study 
Case study Name Location 
Project 1 Yen Lenh Bridge Ha Nam Province 
Project 2 Phu My Bridge Ho Chi Minh City 
Project 3 No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long Highway Quang Ninh Province 
Project 4 New Dong Nai Bridge Dong Nai Province 
Project 5 Co Chien Bridge Tra Vinh and Ben Tre Province 
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This re-category is illustrated in table 8.13.  Hence, the number of criteria here was five, 
and the set of options consists of 5 mentioned projects, thus the number of alternatives was 
also five. The final results will show the riskiness ranking of these projects regarding 
selected critical risks. 
9.2.1. Project Description  
a. Project 1: Yen Lenh Bridge Project 
Yen Lenh Bridge is located on the No 38 national highway, and it crosses the Red River 
connecting Ha Nam Province and Hung Yen Province. The bridge is 2229.95m long and 
15m wide, and clearance for ships is 80m wide and 10m high. It has two approach systems 
and a main bridge. The feasibility of the project was approved in August 2001, and the 
East Sea Project Management Unit of Vietnam was authorized by the Ministry of 
Transport (MOT) to conduct the project. The project was planned to use financial 
resources both from the government and private investors. More specifically, two approach 
systems were constructed by the government’s financial budget, and the main bridge was 
constructed under the BOT contract, and the operation stage was planned to last 17 years 
and one month at the first time of signing the contract in 2002.   
Figure 9. 1 Yen Lenh Bridge 
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The joint venture (JV) of Thang Long Construction Corporation (TLC) and Civil 
Engineering Construction Cooperation No 4 (CIENCO 4) were selected under the bidding 
process. This was the first time they were in a BOT mechanism, and in this joint venture, 
TLC owns 52 percent of the stake and CIENCO 4 owns 48 percent of the stake. It can be 
seen that they are contractors for two approach bridges, but they are also sponsors for the 
main bridge. In BOT’s investment role, the equity budget is £1.44 million which is 
equivalent to 30 percent of the total BOT investment, and the debt from the Bank for 
Development and Investment of Vietnam (BIDV) is £3.36 million (Yen Lenh Contract 
Agreement, 2002). The construction started in June 2002 and finished in September 2004, 
which was 10 months earlier than scheduled.  
Figure 9. 2 Arrangements of Yen Lenh BOT Bridge Project (Toan, 2008) 
 
From figure 9.2, it can be seen that the Yen Lenh BOT contract was signed between MOT 
and the Yen Lenh BOT Company. However, the East Sea Project Management Unit of 
Vietnam was authorized by MOT to manage the project as the role of public client in 
conducting the bidding process and selecting investors, and during the construction stage. 
On the other hand, Vietnam Road Administration (VRA) was authorized by MOT to play 
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the role of the public sector in the operational stage. The Investment license was provided 
by the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MOP). Toll arrangements needed to be 
negotiated between the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and MOT, and then they needed to be 
approved by the Prime Minister. It also can be seen that BIDV is the only bank which 
provides investors with debt, and the insurance contract was signed with BAOVIET 
insurance company. 
b. Project 2 - Phu My Bridge Project 
Phu My Bridge is the largest cable-stayed road bridge in Vietnam, crossing Sai Gon River 
in Ho Chi Minh City. It is 705 meters across the river, with a main span of 380 meters, and 
approach structures on two sides of the river are roughly 758m and 638m long. The main 
bridge is 27m wide with 4 lanes. The project was planned since 2002 together with the 
development plan of Ho Chi Minh City. It was expected to smooth the belt-line road 
system. 
Figure 9. 3 Phu My Bridge 
 
 
 
In July 2003, the  process was conducted and investors were chosen by the Ho Chi 
Minh City people’s committee. Investors are Hanoi Construction Cooperation, Investment 
and Construction JSc (INVESTCO), Ho Chi Minh City Infrastructure Investment Joint 
Stock Company (CII), 620 Chau Thoi Concrete JSc (Beton 6), and Thanh Danh Limited 
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Liability and Commerce Joint Stock Company (Thanh Danh JSc). They together set up the 
Phu My Company (PMC) which is the SPV of the project. In November 2004, the Prime 
Minister approved the final decision about the right to invest in the project. On the 4
th
 of 
February 2005, an investment license was issued by Ho Chi Minh City people’s 
committee, and on the 7th of February 2005, BOT was signed between Ho Chi Minh City 
people’s committee and PMC. The project began construction in September 2005 and 
finished in February 2009, which was 4 months faster than scheduled, and PMC started to 
collect tolls in April 2010 (Thanh, 2013). 
Figure 9. 4 Arrangements of Phu My Bridge Project (Thanh, 2013) 
 
Figure 9.4 clarifies that Ho Chi Minh City People’s committee was authorized to play the 
role of public client in this project. The investment required was £55.6 million excluding 
loan interest and VAT. Private investors are responsible for 30 percent of the total required 
investment by equity. The 70 percent that was remaining was loans from Société Générale 
bank in France, Calyon bank in France, Bank of Investment and Development of Vietnam 
(BIDV), and Ho Chi Minh City Investment Fund for Urban Development (HIFU). It is 
important to note that MOF was the guarantor for HIFU to get loans from Société Générale 
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bank and Calyon bank, and then HIFU lent the loans to the PMC. In terms of contractors, 
PMC had an EPC contract with a joint venture of Bilfinger Company from Germany and 
Baulderstone Hornibrook Company from Australia. This joint venture was responsible for 
building the bridge, and other domestic contractors were employed to construct other 
works such as approach roads and a toll collecting station. The toll mechanism was set up 
by the people’s committee of Ho Chi Minh City. 
c. Project 3 - No 18 highway Uong Bi – Ha Long Project. 
The No 18 highway Uong Bi-Ha Long is a 30.1km long highway from Km77+300 (Uong 
Bi city) to Km107+400 (Ha Long city). This is an important link between Hanoi, Bac 
Ninh, Hai Duong and Quang Ninh. The demand for this highway is very high as it 
connects the capital to the border gate in Quang Ninh Province. There have been serious 
traffic jams, especially during vacation time. However, the quality of the old No 18 
highway has been downgraded, and the demand for upgrading the road is urgent. The 
project is to upgrade the No 18 highway.  
Figure 9. 5 No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long Highway 
 
 
 
The project was planned in 2010 and the contract was first signed in August 2011. The 
authorized state body in the contract is Directorate for Roads of Vietnam (DRV) and the 
SPV is Dai Duong BOT Company which is set up by Dai Duong JSc. Dai Duong JSc is a 
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private company investing in many areas including infrastructures in Vietnam. Currently, 
they have been in a BOT contract with No 18 highway and 5B highway. The contractors 
are joint ventures of Song Da 2 and Hoang Truong Construction Company. The total 
required investment planned was £33.33 million. The investors’ equity is equal to 15 
percent of the BOT planned expenditure, and debt is equivalent to 85 percent of the BOT 
planned investment. The construction started on October 2011 and finished on April 2014, 
which was 6 months earlier than planned. The project was planned to collect tolls for 22 
years from 1
st
 of May 2014 to 6
th
 of November 2037. However, the start of the toll 
collection was delayed until the 19th of October 2014.  
Figure 9. 6 Arrangements of No 18 highway Uong Bi-Halong project 
 
As mentioned above, the project was supported by the MOT by providing funds for land 
acquisition and resentment. Moreover, another toll collecting station which is Pha Lai 
station was also granted to BOT Dai Duong Company from 1
st
 of October 2011 which was 
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3 year earlier than the operation of the toll collection station of the project. Tolls collected 
from Pha Lai station are considered as government’s support for the BOT Company.  
d. Project 4 - New Dong Nai Bridge 
At the time of planning the New Dong Nai Bridge project, the old Dong Nai Bridge was in 
poor condition, and three provinces including Dong Nai, Binh Duong, and Ho Chi Minh 
City were in collaboration for reducing traffic flow through Old Dong Nai Bridge.  For 
example, over 30 tons of trucks were guided to go to Hoa An bridge on No 1K highway. 
However, the effort was just able to reduce around 40 percent of the traffic demand. The 
local government of Dong Nai Province had been proposing an upgrade for the Old Dong 
Nai Bridge since 2005; however, the work was slow, and seemed to be ineffective. 
Therefore, the demand for building a new bridge was necessary. The BOT mechanism was 
proposed, and on May 2008, the BOT contract was sign between Directorate for Roads of 
Vietnam and Construction Corporation No. 1 Company Limited (CC1). The directorate for 
Roads of Vietnam is authorized by MOT to play the role of the public sector in this 
contract. CC1 set up the Dong Nai Bridge BOT JSc, which is the SPV of the project. 
Figure 9. 7 New Dong Nai Bridge 
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The required investment is around £51 million. The investors’ equity is equal to 30 percent 
of the required investment and the rest is debt from banks. The loans were agreed to be 
provided by Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade (VietinBank) 
and Hanoi Commercial Joint Stock Bank (SHB). The arrangement of this project is 
provided in figure 9.8. The construction started in June 2008 and it was planned to finish in 
June 2010. The main bridge was inaugurated in September 2009 which was 3 months 
faster than scheduled. However, by the end of 2014 only the main bridge was finished. 
Other work sections in Tan Van and Vung Tau crossroads have not been finished. 
Figure 9. 8 Arrangements of New Dong Nai Bridge project 
 
e. Project 5 - Co Chien Bridge 
Co Chien Bridge is located in No 60 Highway in Tra Vinh and Ben Tre Province. It is 
expected to shorten the distance between Tra Vinh Province and Ho Chi Minh City by 
around 70km. The total length of the construction is 1619.1m. The main spans are 630m 
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long and 16m wide. Designed loading capacity is HL93 truckloads and the clearance for 
ships is 120m wide and 25m high. 
Figure 9. 9 Co Chien Bridge 
 
 
 
In 2010, the Co Chien Bridge project was approved by the MOT (decision 3053/QD-
BGTVT- 22/10/2010). The project has two works. The first work is to build the Co Chien 
Bridge and the second work is to build the approach road system. The project is the 
combination between the government’s budget and the investors’ budget. The first work 
section was been built under a BOT mechanism with 45.3 percent of investment from 
MOT and the rest from investors, and the second work section was built by the budget 
from the MOT. According to the contract agreement, Civil Engineering Construction 
Cooperation No 1(CIENCO 1), and Tuan Loc Construction Company were selected. They 
set up Co Chien Bridge Company which is the SPV of the project. In September 2013, the 
BOT contract for the first work was signed between MOT and Co Chien Bridge Company. 
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Figure 9. 10 Arrangements of Co Chien Bridge project 
 
The total investment required is around £71 million in which funds from the government 
budget is £32.135 million and the investor’s fund is about £38 million.  The government’s 
fund is for constructing the main spans and 3 main bridge piles. The investors’ budget is 
for building the rest of the construction as well as the operational cost. In the investor’s 
budget, 15 percent is equity and 85 percent is a loan from BIDV. The project started on 2
nd
 
of August 2013, and is expected to finish in 2015. According to the contract, the investor 
will have the right to collect tolls for 18 year and 3 months, starting from August 2015. 
9.2.2. Riskiness Rankings of Five Selected Projects 
Figure 9. 11 Ratio CI/RI of consistent matrices 
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With a total of 57 participants’ answers, 57 matrices were made in determining the weight 
of the risk group where 54.39 percent of them are consistent, and 285 matrices were made 
in determining matrices of option scores where 49.82 percent are consistent. Based on the 
consistency test provided in section 7.5.4.5 of chapter 7, all inconsistent data was removed 
and the final result is only based on consistent data.  
It is worth noting that in the AHP proposed by Satty (1980), there are no rules for the 
minimum number of consistent matrix. More specifically, the AHP system works right 
after the first consistent matrix is formed. Therefore, in applying this theory, researchers 
need to remove inconsistent matrix and use all consistent matrixes formed (Satty, 1980). 
Figure 9.11 shows the ratio CI/RI of consistent matrices. It should be noted that the lower 
the ratio is, the more consistent the matrix is, and the matrix can be accepted if this ratio is 
not higher than 1 (Satty, 1980). 
a. Vector of Criteria Weights (w) 
From the data collected from participants, using the method described in chapter 6, the 
Vector of Criteria Weights (w) is determined as shown in figure 9.12. 
Figure 9. 12 Vector of criteria weights 
Construction Risks 0.276 
Political and legal risks 0.199 
Market risks 0.136 
Operational risks 0.270 
Operational risks 0.119 
  
b. Matrix of Option Scores 
Similarly, using data collected from participants with the method described in section 
6.2.1.2 in chapter 6, the Matrix of Option Scores (S) is determined as shown in Figure 
9.13.  
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Figure 9. 13 Matrix of Option Scores 
0.153 0.251 0.104 0.289 0.227 
0.080 0.367 0.059 0.404 0.288 
0.240 0.188 0.403 0.068 0.153 
0.264 0.115 0.291 0.167 0.198 
0.263 0.079 0.144 0.072 0.134 
Table 9.2 below clarifies the weight of each group in each project options. This table can 
bring more details in evaluating projects. 
Table 9. 2 Risk group weight for each project 
Project 
Risk Groups 
Construction 
Risk 
Political 
and Legal 
Market 
risks 
Operational 
risks 
Relationship 
Risks 
Yen Lenh 0.153 0.251 0.103 0.289 0.227 
Phu My 0.080 0.367 0.059 0.404 0.288 
No 18 
Highway 
0.240 0.188 0.403 0.068 0.153 
New Dong 
Nai 
0.264 0.115 0.291 0.167 0.198 
Co Chien 0.263 0.079 0.144 0.072 0.134 
c. The global vector V is determination 
V = S. W 
 
 
V = 
0.153 0.251 0.103 0.289 0.276 
 0.211 
0.080 0.367 0.059 0.404 0.199 
 0.246 
0.240 0.188 0.403 0.068 0.136 
= 0.195 
0.264 0.115 0.291 0.167 0.269 
 0.204 
0.263 0.079 0.144 0.072 0.119 
 0.143 
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Figure 9. 14 Project riskiness level ranking 
Score Project Ranking 
0.211 Yen Lenh 2 
0.246 Phu My  1 
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4 
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3 
0.143 Co Chien 5 
  
Figure 9. 15 Graphical representation of projects’ risk level ranking regarding all risk groups 
 
Figure 9.14 show the general riskiness ranking of the five mentioned projects, and figure 
9.15 shows the graphical representation of projects’ riskiness level ranking regarding each 
risk group. According to this result, Phu My Bridge project is the riskiest project, and Yen 
Lenh Bridge project is the second riskiest. New Dong Nai Bridge project is in third 
position. No 18 Highway Uong Bi – Ha long project and Co Chien Bridge project are in 
the 4
th
 and 5
th
 positions, respectively. This result was sent again to a small group of 57 
practitioners who are experts knowing about these projects and have worked in these 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Yen Lenh
Phu My
No 18 Highway
Co chien
New Dong Nai
0.00000
0.05000
0.10000
0.15000
0.20000
0.25000
0.30000
0.35000
0.40000
0.45000
Construction
Risks
Political and
Legal Risks
Market Risks Operational Risks Relationship
Risks
Yen Lenh Phu My No 18 Highway New Dong Nai Co Chien
 179 
 
projects. Practitioners were asked to say whether they agreed with the finding. Figure 9.16 
shows practitioners’ opinions about the analyzed result. 
Figure 9. 16 Opinion of officers about the finding 
 
9.2.3. Analysis of Projects’ Situation 
a. Construction Risks 
Figure 9. 17 Weight of different projects regarding Construction risks 
Score Project Ranking 
0.153 Yen Lenh 4 
0.080 Phu My 5 
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0.264 New Dong Nai 1 
0.263 Co Chien 2 
  
This section will discuss projects’ ranking regarding construction risks, including Low 
Quality Products (C3) and Difficulty in Land acquisition and Resettlement (C8). Figure 
9.17 demonstrates the comparison of selected projects, regarding “Low Quality Product 
Risk”, and “Difficulty in Land Acquisition and Resettlement”. It can be seen that Dong 
Nai, Co Chien, and No 18 Highway are in 1
st
, 2
nd
, and 3
rd
 positions, respectively. On the 
other hand, Yen Lenh and Phu My bridges are considered to have lower levels of “Low 
Quality Product” and “Difficulty in Land Acquisition and Resettlement”. 
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In terms of New Dong Nai Bridge Project, as mentioned, the project consists of building a 
new bridge and two support infrastructure systems. The construction started in June 2008 
and it was planned to finish in June 2010. The main bridge was inaugurated in September 
2009 which was 3 months faster than was scheduled. After that, the time for inauguration 
of the whole project was delayed to June of 2014. However, by the end of 2014, only the 
main bridge had been finished. Other work sections in Tan Van and Vung Tau crossroads 
have not been finished, and the investor has submitted a petition to reschedule the time of 
inauguration of the approaching system to early 2015. Practitioners stated that the quality 
of the project is expected to high quality since the quality of the finished main bridge is 
high. In fact, the contractor, CIENCO 1, has been qualified as a high quality contractor. 
Indeed, the main bridge work section, which is the main work section, was offered the gold 
medal for quality in 2009 (MOT, 2010). However, land acquisition has been a serious 
problem in this project. The main bridge work section finished earlier than scheduled as 
this work section is not criticized for the land acquisition and resettlement, but in order to 
build approaching systems, investors must have land-use right from land users. The main 
reason for difficulty in land acquisition in this project is the disagreement amongst land 
users, investors, and the local government about the price for compensation. The 
responsibility for acquisition of land, in this project, belongs to the local government. The 
expenditure for land acquisition is supported by MOT, and the people’s committee of 
Dong Nai Province is in charge of negotiating with land users. However, interviewees from 
the local government justify that the government’s financial support is insufficient to offer 
compensation at the level that is required by land users. Investors responded that the delay 
in land acquisition is negatively influencing their income. More specifically, according to 
the contract of this project, investors have the right to collect tolls in two toll stations, 
namely, Song Phan toll Station and Dong Nai Bridge toll Station (New Dong Nai Bridge 
Contract, 2010). The Song Phan toll station has been operating since 2009 after the main 
bridge was finished. However, because of the delays in beginning construction, the second  
toll station, Dong Nai Bridge Station, was not in operation by the end of 2014 which was 4 
years later than was scheduled. 
Co Chien Bridge Project is considered as the second most risky project with regards to the 
previously mentioned construction risks. Indeed, for this project requirements were not met 
 181 
 
in terms of land acquisition. As mentioned, Co Chien Bridge construction started in 2011, 
and it had to stop for 2 years and was restarted in 2013. According to practitioners in this 
project, one of the factors that led the temporary shutdown of the project was land 
acquisition and resettlement. Regarding land acquisition and resettlement, the 
government’s budget was used for building the approach road systems, and these work 
sections contained most of the land acquisition acts in the project. The people’s committee 
of Tra Vinh and Bentre Province were responsible for this issue. In fact, land acquisition 
and resettlement works were done in 2011 before the project was temporary stopped. 
However, there were many difficulties during the land acquisition stage as the financial 
schedule for land acquisition was delayed by the local government. In addition, the 
technical quality of the bridge was also strongly criticized by experts. For example, there 
were many sinkholes and cracks in the asphalt surface of the approaching roads. However, 
it was said by private investors that one of the problems comes from overloaded vehicles. 
In No 18 highway project, the MOT reported that the quality of asphalt concrete was 
highly poor and hence, the responsibility of all partners was under investigation. Finally, 
two consultant companies, namely Newline Investing and Designing JSC, and Sao Khue 
Investing and Constructing JSC, as well as the contractor, Hoang Truong Constructing and 
Transporting limited liability Company, and the asphalt supplier, Hong Lac Company, 
have been forbidden to take part in any transportation construction project in Vietnam for 3 
years. The collecting toll right was suspended until technical problems were resolved. On 
the 17
th
 of October 2014 the MOT agreed with the investor to collect tolls for the highway 
(Decision 3937/QD-BGTVT, 2014). Regarding land acquisition and resettlement issues, 
interviewees stated that this process was considered as an effective process. Similarly to 
many other domestic PPPs in Vietnam, the expenditure for land acquisition and 
resettlement in this project is provided by MOT and the local government is responsible for 
negotiating and transferring land-use rights to investors. The people’s committee of Quang 
Ninh province authorized the land acquiring power to cities in the area construction, 
namely Halong city, Uong Bi city, and Quang Yen Town, and these cities were very 
effective in fulfilling their responsibility. This, in turn, helped the project to be finished 
earlier than scheduled. In addition, participants demonstrated that another factor helping 
the local government in this process was the helpfulness of the citizens around the 
 182 
 
construction area since the overcharged old highway had created traffic jams and air 
pollution in the areas.  
Construction Risks in Phu My project and Yen Lenh project are less serious compared to 
the previously mentioned projects. In Yen Lenh Project, the local governments in Ha Nam 
and Hung Yen Province are also responsible for Land Acquisition and Resettlement. 
Participants responded that the Land Acquisition and Resettlement process in Yen Lenh 
Bridge also met the required progress because of the effective collaboration of MOP, local 
governments, and investors. This, in turn, led the project to be completed 10 months earlier 
than scheduled. Also, after 10 years of use, respondents did not report any problem 
regarding the poor technical quality of the project. This finding is in contrast to the finding 
of Alfen et al. (2009).  They carried out a case study on Yen Lenh Bridge and they found 
that Land Acquisition and Resettlement was considered as one of the most serious risks in 
this project. In Phu My Project, according to interviewees, the resettlement process in this 
project also faced difficulty. The expected date to start constructing the project was the 31
st
 
of December 2004, but the construction did not start until 2005 because of the delays in the 
resettlement process. The finding shows that this delay did not appear because of the 
conflict in the price offered, but occurred during the resettlement stage. In fact, land users 
were aware of the value for their land according to the market price. Therefore, the price 
that was proposed was accepted. However, at that time the land users complained, they 
were confused about why there was no long-term plan made for the project development. 
Therefore, when the land users were brought together, there was no place to resettle the 
citizens. Also, participants from the People’s committee of Ho Chi Minh City responded 
that, land users were promised that they would have the right to buy low price flats. 
However, the citizens did not receive detailed and transparent information about their new 
place, such as price, size and location. Therefore, they refused to give the land users to the 
local government. Moreover, the land acquisition process was difficult because there were 
seven companies in the area of construction and their land also needed to be cleared. 
According to a retired participant from the Department of Finance in the People’s 
committee of Ho Chi Minh City, companies required compensation of 100 percent of the 
value of the land and 100 percent of the value of the built assets, as well as compensation 
for the losses of their business. However, the local government only provided 60 percent of 
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the built assets because of devaluation, the losses of businesses were not accepted at the 
required cost, and they were not compensated for their land. This respondent explained that 
the land was provided by the government, and companies were forced to transfer land use 
to the city for public services. In terms of the technical quality of the project, the project 
was finished earlier than scheduled. However, during the operational stage, the 
approaching road systems were also criticized because of damages. However, both the 
local government and investors admitted that there was too many overloaded vehicles 
traveling on the route, and as local government could not control overloaded vehicles, they 
therefore had to be in charge of maintaining the damaged parts.  
b. Political and Legal Risks 
Figure 9. 18 Weight of different projects regarding Political and Legal Risks 
Score Project Ranking 
0.251 Yen Lenh 2 
0.367 Phu My 1 
0.188 Co Chien 3 
0.115 Dong Nai 4 
0.079 
No 18 
Highway 
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Political risks in this section include “poor project approval and permit process” (L3), and 
Corruption (P5). From figure 9.18, it can be seen that Phu My Bridge is the most risky 
project. In terms of corruption risks, no specific and detailed information was revealed 
from participants. However, participants speculated that corruption is the issue that is 
dominated the construction industry in Vietnam. Therefore, it is highly likely that this risk 
occurred in these PPP projects in some procedures such as selecting investors, contractors, 
sub-contractors, and verifying the quality of the product. In particular, the largest concern 
for the corruption risk was given for projects in which all parties involved were domestic. 
In terms of Phu My Project, interviewees responded that the risk of having a long approval 
process appeared in the whole life cycle of the project. For example, the project plan was 
developed by people’s committee of Ho Chi Minh City in 2002, and it was approved by the 
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Prime Minister in the same year. However, the contract was not signed until the 7
th
 of 
February 2005. The project had to go through approval processes for 3 years. Further, 
investors have responded that one of the main problems which led to the failure of Phu My 
project was the delays in approving traffic flow organizing strategies from the local 
government. They said that the bridge was finished in 2009. However, in 2010, the plan for 
traffic flow organization had not been approved. Participants from Ho Chi Minh City 
people’s committee said that according to the procedure, firstly, the Department of 
Transport in the People’s committee received the request form from investors, and then the 
request needed to be approved by the Department of transport and Department of finance. 
After that, the request also needed to be approved by the Ho Chi Minh City people’s 
council, and finally the request also needed to be approved by the People’s committee of 
the city. 
Yen Lenh Bridge project also received strong criticism of participants. The project was 
planned in 2000, and on the 21st of August 2001, the feasibility study was approved by 
MOT. On the 5
th
 of December 2001, the project was approved by the Prime Minister to be 
built under the BOT form. In April 2002, investors were chosen and the project began 
construction on the 1
st
 of June 2002. Interviewees said that Yen Lenh Bridge Project is one 
of the earliest PPP projects in Vietnam. Therefore, the legal system at that time was 
ineffective. Moreover, individual government officials were also not qualified as there 
were many of them who had not been specifically trained about PPP mechanisms. These 
are the reasons which led to the poor approval process. These statements are consistent 
with the results in the research by Alfen et al. (2009). They found that many unnecessary 
documents were created in Yen Lenh Project, and some of these were just about general 
cases. Therefore, more detailed documents needed to be issued. They also found that 
because many of the documents were quickly issued without first conducting a feasibility 
study, amendments usually needed to be made, and these amendments interrupted the 
approval process. Additionally, some approvals were also canceled. This, in turn, also 
lengthened the approval process. 
Amongst the five selected projects, No 18 highway project, Dong Nai Bridge project, and 
Co Chien project did not receive many complaints about the poor approval process in 
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comparison with Yen Lenh and Phu My projects. Although interviewees also complained 
about some problems such as unnecessary procedures, too many layers of the government, 
and decentralized authorized power of government agencies, these problems seemed to be 
general problems happening in a majority of projects in Vietnam. It is possible that 
political risks in these projects were considered as less serious than in other projects 
probably because the legal system had been improved in recent years. Interviewees cited 
the 2-year delay in Co Chien Bridge Project but they also stated that the political risks 
should not be blamed for this delay. Instead, the reasons included difficulty in accessing 
financial resources. Similarly, in Dong Nai Bridge Project, investors also revealed 
information about the long approval process to disburse the budget for land acquisition and 
resettlement. However, investors emphasized that the root cause of this long approval 
process came from insufficient financial resources. 
c. Market Risks 
Figure 9. 19 Weight of different projects regarding Market Risks 
Score Project Ranking 
0.1029 Yen Lenh 4 
0.0587 Phu My 5 
0.4031 Co Chien 1 
0.2910 Dong Nai 2 
0.1444 No 18 Highway 3 
  
Market risks in this section refer to “Weak Financial Capacity of Investor” (M2), and 
“Inflation Risks” (M4).  On the top of figure 9.19, Co Chien Bridge project is considered 
as the most risky project regarding market risks. As mentioned, the project started in 2010. 
However, it still has not been completed. The reason for the delay is the delay of the first 
work section. In 2010, the Co Chien Bridge project was approved by the MOT. The project 
has two work sections. The first section is to build the Co Chien Bridge and the second part 
is to build the approach road systems. It was mentioned earlier that the second work 
section was built using the government’s budget and the first part was built by BOT in 
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which the government gave a contribution. In fact, in the original plan, the first work 
section was planned to be built under the BOT mechanism with 100 percent of the 
investment coming from private investors. In 2011, CIENCO 1, CIENCO 4, CIENCO 8 
and 577 JSC were selected as investors.  However, the mechanism to build the first work 
of the project was changed due to financial reasons. This is because originally selected 
investors could not provide sufficient equity to set up the SPV. Therefore, the government 
had to financially contribute to the first work section. On the 5th of July 2013, MOT 
decided that new investors should be reselected for this project, and hence, CIENCO 1 and 
Tuan Loc Construction JSC were selected (Decision 1930/QD-BGTVT, 2013). In this 
project, the contribution of the government budget was 45.3percent which is higher than 
the level regulated in laws which is 30 percent. This refers to the fact that the financial 
difficulties in this project were very high and the government had to create special 
strategies to overcome these difficulties. Nevertheless, according to interviewees, at the 
current time, this risk is still high. The financial contributions from the private investors are 
sufficient since private investors have not found a stable financial resource from BIDV. 
Additionally, the financial contribution of the government is lacking. An interviewee from 
MOT revealed that the financial budget from MOT for 2014 has run out and that MOT had 
to ask the central government to advance the budget for 2015, and it is this budget that is 
being used for this project. These delays reflect the weakness of investors, both from the 
view of the public clients and private sectors. Participants from public agencies defended 
that the financial contribution from MOT was not planned in the original agreement, but it 
was made to resolve the difficulties that occurred from the private investors. Therefore, the 
budget disbursement was not continuous. However, the public sector should be responsible 
for selecting financially weak investors. This reflects that the process of selecting investors 
was not cautiously carried out, and the financial ability of investors was not cautiously 
verified. 
In Dong Nai Bridge Project, market risks also seem to be serious as it stands at the 2nd 
position. More specifically, at the beginning, loans were to initially be provided by VDB. 
However, during the construction time, negotiations failed because of conflicts regarding 
the disbursement plan, mortgage assets, and interest rate, VDB stop providing loans for the 
SPV. Participants from Construction Corporation No 1 Company Limited (CC1) claimed 
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that they had doubts about the financial ability of VDB. However, participants from VDB 
defended VDB by saying that because of the negative obsession of bad debt in previous 
periods, banks now require organizations to provide more mortgage assets, such only 
investing in practical projects. In September 2013, VietinBank and SHB agreed to provide 
investors with new loans of 36.9 million pounds, and the project has continued to progress. 
Weak financial ability of investors also negatively influenced the land acquisition and 
resettlement process of this project. In detail, the government provided a current budget for 
land acquisition; however, investors responded that the provided budget had not been 
sufficient for acquiring land. Investors and the people’s committee of Dong Nai Province 
also required MOT to provide more funds. MOT agreed to support the project with more 
money. However, the disbursement plan was time-consuming. MOT criticized that 
investors must have strong financial ability to advance money before MOT disbursed their 
money. On the one hand, investors have blamed delays in land acquisition on their 
financial ability. Nonetheless, according to participants, after land had been cleared, many 
work sections were still  put on hold, especially the work section in the Tan Van and Vung 
Tau intersection area because of financial difficulties of investors. 
Regarding No 18 highway project and Yen Lenh Bridge project, these projects did not 
receive strong criticism from experts as did the previously mentioned projects. In No 18 
highway project, the financial ability of investors was not strongly criticized. However, the 
inflation rate was a serious issue. This project just started to collect tolls in October 2014, 
and during the construction period, the financial ability of Ocean Company was not 
criticized. In addition, inflation rates since the project was developed were too high, at 21.3 
percent in 2011, 9.1 percent in 2012 and 4.8 percent in 2013. Nevertheless, the project was 
mainly constructed in 2012 and 2013 and the preparation for a high inflation rate was also 
carefully mentioned in the contract. In terms of Yen Lenh Bridge, Cienco 4 and TLC were 
evaluated as having sufficient financial ability, and the inflation rate was also not high 
during the construction period and during the first years of the operation stage. However, 
similar to No 18 Highway project, high inflation rates since 2009 to 2012 had a negative 
impact on the operational and maintenance cost of this project.  
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Cau Phu My Project is the least risky project with regards to market risks. However, 
practitioners also revealed some problems created by market risks. For example, due to the 
insufficient financial ability of the investors, the people’s committee of Ho Chi Minh City 
had to accept the debt/equity ratio which is different from PPP regulations. More 
specifically, the equity/debt ratio was 23.6/76.4 instead of 30/70. Moreover, PMC did not 
have the required ability to loan debts from international banks. Therefore, Ho Chi Minh 
City People’s Committee had to authorize the Ho Chi Minh City Investment Fund for 
Urban Development (HIFU) to get loan from Société Générale bank and Calyon bank 
under the guarantee from MOF, then HFIU loaned these debts to PMC. From this 
mechanism, it can be seen that the Vietnamese government had provided favours to PMC 
with the expectation of a good bridge. However, this mechanism in fact has led to some 
disputes which will be discussed shortly.  
d. Operational Risks 
Figure 9. 20 Weight of different projects regarding Operational Risks 
Score Project Ranking 
0.2891 Yen Lenh 2 
0.4039 Phu My 1 
0.0679 Co Chien 5 
0.1674 Dong Nai 3 
0.0718 
No 18 
Highway 
4 
  
Operational risks here refer to High Maintenance Cost (O4) and Fluctuation of Demand 
(O6). Each participant made comparisons about the five selected projects regarding this 
risk group. From the table, it can be seen that Phu My Bridge project and Yen Lenh Bridge 
project stand at the top of the table. 
In terms of Phu My Bridge Project, participants responded that “Fluctuation of Demand” is 
a main factor leading to the failure of the project. Table 9.3 below demonstrates the 
forecasted traffic volume and the actual traffic volume in 2012. 
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Table 9. 3 Traffic Volume in 2012 comparison (Thanh, 2013) 
Type of  
Vehicle 
Forecasted traffic  
demand ( thousand units) 
Actual traffic 
demand 
(thousand units) 
Percentage Rate 
Motorcycle 10,430 7,294 69.94 
Three-wheeler 0 61 0 
Car 1,350 933 69.17 
Bus and coach 630 0 0 
Truck under 1.5 tons 440 304 69.17 
Van 1,240 336 27.18 
Heavy Truck 1,210 872 72.11 
Container 300 216 7211 
From table 9.3 it can be seen that the actual traffic volume in Phu My Bridge was much 
lower than it was predicted. The total actual highest traffic volume was only 72.11 percent 
of the forecasted volume. In particular, traffic volume for bus was dramatically different 
since the predicted volume was 630 units, but there was no bus traveling through the 
bridge. The reason for this reduction of traffic volume is the poor condition of the 
supporting infrastructure systems. According to respondents, the traffic demand for Phu 
My project was influenced by the traffic volume in the No 2 Belt-line road since the No 2 
belt-line road connects vehicles from different areas in Ho Chi Minh City to Phu My 
Bridge. Participants stated that the people’s committee of Ho Chi Minh City was 
responsible for completing the No 2 Belt Road in 2009. The Department of Transport was 
authorized by Ho Chi Minh City’s People’s committee to be the investor of the project of 
No 2 Belt Road, and the project started in 2006. However, by 2013, the road was not 
finished. This reduction has dramatically influenced the income of the project. According 
to Thanh (2013), the income of the project in 2010 and 2011 was about 1.84 million pounds, 
and in 2012, it was 3.077 million pounds. However, the payable debt is around 10.77 
million pounds annually. Therefore, it is clear that PMC does not have the ability to pay 
the loan. From the above analysis, it can be seen that People’s committee of Ho Chi Minh 
City needs to bear full responsibility for the reduction of the traffic volume. PMC 
submitted the requirements to extend the time for paying the loan. However, this is not 
practical as the actual volume is still not sufficient to pay the annual debts. Moreover, 
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according to the contract, people’s committee of Ho Chi Minh City has to take the project 
back and compensate for PMC’s expenditure investment. Therefore, in September 2012, 
People’s committee of Ho Chi Minh City accepted to take the project back. However, the 
next stage is to determine the value that investors can be compensated for, and this stage 
has not yet been completed. 
Regarding Yen Lenh Bridge project, participants responded that this bridge was faced with 
“High maintenance cost”, and especially “High Fluctuation of Demand” which is the main 
problem leading to the unsuccessfulness of the project. Table 9.4 shows the forecasted 
traffic volume in Yen Lenh Bridge. 
Table 9. 4 Forecasted traffic volume in Yen Lenh Bridge (Contract, 2002) 
Vehicle type 
Traffic Volume 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Motorcycles 338,667 365760 395021 426623 460753 497613 
Car under 12 seats 127,621 137831 148857 160766 173627 187517 
Car 30-40 seats 93,853 101361 109470 118228 127686 137901 
Truck over 10 tons 161,885 174836 188823 203928 220243 237862 
Containers 27,312 29497 31857 34405 37158 40130 
Figure 9.21 below demonstrates the difference between forecasted income and real income 
in this project. It can be seen that the real income is much lower than the forecasted 
income. 
Figure 9. 21 Comparison between forecasted income and actual income (Contract agreement, 2002; and 
Contract agreement renegotiated, 2012) 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Forecasted Income Actual Income Loan Interest
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The first reason for the insufficient traffic volume is the over-optimistic forecast for the 
development of Hung Yen and Ha Nam province. Therefore, this led to a bias in traffic 
demand forecast of the areas. The second reason was that there have been other alternative 
transport routes for drivers around the construction area. More specifically, the bridge was 
expected to attract drivers delivering products from Hai Phong port to Hung Yen and Ha 
Nam without going through Hanoi City. However, Hung Yen and Ha Nam provinces have 
their own ferry. Therefore, the demand for this type of driver dramatically reduced. 
Moreover, the traffic demand was predicted based on the traffic demand on No 1 and No 5 
highways as the bridge is in No 38 highway which links No 1 and No 5 highways. 
Nevertheless, the bridge was designed without considering future infrastructure 
development plans. More specifically, Vinh Tuy Bridge was built in 2005 and Thanh Tri 
Bridge was built in 2006. Two these bridges also link No 1 and No 5 highways. This, also 
in turn, reduces traffic demand for the Yen Lenh Bridge. According to Toan (2008), Thanh 
Tri Bridge reduced the demand for Yen Lenh Bridge from 2.62 percent to 8 percent in 
2007. Moreover, participants responded that the No 38 highway quality was not upgraded; 
therefore, it could not attract large trucks and containers as it was expected to do. 
Furthermore, the demand for the bridge was also reduced because of the rejection of 
collecting tolls from motorbike users in 2006. In short, the insufficient demand for this 
project was caused by the overestimation about the economic development of provinces, 
by the inconsistency between the project land and the future development plan of the areas, 
and by the rejection of collecting tolls from motorbike users. According to Alfen et al. 
(2009), these causes may be the consequences of the insufficient number of research 
studies about the construction industry area, and inconsistency of strategies in the central 
government departments. 
In terms of New Dong Nai Bridge Project, Co Chien Bridge Project and No 18 Highway 
Uong Bi- Ha Long, these projects were not heavily criticized by experts. New Dong Nai 
Bridge Project started to collect tolls in July 2014. According to participants, they have not 
received any announcement about reduction of traffic volume for this project. Similarly, 
No 18 Highway started to collect tolls in October 2014, and the traffic volume is 
considered as sufficient. Moreover, as mentioned, investors of No 18 highway have been 
favored by the MOT to collect tolls in Pha Lai toll Station during the construction period 
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from 2011 to support the project. According to participants from Ocean Company, the 
income in Pha Lai Toll station is slightly fluctuating around the forecasted demand. 
Although Pha Lai toll Station is not in the area of the project, it is also in No 18 Highway. 
Therefore, participants revealed an optimistic demand for this project. Regarding the Co 
Chien Bridge project, this project is still in the construction stage and it is expected to 
finish in August 2015, and both statistical results and interviews show that experts seem to 
be optimistic about the operation of this bridge.   
e. Relationship Risks 
Figure 9. 22 Weight of different projects regarding Relationship Risks 
Score Project Ranking 
0.227 Yen Lenh 2 
0.288 Phu My 1 
0.153 Co Chien 4 
0.198 Dong Nai 3 
0.134 
No 18 
Highway 
5 
  
This section will analyze the comparison of selected projects regarding the risks of 
“Inappropriate distribution of responsibilities and risks” (Re3), and “Non-cooperation 
between different partners” (Re4). From Figure 9.22, it can be seen that the difference 
between scores for different projects are not remarkable in comparison with scores of 
projects in other risk groups. This may indicate that they are on a similar level of risk 
regarding Re3 and Re4. In fact, interviewees responded that they are all in the high level 
regarding relationship risks. In terms of “Inappropriate distribution of responsibilities and 
risks”, interviewees stated that the mechanism to distribute risks in Vietnamese PPPs is not 
effective. More specifically, they said that in all PPP contracts, there are clauses 
distributing risks to party. Despite the fact that the distribution is not suitable, the contract 
clauses about risk distribution are also not clear. For example, contract clauses may say 
that a party needs to responsible for this risk, but they do not specify the clear procedures 
which all parties need to follow if the risk occurs and there are disputes. 
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Phu My Bridge Project and Yen Lenh Bridge project are considered as the most risky in 
terms of these risks. Interviewees responded that the contract clauses in these projects are 
very loose, and they mainly mentioned the technical issues. For example, the contract does 
not mention risk distribution. Therefore, when risks and disputes occurred, it was very 
difficult for resolve issues. They considered that inappropriate distribution of risks and 
responsibilities is one of the main reasons leading to the failure of Phu My project. More 
specifically, the risk of “Delays of supporting infrastructure” was distributed to public 
clients. However, the mechanism to monitor the process of minimizing this risk was not 
mentioned, and the responsibility to prevent this risk was not clearly distributed to all 
layers of the local government. Therefore, the public client was unable to control this risk, 
and the risk in fact did contribute to the failure of the project. However, it was mentioned 
that the investors were able to claim their compensation. Nevertheless, the mechanism to 
obtain compensation was not clearly mentioned, and disputes about accounting for the 
compensation for this project have been taking place. In Yen Lenh Project, according to 
participants from private sectors, “Land acquisition and resettlement” and “Insufficient 
traffic volume” are two risks that investors desire to have detailed risk distribution. 
However, in Yen Lenh Bridge project, “insufficient traffic volume” was not mentioned in 
the contract. Therefore, participants evaluated that private investors lost money in this 
project when the risk occurred but there was no mechanism to claim the compensation. 
“Land acquisition and resettlement” was mentioned in the contract. Nonetheless, the 
responsibility of each party for when the risk occurs was not clarified.   
In New Dong Nai bridge project, Co Chien Bridge project, and No 18 Highway Uong Bi-
Ha Long project, interviewees responded that contracts are more detailed, and risks are 
more clearly allocated. They stated that both private investors and public clients have more 
experience working in these types projects than they had with the Yen Lenh Bridge Project 
and Phu My Bridge project. Nevertheless, “Non-cooperation between different partners” 
was also mentioned many times during the interviews for all selected projects. Participants 
from the private sector clarified that this non-cooperation can come from the micro level in 
each procedure during the project, but it also can come from the macro level when the 
petition of the private sector in many projects is not satisfied. For example, in the micro 
level, New Dong Nai Bridge Project was mentioned as an example of non-cooperation 
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between the local government and investors in the land acquisition and resettlement stage. 
In this stage, both private investors and the local government were not responsible in terms 
of how they responded to one another. In terms of the macro level, they state that 
according to the PPP regulation, the toll mechanism for a project will be submited to MOF 
only after the construction is done, and then MOF will consider the toll mechanism. In 
addition, each time the tolls need to be adjusted, then the adjusting plan needs to be 
submited to MOF (Circular 159/2013/TT-BTC, 2013). Private investors criticized that they 
need to have a clear toll plan including the toll adjustment plan being approved before the 
construction starts since this can help them in mobilizing capital from the banks as the 
banks may worry about the financial plan and may not approve the loan requirement, or 
they can provide loans with a higher interest. However, investors in many projects have 
submitted the requirements to the government but the requirements have not been 
accepted. They believe that this shows the non-cooperation of the government in sharing 
risks with investors. 
9.3. Risk Allocation Using AHP 
This section shows the findings of application of proposed allocation model developed in 
section 6.2.1.3 in chapter 6. As mentioned in chapter 8, in this application, AHP was used 
to allocate 10 chosen risks which were also used in evaluating the riskiness of the projects. 
Table 9.5 below shows these risks. It should be noted that the reason for choosing these 
risks to test the allocation model is that these risks are in depth analysed in section 9.2. 
Therefore, the advantages of understanding these risks were employed. However, it should 
be noted that when applying the proposed framework in reality, other risks can be chosen 
by decision makers based on specific situations. 
Table 9. 5 Risks Selected to demonstrate Allocation Model 
C3. Low Quality products (R1) 
C8. Difficulty in Land acquisition and Resettlement (R2) 
L3. Poor project approval and permit process (R3) 
M2. Weak Financial Capacity of Investor (R5) 
M4. Inflation risk (R6) 
O4. High maintenance cost (R7) 
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O6. Fluctuation of demand (R8) 
P5. Corruption  (R4) 
Re3. Inappropriate distribution of responsibilities and risks (R9) 
Re4. Non-cooperation between different partners (R10) 
Similar to the evaluation of the riskiness of projects, a set of allocation options and a set of 
allocation criteria need to be built. Figure 9.23 shows the set of allocation criteria. It should 
be noted that in the scope of this research, three allocation criteria were selected based on 
discussions with academics and practitioners. However, in reality other criteria can be 
selected based on specific projects.  
Figure 9. 23 Set of allocation criteria 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of the set of allocation options, figure 9.24 shows the set of allocation options. 
Similarly, in reality other options can be selected based on specific projects. It should be 
noted that “Share” option reflects option that both private and public sector have to be 
responsible for the risk. 
Figure 9. 24 Set of allocation option 
 
 
With a total of 32 practitioners participating in the study, in determining the Vector of 
Criteria Weights (w), 32 matrices were made and in determining the Matrix of Option 
Scores, 872 matrices were made. The consistency of data was tested by the method 
provided in section 7.5.4.5, chapter 7. In determining the Vector of Criteria Weights 71.88 
percent of matrices are consistent, while 68.42 percent of matrices in determining the 
Matrix of Option Scores are consistent. Figure 9.25 shows the graphical presentation of the 
ratio CI/RI of consistent matrices.  Obviously, the rate of consistency in this round was 
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higher than in section 9.1 in this chapter which was for ranking the risk level of the project. 
A possible reason is that the number of criteria and the number of options in this round was 
only three, which can increase the consistency. In fact, with three items, a pairwise 
comparison can obtain consistent data at the easiest level. 
Figure 9. 25 Ratio CI/RI of consistent matrixes in risk allocation 
 
The details of the matrix of allocation options and weight of criteria, and the Global score 
for each risk are shown in table 9.6. From these scores, the final decision about risk 
allocation strategy can be made. From table 9.6, it can be seen that three risks are allocated 
to the private sector, three risks are allocated to the public sector, and four risks are shared 
between the two sectors. 
Table 9. 6 Allocation Strategies Based on AHP 
Risks 
Matrix of allocation 
Options 
Weight  of 
allocation 
Criteria 
  
  
  
  
Global G 
   
Final Results 
C3 
0.270 0.346 0.210 0.180 0.297 Public 
 
0.546 Private 1 
0.118 0.094 0.319 0.558 0.157 Share 
 
0.297 Public 2 
0.613 0.560 0.471 0.262 0.546 Private 
 
0.157 Share 3 
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C8 
0.470 0.498 0.446 0.180 
  
0.479 Public 
 
0.479 Public 1 
0.374 0.337 0.364 0.558 0.350 Share 
 
0.350 Share 2 
0.157 0.166 0.190 0.262 0.170 Private 
 
0.170 Private 3 
  
  
L3 
0.583 0.609 0.548 0.180 
  
0.588 Public 
 
0.588 Public 1 
0.288 0.279 0.209 0.558 0.262 Share 
 
0.262 Share 2 
0.130 0.113 0.243 0.262 0.150 Private 
 
0.150 Private 3 
  
  
P5 
0.284 0.249 0.323 0.180 
  
0.275 Public 
 
0.510 Share 1 
0.537 0.515 0.482 0.558 0.510 Share 
 
0.275 Public 2 
0.179 0.237 0.195 0.262 0.215 Private 
 
0.215 Private 3 
  
  
M2 
0.167 0.111 0.165 0.180 
  
0.135 Public 
 
0.464 Share 1 
0.471 0.463 0.463 0.558 0.464 Share 0.401 Private 2 
0.362 0.427 0.372 0.262 0.401 Private 0.135 Public 3 
  
  
M4 
0.479 0.465 0.465 0.180 
  
0.468 Public   
  
  
0.468 Public 1 
0.406 0.435 0.421 0.558 0.426 Share 0.426 Share 2 
0.115 0.100 0.114 0.262 0.106 Private 0.106 Private 3 
  
  
O4 
0.319 0.255 0.201 0.180 
  
0.252 Public 
 
0.570 Private 1 
0.154 0.178 0.196 0.558 0.178 Share 
 
0.252 Public 2 
0.527 0.568 0.604 0.262 0.570 Private 
 
0.178 Share 3 
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O6 
0.137 0.110 0.207 0.180 
  
0.141 Public 
 
0.476 Private 1 
0.316 0.472 0.244 0.558 0.384 Share 
 
0.384 Share 2 
0.547 0.419 0.549 0.262 0.476 Private 
 
0.140 Public 3 
  
 
Re3 
0.242 0.232 0.241 0.180 
  
0.236 Public 
 
0.621 Share 1 
0.590 0.634 0.617 0.558 0.621 Share 
 
0.236 Public 2 
0.168 0.135 0.143 0.262 0.143 Private 
 
0.143 Private 3 
  
  
Re4 
  
0.308 0.263 0.226 0.180 
  
0.262 Public 
 
0.574 Share 1 
0.507 0.570 0.630 0.558 0.574 Share 
 
0.262 Public 2 
0.185 0.167 0.144 0.262 0.164 Private 
 
0.164 Private 3 
9.3.1. Risks allocated to the private sector 
Risks which are allocated to the private sector are “Low Quality Products” (C3), “High 
Maintenance Cost” and “Fluctuation of Demand”. Regarding the “Low Quality Products”, 
participants stated that in current Vietnamese PPPs, this risk is now shared between the two 
sectors. Public sector officials responded that the responsibility of the public and private 
sectors are now described in the decree 15/2013/ND-CP. Before this decree was issued, 
responsibilities of parties were allocated based on the decree 209/2004/ND-CP. 
According to the decree 209/2004/ND-CP, in PPPs, the responsibility of controlling the 
quality of the project was allocated to the private sector and the public sector has very 
little power over controlling the quality of these products during the construction phase. 
However, according to the new decree 15/2013/ND-CP, investors have to submit reports 
to the public sector periodically, and the public sector has the right to monitor the quality 
of products as well as the right to ask for repairs or maintenance if there are any problems, 
and the construction can only be operated if the quality of the products is approved by the 
public sector.  However, some of the participants from the private sector responded that 
sometimes the public sector has control during the constructing process, and these 
participants said that the public sector should only test the final outcome of the 
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construction before it can be operated. They said that now the public sector has too much 
control in controlling the quality of products, such as the design needs to be approved by 
the public sector and that the contractors must be one of the contractors recommended by 
the public sector. They say that this may reduce the value of the PPP form which is to take 
advantage of the private sector.  Similarly, “High maintenance cost” (O4) is also allocated 
to the private sector by the majority of participants. However, investors responded that the 
cause of the damage should be clearly mentioned in the contract clause. For example, if the 
damage is due to the weak macro management from the government, the government 
should be responsible for that. In fact, the maintenance issue has been a disputed issue in 
many Vietnamese PPPs. The perception of participants about allocation of the risk 
“Fluctuation of Demand” is different from the perception about allocation of the two risks 
mentioned above. Although “Fluctuation of Demand” is also allocated to the private sector, 
the scores for the “Private” option and for the “Shared” option are not significantly 
different. This reflects the fact that there are a number of participants who allocated this 
risk to both parties. Investors say that they cannot predict the circumstances in which the 
demand is dramatically changed by a macro development plan of the government. 
Therefore, they can only retain this risk if the contract clauses mention external situations 
which influence the demand.  
 These findings about risk allocation have some similarities in comparison with previous 
research such as research by NTSA (2004) and Li et al. (2005). The findings of these 
studies show similarities to the findings of the current research regarding “Low Quality 
Products” (C3) and “High Maintenance Cost”. More specifically, in these previous studies 
these risks are also allocated to the private sector by the majority of the private sector. In 
terms of “Fluctuation of Demand”, the findings of the current research seem to be more 
similar with findings from studies in developing countries rather than research on 
developed countries. More specifically, research by Lam et al. (2007) states that in a 
developed environment, almost participants allocated “Fluctuation of Demand” to the 
private sector. However, research by NTSA (2004) and Ke et al. (2009) about developing 
markets concludes that this risk should be equally shared. Therefore, although in this 
research this risk is allocated for the private sector, the scores for the “Private” option and 
“Shared” option are not significantly different, and this seem to be more similar to the 
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results in which this risk is equally shared.  The difference is probably because in 
developed countries the development plan of the area can be planned for a long-term 
period. Therefore, the risk of “Fluctuation of Demand” is not influenced by the unpredicted 
development plan, which is the main reason that participants think that the risk should be 
shared. 
9.3.2. Risks allocated to the public sector 
Risks allocated to the public sector in this research are “Difficulty in Land acquisition and 
Resettlement” (C8), “Poor Project Approval and Permit Process” (L3), and “Inflation Risk” 
(M4). Regarding “Difficult in Land acquisition and Resettlement”, from the table it can be 
seen that the first choice of participants is the public sector and the second choice is to 
share this risk between the two sectors. The majority of the participants want this risk to be 
allocated to the public sector but there are also a number of respondents who allocated this 
risk to both parties. Participants from the private sector responded that the public sector 
should be responsible for the entire Land Acquisition and Resettlement process including 
providing expenditure and negotiations. In fact, this mechanism has been used in some 
selected PPPs, and this mechanism follows the instruction of decree 108/2009/ND-CP. 
However, public sector officials say that the government’s budget is limited, and this 
mechanism is only used in some very important projects. In other projects, investors 
provide the cost for land acquisition and resettlement, and the local government will be 
responsible for negotiations. However, the private sector said that the compensation for any 
delays should be clearly embedded in the contract, so the responsibility of each party can 
be investigated in any difficult cases. Investors say that usually if the delay of land 
acquisition is because of the public sector, the concession period can be extended. 
However, investors say that they prefer immediate financial compensation rather than 
extending the concession period as they still have to pay the loan interest every month. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of Ke et al. (2009). In this study, it was suggested 
that this risk be solely or mostly allocated to the private sector. 
In terms of “Poor Project Approval and Permit Process”, and “Inflation Risk”, participants 
say that these risks are in the country level and they seem to be external to the investors. 
Therefore, they should be managed by the public sector. Indeed, the main problem of the 
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poor project approval and permit process is possibly the ineffective legal system, and this 
ineffective system should be improved by the government. Some of participants also say 
that the compensation for this risk should also be embedded in the contract. For example, if 
there are delays due to the poor project approval and permit process, the investors should 
have the right to claim their compensation. However, others say that it is difficult to define 
the responsibility of each party when this risk occurs. In fact, investors say that there are no 
contract clauses mentioning this risk in current Vietnamese PPPs. Compared to previous 
studies, the finding contradicts some of the other findings such as research by Ng and 
Loosemore (2007). This research says that “Poor Project Approval and Permit Process” 
should be allocated to both parties.  In contrast, Li et al. (2005) suggested that the 
allocation of “Poor Project Approval and Permit Process” should strongly depend on 
specific circumstances and there should be no fixed allocation for this risk. 
Regarding the “Inflation Risk”, some of the participants said that the private sector should 
be able to forecast the inflation fluctuation. They can cooperate with financial institutions 
to forecast inflation rates. In terms of the public sector, officials said that the inflation rate 
of a country heavily depends on the macro strategies of the host country’s government, but 
it also strongly depends on the international situation. In fact, this finding is inconsistent 
with many previously mentioned studies, such as Arndt (1998), Wang and Tiong (2000), 
VDTF (2001), and Li et al. (2005). Amongst these studies, only the study by Li et al. 
(2005) allocated this risk to the private sector and the rest allocated this risk to both parties. 
Interviewees say that the reason why this risk is allocated to the public sector is probably 
because in this research participants only compared parties regarding the “The ability to 
foresee the risk”, “The ability to control the probability of occurring”, and “The ability to 
bear the consequence”. More specifically, they said that amongst these criteria, the public 
sector and the private sector may have similar levels of “The ability to foresee the risk” and 
“the ability to bear the consequence”. However, the public sector should dominate in “The 
ability to control the probability of occurring”. Therefore, they chose the option “Public 
Sector”. In addition, many of the participants say that they wanted this risk to be shared 
between both parties, but mostly allocated to the public sector. Nevertheless, there is no 
option for “Mainly allocated to the public sector”. Therefore, they had to choose the option 
“Public Sector”. This, indeed, reflects a limitation of the proposed framework. 
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9.3.3.  Risks Shared between the two sectors 
Risks allocated to both parties are “Corruption” (P5), “Weak Financial Capacity of 
Investor” (M2), “Inappropriate Distribution of Responsibilities and Risks” (Re 3), and 
“Non-cooperation between Different Partners” (Re 4). In terms of the corruption risk, we 
can see that the score for the option “Share” dominated scores for other options; this 
reflects that a majority of participants think that this risk should be shared between the two 
sectors. This result seems to be inconsistent with other research such as that of Lam et al. 
(2007) and Li et al. (2005). In these studies, “Corruption” is allocated to the public sector. 
The reason is probably because in the previous studies, the corruption risk is defined as the 
action corrupting the governments. However, in the current research, the “Corruption Risk” 
is defined as an action corrupting any parties involved in the project. Corruption now 
occurs not only between the public and private sectors, but also amongst the private sector 
and public sector, especially in PPP forms, where investors have the right to decide 
contractors and other partners. This condition creates a favourable environment for 
corruption. Participants said that the public sector should create transparent processes, and 
simplify the legal system, which should be able to mitigate the risk. 
Regarding the “Weak Financial Ability of Investors”, from the scores in the table, it can be 
seen that there are a number of participants who think that the private sector should be 
responsible for this risk. However, a majority of respondents still think that “Weak 
Financial Capacity of Investor” should be shared between both sectors. In other research, 
they generalized this risk as the financial risk and allocated this risk to the private sector 
(Ng and Loosemore, 2007). Explaining this choice in the current study, participants say 
that the private sector should be mainly responsible for this risk. However, the 
responsibility of evaluating the financial ability of investors also belongs to the 
government. On the one hand, the private sector must create clear reports about their 
financial capacity during the tendering period. Nevertheless, this can only be done under 
the effective requirement, evaluating and monitoring system and the responsibility to 
create an effective mechanism to evaluate the financial capacity of investors should belong 
to the government. This mechanism can be one of the most important strategies to mitigate 
this risk. 
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In terms of “Inappropriate Distribution of Responsibilities and Risks” (Re3), and “Non-Co-
operation between Partners” (Re4), participants say that these risks come from the working 
partnership between the two sectors. Therefore, neither the public sector nor the private 
sector can effectively manage them without cooperation from partner parties. Li et al. 
(2005) also mentioned that “Inappropriate Distribution of Responsibilities and Risks” 
should be shared between the two sectors. In their research, “Inappropriate Distribution of 
Responsibilities and Risks” (Re3), and “Non-Co-operation between Partners” (Re4) are 
categorized in the micro level which mainly includes risks occurring in stakeholder 
relationships due to the difference in working methods between parties. In contrast, in 
research by Ke et al. (2009), the authors mention the “Coordination Risk” and this risk is 
solely located to the private sector. However, in the study by Ke et al. (2009), the 
“Coordination Risk” only refers to the ineffective cooperation inside the private 
organizations. Nevertheless, in this research, “Non-Co-operation between Partners” refers 
to the non-cooperation amongst all parties involved in the project. 
9.4. Summary  
This chapter shows the findings of application of AHP to evaluate the riskiness of the 
projects and it also illustrates the allocation strategies found by the developed AHP model. 
In terms of the project’s riskiness evaluation, this research found that Phu My Project is the 
riskiest case and Yen Lenh Bridge Project is the second riskiest case. No 18 Highway 
Uong Bi-Halong stands at the last position, while New Dong Nai Bridge Project and Co 
Chien Bridge Project stand in the third and fourth positions, respectively. More details 
about the riskiness of projects with regards to each risk group are also provided. In 
addition, this chapter also shows that the majority (57.45 percent) of practitioners agreed 
with this riskiness ranking. Furthermore, this chapter also shows risk allocation strategies 
found by the AHP model. In general, “Low Quality Products” (C3), “High Maintenance 
Cost” and “Fluctuation of Demand” are allocated to the private sector, and “Difficulty in 
Land acquisition and Resettlement” (C8), “Poor Project Approval and Permit Process” 
(L3), and “Inflation Risk” (M4) should be managed by the public clients. In contrast, both 
parties should share the responsibility in managing “Corruption” (P5), “Weak Financial 
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Capacity of Investor” (M2), “Inappropriate Distribution of Responsibilities and Risks” (Re 
3), and “Non-cooperation between Different Partners” (Re 4). 
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CHAPTER 10: RETURNS EVALUATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF 
CONCESSION PARAMETERS BY USING RISK-ADJUSTED DNPV 
10.1. Introduction  
In order to demonstrate the applicability of risk-adjusted DNPV in the proposed risk 
evaluation framework, three case studies were used. Due to the availability and reliability 
of data collected, three projects amongst the five projects are used to demonstrate the 
model. They are Yen Lenh Bridge Project, No 18 Uong Bi-Ha Long Highway Project, and 
New Dong Nai Bridge Project. No 18 Uong Bi Ha Long Highway project and New Dong 
Nai Bridge are currently in the operation stage and construction stage. Hence, one of the 
aims of this research is to demonstrate the application of the risk-adjusted DNPV model to 
highlight the different stages of the project’s life cycle. This chapter, firstly, shows the 
return evaluation of Yen Lenh Bridge Project. Secondly, No 18 Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Project’s return evaluation and concession parameters optimization will be demonstrated. 
Finally return evaluation and concession parameters optimization of New Dong Nai Bridge 
Project will be illustrated. 
10.2. Yen Lenh Bridge Project 
As described in chapter 9, Yen Lenh Bridge Project is a BOT project. The operation stage 
was planned to last 17 years and one month at the time of signing the contract in 2002. The 
construction started in June 2002 and finished in September 2004. However, in 2012, the 
project was renegotiated because investors reported that from 2005 to 2012, the revenues 
were under estimation and the main reason that was identified was that the traffic demand 
was insufficient. After the negotiation, it was accepted that the operation period could 
extend until 2026 which is 4 years longer than what was stated in the original contract in 
2002.  
It is important to note that in 2012 the project was also re-evaluated by the government 
using NPV, and in this paper, the project was re-evaluated by using risk-adjusted DNPV.  
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Table 10. 1 Risk Management Analysis in Yen Lenh Bridge Project 
Source Parameter 
Potential 
Risk 
Influence factors 
Risk mitigation 
Revenue Demand 
Lower 
demand than 
expected 
M7. Influence of negative 
 economic events 
 
L5. Restriction on toll and 
tariff  
 
C10. Delay in other 
infrastructures relating to 
the project 
Using real heuristic data 
to forecast the demand 
 
Obtain government 
guarantee to extend the 
contract 
Expenditure 
Maintenance 
cost 
Higher 
maintenance 
cost than 
forecasted 
M4. Inflation risk  
 
M7. Influence of negative 
 economic events 
 
M5. Fluctuation of Interest 
rate  
Assume the cost 
contingency by investor 
 
Define clearly 
responsibility for reasons 
of damages in the 
contract 
 
Table 10.1 shows a part of the risk management analysis of this project. With the analysis 
from table 10.1, in this research, on the revenue side, the risk adjusted parameter was 
calculated for the risk of lower demand than was expected, and on the expenditure side, the 
risk adjusted parameter was calculated for maintenance cost. The historical data of traffic 
volume and cash flows from 2005 to 2012 is available, and this data is audited. Thus, the 
risk premium was determined by using the real option method described in chapter 6. 
Figure 10.1 shows the yearly variation of demand from 2006 to 2012 which creates the 
annualized standard deviation of 16.87 percent.The statistics from 2005 to 2012 are 
audited, and from 2013 to 2030 are forecasted.  
Figure 10. 1 Annual variation of demand from 2006 to 2012 in Yen Lenh Bridge 
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Figure 10.2 shows the NPV calculated in the re-negotiated contract in 2012. It can be seen 
that in this scenario, the project is profitable and it will start to make profit in the year 
2024. The figure shows a decrease until 2012, followed by a rapid increase until 2030At 
the last year of the forecasted period, 2030, investors can obtain nearly 6 million pounds.  
Figure 10. 2 NPV from Re-Negotiated Contract in 2012 in Yen Len Bridge Project 
 
However, it is extremely important to point out that the NPV in Figure 10.2 is not an 
appropriate calculation because the government and investors used the inappropriate risk 
discount rate (ɍ) in re-evaluating this project in 2012. More specifically, the time in which 
the cash flows were concerted is the year 2005. However, the parties still used the risk 
discount rate, 6 percent, used in the contract in 2002 to convert the cash flows. In fact, 
according to MOF (2014) and PG Bank (2012), the risk-free rate in 2005 was 6.875 
percent. The risk discount rate must be higher than risk free rate. Therefore, the risk 
discount rate that was used should have been higher than 6.875 percent. However, in the 
renegotiated contract, parties used the risk discount rate of 6 percent. This, indeed, led to 
the overestimation of the valuation of the project. In fact, the unfair evaluation in figure 
10.2 also shows how the incorrect selection of the discount rate can lead to an extremely 
incorrect evaluation. In other words, the NPV shown in the renegotiated contract in 2012 is 
an inappropriate evaluation overestimating the value of the project. Due to the stated 
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reason, the section below makes another demonstration of the risk-adjusted DNPV and 
NPV. In this demonstration NPV, was recalculated.  
In order to make an appropriate demonstration of the risk-adjusted DNPV and NPV, the 
cash flows were in the year 2012 which was the time of the renegotiated contract, and the 
discount rate is re-determined. The discount rate used to calculate NPV is 12.3 percent 
which was assumed in other Vietnamese BOT projects in 2012. 
10.2.1. Determination of risk adjusted parameter on the expenditure side 
 
In terms of the risk-adjusted parameter on the expenditure side, the heuristic method 
described in chapter 6 was used for this project. The finding from previous research by 
Paul et al. (2014) was applied. In the research, they found that the cost contingency for 
maintenance infrastructure in Vietnam was 35 %. Thus,    = 0.35.  
Using this finding, together with table 10.15 and equation 6.24, the risk-adjusted parameter 
for the operation period of this project can be measured as: 
 ̅ =        * RM4*RM5*RM7 
 
Where, 
RM4: Risk score for the inflation risk  
RM5: Fluctuation of interest rate 
RM7: Risk score for influence of negative economic events 
Thus,  
 
 ̅ = 0.35 + 0.35*0.403*0.378*0.314 = 0.3667 
10.2.2. Determination of risk adjusted parameter on the revenue side 
 
In terms of the risk-adjusted parameters on the revenue side, due to the value of the cash 
flows having been converted to their value in 2012 and the variation of T being different, 
the risk-adjusted parameters on the revenue side were re-calculated. The variation of traffic 
volume is 16.87 percent. The government bond interest rate in 2012 was 9.5 percent. Thus, 
the risk-free rate used is 9.5 percent.  Using above variables together with the equation 
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6.22 in chapter 6, the risk parameter on the revenue side without taking account of 
influential factors, can be determined. Risk scores for risk factors in table 10.1 were 
applied to the equation 6.24. These risk scores can be taken from table 8.1 in chapter 8. 
Therefore, the risk adjusted parameter can be calculated as: 
 ̅ = ƞv + ƞv * RM7*R L5*RC10 
 ̅ = ƞv + ƞv *0.378*0.318*0.308 
Table 10.2 below shows the risk adjusted parameters on the revenue side in risk adjusted 
DNPV in 2012. The parameters are shown in different years during the concession period. 
The details of variables used to calculate ƞv are shown in Appendix G. 
Table 10. 2 Risk Adjusted parameters on revenue side in Yen Lenh Bridge 
Year 
Risk 
Parameter on  
the revenue 
side 
ƞv 
Risk factor 1 
 (M7. Influence of 
negative 
 economic events 
) 
Risk factor 2 
 (L5. Restriction 
on toll and tariff 
) 
Risk factor 2 
 (C10. Delay in 
other infrastructures 
relating to the 
project) 
Risk Adjusted  
Parameter on  
the revenue 
side 
 ̅  
2012 0.2286 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.2371 
2013 0.2713 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.2813 
2014 0.3092 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.3206 
2015 0.3423 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.3550 
2016 0.3723 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.3860 
2017 0.4008 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.4156 
2018 0.4293 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.4452 
2019 0.4590 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.4760 
2020 0.4909 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.5090 
2021 0.5259 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.5453 
2022 0.5649 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.5858 
2023 0.6088 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.6314 
2024 0.6586 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.6830 
2025 0.7153 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.7417 
2026 0.7798 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.8087 
From these new risk-adjusted parameters, return analysis can be made. Table 10.3 shows 
risk adjusted DNPV and re-calculated NPV in this scenario.  
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Table 10. 3 Return Analysis by Risk Adjusted DNPV and re-calculated NPV with ɍ: 12.3%, r: 9.5% 
Year 
Revenue  
( £, 
million) 
Expenditure 
Income  
( £, 
million) 
 ̅  (For  
lower 
revenue) 
 ̅  (for 
higher  
expenditure) 
 ̃̅    ̃̅   
Risk 
adjuste
d  
DNPV 
NPV Operational 
Cost 
Maintenance Tax Investment 
Bank 
Interest 
Total 
( £, million) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
(7)=(2)+(3)+
(4)+(5)+(6) 
(8)=(1)-(7) 10 11 
(12)=10x
(1) 
(13)=11 
x(7) 
16 17 
                              
2002 
        
0.30 0.02 
0.33 -0.33 
        
-0.81 -1.05 
2003 
        
3.12 0.28 
3.40 -3.40 
        
-8.50 -10.70 
2004 
        
1.60 0.45 
2.05 -2.05 
        
-12.74 -15.88 
2005 0.41 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.48 
0.65 -0.25 
      
  
-12.29 -16.44 
2006 0.52 0.04 0.01 0.05   0.59 
0.70 -0.18 
      
  
-12.57 -16.79 
2007 0.53 0.04 0.01 0.05   0.63 
0.74 -0.21 
      
  
-12.89 -17.17 
2008 0.56 0.05 0.01 0.06   0.86 
0.98 -0.42 
    
    
-13.52 -17.84 
2009 0.62 0.05 0.01 0.06   0.64 
0.77 -0.15 
    
    
-13.72 -18.06 
2010 0.86 0.07 0.01 0.09   0.86 
1.03 -0.17 
    
    
-14.02 -18.27 
2011 0.99 0.08 0.02 0.10   0.90 
1.10 -0.11 
    
    
-14.20 -18.40 
2012 1.24 0.11 0.02 0.20 0.10 0.86 
1.29 -0.05   
    
-14.21 -18.45 
2013 1.40 0.12 0.03 0.22   0.70 
1.07 0.33 0.0000 0.3667 0.00 0.0538 -13.95 -18.16 
2014 1.58 0.13 0.03 0.25   0.67 
1.09 0.49 0.0002 0.3667 0.00 0.0608 -13.60 -17.77 
 211 
 
2015 1.74 0.15 0.03 0.28   0.55 
1.00 0.74 0.0007 0.3667 0.00 0.0637 -13.08 -17.25 
2016 1.91 0.16 0.04 0.31   0.51 
1.02 0.89 0.0015 0.3667 0.00 0.0735 -12.52 -16.69 
2017 2.10 0.18 0.04 0.34   0.47 
1.03 1.07 0.0025 0.3667 0.01 0.0809 -11.89 -16.09 
2018 2.31 0.20 0.05 0.37   0.43 
1.04 1.27 0.0037 0.3667 0.01 0.0890 -11.21 -15.45 
2019 2.54 0.22 0.05 0.41   0.38 
1.05 1.49 0.0052 0.3667 0.01 0.0979 -10.48 -14.79 
2020 2.80 0.24 0.04 0.45   0.32 
1.05 1.75 0.0069 0.3667 0.02 0.1025 -9.69 -14.10 
2021 3.02 0.26 0.06 0.48   0.26 
1.06 1.96 0.0089 0.3667 0.03 0.1163 -8.89 -13.41 
2022 3.26 0.28 0.07 0.52   0.20 
1.06 2.20 0.0112 0.3667 0.04 0.1256 -8.07 -12.72 
2023 3.52 0.30 0.07 0.56   0.13 
1.06 2.46 0.0139 0.3667 0.05 0.1356 -7.23 -12.03 
2024 3.80 0.32 0.08 0.61   0.06 
1.07 2.74 0.0170 0.3667 0.06 0.1465 -6.38 -11.35 
2025 4.11 0.35 0.06 0.66     
1.07 3.04 0.0208 0.3667 0.09 0.1507 -5.51 -10.68 
2026 4.44 0.38 0.09 0.71     
1.18 3.26 0.0252 0.3667 0.11 0.1709 -4.68 -10.04 
2027 4.79 0.41 0.10 0.77 
  
1.27 3.52 0.0304 0.3667 0.15 0.1845 -3.86 -9.42 
2028 5.18 0.44 0.10 0.83 
  
1.37 3.80 0.0365 0.3667 0.19 0.1993 -3.06 -8.83 
2029 5.59 0.48 0.11 0.89 
  
1.48 4.11 0.0439 0.3667 0.25 0.2152 -2.28 -8.25 
2030 6.04 0.51 0.12 0.97 
  
1.60 4.44 0.0526 0.3667 0.32 0.2324 -1.52 -7.70 
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In table 10.3, all evaluations by DNPV and NPV show that the project is not profitable. 
More specifically, NPV at the end of the operational period is -7.7 million pounds while 
DNPV is -1.52 million pounds. Both evaluations suggest that the project should not be 
implemented under the PPP mechanism. However, it is very important to recognize that 
there is a remarkable difference between the two evaluations. Figure 10.3 reveals that Risk-
Adjusted DNPV and NPV follow a similar trend, however, Risk-Adjusted DNPV is always 
higher than NPV. This difference is discussed in more detail in chapter 11.  
Figure 10. 3 Risk Adjusted DNPV and NPV of Yen Lenh Bridge Project 
 
10.3. Case study 2 - No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long Highway Project 
10.3.1. Return Analysis 
As described previously in chapter 9, No 18 highway Uong Bi-Ha Long is a 30.1km long 
highway. The project was planned in 2010 and the contract was signed in August 2011. 
The authorized state body in the contract is Directorate for Roads of Vietnam (DRV) and 
the SPV is Dai Duong BOT Company which is set up by Dai Duong JSc. The construction 
started on October 2011 and finished on April 2014 which was 6 months earlier than 
planned. The project was planned to collect tolls from 1
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Table 10.4 shows the risk analysis and mitigation strategies planned by investors in this 
project. From this table, it can be seen that the revenue and expenditure of the project are 
influenced by traffic demand, maintenance cost and construction cost. Therefore, for this 
case study, risk-adjusted DNPV was used to take into account losses by lower demand than 
were expected, a higher maintenance cost, and construction cost overrun. Table 10.4 also 
demonstrates factors which can have an influence on demand and expenditure, and Risk-
Adjusted DNPV took these factors into account. 
Table 10. 4 Risk Management Analysis by Investors in No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long Highway Project 
Source Parameter Potential Risk Influence factor Risk Mitigation 
Revenue Demand 
Lower demand 
than expected 
M7. Influence of negative 
 economic events 
L5. Restriction on toll and 
tariff  
C10. Delay in other 
infrastructures relating to the 
project 
Using real heuristic data to 
forecast the demand 
 
 
Obtain government 
guarantee to extend the 
contract 
Expenditure 
Maintenance 
cost 
Maintenance 
cost is higher 
than predicted 
M4. Inflation risk  
 
M7. Influence of negative 
 economic events 
 
M5. Fluctuation of Interest 
rate 
Assume the cost contingency 
by investor 
Specify the maximum 
fluctuation of cost in the 
contract 
Construction 
cost 
Cost overrun 
M4. Inflation risk  
 
M7. Influence of negative 
 economic events 
 
M5. Fluctuation of Interest 
rate 
 
(C7. Difficulty in Land  
acquisition and  
Resettlement) 
Assume the cost contingency 
by investor 
 
a. Determination of Risk-Adjusted parameter on the expenditure side for maintenance 
cost 
Similarly with case 1, for the risk-adjusted parameter on the expenditure side for 
maintenance cost, the heuristic method described in chapter 6 was also applied. The 
finding by Paul et al. (2014) was also applied. Thus,     = 0.35.  
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It can be seen from table 10.4 that similar influence factors in Yen Lenh Bridge Project 
were used in adjusting risk parameters. Therefore, in this case, the risk adjusted parameter 
for maintenance cost is also 0.3667. 
b. Determination of Risk Adjusted parameter on the expenditure side for Construction 
period 
In this project, to determine the risk parameter for the construction cost overrun, the 
probability-based method was applied. Currently, the Ministry of transport of Vietnam is 
managing 21 PPP projects which have finished their construction period. The cost overrun 
statistics of 20 of these projects were collected. Although the number of projects is only 20, 
the total number of Vietnamese PPPs which finished their construction period is only 21. 
Therefore, the figure presents the general situation of the current cost overrun in current 
Vietnamese PPPs. Figure 10.4 presents the construction cost overrun in 20 out of 21 
finished Vietnamese PPPs.  
Figure 10. 4 Construction Cost overrun in 20 Vietnamese PPPs (%) (MOT, 2014; General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam, 2014; MOF, 2014) 
 
Using figure 10.4, the distribution for construction cost of this project is shown in figure 
10.5. For the purpose of simplicity, a normal distribution was employed in this research.  
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Figure 10. 5 Potential loss distribution due increase of construction cost in No 18 Highway Uong Bi – Ha 
Long Project 
 
(a) Construction Cost Distribution 
 
(b) Potential Loss distribution for construction expenditure 
 
From figure 10.5, it can be seen that the expected value was located at P50, the potential 
loss for expenditure is on the right side part of P50, and the value of loss is located at the 
centre of gravity of the truncated area which is the location of P21. The value of P21 can 
be determined by using the Inverse Normal Distribution function with the mean of 33.33 
and the standard deviation of 5.613.  Using equation 6.17, the risk parameter on the 
expenditure side for construction period can be determined as: 
P50 
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     =
                   
      
 = 
                  
      
 = 0.0679 
 
After having the risk parameter    together with table 10.4, equation 6.25 can be used to 
adjust this risk by using the influence factors. Thus, 
 
 ̅                 * RM4*RM5*RM7*RC7 
       
RM4: Risk score for Inflation risk 
RM5: Risk score for Fluctuation of interest rate 
RM7: Risk score for Negative economic events 
RC7:  Risk score for Difficulty in Land acquisition and resettlement  
 
Thus, 
 ̅                 * 0.502*0.403*0.378*0.314 = 0.0695 
c. Determination of the risk adjusted parameter on the revenue side 
Because the heuristic data about the variation of traffic demand in this highway is available, 
the option pricing method was used.  Figure 10.6 shows the annual variation of traffic 
demand from 2003 to 2010. This figure shows the standard deviation of 15.53 percent. 
Figure 10. 6 Annual traffic variations from 2003 to 2010 by percentage (MOT, 2014; General Statistics 
Office of Vietnam, 2014) 
 
Table 10.5 shows the expected revenues and expenditures from the contract of this 
project. In that table, the year of evaluation is 2011 which was the year of signing the 
contract. It should be noted that the risk-free rate is r: 9.5 percent (PG Bank, 2012); 𝜹: 
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Zero; T: 130. Using these numbers together with table 10.4 and equations 6.20, 6.21, 
6.22, and 6.24, the risk parameter on the revenue side can be determined. Table 10.6 
shows the risk parameters on the revenue side in different years. Details of the 
calculations are provided in Appendix H. 
 
Table 10. 5 Expected revenues and expenditure from No 18 Uong Bi – Halong Highway project 
Year 
Revenue 
 ( mil. 
pounds) 
  
Expenditure   
( mil. 
pounds) 
  
Year 
Revenue 
 ( mil. 
pounds) 
  
Expenditure   
( mil. 
pounds) 
  
2011 0.19 1.4 2026 8.55 13.31 
2012 0.82 13.6 2027 9.24 1.11 
2013 0.91 11.38 2028 9.97 1.21 
2014 1 5.03 2029 10.77 2.41 
2015 5.13 0.18 2030 11.63 3.6 
2016 4.64 0.63 2031 11.52 1.43 
2017 4.88 0.66 2032 12.44 1.55 
2018 5.36 1.42 2033 13.43 1.68 
2019 5.9 1.01 2034 14.51 5.9 
2020 5.4 0.64 2035 15.67 1.97 
2021 5.89 0.7 2036 15.38 1.98 
2022 6.42 2.35 2037 16.62 2.15 
2023 7 0.83 2038 17.94 40.89 
2024 7.63 1.25 2039 19.38 3.96 
2025 8.31 0.99 2040 20.93 2.5 
 
Table 10. 6 Risk parameters on the revenue side in different years in No18 Highway Project 
Year 
Risk Parameter on  
the revenue side 
ƞv 
Year 
Risk Parameter on  
the revenue side 
ƞv 
Year 
Risk Parameter on  
the revenue side 
ƞv 
2011 0.0000 2021 0.0035 2031 0.0216 
2012 0.0000 2022 0.0043 2032 0.0256 
2013 0.0000 2023 0.0053 2033 0.0303 
2014 0.0002 2024 0.0064 2034 0.0359 
2015 0.0004 2025 0.0077 2035 0.0425 
2016 0.0007 2026 0.0092 2036 0.0503 
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2017 0.0011 2027 0.0109 2037 0.0595 
2018 0.0016 2028 0.0130 2038 0.0705 
2019 0.0022 2029 0.0154 2039 0.0835 
2020 0.0028 2030 0.0183 2040 0.0989 
After placing the risk parameters on the revenue side (ƞv), the risk-adjusted parameters can 
be determined by using equation 6.24 and table 10.4 and table 10.6. 
 ̅        *RM7*RL5*RC10 
Where,  
RM7: Risk score for Influence of Negative economic events 
RL5: Risk score for Restriction on tolls 
RC10: Delay in other infrastructures relating to the project 
Thus, 
 ̅        *RM7*RL5*RC10 =      *0.378*0.318*0.308 
Risk adjusted parameters on the revenue side are shown in table 10.7. In this table, the risk 
scores for influence factors are also shown. 
Table 10. 7 Risk adjusted parameters on the revenue side for different year in No 18 Highway Project 
Year 
Risk Parameter 
on  
the revenue side 
ƞv 
Risk factor 1 
 (M7. Influence of 
negative 
 economic events ) 
Risk factor 2 
 (L5. Restriction 
on toll and tariff ) 
Risk factor 2 
 (C10. Delay in 
other 
infrastructures 
relating to the 
project) 
Risk Adjusted 
Parameter on  
the revenue side 
 ̅  
2011 0.0000 0.378  0.308 0.00000 
2012 0.0000 0.378  0.308 0.00000 
2013 0.0000 0.378  0.308 0.00005 
2014 0.0002 0.378  0.308 0.00018 
2015 0.0004 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00043 
2016 0.0007 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00076 
2017 0.0011 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00118 
2018 0.0016 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00167 
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2019 0.0022 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00224 
2020 0.0028 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00289 
2021 0.0035 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00364 
2022 0.0043 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00450 
2023 0.0053 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00548 
2024 0.0064 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00663 
2025 0.0077 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00796 
2026 0.0092 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00951 
2027 0.0109 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.01134 
2028 0.0130 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.01347 
2029 0.0154 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.01599 
2030 0.0183 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.01895 
2031 0.0216 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.02244 
2032 0.0256 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.02657 
2033 0.0303 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.03145 
2034 0.0359 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.03722 
2035 0.0425 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.04406 
2036 0.0503 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.05215 
2037 0.0595 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.06175 
2038 0.0705 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.07313 
2039 0.0835 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.08661 
2040 0.0989 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.10261 
 
From these risk adjusted parameters, losses which can be made because of lower revenue 
and higher expenditure can be determined. From that the return analysis can be made. 
Table 10.8 shows the details of the return analysis by the risk-adjusted DNPV and NPV for 
this project, while figure 10. 7 presents the trend of risk-adjusted DNPV and NPV. It is 
important to note that from the contract agreement, it can be seen that SPV is responsible 
for the annual maintenance and comprehensive maintenance. The comprehensive 
maintenance is made in the frequency stated in the contract, and in this research, it is 
assumed that the risk-adjusted parameters for comprehensive maintenance is also the risk-
adjusted parameters for construction work.  
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Table 10. 8 Return analysis by risk adjusted DNPV and NPV for No 18 Uong Bi-Halong Highway Project 
Year 
Revenue 
 ( million 
pounds) 
Expenditure ( million pounds) 
Income  ̅  
 ̅       (for 
Construction 
period) 
 ̅    (for 
Maintenance) 
 ̃̅    ̃̅   
Risk 
adjusted 
DNPV 
NPV 
Management 
Cost 
Maintenance Tax Investment Total 
               
2011 0.19 0.03 0.0051 0.00369 1.36 1.40 -1.21 
 
0.0695 
  
0.09 -1.31 -1.21 
2012 0.82 0.11 0.0228 -0.10682 13.58 13.60 -12.78 
 
0.0695 
  
0.94 -13.84 -12.59 
2013 0.91 0.12 0.0251 -1.20693 12.44 11.38 -10.47 
 
0.0695 
  
0.86 -23.30 -20.90 
2014 1.00 0.14 0.0345 -1.10228 5.96 5.03 -4.03 0.00018 0.0695 0.3667 0.0002 0.41 -26.68 -23.74 
2015 5.13 0.55 0.0608 -0.43564 
 
0.18 4.95 0.00043 
 
0.3667 0.0022 0.02 -23.26 -20.63 
2016 4.64 0.47 0.0669 0.09205 
 
0.63 4.01 0.00076 
 
0.3667 0.0035 0.02 -20.73 -18.39 
2017 4.88 0.49 0.0736 0.09681 
 
0.66 4.22 0.00118 
 
0.3667 0.0057 0.03 -18.30 -16.28 
2018 5.36 0.54 0.7838 0.09946 
 
1.42 3.95 0.00167 
 
0.0695 0.0090 0.05 -16.24 -14.53 
2019 5.90 0.59 0.3038 0.11499 
 
1.01 4.89 0.00224 
 
0.0695 0.0132 0.02 -13.89 -12.60 
2020 5.40 0.43 0.0979 0.10709 
 
0.64 4.77 0.00289 
 
0.3667 0.0156 0.04 -11.81 -10.92 
2021 5.89 0.47 0.1077 0.11672 
 
0.70 5.19 0.00364 
 
0.3667 0.0214 0.04 -9.74 -9.29 
2022 6.42 1.09 1.1476 0.11692 
 
2.35 4.07 0.00450 
 
0.0695 0.0289 0.08 -8.28 -8.16 
2023 7.00 0.56 0.1303 0.13865 
 
0.83 6.17 0.00548 
 
0.3667 0.0384 0.05 -6.23 -6.62 
2024 7.63 0.61 0.4893 0.14765 
 
1.25 6.38 0.00663 
 
0.0695 0.0506 0.03 -4.30 -5.21 
2025 8.31 0.67 0.1577 0.16470 
 
0.99 7.33 0.00796 
 
0.3667 0.0662 0.06 -2.28 -3.77 
2026 8.55 0.68 12.5816 0.04521 
 
13.31 -4.76 0.00951 
 
0.0695 0.0814 0.87 -3.74 -4.60 
2027 9.24 0.74 0.1908 0.18280 
 
1.11 8.12 0.01134 
 
0.3667 0.1047 0.07 -1.88 -3.33 
2028 9.97 0.80 0.2099 0.19738 
 
1.21 8.77 0.01347 
 
0.3667 0.1344 0.08 -0.05 -2.11 
2029 10.77 0.86 1.3453 0.20199 
 
2.41 8.36 0.01599 
 
0.0695 0.1722 0.09 1.53 -1.08 
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2030 11.63 0.93 2.4600 0.20808 
 
3.60 8.04 0.01895 
 
0.3667 0.2204 0.90 2.76 -0.19 
2031 11.52 0.92 0.2794 0.22756 
 
1.43 10.09 0.02244 
 
0.3667 0.2585 0.10 4.35 0.80 
2032 12.44 1.00 0.3073 0.24571 
 
1.55 10.89 0.02657 
 
0.3667 0.3305 0.11 5.90 1.75 
2033 13.43 1.07 0.3381 0.26530 
 
1.68 11.76 0.03145 
 
0.3667 0.4225 0.12 7.42 2.67 
2034 14.51 1.16 4.4990 0.24519 
 
5.90 8.60 0.03722 
 
0.0695 0.5401 0.31 8.38 3.27 
2035 15.67 1.25 0.4091 0.30930 
 
1.97 13.70 0.04406 
 
0.3667 0.6904 0.15 9.84 4.11 
2036 15.38 1.23 0.4500 0.30319 
 
1.98 13.40 0.05215 
 
0.3667 0.8024 0.17 11.12 4.85 
2037 16.62 1.33 0.4950 0.32736 
 
2.15 14.46 0.06175 
 
0.3667 1.0260 0.18 12.38 5.56 
2038 17.94 1.44 39.4863 -0.03597 
 
40.89 -22.94 0.07313 
 
0.0695 1.3122 2.75 10.05 4.56 
2039 19.38 1.55 2.0441 0.36716 
 
3.96 15.42 0.08661 
 
0.3667 1.6786 0.75 11.07 5.16 
2040 20.93 1.43 0.6588 0.412  2.5 18.43 0.10261  0.3667 2.1478 0.24 12.23 5.80 
 
Figure 10. 7 Risk Adjusted DNPV and NPV for No 18 Uong Bi-Halong Highway Project 
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From table 10.8 and figure 10.7, it can be seen that the project is profitable in both 
evaluations. In general, in Risk-adjusted DNPV Evaluation, investors will start to make a 
profit in 2029, whereas, in NPV evaluation, they can make a profit beginning in 2032. 
Because the project is beneficial, concession parameters can be optimized. The section 
below shows how parties can optimize concession parameters.  
10.3.2. Optimization of concession parameters 
The concession parameters which are subjected to optimization include the concession 
period, and returns obtained during the concession period.  The concession period should 
be able to protect the interest of both sectors, as mentioned clearly in chapter 6.  
As stated in chapter 6, in order to optimize the concession parameter, the expected return 
from the investor (IcR), depreciation cost of the project (  ̃), and net asset value of the 
project (NAVTC) needs to be determined. From the contract, it is shown that the expected 
rate of return for investors (R) is 12.83 percent. Using this number together with the 
forecasted expenditure, the expected return each year can be determined. 
It is important to note that in the contract, there is no mention about the economic life of 
the project. However, according to Shen et al. (2002), economic life of a transportation 
project can be 50 years. Therefore, in this project, it is assumed that the economic life of 
the project is 50 years. Together with assumptions about increasing the rate of the traffic 
level from the contract agreement, table 10.9 is formed. Table 10.9 shows the tolls of the 
project until the end of its economic life without increasing its toll price.  
Table 10. 9 Tolls of the project through its economic life without increasing its toll price. 
Year 
Tolls  
( No Increase of Price) 
Year 
Tolls  
( No Increase 
of Price) 
Year 
Tolls  
( No Increase of Price) 
1 0.1870 18 7.4806 35 10.3462 
2 0.8229 19 8.0791 36 9.5185 
3 0.9052 20 8.7254 37 8.7570 
4 0.9957 21 8.6382 38 8.0565 
5 3.8445 22 9.3292 39 7.4120 
6 3.4771 23 10.0756 40 6.8190 
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7 3.6579 24 10.8816 41 6.2735 
8 4.0237 25 11.7521 42 5.7716 
9 4.4261 26 11.5385 43 5.3099 
10 4.0525 27 12.4615 44 4.8851 
11 4.4172 28 13.4585 45 4.4943 
12 4.8148 29 14.5351 46 4.1347 
13 5.2481 30 15.6980 47 3.8040 
14 5.7205 31 14.4421 48 3.4996 
15 6.2353 32 13.2867 49 3.2197 
16 6.4134 33 12.2238 50 2.9621 
17 6.9265 34 11.2459     
 
Using equation 6.34, and 6.35 and 6.36 and 6.37 the value of IcR,   ̃ and NAVTc can be 
determined. Table 10.14 shows the details of the return analysis for optimizing the 
concession parameters.  
It should be noted that the Risk-adjusted DNPV 
(1)
 and NPV 
(1)
 are obtained from the return 
analysis part in table 10.8. The risk-adjusted DNPV
 (2)
 and NPV
 (2)
 are inversed with DNPV 
(1)
 and NPV 
(1)
. In other words, Risk adjusted DNPV 
(2)
 and NPV 
(2)
 are cumulative from 
the 40
th
 year to the 1
st
 year.  
Table 10. 10 Return analysis for optimizing concession parameters 
Year 
 
Revenue 
 ( 
million 
pounds) 
Revenue 
 
 
Expenditure 
( million pounds) 
Income 
 
Risk Adjusted  
DNPV(1) 
 
IcR 
 
 ̃  
 
NAVTc 
 
Risk Adjusted  
DNPV 
(2)
 
 
2011 0.19 1.40 -1.21 -1.31 0.19  
  
2012 0.82 13.60 -12.78 -13.84 1.90  
  
2013 0.91 11.38 -10.47 -23.30 3.21  
  
2014 1.00 5.03 -4.03 -26.68 3.74 0.08 23.30 35.52 
2015 5.13 0.18 4.95 -23.26 3.76 0.16 21.22 38.91 
2016 4.64 0.63 4.01 -20.73 3.81 0.50 19.16 35.48 
2017 4.88 0.66 4.22 -18.30 3.86 0.80 17.33 32.95 
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2018 5.36 1.42 3.95 -16.24 3.96 1.11 15.66 30.53 
2019 5.90 1.01 4.89 -13.89 4.02 1.46 14.13 28.47 
2020 5.40 0.64 4.77 -11.81 4.06 1.84 12.74 26.12 
2021 5.89 0.70 5.19 -9.74 4.10 2.19 11.49 24.04 
2022 6.42 2.35 4.07 -8.28 4.22 2.57 10.35 21.96 
2023 7.00 0.83 6.17 -6.23 4.25 2.99 9.31 20.51 
2024 7.63 1.25 6.38 -4.30 4.30 3.44 8.37 18.46 
2025 8.31 0.99 7.33 -2.28 4.34 3.93 7.50 16.52 
2026 8.55 13.31 -4.76 -3.74 4.81 4.47 6.71 14.50 
2027 9.24 1.11 8.12 -1.88 4.84 5.03 6.00 15.97 
2028 9.97 1.21 8.77 -0.05 4.88 5.62 5.35 14.11 
2029 10.77 2.41 8.36 1.53 4.94 6.27 4.76 12.28 
2030 11.63 3.60 8.04 2.76 5.04 6.97 4.23 10.70 
2031 11.52 1.43 10.09 4.35 5.08 7.72 3.74 9.46 
2032 12.44 1.55 10.89 5.90 5.11 8.47 3.30 7.88 
2033 13.43 1.68 11.76 7.42 5.14 9.27 2.91 6.33 
2034 14.51 5.90 8.60 8.38 5.24 10.14 2.55 4.80 
2035 15.67 1.97 13.70 9.84 5.27 11.08 2.22 3.84 
2036 15.38 1.98 13.40 11.12 5.30 12.09 1.92 2.39 
2037 16.62 2.15 14.46 12.38 5.33 13.09 1.66 1.10 
2038 17.94 40.89 -22.94 10.05 5.81 14.17 1.42 -0.15 
2039 19.38 3.96 15.42 11.07 5.86 15.33 1.21 2.18 
2040 20.93 2.5 18.43 12.23 5.88 16.23 1.04 1.15 
Using table 10.10 and equations 6. 29 and 6.32, the concession period can be found to 
protect interests of both sectors. The benefit of the private sector can only be protected 
if equation 6.29 is satisfied. More specifically, according to equation 6.29, investors can 
get the expected return if the project is transferred to the government from 2032 to 
2040. The profit that investors can obtain increases from 5.9 million pounds at the end 
of 2032 to 12.23 million pounds at the end of 2040. During this period, the expected 
return (IcR) is always smaller than the Risk-Adjusted DNPV. This means investors can 
obtain more than expected. There is one year that investors should consider, which is 
the year 2038. This is because in the maintenance plan for that year, there will be a large 
amount of comprehensive work and if the project is transferred after this year, the 
investors have to be responsible for this work, and their benefit will reduce remarkably. 
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It can be seen that the profit decreases from 12.38 million pounds at the end of 2037 to 
10.05 million pounds at the end of 2038. On the other hand, to protect the interest of the 
public sector, using equation 6.32, the project can be transferred to the government, 
except the year 2037 and 2038. As mentioned previously, the government will be 
responsible for a large amount of comprehensive maintenance if they get the project in 
2038. This brings a drop from 1.01 million pounds from 2037 to - 0.15 million pounds 
in 2038. The government must be aware that the easier project that is being transferred, 
the more profitable it is for the public sector. Table 10.11 shows the determined 
concession period which can protect the interests of both sectors. The table shows that 
the transfer time should be from 2032 to 2037 or 2039. The difference between 
concession periods in the actual contract, and in other models will be discussed in 
chapter 11.  
Table 10. 11 Concession period for Uong Bi – Halong Highway project based on Risk adjusted DNPV 
Evaluation 
Technique 
To protect 
investors’ 
interests 
To project the 
government interests 
Concession period 
determined 
Risk Adjusted 
DNPV 
From 2032 to 
2040 
Any year, except 2037 
and 2038 
From 2032 to 2036, 
or 2039 
It should be noted that, in this research an interval of the concession period is determined, 
and the specific time of transferring is left to the negotiation based on the results of this 
model. The suggestion to carry out further research to find a specific transfer time will be 
provided in chapter 12 when discussing future research 
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10.4. New Dong Nai Bridge Project 
10.4.1. Return Evaluation 
As described in chapter 9, for New Dong Nai Bridge Project the BOT mechanism was 
proposed in May 2008. The required investment is around £50.71 million. The investors’ 
equity is equal to 30 percent of the required investment and the rest is debt from banks. 
The main bridge was inaugurated in September 2009.  
It should be noted that the first contract agreement of the New Dong Nai Bridge project 
was signed in 2008. However, in December 2013 the contract was revised. Therefore, for 
this project, the evaluation was recalculated with regards to the cash flows’ value in 2013. 
Data from 2008 to 2013 has been audited. These data include the traffic volume, 
construction cost, and expenditure cost from 2008 to 2013. Therefore, the risk parameters 
were not applied to the period from 2008 to 2013. 
Table 10. 12 Risk Management Analysis for New Dong Nai Bridge Project 
Source Parameter Potential Risk Influence factor Risk Mitigation 
Revenue Demand 
Lower demand 
than expected 
M7. Influence of negative 
 economic events 
L5. Restriction on toll and 
tariff  
C10. Delay in other 
infrastructures relating to the 
project 
Using real heuristic data to 
forecast the demand 
 
Obtain government guarantee 
to extend the contract 
Expenditure 
Maintenance 
cost 
Maintenance 
cost is higher 
than predicted 
M4. Inflation risk  
C3. Low quality product 
Using Maintenance Contract 
Construction 
cost 
Cost overrun 
M4. Inflation risk  
M7. Influence of negative 
 economic events 
M5. Fluctuation of Interest rate 
Assume the cost contingency 
by investor 
 
a. Determination of Risk Parameter for Maintenance Cost 
From Table 10.12 above, it can be seen that the loss of the high maintenance cost (O2) will 
happen if the maintenance contract is broken and then the investors will have to sign a new 
contract with other maintenance provider at a with higher cost.  
From the findings in the Risk Identification Finding in chapter 8, the probability of this risk 
(O2) happening is 0.3187 percent. In addition, in the contract agreement, the maintenance 
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cost overrun also mentions that if the maintenance cost increases by over 12 percent, the 
contract will be revised. Therefore, in this paper, the loss made by the maintenance cost 
increase is assumed to be 12 percent. In fact, in other projects, if the data about all of the 
maintenance providers is available, the loss can be determined as the difference between 
the chosen provider and unsuccessful providers (Espinoza and Rojo, 2015). Figure 10.8 
below demonstrates the risk profile because of the broken maintenance contract based on 
the assumption of the actual project.  
Figure 10. 8 Maintenance Risk Profile 
 
 
 
 
 
From figure 10.8, the risk parameter for maintenance can be determined as: 
   = 0.12*0.3187 + 68.13*0 = 0.0382 
Also, from table 10.12 it can be seen that there are two risks which can have an influence 
on the default of the operator which are the inflation risk and risk of Low Quality products. 
Thus, 
 ̅  =         * RM4*RC3 = 0.0382 + 0.0382*0.402*0.31 = 0.043 
b. Determination of risk parameter for construction period  
Similarly to No 18 Highway project, data from the construction cost of 20 out of 21 
previous PPPs in Vietnam and the proposed construction cost for this project were used. 
The distribution about the construction cost for New Dong Nai Bridge is presented in 
figure 10.9.  
 
 
Pr 
=31.87% 
Pr = 
68.13% 
0.0382  
0 .00 
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Figure 10. 9 Potential loss distribution due increase of construction cost 
 
 
(a) Construction Cost Distribution 
 
(b) Potential Loss distribution for construction expenditure 
It can be recognized that the construction cost distribution for New Dong Nai Bridge 
Project has similar a trend compared to the construction cost distribution for No 18 
Highway Uong Bi – Ha Long Project. One of the reasons is that the same data for the 
construction cost in Vietnamese PPPs was used to create the construction cost distribution.  
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In fact, the risk parameter without taking into account the influential factors is slightly 
different to the one in case 2. More specifically, using equation 6.17, and figure 10.9, the 
risk parameter on the expenditure side for the construction period for this project can be 
determined as: 
     =
                   
      
 = 
                    
      
 = 0.0679 
 
Where,  
       Risk parameter on the expenditure side for the construction period 
 
However, from table 10.12, it can be seen that risks used to adjust the risk parameter       
are different. Using equation 6.25, the risk-adjusted parameter  ̅     can be determined as: 
 ̅                 * RM4*RM5*RM7 
       
RM4: Risk score for Inflation risk 
RM5: Risk score for Fluctuation of interest rate 
RM7: Risk score for Negative economic events 
Thus, 
 ̅                 *0.314 *0.403*0.378= 0.0711 
c. Determination of Risk Adjusted Parameter on the revenue side 
As mentioned, the project was re-evaluated with the data audited in 2013. Data from 2007 
to 2013 was used to determine the risk parameter on the revenue side. Figure 10.10 below 
shows the variation of the traffic volume from 2007 to 2013. It should be noted that this 
figure shows the variation of traffic volume, and does not just showing the traffic volume 
by itself. Therefore, in figure 10.10, it does not mean that the traffic volume in 2011 
dropped dramatically, but it just means that the traffic volume in 2011 is just slightly 
higher than it was in 2010.  
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Figure 10. 10 Annual Traffic Variations by Percentage (Data was collected from MOT 2014) 
 
From this figure, the standard deviation can be determined as 2.75 percent. The risk-free 
rate was determined as 8.9 percent as it was the average of the interest rate of the 
government bond in 2013 (PG Bank, 2013). In this project T = 117 (from 2013 to 2030). 
𝜹: Zero. Table 10.13 below shows the expected revenue and expenditure for New Dong 
Nai Bridge Project to determine the risk parameter on the revenue side.  
Table 10. 13 Expected Revenue and Expenditure for New Dong Nai Bridge Project (Revised Contract 
Agreement, 2013) 
Year Revenue Expenditure Year Revenue Expenditure 
2008 1.646 3.42 2020 12.585 3.06 
2009 1.823 7.25 2021 12.597 3.59 
2010 1.95 2.65 2022 12.61 3.39 
2011 1.973 1.93 2023 12.622 6.53 
2012 2.286 0.97 2024 12.635 3.76 
2013 8.466 20.8 2025 12.648 3.97 
2014 11.739 19.03 2026 12.66 5.33 
2015 11.901 2.81 2027 12.673 4.88 
2016 12.066 2.74 2028 12.686 4.71 
2017 12.232 2.62 2029 12.698 4.93 
2018 12.401 2.76 2030 12.698 5.3 
2019 12.572 3.14 
 
   
Using these numbers and equations 6.21, 6.22, 6.23, and 6.24 from chapter 6, risk 
parameters on the revenue side (    can be found. The details of calculating (    are 
provided in Appendix I. After placing the risk parameters on the revenue side (   , risk-
0
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adjusted parameters on the revenue side ( ̅ ) can be determined by using equation 6.24 and 
table 10.13. More specifically,  
 ̅     +   *RM7*RM5*RC10 
 ̅ =    +   *0.378*0.318*0.308 
 Table 10.14 below shows the details of the risk adjusted parameters ( ̅ ) on the revenue 
side in different years.  
Table 10. 14 Risk adjusted parameters ( ̅ ) on the revenue side in different years. 
Year 
Risk Parameter on  
the revenue side 
     
 
 M7 (Influence of 
negative 
 economic events) 
L5 
(Restriction 
on toll and 
tariff) 
C10 (Delay in other 
infrastructures relating 
to the project) 
Risk Adjusted 
Parameter on  
the revenue side   ̅ ) 
2013 0.000000000000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000000 
2014 0.000000000717 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000001 
2015 0.000000011972 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000012 
2016 0.000000035853 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000037 
2017 0.000000055052 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000057 
2018 0.000000060689 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000063 
2019 0.000000055481 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000058 
2020 0.000000045229 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000047 
2021 0.000000034246 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000036 
2022 0.000000024686 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000026 
2023 0.000000017210 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000018 
2024 0.000000011726 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000012 
2025 0.000000007866 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000008 
2026 0.000000005222 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000005 
2027 0.000000003443 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000004 
2028 0.000000002261 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000002 
2029 0.000000001481 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000002 
2030 0.000000000970 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.000000001 
 
It can be recognized that the risk-adjusted parameters on the revenue side are very small. This 
illustrates that the predicted level of transport demand shown in the contract will not fluctuate in 
the future. One of the reasons that caused this tiny fluctuation is that the standard deviation is 
very small at 2.75 percent. This means that the traffic levels in this route in recent years are 
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stable. This, in deed, creates advantages for the government and the investors in forecasting 
demands. In fact, in the contract, it is assumed by investors that the increasing level of demand 
after 2015 is only 1 percent. From these risk-adjusted parameters, loss in the revenue and 
expenditure side can be shown using equation 6.28 and 6.29, from that the return analysis can be 
found. Table 10.15 shows the return analysis by NPV and Risk-adjusted DNPV.
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Table 10. 15 Return analysis by NPV and Risk Adjusted DNPV 
Year Revenue 
Expenditure 
Income 
 ̅  
 
 ̅    (for 
Maintenance) 
 ̅       (for 
Construction 
period) 
 
 
 ̃̅   
 
 ̃̅   
 
NPV 
 
Risk 
adjusted 
DNPV 
 
Investment Tax Management Maintenance Total 
               
2008 
 
3.42 0.00 
  
3.42 -3.42 
     
-6.13 -5.24 
2009 1.823 6.91 0.15 0.20 
 
7.25 -5.61 
     
-15.06 -13.13 
2010 1.950 2.24 0.17 0.21 0.03 2.65 -0.83 
     
-16.24 -14.20 
2011 1.973 1.47 0.18 0.25 0.04 1.93 0.02 
     
-16.22 -14.18 
2012 2.286 0.46 0.18 0.27 0.04 0.96 1.16 
     
-14.87 -12.92 
2013 8.466 20.25 0.21 0.29 0.16 20.91 -18.51 
     
-33.38 -31.43 
2014 11.739 15.96 0.77 1.03 0.24 18.00 -2.10 0 0.0430 0.071 0.00 1.14 -35.22 -34.40 
2015 11.901  1.07 1.89 0.04 3.00 11.86 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.01 -26.16 -24.41 
2016 12.066  1.08 2.04 0.04 3.17 9.16 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.01 -19.77 -17.33 
2017 12.232  1.10 2.20 0.22 3.52 9.44 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.00 -13.94 -10.61 
2018 12.401  1.11 2.38 0.05 3.55 9.47 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.00 -8.75 -4.43 
2019 12.572  1.13 2.57 0.35 4.04 9.26 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.01 -4.26 1.12 
2020 12.585  1.14 2.78 0.06 3.98 9.51 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.17 6.35 
2021 12.597  1.14 3.00 2.20 6.34 9.00 0 0.0711 
 
0.00 0.03 3.26 10.88 
2022 12.610  1.15 3.24 0.07 4.46 9.21 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.00 3.26 15.16 
2023 12.622  1.15 3.50 0.08 4.72 6.08 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.13 6.38 17.69 
2024 12.635  1.15 3.78 0.98 5.91 8.87 0 0.0711 
 
0.00 0.01 8.20 21.16 
2025 12.648  1.15 4.08 0.41 5.64 8.67 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.00 10.56 24.27 
2026 12.660  1.15 4.41 0.10 5.65 7.32 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.05 12.60 26.67 
2027 12.673  1.15 4.76 0.10 6.01 7.78 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.02 14.13 29.02 
2028 12.686  1.15 5.14 0.06 6.36 7.96 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.01 15.57 31.24 
2029 12.698  1.15 5.55 1.18 7.88 7.76 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.00 16.87 33.22 
2030 12.698  1.15 6.00 0.13 7.28 7.40 0 0.0430 
 
0.00 0.01 18.00 34.96 
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Table 10.15 and figure 10.11show that the project is profitable in both evaluations. 
However, the evaluation by the Risk-Adjusted DNPV is always higher than the evaluation 
by NPV. It can be seen in NPV evaluation that the project will start to make a profit in the 
year 2020, while the Risk-Adjusted DNPV shows that the project can make a profit 
beginning in 2019. It should be noted that the investors have collected tolls since 2009 
from Song Phan toll station. The government has shown initiative support for the investors. 
Therefore, in NPV evaluation project becomes profitable after 12 years while, in with the 
Risk Adjusted DNPV it becomes profitable after 11 years.  
Figure 10. 11 Trends of NPV and risk adjusted DNPV 
 
Because the project is profitable in the Risk-adjusted DNPV, concession parameters can be 
optimized. The section below shows how concession parameters (concession period and 
return in concession period) can be optimized.  
10.4.2. Optimization of Concession Parameters 
Similarly to case 2, the expected return from the investor (IcR), depreciation cost of the 
project (  ̃), and net asset value of the project (NAVTC) need to be determined. From the 
contract, it can be determined that the expected rate of return for investors(R) is 15 percent. 
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Using this number together with the forecasted expenditure, the expected return each year 
can be determined. 
Similarly, in this project, it is assumed that the economic life of the project is 50 years. 
Assume that at the last 10 years of the economic life the traffic demand decreases because 
of the new roads.  By using assumptions about fluctuation rates of the traffic level 
mentioned from the contract agreement, which is 1 percent each year, the revenue from 
2038 to 2057 can be forecasted. Table 10.16 shows the revenue of the project until the end 
of its economic life without increasing its toll price. 
Table 10. 16 Revenue of the project through its economic life without increasing in toll price (mil. pounds) 
Year Revenue Year Revenue Year Revenue 
2014 7.83 2029 8.47 2044 8.31 
2015 7.93 2030 8.47 2045 8.23 
2016 8.04 2031 8.47 2046 8.15 
2017 8.15 2032 8.47 2047 8.06 
2018 8.27 2033 8.47 2048 7.98 
2019 8.38 2034 8.47 2049 7.90 
2020 8.39 2035 8.47 2050 7.83 
2021 8.40 2036 8.47 2051 7.75 
2022 8.41 2037 8.47 2052 7.67 
2023 8.41 2038 8.47 2053 7.59 
2024 8.42 2039 8.56 2054 7.52 
2025 8.43 2040 8.65 2055 7.44 
2026 8.44 2041 8.57 2056 7.37 
2027 8.45 2042 8.48 2057 7.29 
2028 8.46 2043 8.40     
 
Using table 10.16 and equations 6.34, 6.66 and 6.37,  ̃  and the Net Asset Value (NAVTC) 
can be found. From these values, concession parameters can be determined. Table 10.17 
shows the details of the return analysis that is used to optimize concession parameters. It 
should be noted that the Risk-adjusted DNPV 
(1)
 is obtained from the return analysis part, 
and DNPV
 (2)
 is the opposite of DNPV 
(1)
. In other words, DNPV 
(2)
 is cumulative from the 
year 30
th
 to the 1
st
 year.  
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Table 10. 17 Return analysis to optimize concession parameters 
Year 
 
Revenue 
 
Expenditure 
Income 
 
DNPV
(1)
 
 
IcR 
 
 ̃  
 
NAV 
 
DNPV
(2)
 
 
         
2008 
 
3.42 -3.42 -5.24 0.514 
   
2009 1.647 7.25 -5.61 -13.13 1.601 
   
2010 1.820 2.65 -0.83 -14.20 2.000 
   
2011 1.950 1.93 0.02 -14.18 2.289 
   
2012 2.127 0.97 1.16 -12.92 2.435 
   
2013 2.286 20.91 -18.63 -31.55 5.572 
   
2014 16.93 19.22 -2.29 -34.70 8.46 1.79 48.86 66.58 
2015 14.67 2.63 12.04 -24.55 8.85 1.55 43.57 69.73 
2016 11.90 2.49 9.41 -17.27 9.22 1.26 39.03 59.58 
2017 12.07 2.79 9.28 -10.67 9.64 1.27 34.94 52.29 
2018 12.23 2.75 9.48 -4.48 10.05 1.29 31.24 45.70 
2019 12.40 3.19 9.22 1.03 10.53 1.31 27.90 39.51 
2020 12.57 3.06 9.52 6.27 10.99 1.33 24.89 34.00 
2021 12.58 5.35 7.24 9.85 11.79 1.33 22.19 28.76 
2022 12.60 3.38 9.22 14.13 12.30 1.33 19.76 25.18 
2023 12.61 3.55 9.05 17.99 12.83 1.33 17.58 20.90 
2024 12.62 4.65 7.98 21.08 13.53 1.33 15.62 17.04 
2025 12.64 4.28 8.36 24.08 14.170 1.33 13.86 13.94 
2026 12.65 4.18 8.46 26.87 14.80 1.33 12.29 10.95 
2027 12.67 4.43 8.23 29.37 15.46 1.34 10.88 8.16 
2028 12.67 4.64 8.03 31.60 16.16 1.34 9.62 5.66 
2029 12.69 6.03 6.66 33.29 17.06 1.34 8.49 3.43 
2030 12.70 5.29 7.41 35.03 17.86 1.34 7.48 1.74 
 
Using table 10.17 and equations 6.29 and 6.32, the concession period for New Dong Nai 
Bridge can be found.  In order for investors to obtain the expected return, the equation 6.29 
must be satisfied. From table 10.17 it can be seen that DNPV 
(1)
 starts to be higher than IcR 
in the year 2022. Thus, from 2022 the equation 6.29 will be satisfied. It can also be 
recognized that the difference between the DNPV 
(1)
 and IcR becomes bigger from 2022 to 
2030. This means that from 2022 to 2030, the longer the concession period is, the higher 
return investors get. On the other hand equation 6.32, which is to protect the government’s 
interest, can only be satisfied before the year 2026. It can be observed that if the project is 
transferred to the government at the beginning of 2025, the government will get a total of 
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13.94 million pounds while the NAV at that year is 13.83. Therefore, the interest of the 
government can be protected. Beginning in 2025, the DNPV 
(2)
 will decrease faster than 
the NAV because the income will decrease faster. For the investors, closer the transfer time 
is to 2030, the higher return the investors can achieve. In contrast, closer the transfer time 
is to 2030, the lower the benefit government will obtain. Table 10.18 shows the concession 
period determined by the Risk Adjusted DNPV to protect the interests of both sectors. It 
can be seen that in order to protect both of the sectors, the project should be transferred 
from 2022 to 2025.  
Table 10. 18 Concession Period of New Dong Nai Bridge Project determined by Risk Adjusted DNPV 
Evaluation 
Technique 
To protect investors’ 
interests 
To project the government 
interests 
Determined Concession 
Period 
Risk Adjusted DNPV From 2022 to 2030 Before 2026 From 2022 to 2025 
Similarly to No 18 Uong Bi- Halong Project, in the scope of this research, only the interval 
of the concession period is concluded. The specific transfer time is left for negotiation 
between the two sectors. The difference between the concession period determined in this 
research, the one in the contract, and the one determined by other models will be discussed 
in chapter 11.  
10.5. Summary 
The return evaluation and optimization of the concession parameters are essential functions 
of the proposed framework. This chapter showed the findings of application of the Risk-
Adjusted DNPV in evaluating the return and optimizing concession parameters. More 
specifically, Yen Lenh Bridge project, No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long project, and New Dong 
Nai Bridge Project were applied. The findings show that Yen Lenh bridge project is not 
profitable, and it should not be implemented. Therefore, concession parameters for this 
project do not need to be optimized.  On the other hand, No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long project 
is beneficial in this evaluation. Evaluation shows that this project can make a profit 
beginning in 2029. It was also found that this project should be transferred to the 
government from 2032 to 2037, or in 2039. Furthermore, the evaluation also demonstrates 
that New Dong Nai Bridge is profitable, and investors can make a positive return 
beginning in 2019. For this project, the transfer time was determined to be from 2022 to 
2026. 
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CHAPTER 11: DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
11.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings of this research shown in chapters 8, 9 and 10. These 
findings are discussed in relation to the hypotheses described in chapter 1 in order to show 
whether the hypotheses are proved or not. First, the findings from the risk identification 
function of the framework shown in chapter 8 will be discussed.  Secondly, the results of 
the project’s riskiness ranking by AHP are discussed. Thirdly, the use of AHP to allocate 
risks in Vietnamese PPP is discussed. Fourthly, the findings of project returns and the 
concession parameter’s optimization using the Risk-Adjusted DNPV are also discussed 
11.2. Critical Risks in Vietnamese PPPs 
11.2.1. Construction Risks 
As mentioned previously in the literature review in chapter 3, research into the risks in 
PPPs does not usually focus on construction risks but rather on political risks. Previous 
research such as that of Thuyet et al. (2007) Xu et al. (2010), Xu et al. (2011), and Song et 
al. (2013) discovered that construction risks are not the most critical risks in PPPs. 
Similarly, in this research, it can be seen that there is only one construction risk, C7, in the 
top ten risks, and four construction risks at the bottom of the top 20 risks (C4, C3, C10, 
C8). In fact, this result supports some of the other research in the Vietnamese construction 
industry such as research by Toan and Ozawa (2008). However, it should be noted that 
although there is a small number of construction risks at the top of the risk ranking, as long 
as they are at the top of the table, they have a by far higher score in comparison to other 
risks. For example C7 in this research is the most critical risk with the highest score, and it 
also stands at the 4
th
 position in research by Toan and Ozawa (2008) about Vietnamese 
BOTs.  
According to the findings analysis, across the different groups of respondents (public 
sector and private sector), there were significant differences regarding the risk score of 
construction risks. As was shown in chapter 8, this disagreement can be seen in 6 out of 10 
construction risks. This significant difference can be because of different points of view of 
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each sector regarding the risks.  More specifically, the results from the test show that Poor 
Design got the significant difference between groups as determined by Welch’s F (1, 
23.676) = 11.038, p < 0.05. Similarly, Low Quality Products also got the significant 
difference in risk scores (Welch’s F (1, 22.468) = 22.677, p < 0.05).   Findings also 
demonstrate that perception of two sectors are statistically significant different for the risk 
Low Site safety (Welch’s F (1, 28.608) = 67.582, p < 0.05). The next risk which received 
the significant different result is Design Changes (Welch’s F (1, 41.169) = 11.989, p 
<0.05). Additionally, the risk Impractical Feasibility Study (Welch’s F (1, 35.599) = 6.55, 
p < 0.05) is also considered as a risk that obtained the significantly different perception. 
The final risk in this risk group which was given the significant difference in result is the 
risk Impractical Requirements of Progress of Project (Welch’s F (1, 39.764) = 65.112, p < 
0.05). 
The possible reasons for this difference were presented in chapter 8 together with the 
findings of the risks’ identifications. This difference may suggest that identifying and 
observing risks are based on the role of each party involved in PPPs. Table 11.1 below 
shows the hypothesis result together with the research questions.  
Table 11. 1 Research Questions about the Construction Risks and Hypothesis Test Result 
Research question 
Is there a significant difference between the public and private sector 
regarding the risk score of construction risks? 
Hypothesis 
Ha0 (p>0.05): There is no significant difference between the public and 
private sector regarding construction risks.  
Results 
The results indicated that: 
There were significant differences between the public sector and private 
sector regarding the risk score of 6 construction risks, namely, 
C2. Poor design (p < 0.05). 
C3: Low Quality Products (p < 0.05). 
C4. Low Site safety (p < 0.05). 
C6. Design changes (p < 0.05). 
C8. Impractical feasibility study (p < 0.05). 
C9. Impractical requirements of progress of project (p < 0.05). 
Researcher’s 
observations 
 Construction risks were identified from the literature review in 
chapter 3. 
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 The public sector and private sector have different perceptions about 
the 6 mentioned risks. 
 The possible reason can be the difference in their responsibility in 
implementing a PPP.  
 In general, the private sector is more concerned about 6 these risks 
than the public sector, and one of the possible reasons is that the 
private sector is the party who bears most of these risks.  
Conclusion The null hypothesis Ha0 was rejected for these risks.  
11.2.2. Legal Risks 
Legal risks in this research contain risks relating to legal and regulation issues. In fact, 
these risks can be seen as macro factors as they influence all sectors and seem to be 
external to the private investors. Legal risks are one of the main areas that researchers 
about PPPs often focus on (Tang et al. 2010). From the findings in chapter 8, it can be seen 
that there is only one legal risk in the top ten risks and three legal risks in the top 20 risks. 
The legal risk that got the highest risk score amongst the legal risks is L3 (Poor project 
approval and permit process). In fact, L3 also stands at the 2
nd
 position in the general risk-
ranking table. This finding supports research by Thuyet et al. (2007) and Toan and Ozawa 
(2008) about the Vietnamese construction industry as well as that of Yuan et al. (2008) and 
Xu et al. (2011) who conducted research about the China market.   
The test shows that there were significant differences between the public and private 
sectors regarding 5 out of 6 legal risks. More specifically, the opinions of two sectors are 
significant difference for the risk Disapproval of Guarantees by the Government (Welch’s 
F (1, 50.048) = 61.702, p <0.05). The second risk which obtained significant difference 
from the test is the risk Revision of the Contract Clauses (Welch’s F (1, 33.782) = 24.307), 
p < 0.05). The third significant difference of perceptions of two sectors for this risk group 
comes from the risk Regulation Change (Welch’s F (1, 79.835) = 71.813, p < 0.05). 
Similarly, opinions of two sectors are also significant different with regards to the risk 
Restriction on Tolls (Welch’s F (1, 25.635) = 5.119, p < 0.05). The last significant 
difference was determined for the Taxation Risk (Welch’s F (1, 26.121) = 39.455, p < 
0.05).  
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The possible reasons for these differences were provided in chapter 8 in accordance with 
the results. Table 11.2 summarizes the research question about the legal risk group and 
hypothesis test.  
Table 11. 2 Research question about Legal Risks and Hypothesis test result 
Research question 
Is there a significant difference between the public and private sectors 
regarding the risk score of legal risks? 
Hypothesis 
Ha0 (p>0.05): There is no significant difference between the public and 
private sector regarding legal risks.  
Results 
The results indicated that: 
There were significant differences between the public sector and private 
sector regarding the risk scores of 5 legal risks, namely, 
L1. Disapproval of guarantees by the government (p < 0.05). 
L2. Revision of the contract clauses (p < 0.05). 
L4. Regulation Change (p < 0.05). 
L5: Restriction on Tolls (p < 0.05). 
L6. Taxation risks (p < 0.05). 
Researcher’s 
observations 
The list of construction risks was identified from the literature review in 
chapter 3. 
 The public sector and private sector have different perception on 5 
out of 6 mentioned risks. 
 In general, the private sector is more concerned about 5 of these risks 
than is the public sector. 
Conclusion The null hypothesis Ha0 was rejected for these risks.  
 
11.2.3. Market Risks 
This group of risks contains 10 risks referring to the market situation which can have an 
influence on the financing plan of the project. It can be seen from the list of risks 
mentioned in chapter 4 that this risk group contains the risks both in the macro level and in 
the project level. Project level risks such as weak financial ability of the investors can be 
resolved by investors. However, risks such as Inflation Risk or Interest Exchange can only 
be resolved by the public sector. Moreover, for the risk of negative economic event, 
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sometimes this risk is influenced by the world economic situation and in that case, it seems 
to be external to the host government.  
In fact, the findings chapter shows that market risks are highly evaluated by respondents as 
there are 4 market risks that are in the top 10 risks and 7 market risks in the top 20 risks. 
This finding can assist some of other findings such as those by Zayed and Chang (2002) 
and Schaufelberger et al. (2003). In research by Zayed and Chang (2002), the market risk 
group is the second most critical group amongst 8 groups, while Schaufelberger et al. 
(2003) stated that the majority of projects observed in their research had high market risks. 
In fact, research in the developed market such as that of Akintoye et al. (2003a) suggests 
that the market risks can directly lead to the high cost of PFI projects.  
Findings from the test indicate that the perceptions of two sectors are significantly different 
regarding to the risk Weak Financial Capacity of Investor (Welch’s F (1, 21.153) = 6.596, 
p < 0.05). The second risk in this group which received the significant difference is the 
Inflation Risk (Welch’s F (1, 95.569) = 17.421, p < 0.05). Significant difference was also 
found in the risk Difficulty in Accessing Finance from the Banks (Welch’s F (1, 30.914) = 
178.780, p < 0.05). The public and the private sector also illustrated that their perceptions 
are significantly different with regards to the risk Poor Financial Market (Welch’s F (1, 
27.162) = 37.429, p < 0.05). The next significant difference comes from the risk Foreign 
Currency Exchange Fluctuation (Welch’s F (1, 32.731) = 44.796, p < 0.05). Similarly, 
statistics also demonstrate that significant difference also can be found in the statistics for 
the risk Poor Financial Market (Welch’s F (1, 27.162) = 37.429, p < 0.05). The last risk in 
this group that result shows the significant difference is the risk Income Streams are 
usually in Local Currency (Welch’s F (1, 32.021) = 179.322, p < 0.05). Possible reasons 
for these differences can be found in chapter 8 in accordance with the results. Table 11.3 
shows the research question about market risks and the hypothesis test. 
Table 11. 3 Research question about market risks and hypothesis test 
Research question 
Is there a significant difference between the public and private sectors 
regarding the risk score of market risks? 
Hypothesis 
Ha0 (p>0.05): There is no significant difference between the public and 
private sectors regarding market risks.  
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Results 
The results indicated that: 
There were significant differences between the public sector and private 
sector regarding the risk score of 6 out of 10 market risks, namely, 
M2: Weak Financial Capacity of Investor (p < 0.05). 
M3. Difficulty in accessing finance from the banks (p < 0.05). 
M4. Inflation risk (p < 0.05). 
M6. Foreign currency exchange fluctuation (p < 0.05). 
M8. Poor financial market (p < 0.05). 
M9. Income streams are usually in local currency (p < 0.05). 
Researcher’s 
observations 
The list of market risks was identified from the literature review in 
chapter 3  
 The public sector and private sector have different perceptions on 6 
out of 10 mentioned risks 
 In general, the public sector is more concerned about 6 of these risks 
than is the private sector. 
Conclusion The null hypothesis Ha0 was rejected for these risks.  
11.2.4. Operational Risks 
This risk group has 5 risks referring to difficulties that investors can have during the 
operational stage of the project. From the findings in chapter 8 it can be seen that there are 
only two risks, namely O4 (High maintenance cost) and O5 (Fluctuation of demand stand) 
in the top ten group. Other risks in the Operational risk group have low scores and stand at 
the bottom of the general risk ranking table. This seems to be consistent with the general 
situation of PPPs as the World Bank (2015) also mentions that the traffic volume risk is 
one of the greatest challenges in PPP highway projects in many countries. In addition, the 
finding of the current research can also be supported by some research in developing 
markets such as that of Jung (2011) and Lee (2011). In fact, while others may have 
influence on the expenditure or indirect influence on the income of the project, O4 and O5 
can have a direct influence on the income of any PPP.  
Findings indicate that there are significant differences between perceptions of two sectors 
with regards to 4 risks in this risk group. More specifically, the first risk which obtains the 
significant difference is the risk Operation Cost Overrun (Welch’s F (1, 91.316) = 206.584, 
p < 0.05). The second risk in this group is the risk Default of Operator (Welch’s F (1, 
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67.852) = 136.005, p < 0.05). Two sectors also gave significant different opinion to the risk 
Low Quality of Operation (Welch’s F (1, 32.013) = 11.143, p < 0.05). The last risk which 
is considered as receiving different perception from the public and the private sector is 
Fluctuation of Demand (Welch’s F (1, 60.842) = 15.223, p < 0.05). Reasons for these 
differences are discussed in chapter 8 in accordance with the finding.  Table 11.4 below 
shows the research question about operational risks and the hypothesis test. 
Table 11. 4 Research question about operational risks and hypothesis test 
Research question 
Is there a significant difference between the public and private sectors 
regarding the risk score of operational risks? 
Hypothesis 
Ha0 (p>0.05): There is no significant difference between the public and 
private sectors regarding operational risks.  
Results 
The results indicated that: 
There were significant differences between the public sector and private 
sector regarding the risk score of 4 out of 5 operational risks, namely, 
O1. Operation cost overrun (p < 0.05). 
O2 Default of operator (p < 0.05). 
O3. Low Quality of operation (p < 0.05). 
O5. Fluctuation of demand (p < 0.05). 
Researcher’s 
observations 
The list of market risks was identified from the literature review in 
chapter 3. 
 The public sector and private sector have different perception on 4 
out of 5 mentioned risks. 
 In general, the private sector is much more concerned about 5 of 
these risks than is the public sector. 
Conclusion The null hypothesis Ha0 was rejected for these risks.  
11.2.5. Political Risks 
This risk group has 7 risks which refer to the political situation of the host country. The 
findings indicate that only the corruption risk (P4) stands in the top ten risks, and there is 
one more risks P1 (Concession Termination by Government), in the top 20 risks. Other 
political risks have lower scores and stand at the bottom of the risk ranking level shown in 
the findings in chapter 8. This finding may suggest that Corruption is the only political risk 
that respondents are concerned about in Vietnamese PPPs. This finding can support 
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previous research by such as Sachs et al. (2007) who found that in China, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam that Corruption is the most critical risk amongst political 
risks. Indeed, the research by Toan and Ozawa (2008) also suggested this about 
Vietnamese BOT. In fact, this finding is also consistent for the Vietnamese Construction 
Market as Ling and Hoang (2010) and Thuyet et al. (2007) also found this in construction 
projects that were observed.  
The significant difference test proves that there are 6 risks in this group which obtain 
significant difference scores from two sectors. More specifically, the opinion of two 
sectors are significant different regarding to the risk Concession Termination by 
Government (Welch’s F (1, 32.833) = 57.682, p < 0.05). Similarly, the risk Political 
Opposition (Welch’s F (1, 96.739) = 351.617, p < 0.05) also obtained the significantly 
different opinion from two sectors. The next risk that the opinions of two sectors are 
significant different is the risk Unstable Government (Welch’s F (1, 37.227) = 83.695, p < 
0.05). The statistics also point out that the risk Public Sector Default (Welch’s F (1, 
50.285) = 14.259, p < 0.05). Likewise, results presented that another significant difference 
comes from the risk Public Scepticism about the Real Benefits of PPP (Welch’ F (1, 
46.453) = 71.756, p < 0.05). The last risk in this group that achieved the significantly 
different result is Forced Buy out Risks (Welch’s F (1, 34.405) = 163.824, p < 0.05). Table 
11.5 below summarizes the hypothesis test for this risk group.  
Table 11. 5 Research question about political risks and hypothesis test 
Research question 
Is there a significant difference between the public and private sectors 
regarding the risk score of political risks? 
Hypothesis 
Ha0 (p>0.05): There is no significant difference between the public and 
private sectors regarding political risks.  
Results 
The results indicated that: 
There were significant differences between the public sector and private 
sector regarding the risk score of 6 out of 7 political risks, namely, 
P1. Concession Termination by Government (p < 0.05). 
P2. Political opposition (p < 0.05). 
P3. Unstable government (p < 0.05). 
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P5: Public sector default (p < 0.05). 
P6. Public scepticism about the real benefits of PPP (p < 0.05). 
P7. Forced Buy out Risks (p < 0.05). 
Researcher’s 
observations 
The list of political risks was identified from the literature review chapter 
3. 
 The public sector and private sector have different perception on 6 
out 7 mentioned risks. 
 In general, the private sector is much more concerned about 7of 
these risks than is the public sector. 
Conclusion The null hypothesis Ha0 was rejected for these risks.  
11.2.6. Relationship Risks 
The relationship risk group contains 4 risks referring to the difficulties that both sectors can 
have in dealing with other parties. The findings show that only Re2. Inadequate experience 
in PPP of the Public sector stands in the top 20 critical risks. Other risks have low scores. 
In fact, in previous studies about Vietnam such as those by Thuyet et al. (2007), Sachs et 
al. (2007), Toan and Ozawa (2008) and Ling and Hoang (2010), these relationship risks are 
not mentioned. However, the findings of the current  research is that the public sector does 
not have enough experience in implementing PPP which can be found in some research in 
the emerging market such as that of Castalia Strategic Advisors (2007), Farquharson et al. 
(2011), and Mohammed (2012). In fact, there are many researches that categorize 
relationships into different areas which do not relate to the research into risks. These types 
of research have been done by Erridge and Greer (2002), Ysa (2007), Chan et al. (2003), 
Consoli (2006), Vazquez and Allen (2004), Henisz (2006) and El-Gohary et al. (2006). 
These researches focus on the factors that can facilitate or inhibit the relationship between 
sectors. Table 11.6 below shows the research question and hypothesis test for relationship 
risks. 
Findings of the significant difference test show that there are only two risks that received 
significantly different results from the public and the private sectors. More specifically, the 
first risk to mention is the risk Inappropriate Distribution of Responsibilities and Risks 
(Welch’s F (1, 27.418) = 123.122, p < 0.05). Similarly, Low-cooperation between 
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Different Partners also found significant different results (Welch’s F (1, 46.584) = 16.227, 
p < 0.05). Table 11.6 summarizes the results of the test. 
 
Table 11. 6 Research question about relationship risks and hypothesis test 
Research question 
Is there a significant difference between the public and private sectors 
regarding the risk score of relationship risks? 
Hypothesis 
Ha0 (p>0.05): There is no significant difference between the public and 
private sectors regarding relationship risks.  
Results 
The results indicated that: 
There were significant differences between the public sector and private 
sector regarding the risk score of 2 out of 4 relationship risks, namely, 
Re3. Inappropriate distribution of responsibilities and risks (p < 0.05). 
Re4. Low-cooperation between different partners (p < 0.05). 
Researcher’s 
observations 
The list of political risks was identified from the literature review in 
chapter 4. 
 The majority of risks in this group have a low risk score. 
 The public sector and private sector have different perceptions on 
only 2 out of 4 mentioned risks. 
 The public sector is more concerned about this risk than is the 
private sector. 
Conclusion The null hypothesis Ha0 was rejected for these risks.  
 
11.3. Project’s Riskiness Evaluation and Risk Allocation by AHP 
11.3.1. Project’s Riskiness Evaluation  
The discussion about the situation of cases was provided in section 9.2 of chapter 9 
together with the statistical findings in order to make it easier for readers. Findings in this 
section also show that 57.45 percent of the practitioners agreed with the riskiness ranking 
of the projects, while 36.17 percent gave a neutral opinion, and the rest disagreed. These 
rates indicate that the majority of participants agreed that the evaluation using the AHP 
method can reflect the real situation. Together with in-depth qualitative analysis about real 
status of projects provided in chapter 9, these prove the hypothesis H3 that project 
evaluation based on AHP can indicate the real situation of Vietnam at a reasonable level. 
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However, in the scope of this research, the reason that 36.17 percent of practitioners gave a 
neutral opinion and 6.38 percent disagreed was not explored. In addition, it should be noted 
that practitioners gave the opinion about the riskiness ranking with regard to all risk 
groups, not only to a single group.  
It can be seen from section 9.1 in chapter 9 that the consistency level of input data in 
project evaluation is around 50 percent. In this evaluation, the number of options and the 
number criteria are all 5. In fact, this level of consistency is higher than some of the other 
simulations conducted in previous research. For example, in research by Li et al. (2013), 
random AHP simulation was carried out 45 times with the number of elements being 5 and 
the rate of consistency only 8.89 percent. One of the fundamental reasons is that the 
simulation in the research by Li et al. (2013) was made randomly, while in this research all 
participants have certain knowledge about PPPs, and about 5 cases chosen. In fact, Li and 
Zou (2011) suggested that by choosing participants who are experts in the field, with high 
relevant experience, and in the management team, the consistency of standard AHP can be 
improved. The level of consistency in standard AHP can also be improved if all 
respondents carefully compare alternatives (Cheng and Li, 2003; Banuelasy and Antonyz, 
2004). In reality, the carefulness of respondents is highly likely to be higher as there is the 
pressure of responsibility. Therefore, it is expected that in the real situation in Vietnamese 
PPPs, the rate of consistency can be higher 
11.3.2. Risk Allocation 
The similarities and differences of the allocation strategies found by AHP, in comparison 
with findings from previous studies, are provided together with findings in section 9.3 of 
chapter 9 to make it easier for readers. The findings prove the hypothesis H4 that AHP can 
be used to allocate risk with regards to selected criteria. In fact, previous studies only show 
the allocation strategy based on single criteria that “the risk should be transferred to the 
party which is best to manage it”. This criterion seems to be unclear, and it can make it 
difficult for experts to judge. However, in this study, the manageability of each option can 
be evaluated clearly based on selected criteria.   
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In terms of the consistency level of the pairwise comparison matrix, the findings in section 
9.3 in chapter 9 show that the consistency level was around 70 percent. It can be seen that 
the consistency level is higher than that in the project evaluation section as the number of 
elements is only three. In fact, simulation from research by Li et al. (2013) finds that the 
consistency level is around 90 percent. As mentioned previously, the consistency level can 
be improved by choosing participants who are experts in the field, with high relevant 
experience, and who are in the management team.  
11.4. Return Evaluation and Optimization of Concession Parameters by Risk-
Adjusted DNPV 
11.4.1. Return Evaluation 
11.4.1.1. Risk-Adjusted DNPV in comparison with NPV 
This section will discuss about the difference between evaluation by Risk Adjusted DNPV 
and NPV. Findings from three cases in chapter 10 are used. 
Figure 11.1 compares the NPV evaluation with Risk adjusted DNPV in the based case and 
in three scenarios in which the risk-free rate increases and decreases by 10 percent in Yen 
Lenh Bridge Project. It should be noted that this is the re-calculated NPV shown in section 
10.2.2 in chapter 10. Figure 11.1 shows that all evaluations show the negative values. In 
fact, this is one of the failed PPP projects in Vietnam. It can be seen that although the trend 
of the Risk adjusted DNPV and NPV are similar, NPV is lower than the Risk-Adjusted 
DNPV in all scenarios. This figure also shows that the Risk-Adjusted DNPV follows the 
opposite trend of the risk free rate.  
Figure 11. 1 NPV and Risk Adjusted DNPV in different risk free rates in Yen Lenh Bridge project 
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It can also be seen in this figure that the difference between the Risk-Adjusted DNPV and 
NPV becomes bigger when it comes closer to the end of the observed period. Although the 
data from 2002 to 2012 was audited, and this period was not added to the loss on the 
revenue side and on the expenditure side, the difference is still remarkable. This difference 
comes from the difference between the risk-free rate used in Risk-Adjusted DNPV and the 
risk discount rate (higher than the risk-free rate) used in NPV.  This figure proves the 
hypothesis H5 that in the observed cases, projects are more beneficial in the Risk-Adjusted 
DNPV evaluation than in NPV evaluation.  
In terms of No 18 Uong Bi-Ha Long Highway Project, Risk-adjusted DNPV in different 
scenarios of the risk-free rate is also compared to NPV state in the contract agreement. 
Figure 11.2 shows the comparison. Similarly to Yen Lenh Bridge Project, NPV is only 
higher than the Risk Adjusted DNPV if the risk-free rate increases 10 percent.  
Figure 11. 2 NPV and Risk Adjusted DNPV in different risk free rates in No 18 Uong Bi-Ha Long highway 
project 
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According to the based case of the risk-Adjusted DNPV, at the end of the concession 
period, investors can obtain 12.23 million pounds while NPV shows that they will get 
only 5.8 million pounds. This again proves the hypothesis H5 that the project is more 
profitable in Risk-Adjusted DNPV evaluation.  
Similarly, in New Dong Nai Bridge Project, NPV is lower than Risk-Adjusted DNPV in 
all scenarios. From 2008 to 2020, which is the time period the project does not make a 
profit, the difference between these evaluations is smaller, especially from 2008 to 
2013. One of the reasons the difference between evaluations made during this period 
only comes from the difference between the risk-free rate and risk discount rate is 
because the data from 2008 to 2013 is audited. However, after 2013, the difference is 
also contributed by the loss on the revenue side and on the expenditure side that is 
calculated in the Risk-Adjusted DNPV. Again hypothesis H5 is supported by the New 
Dong Nai Bridge project.  
Figure 11. 3 NPV and Risk Adjusted DNPV in different risk free rates in New Dong Nai Bridge project 
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free rate increases, the risk discount rate also increases. As a result, the NPV will decrease. 
In the scope of this research the movement of NPV based on the movement of the risk-free 
rate is not modelled. Basically, the difference between the Risk-Adjusted DNPV and NPV 
comes from the difference between the risk-free rate and the risk discount rate, and from 
losses that were calculated. Therefore, if the difference made by the risk-free rate and the 
risk discount rate is smaller than the loss on the revenue and expenditure side, the Risk-
Adjusted DNPV and NPV come closer to each other, and vice versa.  These findings 
support previous criticism by academics that investors are obtaining excessive returns in 
PPP (NCHRP, 2009; House of Commons, 2011; National Audit Office, 2012; Vecchi et al. 
2013). 
11.4.1.2. Generalized trend of Risk adjusted DNPV 
This section attempts to generalize the trend of the loss on the revenue side, the loss on the 
expenditure side, and the Risk-Adjusted DNPV for three cases. The generalized trend of 
NPV is also provided. This generalization is to observe whether these parameters in these 
projects can be predicted.  
a. Yen Lenh Bridge 
Figure 11.4 below shows the loss in the revenue side in Yen Lenh Bridge Project. It can be 
seen that the loss in the revenue side increases gradually, and this increase can be presented 
by the polynomial line with the equation: 0.0017x
2
 - 0.0175x + 0.0366 
with R² = 0.9743. On the other hand, the loss on the expenditure side in Yen Lenh Bridge 
can be presented by an exponential line with the equation: y = 0.052e
0.0848x
 
with R² = 0.9957. It can be seen that both trend lines show a good fit with the data that was 
analyzed. These good fits indicate that since 2013, losses in Yen Lenh Bridge are more 
predictable.  
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Figure 11. 4 Trend lines for losses in Yen Lenh Bridge Project 
  
Figure 11.5 shows the Risk-Adjusted DNPV and NPV in this project with their fitted trend 
lines. It can be seen that the figures for Risk-Adjusted DNPV can be presented with the 
polynomial line by equation: y = 0.0002x
4
 - 0.0133x
3
 + 0.3796x
2
 - 4.0834x - 0.2253 with 
R² = 0.945. On the other hand, figures for NPV can be presented by the line with the 
equation: y = 0.0003x
4
 - 0.0209x
3
 + 0.5584x
2
 - 5.7305x + 0.4227 
with R² = 0.9209. It can be observed from the figure that the lines show a better fit since 
the numbers increase after the year 2012, especially for Risk-Adjusted DNPV. One of the 
reasons is that the forecast for Risk-Adjusted DNPV is based on actual statistics from 2002 
to 2012. Therefore, the actual movement of returns is taken into account in the Risk-
Adjusted DNPV technique. Thus, there is a greater possibility to predict in Risk-Adjusted 
DNPV. In fact, the calculation was set at the year 2012. Therefore, this brings the 
advantage to investors to predict the future returns from 2012.  
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Figure 11. 5 Trend Lines for Risk Adjusted DNPV and NPV in Yen Lenh Bridge Project 
  
b. No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long Project 
Figure 11. 6 Trend Lines for Loss in No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long Project 
  
Figure 11.6 shows the loss on the revenue side, and on the expenditure side in the No 18 
Uong Bi – Ha Long highway project. In terms of loss on the revenue side, the figure also 
shows the estimated curve generated from the data. It can be seen that the loss on the 
revenue side is fitted into an exponential trend line described by the equation: y = 
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0.0682e
0.1913x, the curve follows the general trend of the loss on the revenue side with a 
good fit. It can be seen from the figure 11. 6 that there is a small difference between two 
lines, however, with the R² = 0.9599, the curve is well-fitted to the data. From this 
estimated curve, investors can forecast the trend of the loss on the revenue side by using 
the exponential trend line. Differently, figures for the loss on the expenditure side do not 
really fit to an estimated curve. The curve that fits the data the most is the polynomial line 
described by the equation: 8E-07x
6
 + 8E-05x
5
 - 0.0027x
4
 + 0.047x
3
 - 0.381x
2
 + 1.2191x - 
0.6119. However, it fits R² = 0.4142 only. It means there are many time points in which the 
data is very different from the estimated curve.  
In terms of the Risk-Adjusted DNPV, and NPV, figure 11.7 shows the Risk-adjusted DNPV 
and NPV of the No 18 Uong Bi Ha Long highway project with different estimated curves. 
It can be seen that that the polynomial trend line is the most fitted line, and this line can be 
described by the equation: y = -0.0059x
3
 + 0.2851x
2
 - 2.5769x - 11.21 with R² = 0.901 for 
Risk Adjusted DNPV. On the other hand, NPV can be presented by the line with the 
equation: y = -0.0047x
3
 + 0.2239x
2
 - 2.021x - 10.577 
with R² = 0.8571. Statistics show that the Risk-Adjusted DNPV is more fitted to the line 
than is NPV.  It can be suggested from this figure that the returns from 2017 to 2038 are 
more predictable than returns in other years. 
Figure 11. 7 Risk Adjusted DNPV and NPV in No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long Project and estimated curves 
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The general trend of the estimated curves follows the trend of the data of Risk-Adjusted 
DNPV and NPV. However, there are some points in which the estimated curve is far from  
the line of the Risk-Adjusted DNPV and NPV. For example, this is the case from 2011 to 
2017.  However, with the R2 of 0.901 and of 0.8571 for the Risk Adjusted DNPV and NPV, 
respectively, these lines can be considered as good fitted lines showing reasonable 
prediction ability.  
c. New Dong Nai Bridge Project 
As can be seen from section 10.4 in chapter 10, the predicted loss on the revenue side for 
this project is too small. Therefore, only the loss on the expenditure side is generalised. 
Figure 11.8 shows that the data of the loss on the expenditure side for New Dong Nai 
Bridge project can be fitted to the polynomial line which can be described as y = -0.0013x
3
 
+ 0.0418x
2
 - 0.3884x + 1.0504. However, this is not a good fit as R² = 0.5508. After the 
dramatic drop in the first period, the numbers seem to be more stable, but it is still 
unpredictable.  
 
Figure 11. 8 Trend lines for Loss on the expenditure side in New Dong Nai Bridge project 
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Figure 11.9 shows the Risk-adjusted DNPV, and NPV of New Dong Nai Bridge with the 
most fitted curve. It can be recognized that the polynomial line is also the line that fits the 
data the most. The polynomial line for Risk-Adjusted DNPV can be described as y = 
0.0009x
4
 - 0.0722x
3
 + 1.8724x
2
 - 14.709x + 11.286 with R² = 0.9542, whereas, the trend of 
NPV can be described by the equation: y = 0.0011x
4
 - 0.0793x
3
 + 1.9048x
2
 - 14.698x + 
9.6247 with R² = 0.9332. In general, the line for Risk-Adjusted DNPV looks to be more 
fitted.  
Figure 11. 9 Risk adjusted DNPV, and NPV in New Dong Nai Bridge Project and estimated curves 
  
In this project, returns in both evaluations can be more predictable from 2016. It can be 
seen in both evaluations that the red lines are closer to the green lines during this time, 
whereas, for other years, especially from 2011 to 2014, the difference becomes more 
significant. The project is expected to collect tolls from 2015, and it can be recognized that 
in the future returns are more foreseeable for this project.  
11.4.2. Concession Parameters  
This section will discuss the concession period found from the Risk-Adjusted DNPV 
models, namely the BOTCcM Model and BOTCcM Net Asset value Model (described in 
chapter 5) in comparison with the actual concession period agreed upon in the contract 
agreement. In addition, the concession period found from other NPV-based models will be 
also discussed. As mentioned in chapter 10, the concession period is only optimized for No 
18 Uong Bi-Ha Long Project and New Dong Nai Bridge Project.  
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Table 11.7 shows the comparison of concession parameters determined by the Risk-
Adjusted DNPV and NPV in No 18 Uong Bi-Ha Long Project, while table 11.8 compares 
different concession periods concluded from Risk Adjusted DNPV models and other NPV 
based models.  
Table 11. 7 Comparison of Concession parameters in Risk-Adjusted DNPV and NP V in No 18 Uong Bi-Ha 
Long Project 
Year DNPV
(1)
 NPV
(1)
 IcR 
NAVTc for 
Risk adjusted 
DNPV model 
NAVTc for 
NPV 
based 
models 
DNPV 
(2)
 
NPV 
(2)
 
                
2011 -1.31 -1.21 0.19         
2012 -13.84 -12.59 1.90         
2013 -23.30 -20.90 3.21         
2014 -26.68 -23.74 3.74 23.30 21.60 35.52 26.69 
2015 -23.26 -20.63 3.76 21.22 19.18 38.91 29.54 
2016 -20.73 -18.39 3.81 19.16 16.89 35.48 26.43 
2017 -18.30 -16.28 3.86 17.33 14.89 32.95 24.18 
2018 -16.24 -14.53 3.96 15.66 13.12 30.53 22.08 
2019 -13.89 -12.60 4.02 14.13 11.55 28.47 20.33 
2020 -11.81 -10.92 4.06 12.74 10.15 26.12 18.39 
2021 -9.74 -9.29 4.10 11.49 8.93 24.04 16.72 
2022 -8.28 -8.16 4.22 10.35 7.84 21.96 15.09 
2023 -6.23 -6.62 4.25 9.31 6.88 20.51 13.95 
2024 -4.30 -5.21 4.30 8.37 6.03 18.46 12.42 
2025 -2.28 -3.77 4.34 7.50 5.27 16.52 11.01 
2026 -3.74 -4.60 4.81 6.71 4.60 14.50 9.56 
2027 -1.88 -3.33 4.84 6.00 4.01 15.97 10.40 
2028 -0.05 -2.11 4.88 5.35 3.48 14.11 9.13 
2029 1.53 -1.08 4.94 4.76 3.02 12.28 7.91 
2030 2.76 -0.19 5.04 4.23 2.62 10.70 6.87 
2031 4.35 0.80 5.08 3.74 2.25 9.46 5.99 
2032 5.90 1.75 5.11 3.30 1.94 7.88 4.99 
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2033 7.42 2.67 5.14 2.91 1.67 6.33 4.04 
2034 8.38 3.27 5.24 2.55 1.42 4.80 3.12 
2035 9.84 4.11 5.27 2.22 1.21 3.84 2.53 
2036 11.12 4.85 5.30 1.92 1.02 2.39 1.68 
2037 12.38 5.56 5.33 1.66 0.86 1.10 0.94 
2038 10.05 4.56 5.81 1.42 0.72 -0.15 0.24 
2039 11.07 5.16 5.86 1.21 0.596 2.18 1.24 
2040 12.23 5.80 5.88 1.04 0.499 1.15 0.64 
 
Table 11. 8 Concession periods for No 18 Uong Bi-Ha Long Project based on different models 
Model 
To Project Investors’ 
Interests 
To Project Public clients’ 
Interests 
Transfer time 
Contract Agreement 2030 Not mentioned 2030 
BOTCcM 2037 Not mentioned 2037 
BOTCcM Net Asset Value 2037 Any Year Except 2038 2037 
From 2032 to 2040 From 2032 to 2040 
Any year, except, 2037 
2038 
From 2032 to 2036, 
or 2039 
 
Figure 11. 10 Transfer Time in different models for No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long Project 
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In the contract agreement, the project will be transferred to the government on 05/10/2030. 
More specifically, it shows that the contract agreement cannot protect the interests of any 
sector in any models. In order to protect both sectors’ interests, the BOTCcM model and 
BOTCcM Net Asset Value model say that the project should be transferred to the 
government in 2037. Nevertheless, according to risk-adjusted DNPV in this research, the 
project should be transferred to the government from 2032 to 2036, or in 2039. The figure 
shows that if the project is transferred to the government in 2037 the profit obtained by the 
investor is high (see the Risk-Adjusted DNPV
 (1)
 and NPV
 (1)
 lines) as there is a peak in this 
year. However, as shown in the Risk-Adjusted DNPV
 (2)
 and NPV
 (2)
 lines, the benefit the 
government can get in this year is very small. Risk Adjusted DNPV gives both sectors 
more options which can balance their interests.  
Table 11.9 shows the comparison of concession parameters determined by the Risk-
Adjusted DNPV and NPV in New Dong Nai Bridge Project, and different concession 
periods are shown in table 11.10. Figure 11.11 show the graphical representation of the 
concession period in different models.  
Table 11. 9 Comparison of Concession parameters in Risk Adjusted DNPV and NPV in New Dong Nai 
Bridge Project 
Year 
NPV
(1)
 DNPV
(1)
 IcR 
NAVTc for 
risk 
adjusted 
DNPV 
 
NAVTc 
for NPV 
models 
 
NPV
(2)
 
 
DNPV
(2)
 
 
2008 -6.13 -5.24 0.514         
2009 -15.06 -13.13 1.601         
2010 -16.24 -14.20 2.000         
2011 -16.22 -14.18 2.289         
2012 -14.88 -12.92 2.435         
2013 -33.50 -31.55 5.572         
2014 -35.50 -34.70 8.455 48.864 42.713 52.463 66.58 
2015 -26.30 -24.55 8.850 43.566 33.289 54.463 69.73 
2016 -19.75 -17.27 9.223 39.034 27.194 45.263 59.58 
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2017 -14.01 -10.67 9.641 34.939 21.578 38.704 52.29 
2018 -8.82 -4.48 10.053 31.241 17.104 32.973 45.70 
2019 -4.35 1.03 10.531 27.904 13.543 27.782 39.51 
2020 -0.25 6.27 10.990 24.894 10.711 23.309 34.00 
2021 2.51 9.85 11.791 22.188 8.463 19.214 28.76 
2022 5.62 14.13 12.298 19.758 6.681 16.454 25.18 
2023 8.34 17.99 12.831 17.577 5.269 13.335 20.90 
2024 10.46 21.08 13.528 15.619 4.150 10.621 17.04 
2025 12.43 24.08 14.170 13.864 3.266 8.502 13.94 
2026 14.19 26.87 14.797 12.291 2.567 6.533 10.95 
2027 15.72 29.37 15.462 10.881 2.014 4.766 8.15 
2028 17.04 31.60 16.158 9.620 1.579 3.242 5.66 
2029 18.00 33.29 17.063 8.492 1.235 1.924 3.43 
2030 18.96 35.03 17.856 7.484 0.965 0.956 1.74 
 
Table 11. 10 Concession periods for New Dong Nai Bridge based on different models 
Model 
To Project Investors’ 
Interests 
To Project Public clients’ 
Interests 
Transfer time 
Contract Agreement 2027 Not mentioned 2027 
BOTCcM From 2027 to 2030 Not mentioned From 2027 to 2030 
BOTCcM Net Asset Value From 2027 to 2030 Before 2030 From 2027 to 2029 
Risk Adjusted DNPV From 2022 to 2030 Before 2026 From 2022 to 2026 
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Figure 11. 11 Transfer Time in different models for New Dong Nai Bridge project 
 
In the contract, it is agreed that the project will be transferred to the government in 2027. 
The BOTCcM model says that it should be transferred from 2027 to 230. However, 
according to the BOTCcM NAV model it should be transferred from 2027 to 2029. There 
is one year, 2027, which satisfies the contract and these models. However, the result of this 
research shows that the project should be transferred from 2022 to 2025. This is a more 
reasonable period as there are some points where both sectors can obtain equal returns. For 
example, in year 2033, the Risk-Adjusted DNPV 
(1)
 and Risk-Adjusted DNPV 
(2)
 cross 
each other, and this means both sectors receive equal returns. However, this specific 
transfer time also depends on negotiations. It is just suggested in this research.  
11.4.3.  Testing the accuracy of Risk-Adjusted DNPV and NPV 
This section shows the accuracy test of the Risk-Adjusted DNPV in comparison with 
DNPV. Due to the availability of the actual financial report, the test will apply values of (a) 
the actual income of Yen Lenh Project in 2013, (b) the actual income of Yen Lenh Project 
in 2014, (c) Expenditure in No 18 Highway Project in 2011, (d) Expenditure in No 18 
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New Dong Nai Bridge Project. In order to test this accuracy, the Root Means Squared 
Error, expressed by equation 7.7 and the Mean Absolute Percentage Error described by 
equation 7.8, and the Average Accuracy described by equation 7.9 were applied. Table 
11.11 shows the data to use in the test, while table 11.12 summarizes the test results.  
Table 11. 11 Actual data and Forecasted Data by Risk Adjusted DNPV and NPV 
Items 
Actual Values  
(mil. Pound) 
Predicted by DNPV 
(mil. Pound) 
Predicted by NPV 
(mil. Pound) 
Income in Yen Lenh Project in 2013 0.24 0.28 0.29 
Income in Yen Lenh Project in 2013 2014 0.38 0.43 0.39 
Expenditure in No 18 Highway Project in 2011 1.36 1.50 1.40 
Expenditure in No 18 Highway Project in 2012 8.81 14.71 15.44 
Expenditure in No 18 Highway Project in 2013 13.46 13.50 15.92 
Expenditure in No 18 Highway Project in 2014 22.38 8.68 8.76 
Construction Cost in New Dong Nai Bridge 57.75 53.36 53.01 
 
Table 11. 12 Summary of the testing result 
Description Risk Adjusted DNPV NPV 
Root Mean Squared Error 5.87 6.08 
Mean Absolute Error (%) 24.91 27.25 
Average Accuracy (%) 75.09 72.75 
Table 11.12 shows that the Risk-adjusted DNPV made smaller error in evaluating projects. 
When 7 values were tested, Risk adjusted DNPV produced the error of 5.87 million 
pounds, while, NPV produced the error of 6.08 million pounds. In fact, it can be seen in 
table 11.11 that the high error comes from the actual expenditure for No 18 highway 
project in 2014. The actual cost for this year is 22.38 while the Risk-Adjusted DNPV 
estimated that it should be 8.68 and NPV estimated about 8.76. This massive increase in 
the actual cost results in high error value. In addition, the table also demonstrates that risk-
adjusted DNPV obtains the average accuracy of 75.09 percent while the NPV only shows 
the result of 72.75 percent. These numbers improve the hypothesis H5 that Risk-Adjusted 
DNPV is more effective than NPV in evaluating the project returns, therefore it is also 
more effective in optimizing concession parameters. 
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11.5. Summary  
This chapter discussed the findings shown in chapters 8, 9, and 10 with reflections on the 
research hypotheses. The purpose of the discussion was to show how the findings can 
prove the hypotheses, and therefore prove the robustness of the framework. The discussion 
shows that hypothesis H1 is proved by the findings illustrated in chapter 8. Hypotheses H2 
and H3 about the applicability of the AHP model in this framework can be proved by the 
findings in chapter 9. This chapter also shows that H4 is proved statistically by the findings 
in chapter 10. Moreover, hypothesis H5 is also proved by findings in chapter 10 together 
with the statistical tests that were carried out. In addition, this chapter also showed the 
application of the framework in reality. The notifications for flexibly applying each 
function were also demonstrated.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
12.1. Introduction 
In order to fulfil a need of the scientific and systematic approach to manage risks in PPPs 
in the transport sector in Vietnam, this research proposed a framework to effectively 
manage critical risks. The proposed framework was expected to be able to identify and 
assess critical risks. It also was designed to be able to evaluate the riskiness of the project 
and to allocate critical risks. In addition, the proposed framework was also designed to 
evaluate project returns and to determine the concession period. The proposed framework 
was tested by using real data from PPPs in the Vietnamese transport sector. 
In this final chapter of the thesis, a summary of the research is provided. Firstly, findings 
are summarized. Secondly, the proofs of the hypotheses are demonstrated. Also, the 
contribution of the research is also highlighted. In addition, this chapter also shows the 
limitations of the research and the direction for future works. 
12.2. Summary of findings 
Before summarizing the findings of the research, it should be noted that, the findings are to 
prove the hypotheses about the proposed framework. Therefore, the final purpose of the 
research is to use the findings to prove the applicability of the proposed framework rather 
than only show the findings.  
12.2.1. Risk identification and ranking by the proposed framework 
The analysis of data shows that the ten most critical risks in PPPs in the transport sector in 
Vietnam are (C7) Difficulty in Land acquisition and Resettlement, (L3) Poor project 
approval and permit process, (M4) Inflation risk, (M7) Influence of negative economic 
events, (O4) High maintenance cost, (P4) Corruption, (O5) Fluctuation of demand, (Re2) 
Inadequate experience in PPP of Public sector, (M2) Weak Financial Capacity of Investor, 
and (M1) Lack of transparency (see chapter 8 for other risks’ rankings). In addition, 
amongst the 44 risks that were identified, there are 32 risks where the public and the 
private sectors significantly differ in their perceptions.   
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12.2.2. Project’s riskiness evaluation by the proposed framework 
The analysis of the data showed that amongst the five projects selected, namely, Yen Lenh 
Bridge Project, Phu My Bridge Project, No 18 highway Uong Bi – Ha Long Project, Co 
Chien Bridge, and New Dong Nai Bridge, with regards to all selected risks, the most risky 
project was the Phy My Bridge project. The second most risky project was the Yen Lenh 
Bridge Project. New Dong Nai Bridge Project, Co Chien Project, and No 18 highway Uong 
Bi – Ha Long Project stand at 3rd, 4th, and 5th position, respectively. This riskiness ranking 
was agreed by 57.45 percent of participants, while 31.91 percent of them gave a neutral 
opinion. 
12.2.3. Risk allocation strategies by the proposed framework 
The findings in section 9.2.1 in chapter 9 showed that amongst the 10 selected risks to test 
the AHP allocation model, three risks, namely Low Quality Products (C3), High 
Maintenance Cost (O4) and Fluctuation of Demand (O5) are allocated to the private sector. 
Difficulty in Land acquisition and Resettlement (C8), Poor Project Approval and Permit 
Process (L3), and Inflation Risk (M4) are allocated to the public sector. In contrast, 
Corruption (P5), Weak Financial Capacity of Investor (M2), Inappropriate Distribution of 
Responsibilities and Risks (Re 3), and Non-cooperation between Different Partners (Re 4) 
where allocated to the private sector. 
12.2.4. Project Returns Evaluation by the proposed framework 
From the findings from chapter 10, it can be seen that the function of the return evaluation 
of the proposed framework was demonstrated in three cases, namely Yen Lenh Bridge 
Project, No 18 highway Uong Bi – Ha Long Project, and New Dong Nai Bridge. 
In terms of Yen Lenh Bridge Project, the findings show that the project is not beneficial.  
In other words, the project should not have been conducted. Regarding the No 18 highway 
Uong Bi – Ha Long Project, the proposed framework shows that the project is beneficial 
and the return that the private sector can achieve at the end of the signed concession period 
is higher in the framework’s evaluation than in the signed contract evaluation. Similarly in 
terms of New Dong Nai Bridge Project, analysis shows that the project is beneficial and 
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the private sector can achieve a return at the end of the signed concession period that is 
higher in the framework’s evaluation than in the signed contract evaluation. More details 
were provided in chapter 10. 
12.2.5. Concession Period determined by the proposed framework 
The concession period was determined for No 18 highway Uong Bi – Ha Long Project and 
New Dong Nai Bridge Project. The findings in chapter 10 show that for No 18 highway 
Uong Bi – Ha Long Project, the concession period should be ended between the years of 
2032 and 2036, or in 2039, whereas, for New Dong Nai Bridge Project, the concession 
period should be ended between the years of 2022 and 2025. More details about returns 
that investors can obtain in each year of these periods can be found in chapter 10. 
12.3. Proving the hypotheses 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the research had the following hypotheses: 
H1. There are significant differences between perceptions of the public sector and the 
private sector about the criticality of risks (Hypothesis was tested based on the findings 
provided in chapter 8). 
H2. The proposed framework can evaluate projects with regards to critical risks by 
applying a model based on AHP (Hypothesis was tested based on the findings provided 
in chapter 9). 
H3. Risk allocation strategies with regards to selected criteria can be found by using the 
proposed framework applying an allocation model based on AHP (Hypothesis was 
tested based on the findings provided in chapter 9). 
H4. Projects are more beneficial in the proposed framework’s evaluation than in 
traditional NPV evaluation (Hypothesis was tested based on the findings provided in 
chapter 10) 
H5. The proposed framework using Risk-Adjusted DNPV is more effective than NPV 
in evaluating project returns and in determining the concession period (Hypothesis was 
tested based on the findings provided in chapter 10 and tests in chapter 11) 
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After analysing the applicability of the framework from the finding chapters (chapter 8, 9, 
10) and discussion chapter (chapter 11), following conclusion can be drawn: 
 The proposed framework can identify and rate critical risks in PPPs in the transport 
sector in Vietnam. Moreover, risks with higher risk scores are considered as more 
serious (see findings in chapter 8). 
 There are significant differences between perceptions of the public sector and the 
private sector about critical risks (see findings in chapter 8). 
 The proposed framework can evaluate PPPs with regards to critical risks and the 
evaluation results can reasonably reflect the real situation (see chapter 9). 
 By using the proposed framework, allocation strategies for critical risks can be 
found with regards to selected criteria (see chapter 9).  
 Projects are more beneficial in the proposed framework’s evaluation than in 
traditional NPV evaluation.  
 The proposed framework can be more accurate in evaluating project returns than 
traditional NPV methods. This, in turn, leads to a more reasonable concession 
period.  
12.4. Verification and Validation 
12.4. 1. Verification 
a. Verification of the structure of the framework 
The contents and structure of the framework was checked and verified by using the 
literature review and the opinions of academic experts. The purpose of this verification is 
to find and correct any discrepancies, errors and consistencies with published research. 
Since the development of each element of the framework, the content was submitted to 
academic experts. Due to the unwillingness of the practitioners, the development of each 
element of the framework in the early stage was only verified by previous literature and 
academic experts. However, the final structure of the framework again was submitted to 
 269 
 
both academic and practitioner experts. Their comments and suggestions were applied 
when applicable. Comments and suggestions from academics and practitioners were both 
analysed before applying any corrections. The purpose of doing this was to make the 
structure of the framework reasonably applicable to the research area. 
b. Verification for consistency  
The purpose of this verification was to test whether the same input data would create the 
same output data and the same conclusion through the proposed framework. Different 
components of the framework were tested for their consistency by using different sets of 
data to test the logics of the movement. In fact, the consistency of each element was 
supported by the literature review (see chapters 3, 4, and 5). Therefore, with this 
consistency, it is highly likely that the framework combined with these elements can 
provide consistent results. However, the repetition of different data sets was still applied. 
The result of the repetition test described that the framework is syntactical and logical as 
the result is the same if the same data set was applied. On the other hand, different sets of 
data create different findings through the proposed framework.  
12.4. 2. Validation 
a. Validity of input data 
The purpose of this validity is to ensure that the input data is reasonably correct. As 
mentioned previously, data was collected from questionnaires and case studies. While the 
questionnaire was for collecting data for risk identification, and AHP models, case studies 
were applied to collect financial data. In order to test the validity of the data in the 
questionnaire, analysis software was applied, such as SPSS. The consistency of the input 
data for the AHP model collected from the questionnaire was also tested by using a 
consistency test provided by Satty (1980) (see chapter 9). In terms of financial data for 
return evaluation and concession parameter optimization, the validity of the data was 
ensured by collecting data from financial reports, signed contract agreements, and other 
reliable sources.  
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b. Validity of the robustness of the framework  
It should be noted that the purpose of this research is to propose a risk evaluation 
framework. For this purpose, a number of hypotheses relating to the robustness of the 
framework were proposed (see chapter 1). Consequently, the robustness of the framework 
can be proved if these hypotheses are proved. The first method of validating the framework 
was to validate each component by using literature review. Published research has 
suggested that these components are robust to use. Therefore, the robustness of the 
framework was also supported by the literature review. In addition, it should be recognized 
that the application this framework used in case studies in Vietnam is also the method to 
test the robustness. Through the findings of the application in chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11 it 
can be seen that the hypotheses about the applicability of the framework was statistically 
proved. Hence, the robustness of the proposed framework in Vietnamese PPPs context was 
proved.  
12.5. Generalizability, applicability and Implication 
12.5. 1. Generalizability and applicability 
Regarding the application of the framework to the real world, the framework is flexible for 
practitioners to apply in different projects. The result of the risk identification can be used 
in any PPPs in the transport sector in Vietnam without adaptation. Risk scores can be used 
to price risks in other projects. In addition, the different perceptions between the public 
sector and the private sector regarding these risks can also be applied. In terms of applying 
the function of AHP to rank the riskiness of the project, the government can use this 
method to select the less risky project to consider PPP forms. Also, it should be noted that 
in this research, in order to reduce the number of questionnaires and increase the rate of 
response, the pairwise comparisons were not made for sub-criteria (risks). In real world 
situations where it is the responsibility of the expert to compare the projects, the sub-
criteria (risks) can be compared. However, it should be noted that the weight of sub-criteria 
must take into account the weight of the criteria. Also, in this research two risks were 
chosen for each risk group. However, in practice the government can choose as many risks 
as they want. However, according to Li et al. (2013), the number of elements for each 
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comparison should not be over 5. Thus, the number of projects, number of groups, and 
number of risks in each risk group should not be over 5. Similarly, in applying AHP to 
allocate risks in reality for specific projects, up to 5 criteria and 5 allocation options can be 
applied, and the procedure of statistically analysing data is still similar to the procedure 
shown in this study In addition, both sectors can use the Risk-Adjusted DNPV function of 
this framework to evaluate other PPPs in the transport sector. In order to effectively apply 
this function of the framework, some data must be collected. For example the traffic level 
of the routes used in the past can be collected. Data about construction cost overrun in 
other PPPs in the transport sector needs to be analysed. It should be noted that in this 
research the general risk scores were used to price risks. However, some risk scores are 
statistically different, therefore, in reality, the score made by each sector can be used in 
specific situations, and the reason for use of the scores made by one party needs to be 
clarified in negotiations to prevent conflicts of interest. 
12.5. 2. Implications 
Although this research attempts to fill gaps in previous studies, it also creates an attractive 
area which requires further investigation. The investigation may focus on a single aspect of 
the framework or the entire framework as a whole. In general, the main implications can be 
divided into the research implication and the practice implication. More specifically, from 
the research perspective, development of scientific methods to criticality evaluate risks, the 
ability to manage risks, the riskiness of the project and project return will minimize the gap 
between theory and practice. This is not only essential in the area of PPPs but also in the 
general construction industry. For example, previous research has shown that construction 
projects have been mainly evaluated by NPV. However, the findings of this research 
demonstrate that NPV has its own weaknesses, and these weaknesses can be resolved by 
the proposed method in this research. This finding can lead to implication of discovery in 
research in project evaluation in the construction industry. In terms of the practice 
perspective, the conclusion of this research may affect the operation of PPPs’ scheme in 
reality. The practice of PPPs in Vietnam can be changed to protect the interest of both 
sectors rather than only private investors. The different perception of each sector with 
regard to risk can be taken into account in negotiation process. Furthermore, legal aspects 
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of PPPs can be considered to structure the legal framework to evaluate the riskiness of 
PPPs while implementing the project  
12.6. Contribution to knowledge  
This research attempts to fill some gaps in knowledge with regards to the area of Public-
Private Partnership. Following contributions can be concluded:  
 Firstly, this research fills a gap in the knowledge in that there is very limited 
research about PPPs in the transport sector in Vietnam, and the previous studies 
about this market were just about identifying critical risks rather than proposing 
methods to evaluate them. This research can be seen as providing a foundation for 
further research in this area in Vietnam. 
 Secondly, this research aims to propose a framework rather than focusing on a 
single element of risk management like most of the previous studies have done. 
Therefore, framework is expected to be able to evaluate risks in PPPs from 
different perspectives. 
 Thirdly, in this research AHP was applied with new purposes, namely, project’s 
riskiness evaluation, and risk allocation. These functions of AHP have not been 
tested in the area of PPPs before. Hence, future application of AHP regarding to 
project’s riskiness evaluation, and risk allocation can be further explored.  
 Importantly, a new method of return evaluation, DNPV, was developed in this 
research by proposing a Risk-Adjusted DNPV method. The development of the 
Risk-Adjusted DNPV method in this research is one of the first developments of 
the DNPV method in the area of PPP in the international context. Furthermore, a 
new model to determine concession was also developed by applying Risk-Adjusted 
DNPV, and by overcoming the limitations of measurement of Net Asset Value in 
previous models.  
 In terms of practice, the research provides understanding about the critical risks in 
Vietnamese PPPs in the transport sector. The deep understanding about the 
situation of selected case studies is also revealed. Moreover, by using the proposed 
 273 
 
framework, practitioners both from the public and the private sectors can both 
quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate projects with regards to critical risks. 
Moreover, although this research project focuses on the Vietnamese construction 
industry, the results should be useful, not only in this country but also in other 
countries, particularly in developing countries in South East Asia where critical risks 
might have similar features.  
12.7. Limitations 
The proposed framework was created by developing previous models and systematic 
combinations of these models. In order to develop the models, several assumptions were 
created (details of these assumptions are shown accordingly with each findings section). 
Thus, limitations may be created by these assumptions.  
The first limitation of this research is the computation of the risk score. More specifically, 
the risk score is multiplied by the result of the probability of occurrence and the degree of 
impact. This might lead to the situation that risks with very high degrees of impact and 
very small probabilities of occurrence can get a moderate score (Cooper et al. 2005).  
The second limitation of the research is in the function of the project’s riskiness evaluation 
by AHP. As criticized in the literature review about AHP in chapter 4, AHP should be used 
only if the number of criteria (or sub-criteria) is not over five. Thus, it might limit the 
number of risks in each level of the hierarchy structure.  
The third limitation of the framework is in the model to allocate risks. More specifically, it 
is assumed that the importance of criteria is the same for all risks. For example, “The 
capability to foresee the risk i” is equally important to “The ability to foresee the risk j”. 
This is also one of the limitations of the research as in reality, they might not be equally 
important. For instance, for private investors, regarding the inflation risk, the ability to 
foresee the risk might be more important than the ability to control the probability of 
occurrence. However, for the insufficient traffic volume risk, these abilities might be equal. 
Also, due to limited time and financial resources, these developed AHP models were tested 
with respect to 10 risks out of a total of 44 risks.  
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The fourth limitation of this research is that the low response rate of in testing AHP for 
allocation strategy may reduce the quality of the result analysed, and this rate needs to be 
increased in the future research.  
The fifth limitation of the research belongs to the function of the Risk-adjusted DNPV. 
Previous academics such as Chiesa and Frattini (2009), Halliwell (2011), Boussabaine 
(2013), and Espinoza and Morris (2013) suggested that the risk-free rate should be used 
instead of the risk discount rate. However, the risk-free rate can also fluctuate, and in this 
research the fluctuation of the risk-free rate was not modelled. 
The sixth limitation in this proposed framework is that the variation of the risk score of the 
risk factor over a long period is not modelled. For example, the probability of occurrence 
and degree of impact of risk i may be different in the future. 
The seventh limitation of this research is about the assumption of the economic life of a 
project. It is assumed that the economic life of a transport project is 50 years as this has 
been suggested by experts such as Shen et al. (2002). However, this might be the case for 
specific projects. 
Another limitation of this research is that the framework can only show an interval of the 
concession period. In fact, the fixed concession period is left for the negotiation stage.  
12.8. Future works 
Based on the findings and discussion of this research, other researchers can carry out future 
work following these suggestions:  
 Future work can improve the computation of the risk score. More specifically, 
although the risk score is still the function of the probability of occurrence and the 
degree of impact, it can be computed as suggested by Cooper et al. (2005): 
Risk Score = the probability of occurrence + the degree of impact + the probability 
of occurrence x the degree of impact 
This can overcome the first limitation of this research, mentioned in the limitation 
section.  
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 Future works can explore this area by overcoming the limitations of this research. 
For example, future research can improve the risk allocation model by proposing a 
new model which can take into account the difference between the appropriate 
ability criteria for each risk. Besides, a new test for AHP risk allocation model 
needs to be carried out with higher response rate obtained to more effective show 
the applicability of risk allocation model.  
 Furthermore, future research can retest the riskiness evaluation model and risk 
allocation model with regards to all risk factors. This must be done in a very 
specific type of research with more investment on time and financial resources.  
 Future research can also develop the risk-adjusted DNPV model by modelling the 
fluctuation of the risk-free rate and the fluctuation of other risk factors. This may be 
done by using the Monte Carlo Simulation, and then a distribution of the Risk-
Adjusted DNPV may be created based on distribution of the risk-free rate and other 
risk factors.  
 Moreover, future research can also attempt to propose a method to determine a 
specific time to transfer the project to the government. For example, the 
Bargaining-Game Theory proposed by Shen et al. (2007) can be combined with the 
concession determination model in this framework to identify a specific time for 
project transfer. 
 Additionally, future research can retest this research by using other advanced 
methods in determining the required sample size of the questionnaires. One of the 
recommended methods can be the application of Gpower as this method was 
evaluated by Faul et al. (2007), (Dattalo 2008), and Gardner (2010) as powerful and 
reliable technique.  
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Appendixes  
Appendix A: Questionnaire for Risk Identification 
Dear sir/madam, 
I am Nguyen Minh Nhat, a research student at the University of Liverpool, United 
Kingdom, currently conducting a PhD project about “Risks Evaluation in PPP projects in 
the Transport Sector in Vietnam”. I am conducting a survey to investigate risks occurring 
in Vietnamese PPPs. I am inviting you to participate in my research by completing a 
questionnaire on the topic. The questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes, and it 
will mean a lot for my research, which would be incomplete without the questionnaire. 
Following completion of the questionnaire you might also be asked to participate in a 
short interview to explore issues in more depth. The interview should take approximately 
15 minutes. Both the survey and the interview are entirely voluntary and you will be asked 
to complete a consent form before doing each of them. 
Please be aware that all of your personal details will be kept anonymous and you can 
decline to answer any questions or withdraw completely from the process at any time. You 
should feel free to add any additional remarks to my survey or leave sections blank. In 
addition, please contact me if you have any trouble answering certain questions.  
Thank you very much in advance for your cooperation. 
Yours faithfully, 
Nguyen Minh Nhat 
PhD Researcher 
School of Architecture 
Mobile: +447469257268/+84 988281866 
Email: nguyenmn.liv@gmail.com  
 
The research directed by: 
Dr AH Boussabaine  
School of Architecture 
University of Liverpool 
Tel: 0151 7942619 
Email: Halim@liv.ac.uk  
& 
Mr John Lewis 
School of Architecture 
University of Liverpool 
Email: J.Lewis@liverpool.ac.uk
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BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT RESPONDENTS 
1.   Which Party Do You Work for? Public Investor Lender Contractor Academic 
 
2.   Level of Experience in Construction Areas Under 5 years 
From 5 to 10 
years 
More Than 10 
years  
3.   Level of Experience in PPP projects (PPP, 
PFI, P3) 
Under 5 years 
From 5 to 10 
years 
More Than 10 
years 
More Than 10 
years  
4.     Working position Managers 
Head of a 
department 
Staff 
 
5.   Have you been trained about PPP projects: Yes No 
 
6. Email Address 
 
RISK EVALUATION 
I.     Political Risks 
Risks 
Frequency of Occurrence Degree of Impact 
Very Low Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Very 
Low 
Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
P1. Concession Termination by Government 
          
P2. Political opposition 
          
P3. Unstable government 
          
P4. Corruption 
          
P5. Public sector default 
          
P6. Public scepticism about the real benefits of 
PPP           
P7. Forced Buy out Risks 
          
II. Construction Risks 
Risks 
Frequency of Occurrence Degree of Impact 
Very Low Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Very 
Low 
Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
C1. Changes in industrial code of practices 
          
C2. Poor design 
          
C3. Low Quality products 
          
C4. Low Site safety 
          
C5. Unavailability of materials 
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C6. Design changes 
          
C7. Difficulty in Land acquisition and 
Resettlement           
C8. Impractical feasibility study 
          
C9. Impractical requirements of progress of 
project           
C10. Delay in other infrastructures relating to the 
project           
III. Operation Risks 
Risks 
Frequency of Occurrence Degree of Impact 
Very Low Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Very 
Low 
Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
O1. Operation cost overrun 
          
O2. Default of operator 
          
O3. Low Quality of operation 
          
O4. High maintenance cost 
          
O5. Fluctuation of demand 
          
IV. Market  Risks 
Risks 
Frequency of Occurrence Degree of Impact 
Very Low Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Very 
Low 
Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
M1. Lack of transparency 
          
M2. Weak Financial Capacity of Investor 
          
M3. Difficulty in accessing finance from the 
banks           
M4. Inflation risk 
          
M5. Fluctuation of Interest rate 
          
M6. Foreign currency exchange fluctuation 
          
M7. Influence of negative economic events 
          
M8. Poor financial market 
          
M9. Income streams are usually in local currency 
          
M10. Asset value less than predicted at the time 
of transferring           
V. Legal Risks 
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Risks 
Frequency of Occurrence Degree of Impact 
Very Low Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Very 
Low 
Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
L1. Disapproval of guarantees by the government 
          
L2. Revision of the contract clauses 
          
L3. Poor project approval and permit process 
          
L4. Regulation Change 
          
L5. Restriction on tolls 
          
L6. Taxation risks 
          
VI. Relationship Risks 
Risks 
Frequency of Occurrence Degree of Impact 
Very Low Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Very 
Low 
Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Re1. Inadequate experience in PPP of Private 
sector           
Re2. Inadequate experience in PPP of Public 
sector           
Re3. Inappropriate distribution of responsibilities 
and risks           
Re4. Low quality  of cooperation between 
different partners           
VII. Other risks 
          
Risks 
Frequency of Occurrence Degree of Impact 
Very Low Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Very 
Low 
Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Ot1. Bad natural events 
          
Ot2. Force majeure events 
          
Other risks that you want to mention 
         
Risks 
Frequency of Occurrence Degree of Impact 
Very Low Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Very 
Low 
Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
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Appendix B: ANOVA Significant Difference Test 
 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
 Statistic
a
 df1 df2 Sig. 
C1 
Welch .050 1 32.921 .825 
Brown-Forsythe .050 1 32.921 .825 
C2 
Welch 11.038 1 23.676 .003 
Brown-Forsythe 11.038 1 23.676 .003 
C3 
Welch 11.677 1 22.468 .002 
Brown-Forsythe 11.677 1 22.468 .002 
C4 
Welch 67.582 1 28.608 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 67.582 1 28.608 .000 
C5 
Welch 1.017 1 28.989 .322 
Brown-Forsythe 1.017 1 28.989 .322 
C6 
Welch 11.989 1 41.169 .001 
Brown-Forsythe 11.989 1 41.169 .001 
C7 
Welch .359 1 71.017 .551 
Brown-Forsythe .359 1 71.017 .551 
C8 
Welch 6.550 1 35.599 .015 
Brown-Forsythe 6.550 1 35.599 .015 
C9 
Welch 65.112 1 39.764 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 65.112 1 39.764 .000 
C10 
Welch 1.856 1 23.485 .186 
Brown-Forsythe 1.856 1 23.485 .186 
L1 
Welch 61.702 1 50.048 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 61.702 1 50.048 .000 
L2 
Welch 24.307 1 33.782 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 24.307 1 33.782 .000 
L3 
Welch 1.126 1 56.637 .293 
Brown-Forsythe 1.126 1 56.637 .293 
L4 
Welch 71.813 1 79.835 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 71.813 1 79.835 .000 
L5 
Welch 5.119 1 25.635 .032 
Brown-Forsythe 5.119 1 25.635 .032 
L6 
Welch 39.455 1 26.121 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 39.455 1 26.121 .000 
M1 Welch 2.203 1 28.593 .149 
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Brown-Forsythe 2.203 1 28.593 .149 
M2 
Welch 6.596 1 21.153 .018 
Brown-Forsythe 6.596 1 21.153 .018 
M3 
Welch 178.780 1 30.914 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 178.780 1 30.914 .000 
M4 
Welch 17.421 1 95.569 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 17.421 1 95.569 .000 
M5 
Welch 44.796 1 32.731 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 44.796 1 32.731 .000 
M7 
Welch .017 1 23.144 .897 
Brown-Forsythe .017 1 23.144 .897 
M8 
Welch 37.429 1 27.162 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 37.429 1 27.162 .000 
M9 
Welch 179.322 1 32.021 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 179.322 1 32.021 .000 
M10 
Welch 29.142 1 19.633 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 29.142 1 19.633 .000 
O1 
Welch 206.584 1 91.316 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 206.584 1 91.316 .000 
O2 
Welch 136.005 1 67.852 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 136.005 1 67.852 .000 
O3 
Welch 11.143 1 32.013 .002 
Brown-Forsythe 11.143 1 32.013 .002 
O4 
Welch .002 1 36.574 .962 
Brown-Forsythe .002 1 36.574 .962 
O5 
Welch 15.223 1 60.842 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 15.223 1 60.842 .000 
OT1 
Welch 3.856 1 47.240 .055 
Brown-Forsythe 3.856 1 47.240 .055 
OT2 
Welch 26.662 1 54.320 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 26.662 1 54.320 .000 
P1 
Welch 57.682 1 32.833 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 57.682 1 32.833 .000 
P2 
Welch 351.617 1 96.739 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 351.617 1 96.739 .000 
P3 
Welch 83.695 1 37.227 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 83.695 1 37.227 .000 
P4 Welch .058 1 28.963 .811 
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Brown-Forsythe .058 1 28.963 .811 
P5 
Welch 14.259 1 50.285 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 14.259 1 50.285 .000 
P6 
Welch 71.756 1 46.453 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 71.756 1 46.453 .000 
P7 
Welch 163.824 1 34.405 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 163.824 1 34.405 .000 
Re1 
Welch 1.614 1 29.946 .214 
Brown-Forsythe 1.614 1 29.946 .214 
Re2 
Welch 1.869 1 34.059 .181 
Brown-Forsythe 1.869 1 34.059 .181 
Re3 
Welch 123.122 1 27.418 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 123.122 1 27.418 .000 
Re4 
Welch 16.227 1 46.584 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 16.227 1 46.584 .000 
M6 
Welch 44.796 1 32.731 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 44.796 1 32.731 .000 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire for Project Riskiness Evaluation 
How critical is Construction Risk in comparison with Political and Legal Risks? Equal 
Slightly  
More 
Critical 
Strongly  
more 
Critical 
Very 
strongly 
more 
Critical 
Extremely  
more 
critical  
How critical is Construction Risk in comparison with Market Risks?           
How critical is Construction Risk in comparison with Operation Risks?           
How critical is Construction Risk in comparison with Relationship Risks?           
How critical is Political and Legal Risks in comparison with Market Risks?           
How critical is Political and Legal Risks in comparison with Operation Risks?           
How critical is Political and Legal Risks in comparison with Relationship Risks?           
How critical is Market Risks in comparison with Operation Risks?           
How critical is Market Risks in comparison with Relationship Risks?           
How critical is Operation Risks in comparison with Relationship Risks?           
  
With regards to Construction Risk please answer Equal 
Slightly  
riskier 
Strongly  
riskier 
Very 
strongly 
riskier 
Extremely  
riskier 
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Phu My Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Bridge Project? 
          
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien Bridge Project?           
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi - Ha Long 
Project? 
          
How risky is Co Chien Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Co Chien Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi - Ha Long 
Project? 
          
How risky is New Dong Nai Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Bridge Project? 
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With regards to Potilical and Legal Risks please answer           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Phu My Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Bridge Project? 
          
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien Bridge Project?           
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi - Ha Long 
Project? 
          
How risky is Co Chien Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Co Chien Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi - Ha Long 
Project? 
          
How risky is New Dong Nai Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Bridge Project? 
          
  
With regards to Market Risks please answer           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Phu My Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Bridge Project? 
          
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien Bridge Project?           
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi - Ha Long 
Project? 
          
How risky is Co Chien Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Co Chien Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi - Ha Long 
Project? 
          
How risky is New Dong Nai Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Bridge Project? 
          
  
 310 
 
With regards to Operational Risks please answer           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Phu My Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Bridge Project? 
          
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien Bridge Project?           
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi - Ha Long 
Project? 
          
How risky is Co Chien Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Co Chien Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi - Ha Long 
Project? 
          
How risky is New Dong Nai Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Bridge Project? 
          
  
With regards to Relationship Risks please answer           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Phu My Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Yen Lenh Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Bridge Project? 
          
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with Co Chien Bridge Project?           
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Phu My Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi - Ha Long 
Project? 
          
How risky is Co Chien Bridge Project in comparison with New Dong Nai Bridge Project?           
How risky is Co Chien Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi - Ha Long 
Project? 
          
How risky is New Dong Nai Bridge Project in comparison with No 18 Highway Uong Bi-Ha Long 
Bridge Project? 
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Appendix D: Example of AHP Computation for Riskiness Evaluation 
  CR Value = 0.057   OK       
         
 
Pairwise comparisons 
              Item 
Number Item Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
     
  
Item 
Description 
Project 
1 
Project 
2 
Project 
3 
Project 
4 
Project 
5           5th Root 
Eigenvec
tor A w 
Lambda 
Vector 
Lambda 
Max 
1 Project 1 1.000 0.333 1.000 1.000 1.000           0.803 0.149 0.808 5.422 5.255 
2 Project 2 3.000 1.000 3.000 1.000 1.000           1.552 0.288 1.490 5.173   
3 Project 3 1.000 0.333 1.000 0.333 0.333           0.517 0.096 0.497 5.173   
4 Project 4 1.000 1.000 3.000 1.000 2.000           1.431 0.266 1.393 5.246   
5 Project 5 1.000 1.000 3.000 0.500 1.000           1.084 0.201 1.059 5.262   
  Sum 7.00 3.67 11.00 3.83 5.33                     
                                  
 
STANDARDIZED 
MATRIX 
              
    
Project 
1 
Project 
2 
Project 
3 
Project 
4 
Project 
5           Weight 
    1 Project 1 0.143 0.091 0.091 0.261 0.188           15.461% YL 
   2 Project 2 0.429 0.273 0.273 0.261 0.188           28.448% PM 
   3 Project 3 0.143 0.091 0.091 0.087 0.063           9.483% CC 
   4 Project 4 0.143 0.273 0.273 0.261 0.375           26.484% DN 
   5 Project 5 0.143 0.273 0.273 0.130 0.188           20.125% 18.0000 
   
            
100.0% 
    
            
Count 5.000 
   
            
Lambda 
max 5.255 
   
            
 CI 0.064 
   
            
CR 0.057 
   
            
Constant 1.120 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire for Risk Allocation Evaluation 
 
Equal 
Slightly 
More Important 
 
Strongly 
more 
Important 
Very strongly 
more Important 
 
Extremely 
more Important 
 
How important is The ability to foresee the risk in comparison with The ability to control the risk's probability of occurring?           
How important is The ability to control the risk's probability of occurring in comparison with The ability to bear the consequence of the risk?           
How important is The ability to foresee the risk in comparison with The ability to bear the consequence of the risk?           
  
With Regards to the ability to foresee the risk of Low Quality Products Equal 
Slightly 
better 
 
Strongly 
better 
 
Very strongly 
better 
 
Extremely 
better 
 
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
With Regards to the ability to control the probability of occurring of the risk Low Quality Products           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector? 
With Regards to the ability to control the bear the consequence Low Quality Products           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
  
With Regards to the ability to foresee the risk of Difficulty in Land acquisition and Resettlement           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
With Regards to the ability to control the probability of occurring of the risk Difficulty in Land acquisition and Resettlement           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
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How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
With Regards to the ability to control the bear the consequence Difficulty in Land acquisition and Resettlement           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
  
With Regards to the ability to foresee the risk of Poor project approval and permit process           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
With Regards to the ability to control the probability of occurring of the risk Poor project approval and permit process           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
With Regards to the ability to control the bear the consequence Poor project approval and permit process           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
  
With Regards to the ability to foresee the risk of Corruption            
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
With Regards to the ability to control the probability of occurring of the risk Corruption            
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
With Regards to the ability to control the bear the consequence Corruption            
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
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How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
  
With Regards to the ability to foresee the risk of Weak Financial Capacity of Investor           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
With Regards to the ability to control the probability of occurring of the risk Weak Financial Capacity of Investor           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
With Regards to the ability to control the bear the consequence Weak Financial Capacity of Investor           
How better is public sector in comparison with Share option?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
How better is public sector in comparison with the private sector?           
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Appendix F: Example of AHP calculation sheet for Risk Allocation 
Risk 5 C3 CR Value = 0.046   OK 
     
 
Pairwise comparisons 
       Item 
Number Item Number 1 2 3 
     
  
Item 
Description Public Share Private 5th Root 
Eigenvec
tor A w 
Lambda 
Vector 
Lambda 
Max 
1 Public 1.00 0.50 3.00 1.145 0.333 1.015 3.054 3.054 
2 Share 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.817 0.528 1.612 3.054   
3 Private 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.481 0.140 0.426 3.054   
4                 
5                   
  Sum 3.33 1.83 7.00           
                    
 
STANDARDIZED 
MATRIX 
       
    Public Share Share Weight   
   1 Public 0.300 0.273 0.429 33.377% 
    2 Share 0.600 0.545 0.429 52.468% 
    3 Private 0.100 0.182 0.143 14.156% 
    4           
    5           
    
     
100.0% 
    
     
Size of 
Matrix 3 
   
     
Lambda 
max 3.054 
   
     
 CI 0.027 
   
     
CR 0.046 
   
     
Constant 0.580 
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Appendix G: Computation of Risk Adjusted Parameters on the revenue side of Yen Lenh Bridge 
Year 𝜹 r T 𝝈 S X d1 d2 N(d1) N(d2) N(-d1) N(-d2) 
Risk 
Paramete
r on  
the 
revenue 
side 
ƞv 
Risk factor 1 
 ( M7. 
Influence of 
negative 
 economic 
events ) 
Risk factor 
2 
 ( L5. 
Restriction 
on toll and 
tariff ) 
Risk factor 2 
 (C10. Delay 
in other 
infrastructures 
relating to the 
project) 
 
Risk 
Adjusted 
Parameter on  
the revenue 
side 
2012 0 0.095 1 0.17 65.83 33.58 4.64 4.55 1.000 1.000 1.77E-06 2.7E-06 0.0000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00000 
2013 0 0.095 2 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.74 3.57 1.000 1.000 9.33E-05 0.00018 0.0000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00002 
2014 0 0.095 3 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.42 3.17 1.000 0.999 3.08E-04 0.00076 0.0002 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00021 
2015 0 0.095 4 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.29 2.95 1.000 0.998 5.02E-04 0.00158 0.0007 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00070 
2016 0 0.095 5 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.23 2.81 0.999 0.998 6.15E-04 0.00248 0.0014 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00147 
2017 0 0.095 6 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.21 2.71 0.999 0.997 6.53E-04 0.00338 0.0024 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00248 
2018 0 0.095 7 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.22 2.63 0.999 0.996 6.39E-04 0.00426 0.0036 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00372 
2019 0 0.095 8 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.24 2.57 0.999 0.995 5.94E-04 0.00513 0.0050 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00519 
2020 0 0.095 9 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.27 2.51 1.000 0.994 5.34E-04 0.00598 0.0066 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00689 
2021 0 0.095 10 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.31 2.47 1.000 0.993 4.68E-04 0.00684 0.0086 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.00887 
2022 0 0.095 11 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.35 2.42 1.000 0.992 4.04E-04 0.00771 0.0108 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.01118 
2023 0 0.095 12 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.39 2.38 1.000 0.991 3.44E-04 0.0086 0.0134 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.01387 
2024 0 0.095 13 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.44 2.34 1.000 0.991 2.90E-04 0.00953 0.0164 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.01703 
2025 0 0.095 14 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.49 2.31 1.000 0.990 2.43E-04 0.0105 0.0200 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.02076 
2026 0 0.095 15 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.54 2.27 1.000 0.989 2.02E-04 0.01153 0.0243 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.02515 
2027 0 0.095 16 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.59 2.24 1.000 0.987 1.67E-04 0.01262 0.0293 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.03036 
2028 0 0.095 17 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.64 2.20 1.000 0.986 1.38E-04 0.01379 0.0352 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.03654 
2029 0 0.095 18 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.69 2.17 1.000 0.985 1.13E-04 0.01504 0.0423 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.04388 
2030 0 0.095 19 0.17 65.83 33.58 3.74 2.13 1.000 0.984 9.29E-05 0.01639 0.0507 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.05262 
 ̅v 
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Appendix H: Computation of Risk Adjusted Parameters on the revenue side of No 18 Uong Bi – Ha Long Project 
Year 𝜹 r T 𝝈 S X d1 d2 N(d1) N(d2) N(-d1) N(-d2) 
Risk 
Parameter 
on  
the 
revenue 
side 
ƞv 
Risk factor 1 
 ( M7. 
Influence of 
negative 
 economic 
events ) 
Risk factor 
2 
 ( L5. 
Restriction 
on toll and 
tariff ) 
Risk factor 2 
 (C10. Delay 
in other 
infrastructures 
relating to the 
project) 
Risk 
Adjusted 
Parameters 
on the 
revenue side 
(  ̅v) 
 
 
2011 0 0.095 1 0.1553 277.5 137.4 5.22 5.14 1.000 1.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0000 
2012 0 0.095 2 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.18 4.02 1.000 1.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0000 
2013 0 0.095 3 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.81 3.57 1.000 1.000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0000 
2014 0 0.095 4 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.64 3.33 1.000 1.000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0002 
2015 0 0.095 5 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.57 3.18 1.000 0.999 0.0002 0.0007 0.0004 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0004 
2016 0 0.095 6 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.54 3.07 1.000 0.999 0.0002 0.0011 0.0007 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0008 
2017 0 0.095 7 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.53 2.99 1.000 0.999 0.0002 0.0014 0.0011 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0012 
2018 0 0.095 8 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.55 2.93 1.000 0.998 0.0002 0.0017 0.0016 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0017 
2019 0 0.095 9 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.58 2.88 1.000 0.998 0.0002 0.0020 0.0022 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0022 
2020 0 0.095 10 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.61 2.83 1.000 0.998 0.0002 0.0023 0.0028 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0029 
2021 0 0.095 11 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.65 2.80 1.000 0.997 0.0001 0.0026 0.0035 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0036 
2022 0 0.095 12 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.69 2.76 1.000 0.997 0.0001 0.0029 0.0043 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0045 
2023 0 0.095 13 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.74 2.73 1.000 0.997 0.0001 0.0032 0.0053 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0055 
2024 0 0.095 14 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.79 2.70 1.000 0.997 0.0001 0.0035 0.0064 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0066 
2025 0 0.095 15 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.84 2.67 1.000 0.996 0.0001 0.0038 0.0077 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0080 
2026 0 0.095 16 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.89 2.65 1.000 0.996 0.0001 0.0041 0.0092 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0095 
2027 0 0.095 17 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.94 2.62 1.000 0.996 0.0000 0.0044 0.0109 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0113 
2028 0 0.095 18 0.1553 277.5 137.4 3.99 2.59 1.000 0.995 0.0000 0.0048 0.0130 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0135 
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2029 0 0.095 19 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.04 2.57 1.000 0.995 0.0000 0.0051 0.0154 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0160 
2030 0 0.095 20 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.09 2.54 1.000 0.995 0.0000 0.0055 0.0183 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0189 
2031 0 0.095 21 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.15 2.52 1.000 0.994 0.0000 0.0059 0.0216 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0224 
2032 0 0.095 22 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.20 2.49 1.000 0.994 0.0000 0.0064 0.0256 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0266 
2033 0 0.095 23 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.25 2.46 1.000 0.993 0.0000 0.0069 0.0303 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0314 
2034 0 0.095 24 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.30 2.44 1.000 0.993 0.0000 0.0074 0.0359 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0372 
2035 0 0.095 25 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.35 2.41 1.000 0.992 0.0000 0.0080 0.0425 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0441 
2036 0 0.095 26 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.40 2.38 1.000 0.991 0.0000 0.0086 0.0503 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0522 
2037 0 0.095 27 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.45 2.36 1.000 0.991 0.0000 0.0093 0.0595 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0618 
2038 0 0.095 28 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.50 2.33 1.000 0.990 0.0000 0.0100 0.0705 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0731 
2039 0 0.095 29 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.55 2.30 1.000 0.989 0.0000 0.0107 0.0835 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.0866 
2040 0 0.095 30 0.1553 277.5 137.4 4.60 2.27 1.000 0.988 0.0000 0.0116 0.0989 0.3780 0.3180 0.3080 0.1026 
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Appendix I: Computation of Risk Adjusted Parameters on the revenue side of New Dong Nai Brigde Project 
Year 𝜹 r T 𝝈 S X d1 d2 N(d1) N(d2) N(-d1) N(-d2) 
Risk 
Parameter 
on  
the 
revenue 
side 
(ƞv) 
Risk factor 
1 
 ( M7. 
Influence 
of negative 
 economic 
events ) 
Risk factor 
2 
 ( L5. 
Restriction 
on toll and 
tariff ) 
Risk factor 2 
 (C10. Delay 
in other 
infrastructur
es relating to 
the project) 
Risk 
Adjusted 
Parameters 
on the 
revenue 
side (  ̅v) 
 
 
2014 0 0.089 1 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 27.0 27.0 1 1 2.14E-161 3E-161 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2015 0 0.089 2 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 21.4 21.4 1 1 4.13E-102 7E-102 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2016 0 0.089 3 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 19.4 19.3 1 1 7.21E-84 1.6E-83 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2017 0 0.089 4 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 18.4 18.3 1 1 6.81E-76 1.9E-75 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2018 0 0.089 5 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 17.9 17.8 1 1 5.00E-72 1.7E-71 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2019 0 0.089 6 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 17.7 17.6 1 1 3.23E-70 1.4E-69 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2020 0 0.089 7 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 17.6 17.5 1 1 1.40E-69 7.6E-69 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2021 0 0.089 8 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 17.6 17.5 1 1 1.11E-69 7.7E-69 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2022 0 0.089 9 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 17.7 17.6 1 1 2.87E-70 2.6E-69 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2023 0 0.089 10 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 17.8 17.7 1 1 3.37E-71 3.9E-70 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2024 0 0.089 11 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 18.0 17.8 1 1 2.23E-72 3.4E-71 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2025 0 0.089 12 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 18.1 18.0 1 1 9.59E-74 1.9E-72 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2026 0 0.089 13 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 18.3 18.1 1 1 2.96E-75 7.8E-74 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2027 0 0.089 14 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 18.5 18.3 1 1 7.06E-77 2.5E-75 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2028 0 0.089 15 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 18.7 18.5 1 1 1.37E-78 6.4E-77 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2029 0 0.089 16 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 18.9 18.7 1 1 2.23E-80 1.4E-78 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
2030 0 0.089 17 0.0275 £229.0 £119.0 19.2 18.9 1 1 3.18E-82 2.8E-80 0.00000 0.378 0.318 0.308 0.0000 
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Appendix K: Current and Future PPPs in Transport sector in Vietnam 
  Project Investors Length 
Expenditure (billion Vietnam Dong) 
Construction 
Time 
Toll 
Collection 
Toll 
Collection 
Station Total Construction 
Land 
Acquisition 
and 
resettlement   
Investors’ Investment 
Public sector’ 
contribution 
Start Finish Start 
Total Equity Debt 
Public
’ 
budget 
BT 
form 
        481,481 260,314 32,864 
206,8
37 
22,280 
127,9
02 
75,758 7,466         
I 
Projects in 
Operation 
Stage 
    11,641 6,392 627 9,359 1,367 6,969 1,734 
         
-    
        
1 
No 2 Highway  
Noi Bai – Vinh 
Yen 
BOT QL2 22 755     416     339       Aug-08 
Km12+400
;Km26+40
0 
2 
Deo Ngang 
highway tunnel 
Song Da 
Cooperation 
495m 
tunnel; 
2114m 
Road 
150               
Nov-
02 
Nov-04 Nov-04 Deo Ngang 
3 
No 1 highway 
(Thanh Hoa city 
bypass road) 
BOT Thanh 
Hoa 
10.035 897 773 125 756 137 544 141   
Feb-
05 
Jan-09 Jan-09 Tao Xuyen  
4 
No 1 highway ( 
Vinh city bypass 
road) 
CIENCO 4 25 378 348 30 378 113 265     
Jun-
03 
Apr-06 Apr-06 Ben Thuy 
5 
No 1 highway 
(Ha Tinh bypass 
road) 
Song Da 
Cooperation 
16.3 458 319 66 456 137 319 2   
Nov-
05 
Dec-08 Jan-09 Cau rac 
6 
No 1 highway ( 
Dong Hoi city 
bypass road) 
BOT Dong 
Hoi 
19.46 657     596 89 507 61   
Dec-
05 
Oct-10 Oct-10 Quan Hau 
7 
No 1 highway  
Hoa Cam- Hoa 
Phuoc, and Tu 
Cau – Vinh Dien 
 
545 JSc.,  13 931     750 113 638 181   
Sep-
07 
Nov-12 Nov-09 
Nam Hai 
Van – ha 
Phuoc 
321 
 
321 
 
8 
No 1 highway 
Phan Rang – 
Thap Chap 
Company 
577 & CII 
10 548 470 78 548 110 438     
Apr-
09 
Dec-12 May-13 Cam Thinh 
9 
No 20 highway 
(Km76 - 
Km206) 
Hung Phat 
and Hai Phat 
Companies 
21.3 282 255   282 56 226     
Oct-
08 
Jan-11 Jan-11 
Tan Phu 
Km74+760
,91 và Bao 
Loc 
Km108+55
7 
10 
No 51 highway, 
Km 0+900-
Km73+600 
BVEC 72,7 3,971 3,709 262 3,971 397 3,574     
Aug-
09 
Aug-12 Aug-12 2 stations 
11 
Rach Mieu 
Bridge 
Rach Mieu 
BOT 
company 
8.2 1,304 519 66 519 155 362 785   
Apr-
02 
Jan-09 Apr-09 
Rack mieu 
Bridge  
12 
Yen Lenh 
Bridge 
Thang Long 
Company & 
CIENCO4 
2.2 297     156 59 97 141   
Jun-
02 
2004 2004 Yen Lenh 
13 
No 2 Highway ( 
Vinh Yen city 
bypass road) 
BOT 
Vietracimex 
8 
10.6 615     531     84       Jan-11 
Bac Thang 
Long – noi 
Bai 
14 No 1K highway 
CIENCO 6 
& Pho Tha 
11 397               
Jun-
03 
2006 2007 1K Station  
II 
Projects in 
Construction 
Stage 
    104,734 86,582 11,358 
97,58
2 
13,584 
83,99
5 
3,002 7,236         
II.1 
On No 1 
highway from 
Thanh Hoa – 
Can Tho 
    53,827 46,253 5,219 
48,65
9 
7,396 
41,26
3 
1,145 4,509         
1 
No 1 highway 
Nghi Son ( 
Thanh Hoa) – 
Cau Giat ( Nghe 
An) 
CIENCO4 
and 
Company 
319 
34 3,627 3,137 490 3,463 421 3,042 164 
         
-    
2013 2015 2015 Cau Giat 
2 
No 1 highway 
Nam Ben Thuy 
– Ha Tinh city 
CIENCO4 35 2,434 1,829 415 2,364 311 2,053 70 
         
-    
2012 2015 2015 
Ben Thuy I 
and II 
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3 
No 1 highway 
Km597+549 - 
Km605; 
Km617-Km641, 
Quang Binh 
Province 
Tasco 29.2 2,005 1,850 155 2,005 275 1,729     
Apr-
13 
Dec-15 Jan-16 Km601 
4 
No 1 highway 
Km672+600 -
Km704+900, 
Quang Binh 
Province 
Truong Dinh 
Company 
33.1 983 942 41 983 147 835     
Jun-
13 
Jun-15 Jul-15 Quan Hau 
5 
No 1 highway 
Km741+170 - 
Km756+705, 
Quang Tri 
Province   
Truong Dinh 
and Truong 
Son 
Company 
15.5 1,068 940 128 1,068 160 908     
Jun-
13 
Dec-15 Jan-16 
Dong Ha 
Km763+80
0 
6 
No 1 highway 
Dong Ha – 
Quang Tri Town 
Truong Dinh 
Company 
13 1,030 886 144 1,030 155 876 144   
Oct-
08 
Dec-13 Jan-14 
Km763+80
0 
7 
No 1 highway 
Km791A+500÷
Km848+875, 
Thu Thien Hue 
Province 
Trung 
Phuong 
31.3 2,209 1,981 228 2,209 296 1,913     
May-
13 
May-15 Jun-15 Tu Ha 
8 
Phuoc Tuong-
Phu Gia 
Highway Tunnel 
Hung Phat + 
Q.K.L + 
Company 
669 + Viet 
Thanh 
Company 
357m+
4,2km 
và 
447m+
2,6km 
1,743 1,683 60 1,743 262 1,481     
May-
13 
Dec-14 Jan-15 Km867 
9 
No 1 highway, 
Km947- Km987, 
Quang Nam 
Province 
Company 
545 
30 1,487 1,317 170 1,259 189 1,070 228   
Dec-
13 
Dec-15 Jan-16 Hoa Phuoc 
10 
No 1 highway 
Km987÷ 
Km1027, Quang 
Nam Province 
CIENCO 5 40 1,626 1,410 216 1,626 238 1,388     
Mar-
13 
Dec-15 Feb-16 Tam Ky 
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11 
No 1 highway 
Km1063+877 ÷ 
Km1092+577, 
Quang Ngai 
Province 
Thien Tan + 
Thanh An 
Company 
29.4 2,139 1,006 312 2,139 289 1,850     
Jun-
13 
Dec-15 Jan-16 
Km1072+2
00 
12 
No 1 highway 
Km1125÷ 
Km1153, Binh 
Dinh Province  
Thanh An + 
Bac Ai + 
Long Trung 
Son + 
VInaconex 
PVC 
28.7 1,644 843 194 1,644 239 1,405     
Jun-
13 
Dec-15 Jan-16 
Km1148+1
300 
13 
No 1 highway 
Km1212+400 ÷ 
Km1265, Binh 
Dinh, Phu Yen 
Hoang Son + 
Kien Long 
company 
40.7 2,045 1,072 235 2,043 279 1,764     
Mar-
13 
Dec-15 Jan-16 
Km1212+5
50 
14 
Deo Ca highway 
tunnel  
BOT Deo Ca 13,4 15,603 15,064 539 
10,55
5 
2,111 8,444 539 4,509 
Nov-
12 
Jul-17 
11/2012 và 
7/2017 
Thach Ban 
+ Deo Ca 
15 
No 1 highway 
Km1374+525 - 
Km1392 and 
Km1405 - 
Km1425, Khanh 
Hoa Province  
  
Deo Ca + 
Vietinbank + 
Hai Thach 
37.7 2,644 2,328 316 2,644 339 2,305     
May-
13 
2015 2016 Km1424 
16 
No 1 highway 
Km1488 - 
Km1525, Khanh 
Hoa Province 
Company 
194 
36.1 2,700 2,321 379 2,700 345 2,355     
Jun-
13 
2015 2016 Cam Thinh 
17 
No 1 highway 
Km1642- 
Km1692, Binh 
Thuan 
BOT Binh 
Thuan 
44.7 2,608 2,293 315 2,608 336 2,272     
Jun-
13 
2015 2016 
Km1661+6
00 
18 
Upgrade road, 
Phan Thiet-Bien 
Hoa 
Company 
319 
113.7 2,086 2,067 19 2,086 284 1,802     
Apr-
13 
2014 2015 Song Phan 
19 
No 1 highway 
(Bien Hoa city 
bypass road) 
Dong Thuan 
Company 
12.2 1,255 890 365 1,255 251 1,004     
Jul-
10 
Mar-14 May-14 
Km1841+9
12 
324 
 
324 
 
20 
No 1 highway, 
Can Tho – 
Phung Hiep, 
Km2078-
Km2100 
Thi Son + 
No 9 
Construction 
Company 
21.6 1,494 1,262 232 1,837 259 1,578     
Aug-
13 
2015 2016 
Km2079+5
35 
21 
Lai Cay, Tien 
Giang bypass 
road  
BVEC-
TRICO 
38.5 1,398 1,133 265 1,398 210 1,188 
           
-    
         
-    
Feb-
14 
2015 2016 
Km1999+9
00 
II.2 
Projects in Tay 
Nguyen area 
    4,601 2,917 235 4,574 734 3,840 26 
         
-    
        
1 
No 14 highway 
Pleiku-bridge 
110 (Km542 - 
Km607+850) 
Duc Long 
Gia Lai - 
Company 
57.6 1,776 1,046 100 1,776 267 1,509     
Jun-
13 
Dec-15 Jan-16 
Km1610+8
00 and 
Km1667+4
70 
2 
No 14 highway 
Km678+734 - 
Km704, Dak 
Lak 
Quang Duc + 
Dong Hung 
Gia Lai +Se 
San 4A  
25.5 836 520 22 836 125 711     
Jun-
13 
Dec-15 Jan-16 
Km 
1747+040 
3 
No 14 highway 
Km734+600 - 
Km765, Dak 
Nong 
Toan My 14 
+ Bang 
Duong  
29.3 1,021 565 87 1,021 153 868     
Jun-
13 
Dec-15 Jan-16 
Km1813+6
50 
4 
No 14 highway  
Km921+025-
Km962+331, 
Binh Phuoc 
Province 
Duc Thanh 
Company 
39.5 968 786 26 942 188 753 26   
Apr-
10 
Sep-14 Oct-10 
Km957+40
0QL14 
II.3 Other projects     46,306 37,413 5,904 
44,34
9 
5,454 
38,89
2 
1,831 2,727         
1 
Ha Noi- Hai 
Phong highway 
VIDIFI 105.5 24,566 23,070 1,496 
24,56
6 
3,000 
21,56
6 
    2008 2015 2015 
No 15 
highway 
2 
No 10 highway 
– Tan De Bridge 
– La Uyen 
Bridge 
TASCO 5.5 715 352 363 594 89 505 121   2009 Jun-14 Apr-09 
Tan De 
Bridge 
3 
New Dong Nai 
Bridge and 
approaching 
roads 
 No 1 
Construction 
Company  
3.87 1,648 1,444 204 1,648 330 1,318     
Jul-
08 
Jun-14 Jan-09 
 Song 
Phan, 
Dong Nai  
325 
 
325 
 
4 
No 18 Uong Bi 
– Ha Long 
OCEAN 
cooperation 
30.1 1,727 1,083 644 1,083 162 921 644   
Oct-
11 
Apr-14 May-14 Km97 
5 Co Chien Bridge 
CIENCO1+T
uan Loc 
company 
1.6 2,308 2,308   1,264 190 1,074 1,044   
Aug-
13 
Aug-15 Sep-15 
Co Chien 
Bridge 
6 Viet Tri Bridge 
CIENCO1+
Yen Khanh + 
Thai Son 
3.1 1,900 113 1,787 1,900 265 1,635     
Nov-
13 
Nov-15 Dec-15 Km52 
7 
No 19 highway 
Km17+027-
Km50 Binh 
Dinh, and 
Km108-
Km131+300  
Gia Lai 
Company 36 56 2,045 1,284 125 2,045 280 1,765     
Dec-
13 
Dec-15   
Km55+900
, 
Km124+16
0 
8 
My Loi Bridge ( 
No 50 highway) 
 Phat Dat + 
620 Long An  
2.691 1,438 1,388 50 1,313 197 1,116     
Jan-
14 
Aug-15 Sep-15 
 
Km34+826  
9 
No 20 highway 
Bao Loc – Da 
Lat, Lam Dong 
319 Yen 
Khanh + 
Thai Son 
Company 
124.77 4,110 2,839 459 4,110 207 3,903   2,727       Bao Loc  
10 
No 1 highway 
Ha Noi – Bac 
Giang 
Ocean + 
Vinaconex + 
319 + Van 
Phu 
46 4,213 2,503 168 4,213 496 3,716     
Feb-
14 
Jun-16 Jul-16 Km152+00 
11 
No 91 highway 
Km14 - 
Km50+889 
KCN+ 
Cuong 
Thuan + 
IDICO 
28.15 1,579 971 607 1,579 233 1,346     
Sep-
14 
Dec-15 Jan-16 Km14+770  
III 
BT Projects in 
construction 
stage 
    16,075 11,377 776 
10,36
9 
1,112 9,257 1,117 
         
-    
        
1 
No 20 highway 
Dong Nai – Lam 
Dong 
BT Cuu 
Long   
117 4,589 154 513     
 250 
triệu 
USD  
    
Oct-
11 
31/12/2
015 
    
326 
 
326 
 
2 
Highway La Son 
– Tuy Loan 
TNXP 
Truong Son 
+ No 1 
Construction 
company + 
Van Tuong + 
Truong Son 
construction 
company 
(Ministry of 
defense) + 
No 8 
transportatio
n 
constuctuion 
company + 
Truong thinh 
+ Son Hai 
82 11,486 11,223 263 
10,36
9 
1,112 9,257 1,117   
Dec-
13 
2016     
IV 
Projects in 
Development 
Stage 
    349,032 155,962 20,103 
89,52
7 
6,218 
27,68
1 
69,904 230         
IV.1 
Road sub-
sector  
    112,694 31,056 4,971 
28,70
8 
5,373 
23,03
5 
5,385 
         
-    
        
1 
Dau Giay-Phan 
Thiet Highway 
Bitexco + 
NĐT2 
98.7 17983 16161 1822 10364 3150 7214 5385   
Quý 
III/2
015 
2019 2019 
Shadow 
toll 
2 
No 18 Bac 
Ninh- Uong Bi 
Ocean 
Company 
40 1,400 950 450 1,400 210 1,190     2014 2016 2016 
Pha Lai 
(Km26) 
3 
No 6 highway 
and Hoa Lac – 
Hoa Binh  
No 36 
Company ( 
Ministry of 
Defense) 
66.3 3,200             2014 2016 
2015 
Ky Son 
(QL6) 
4 
Upgrade Phap 
Van – Cau Gie 
highway 
Not decided 
yet 
30 7269 5620 1649 7269 877 6392     2014 2019 2019 
Shadow 
toll 
5 
No 32 Nhon – 
Son Tay 
Highway 
 
Not decided 
yet 
  1,400   
  
 
                  
327 
 
327 
 
6 
Ninh Binh – 
Nghi Son 
highway 
Not decided 
yet 
  17,000                       
7 
Bien Hoa- Vung 
Tau Highway 
Not decided 
yet 
  11,600                       
8 
Trung Luong – 
My Thuan 
highway 
Not decided 
yet 
  12,000                       
9 
Belt road III Ho 
Chi Minh city, 
Tan Van – Nhon 
Trach 
Not decided 
yet 
17.85 9,200                       
10 
No 1 Lang Son- 
Bac Giang 
Not decided 
yet 
  10,000                       
11 
Upgrade No 1 
highway: Phung 
Hiep – Soc 
Trang – Bac 
Lieu – Ca Mau 
Not decided 
yet 
  2,000                       
12 
No 22B Go Dau 
– Xa Mat, Tay 
ninh province 
Not decided 
yet 
84.16 1,200                       
13 
No 27 highway 
Km0-Km88, 
Dac Lack 
Province 
Not decided 
yet 
  2,130                       
14 
No 27 highway 
Km88-Km174 
Lam Dong 
Province 
Not decided 
yet 
  2,500                       
15 No 26 highway 
Not decided 
yet 
  772                       
16 
Dai Ngai Bridge 
on no 60 Bridge 
Not decided 
yet 
                          
17 
Upgrade no 6 
highway 
Km78+300- 
Km303+790  
Not decided 
yet 
  1,865                       
328 
 
328 
 
18 
Upgrade no 15 
highway 
CIENCO4+T
uan Loc 
Company 
13Km 375 325 50 375 56 319     2014 2016 2016   
19 
Upgrade no 
highway 28B  
 69Km  1,500                       
20 
No 38 highway ( 
connect No 1 
highway and 
no5 highway) 
Not decided 
yet 
32.8 1300 950 350 1300 156 1144     
Jun-
14 
2016 2016   
21 
Crossroad (No 
46 highway and 
North – South 
railway) 
Cienco 4 0.75 420 380 40 420 50.4 369.6     
Apr-
14 
Oct-15 Oct-15 Ben Thuy 
22 
Crossroad (No 
48 highway and 
North – South 
railway) 
Cienco 4 4 480 420 60 480 57.6 422.4     
Jun-
14 
Jan-16 Jan-16 Hoang Mai 
23 
Phu Ly city 
bypass road 
FACON-
CIENCO1 
20 2000 1750 250 2000 240 1760     
Oct-
14 
Oct-16 Nov-16 Dong Van 
24 
New No 3 
highway Thai 
Nguyen – Cho 
Moi 
Not decided 
yet 
40 4800 4500 300 4800 576 4224     
Sep-
14 
Oct-16 Nov-16 Km65 
25 
Crossroad No 1 
highway and No 
8B highway  
Not decided 
yet 
  300     300                 
IV.2 
Domestic 
waterway  
    1,598              -               -    
               
-    
           -    
               
-    
           
-    
         
-    
        
1 
Upgrade Cho 
Gao Canel  
Not decided 
yet 
  1,407                       
2 
Waterway Ham 
Luong River 
Not decided 
yet 
  191                       
IV.3 Marine Project 
 
  473 228 2 
               
-    
           -    91 230 230         
1 
Upgrade Cai 
Trap Cannel  
Not decided 
yet 
5.1 107 105 2 
               
-    
           -    91 107 107 2014 2014     
2 
Vessel Traffic 
Service System 
Hai Phong  
Not decided 
yet 
0 123 123            -    
               
-    
           -    
               
-    
123 123 2014 2014 0   
329 
 
329 
 
3 
Derogation of 
Bo De canal for 
Nam Can port 
Not decided 
yet 
  243                       
IV.4 Railway 
 
  61,882              -               -    
               
-    
           -    
               
-    
           
-    
         
-    
        
1 
Bien Hoa – 
Vung Tau 
Railway 
Not decided 
yet 
  33,882                       
2 
Railway to Hai 
Phong Port 
Not decided 
yet 
  28,000                       
IV.5 
Air 
Transportation  
  171,287 124,678 15,130 
60,81
9 
845 4,555 64,289 
         
-    
        
1 
Long Thanh 
Airport  
Not decided 
yet 
  164,157 117,978 14,700 
55,41
9 
    62,559   2,019 2,025     
2 
Cam Ranh 
Airport 
Not decided 
yet 
  2,000 2,000   700 140 560 1,300   2,014 2,017     
3 
Quang Ninh 
Airport 
Not decided 
yet 
  5,130 4,700 430 4,700 705 3,995 430   2,017 2,020     
 
 
 
 
 
 
